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ABSTRACT
In my dissertation, I examine two main research questions: 1. Can we regard
democracy as the new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of
international society in the post-Cold War era and in the 21st century? and 2. Should
we think that each path toward democracy is relatively different based on the
characteristics of each international society and the internal and external variables of
each state? In my dissertation, I use typology to demonstrate that each country has
taken its own unique path toward democracy, and that democracy has become the
post-Cold War and 21st century new standard of civilization and new wave expansion
of international society.

A pluralist international society, a solidarist international

society, and a liberal anti-pluralist international society have influenced paths toward
democracy, along with institutions such as international law, diplomacy, Great Powers
and international organizations.

In addition to those, internal variables such as each

country’s history, culture, politics, economy, military power and foreign policy can
also influence paths toward democracy.

However, in my dissertation, I primarily

focus on the characteristics of international society and institutions rather than internal
variables in order to examine the different paths toward democracy.

Case studies on

countries such as China, South Korea, and Iraq can help demonstrate that each type of
international society as well as external and internal variables can have an impact on
paths toward democracy.

In the case of China, democratization can be viewed in the

context of interest-oriented socialization.

In South Korea, it can be viewed as valueii

oriented socialization, and, finally, in Iraq, it can be viewed as the use of force. To
conclude, democracy is gradually becoming the post-Cold War and 21st century new
standard of civilization and new wave expansion of international society, and each
country’s path toward democracy is relatively different based on each circumstance.
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Introduction
Democracy itself has been one of the big topics in the departments of Political
Science and even in the departments of International Relations.

In particular, since

the end of the Cold War, democracy has attracted more and more attention in the
academic arena, as in reality the end of the Cold War gave a greater opportunity of the
spread of freedom even at the corner of international society than ever.

Democracy is

recognized as a global phenomenon, and we can even say that democracy can be
strongly felt as one of the predominant norms of international society and even as the
emerging new standard of civilization.
In my project, I will regard democracy as the criterion of full membership in
international society.

I will describe democracy as the 21 century new standard of

civilization and as the new wave expansion of the international society. 1 Also, as
many English School scholars take on, in my dissertation, I will use the metaphor of
circles, such as insider/democracy and outsider/non-democracy. 2 I will show how the
inner circle has been widened, as the outer circle has been diminished.

In addition, I

will use three international societies – i.e. pluralist international society, solidarist
international society, and liberal anti-pluralist international society - which can have an
impact on paths toward democracy.

Due to three international societies, we can see

1

Gong uses the concept of civilization as the criteria for the full membership into international society.
By using the concept of the standard of civilization, he attempts to show how Japan, China, and Siam
became the members of international society in the nineteenth century. See Gerrit W. Gong (1984).
2

The mechanism of two circles can be traced into Hugo Grotius’s approach to international relations
and more deeply into James Lorimer’s approach to international relations. See, for more detail,
Lorimer (1883), Bull (1977), Buzan and Segal (1998), Buzan (1996), Buzan (2004a), and Simpson
(2004).
1

three general types of paths toward democracy – interests, legitimacy, and force.

For

example, China has become gradually democratic, though slow, in its pursuit of its
national interests, since China belongs to a pluralist international society.

In South

Korea, people have authentically accepted democracy since that country belongs to a
solidarist international society.

Iraq was forced to adopt democracy since Iraq

belongs to a liberal anti-pluralist international society.
Indeed, in my scheme, I will choose three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq,
to examine whether or not democracy is the post-Cold War new standard of
civilization, and further, to examine whether or not each state has its unique path
toward democracy.

These three cases will ultimately help examine how democracy

has become the emerging new standard of civilization as well as the new wave
expansion of international society.

For instance, I will investigate whether or not

three countries are heading toward democracy, and I will scrutinize “why” and “how
possible” three countries will, or have become the full members of international
society via adopting their own unique path toward democracy, if they are moving
toward democracy.

In this process, I will make an attempt to illustrate how internal

and external variables can have a great impact on the unique path of each country
toward democracy.

I will conclude that democracy ultimately can be a universal

norm along with human rights, but that each path toward democracy can be different
on the basis of relatively different internal and external variables such as cultural,
historical, political, economic and foreign relations as well as institutions, while
emphasizing the fact that each different character of international society can have
relatively different effects on each path toward democracy as well. 3

3

As Anwar Ibrahim point outs, many scholars’ arguments can be parallel with my argument that each
state has its own path toward democracy on the basis of various factors such as its own political, social
2

My dissertation is divided into five chapters and an appendix.

In my

dissertation, I will contend with two main research questions, “can we regard the
democracy as the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and in the 21st
century, and as the new wave expansion of international society?” and, “can we think
that each path toward democracy is relatively different, on the basis of the characters
of each international society and the internal and external variables of each state?”
Simultaneously, I will stress the distinguishing factors of each chapter.

In Chapter I,

first of all, I will introduce the English School as one of the emerging dominant
international relation theories in the 21 st century, and explain how it has greatly
contributed to the study of international relations.

Also, I will reveal its

distinguishing characters, such as international society, the standard of civilization,
Great Powers and outlaw states.

And in Chapter I, importantly, I will be engaged in

the debate among pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist perspectives on
international society, while displaying their relatively different basic frameworks.

I

will claim that each character of international society can be comprehended as an
independent variable that can shape relatively distinct paths toward democracy.
Finally, in Chapter I, I will attempt to investigate whether or not democracy can be
recognized as an emerging new standard of civilization as well as the new wave
expansion of international society.

And, I will use the concept of democracy in an

inclusive way rather than an exclusive way, while illustrating close connection
between human rights and democracy, and disclosing reasons why I choose democracy
rather than human rights as the emerging new standard of civilization.

and cultural factors. But, they do not pay attention to external variables to which in my dissertation, I
pay great attention. See Anwar Ibrahim (2006: 6).
3

In Chapters II-V, I will touch on external variables that can promote and
consolidate democracy across international society.
emphasis on external variables.

Chapters II - V incline to put

In terms of that, I can say that Chapters II-V really

talk about the story concerning international relations’ perspective on promotion and
consolidation of democracy.

In the academic arena, democracy has been a popular

and predominant issue in comparative politics which has been obsessed with domestic
factors rather than international relations.

In my dissertation, as revealed above, I

call immense attention to democracy as the new standard of civilization in the postCold War era and the 21 st century.

However, instead of comparative politics, I

address international relation theory for illuminating democracy as the new standard of
civilization.

Unlike comparative politics, international relations theories (IR) incline

to pay more attention to external factors than internal factors, though this does not
necessarily mean that IR entirely disregards internal factors.

In Chapters II-V, I will

put enormous stress on the importance of external factors to investigate how they can
affect each path toward democracy.

Chapters II-V are relatively about international

law (Chapter II), diplomacy (Chapter III), Great Powers (Chapter IV), and
international organization (Chapter V).

Each chapter will show how each institution

can have a great impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy and the path
toward democracy, while stressing the fact that each institution will be ultimately
essential in international society to manage international society and even augment the
wellbeing of international society.

Precisely speaking, in Chapter II, I will examine

how international law can promote and consolidate democracy across international
society.

In Chapter III, I will explore how diplomacy can promote and consolidate

democracy across international society.

In Chapter IV, I will investigate how Great

Powers can promote and consolidate democracy across international society.
4

In

Chapter V, I will examine how international organizations can influence the promotion
and consolidation of democracy across international society.

I will conclude that

democracy will be the post-Cold War and 21st century new standard of civilization and
the new wave expansion of international society.

In my dissertation, I will express

how democracy is gradually becoming the new standard of civilization and the new
wave of expansion of international society, but that each path toward democracy is
relatively different on the basis of each circumstance.
Though in my dissertation, I emphasize external variables rather than internal
variables for democratization, this does not necessarily mean that we can completely
ignore internal variables.

Thus, in an appendix, I will examine internal variables

which can have an impact on paths toward democracy.

As internal variables, I will

touch on history, culture, politics, economy, military power and foreign policy.

In the

appendix, I will look into China’s unique path toward democracy via internal
variables; I will present South Korea’s unique path toward democracy via internal
variables; and I will uncover Iraq’s unique path toward democracy via internal
variables.

5

Chapter I. The English School and Democracy
Introduction
This chapter is divided into three parts. In Part I, I will investigate the
English School.

I will also attempt to divulge and underline the English School as

the IR theoretical background for the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

In

my dissertation, indeed, I adopt the English School perspective for the following
three reasons.

First, I personally believe that the English School is wider and

deeper than any other IR theory, and due to this reason, the English School is more
able to explain international affairs than other IR theories.

As a simple example, in

comparison with social constructivism, the English School is seriously concerned
with moral features in international society.

Second, the English School can be used

to understand the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

Due to the English

School’s adoption of pluralistic methodology and interdisciplinary characteristics, we
can observe international affairs via various spectrums, which can lead to more
accurate assessment and explanation of them.

With these distinguishing traits, we

can use them for democratic development, since democratic development itself
cannot be generalized with a single path.

Third, in my dissertation, I intend to use

English School’s terminologies, like ‘international society,’ ‘Great Powers,’ ‘the
standard of civilization,’ and ‘outlaw states.’ This is not only for my emphasis on
democratic development, in particular, standard of civilization, but also, I put myself
into the ring of the English School scholars such as Barry Buzan, Jack Donnelly,
6

Nicholas Wheeler, Richard Little, John Vincent, Andrew Hurrell, Gerry Simpson,
Hidemi Suganami, Allex Bellamy, Gerrit Gong, and Tim Dunne.
Part I is composed of three sections.

In the first section, I will start with the

question, “how can we define the English School ?”
School, while comparing it with other IR theories.

I will define the English

Also, I will briefly disclose the

shared grounds and the differences between the English School and other IR theories.
In the second section, I will look into the origin and evolution of the English School.
The English School has a short history, around fifty years, but it has had fluctuation
and has gradually transformed itself.

Currently, its members are not limited to the

UK, but they are more than 180 scholars across international society regardless of
national, cultural and geographical differences.

In the third section, I will focus on

distinguishing traits of the English School, like ‘international society,’ ‘the standard
of civilization,’ ‘Great Powers’ and ‘outlaw states.’ They will be very often used in
the later chapters, when dealing with democratic development, which can help
comprehend the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

All in all, in Part I, I

will reveal definition, origin, evolution and characters of the English School, which
can help understand democratic development with which I will deal in later chapters.
In Part II, I will examine pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist facets of
international society as a whole and their relative impacts on paths to democracy in
the era of the post-Cold War and the 21st Century.

I will claim that international

society in the 21st century reflects three aspects, pluralist, solidarist and liberal antipluralist facets rather than one of them alone, while revealing that how three different
aspects, pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist can have their relatively
distinguishing impacts on paths to democracy.

Also, in Part II, China, South Korea

and Iraq can be taken to illustrate pluralist, solidarist, and liberal anti-pluralist paths
7

to democracy.

Each has its unique path toward democracy, due to the relatively

different character of the international society pressures they face as well as
distinctive internal conditions.

In general, English School scholars claim that

international society can be characterized with pluralism or solidarism.

There have

been even debates on pluralism vs. solidarism among English School scholars.
However, it is not enough for pluralism or solidarism to display international society
properly.

As for me, even both solidarism and pluralism are still short of proper

assessment and explanation on international affairs, even though we might consider
both of them, ‘pluralism’ and ‘solidarism’ simultaneously for international society.
Thus, I add one more feature to pluralism and solidarism, which is called liberal antipluralism.

I believe that all three façades of international society – i.e. pluralism,

solidarism, and liberal anti-pluralism - can be better in evaluation and account of
international affairs in international society.

Thus, if asked about my perspective on

international society, I would say ‘co-existence of pluralism, solidarism and liberal
anti-pluralism’ within the whole international society, claiming that this is an apt way
to study international relations, since not only one of them can describe international
society in a proper way.
In Part II, I will focus on the concept of pluralism, solidarism and liberal antipluralism, and I will investigate how pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist
frameworks of international society as whole can have an impact on the promotion
and consolidation of democracy.

Under each different framework of international

society, states tend to behave in relatively different ways, since each different
structure as an independent variable can lead to a certain different pattern of behavior
of states as dependent variables.
on the role of structure.

This can be similar to Kenneth Waltz’s emphasis

Kenneth Waltz claims that international structure can shave
8

and shove behavior of states and eventually produce a certain pattern of behaviors of
states.4 According to neorealist logic, different international structures bring out
systematically different patterns of conflict (Waltz 1979 and Gowa 1999).

Like

Waltz’s concept of the role of international structure, in my dissertation, pluralist,
solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist structures of international society as whole have a
relatively different impact on each state’s behavior.

In consideration of three

different structures of international society, I will investigate how pluralist, solidarist
and liberal anti-pluralist frameworks can have an effect on democratic development
across international society.

In the process, we can expect that certain different

strategies can be squeezed out in order to promote and consolidate democracy.
Below, I will scrutinize pluralism, solidarism and liberal anti-pluralism, disclosing
different paths toward democratic development on account of them.

I will look into

whether or not the concept of the standard of civilization can be applicable to each of
them as well.

Further, I will investigate three cases, China, South Korea, and Iraq in

order to help comprehend how pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist
frameworks can have an impact on democratic development across international
society.
In Part III, I will deal with the question, “is democracy becoming the new
wave expansion of international society and the new standard of civilization in the
post-Cold War era and the 21st century?” I will examine the concept of democracy,
and demonstrate democracy as the new wave expansion of international society and
the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century.

In

other words, in Part III, I will attempt to examine whether or not, why, and how

4

See, for more information, Kenneth Waltz (1979)
9

possibly democracy has become the Post-Cold War and 21st century standard of
civilization as well as the new wave expansion of international society.

In the post-

Cold War era and the 21 st century, democracy has been a more and more predominant
norm of international society.

Currently, more than 65% of the 192 states in

international society can be called democracy.

This implies that democracy can be

called a new global phenomenon in the late 20th and 21st century, in particular, when
considering that in 1970s there were less than 30 democratic states across
international society.5 Also, according to the United Nations, between 1980 and
2002, 81 states experienced a transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Morton,
2005:521).

This conveys the clear message that democracy has gradually become

the new wave expansion of international society and the emerging new standard of
civilization.

In Part III, I will demonstrate that democracy should be recognized as

the new wave expansion of international society and the emerging new standard of
civilization in the post-Cold war era and the 21st century.
Part I. English School
1> How can we define the English School ?
If asked about what the English School is, I would say that the English
School can be understood as one way to study for international relations, by adopting
the dynamic mixture of several social sciences, such as political science, international
law, history and sociology.

Its methodology is considered as pluralistic.

As a

gate-keeper of the new-aged English School, Barry Buzan describes the methodology
5

In 1950, merely 14.3 of the countries in the world were democracies, which means 31% of the
world’s population. In 1990, the Freedom House estimated 46.1% of the nations in the world as
democracies. See Dalton and Shin (2004:1). Also, currently, there are more than 120 electoral
democracies in the world, representing more than 63 percent of the world's states, or 59.6 percent of the
global population. See, for more information, “Global Democracy Continues Forward March.”
Freedom House. Available at the website: http://www.freedomhouse.org/article/global-democracycontinues-forward-march?page=70&release=90
10

of the English School as pluralistic, emphasizing the co-existence of the international
system (Machiavelianism, realism, positivism), international society (Grotianism,
rationalism,

hermeneutic

interpretivism)

and

world

society (Revolutionary

Kantiansm, liberalism, critical theory). 6 In terms of interdisciplinary character,
originally, Hedley Bull invited various scholars and practitioners to the British
Committee, due to its lack of scholars in International Relations during its early
period and due to its need for contact among people with different training and
different perspectives. 7 This has gradually become one of the English School’s key
methods to study for international relations. 8
The English School is not very different from American IR theories.
Instead, the English School has shared some common ground with American
mainstream

constructivism

and

post-structuralism.

9

In

consideration

of

constructivism, let’s recall the English School scholars’ works that reveal some facets
of constructivism.

For instance, Martin Wight personified the sovereign state, and

6

Machiavelianism, Grotianism and Revolutionary Kantianism as three traditions were introduced by
Martin Wight (1992). Here, as Suganami points out, we should not be confused with terms,
rationalism. Here, rationalism (Grotian) is quite different from rationalism in the American IR
according to which states are the key actors and rational utility-maximizers. Rationalism (Grotian)
implies a considerable degree of order and justice. See Linklater and Suganami (2006:29, 42). Also,
see, for more information concerning American IR’s rationalism, Keohane (1989). And, see, for more
information concerning Grotian rationalism, Suganami (1983).
7

See Adam Watson (1998).

8

Suganami claims that English School’s investigation into world politics can be categorized into three
ways as structural, functional and historical. Structural investigation can be seen in Manning (1962),
James (1986) and Bull (1977). Functional investigation can be seen in Bull (1977), and Vincent
(1974) and (1986). Historical Investigation can be seen in Wight (1977), Bull and Watson (1984),
Gong (1984), and Watson (1992). Suganami is really good at categorizing three investigations to
world politics. However, in my dissertation, I do not deal with these three ways to study of
international society much, even if you will notice these aspects in my dissertation, in particular, case
studies. See, for more detail, Suganami (2001b:404), and Linklater and Suganami (2006: 43-80).
9

Ole Waever claims that ES has shared some common grounds with social constructivism and poststructuralism. See, for more information, Waever (1999).
11

had been well aware of international society as the outcome of social construction,
that is, a social fact, believing that international society emerges within common
culture alone (Wight 1966, Buzan 1993, and Dunne 1995).
of international society exhibits his constructive thinking.

Hedley Bull’s concept

Bull mentions:

A society of states (or International Society) exists when a group
of states, conscious of certain interests and common values,
from a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be
bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one
another, and share in the working of common institutions (Bull,
1977: 13).
The above reveals the holistic and interpretive view of the social world (Dunne,
1995: 382), and this also discloses that cultural change shapes perceptions of
different common interests in a context of coexistence and cooperation (Devlen,
James and Ozdamar, 2005: 182).

As for Bull, this implies that identity and interests

are derived from social practice (Dunne, 1995: 384).

Thus, his concept of anarchy

indicates that the highly cooperative form of behavior is possible even in anarchy,
which is shared with a mainstream constructivist Alexander Wendt (Dunne,
1995:372).

We can even assume that international environment can be, in a large

part, defined as “what states make of it” in Wendt’s terms.
However, the above does not necessarily mean that the English School can
be reduced into Social Constructivism.

As a matter of fact, the English School

shares some common ground with Realism as well.
methodology, we can perceive the legacy of realism.

In the English School’s
English School scholars, in

general, express that international relation should be observed in a conversation
among three traditions of thought, realism, rationalism and liberal revolutionism.
Martin Wight, Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan stress the co-existance and conversation
of three traditions of thought in international society.
12

At this point, we can see that

realism is one of the English School’s key tendencies.

10

Wight adopts

Machiavellianism to describe one aspect of the international environment, an
international system in which immorality is one of predominant characteristics. 11
And Wight acknowledged it as international anarchy which is one of the fundamental
causes of war (Wight, 1949:33).

Also, more obviously, in his inaugural paper to the

British Committee in January 1959, “Why is There no International Theory?”
Wight’s realist thought can be easily found. 12 He made a reference to the contrasting
dichotomy between political theory and international theory.

He claims that

political theory is on the basis of progress and justice, whereas international theory is
on the basis of recurrence and of intellectual and moral poverty. 13 This articulates
that his perspective on the international environment is pretty much realist.

Also,

his work, “Power Politics” clearly proves that Wight can be recognized as a realist.
In his work, Wight stresses the significance of power in international politics.

He

puts power prior to morality, even if he does not completely disregard the role of
morality.

He mentions, “in International Politics, moral forces are never effective

10

Some English School scholars in particular, Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull can
be clearly recognized as classical realists. Here, I did not deal with Butterfield’s classical realist
thought, but he can be obviously put into a classical realist camp. For instance, in his work,
“Christianity and History,” he stresses the negative human nature. See, for more information,
Butterfield (1949).
11

Wight’s Christianity might be closely related with his adoption of Machiavelism for international
system. As Sean Molloy put it, Wight’s concept of pessimistic and immoral international
environment might be rooted in his Christianity, such as original sin. See Molloy (2003)
12

However, I have to admit that Wight’s deep intention to show such dichotomy of internal and
external arenas is ultimately to claim that ethics and morality should be considered in international
society. In other words, Wight has intention to show that progress is possible in international society.
Nonetheless, in general, we cannot deny that along with such dichotomy, Wight could be put into the
category of realist camp.
13

Jao Marques de Almeida, however, rejects the assumption of Martin Wight’s realist tendency. Jao
Marques de Almeida claims that his inaugural paper implies Martin Wight’s stress on the necessity of
rationalism in order to explain the nature of international society. See Jao Marques de Almeida
(1999).
13

unless they are backed by power” (Wight, 1949:29).

All of these obviously display

Wight’s classical realist thought which can be shared with Hans Morgenthau.
Wight, Bull can be also put into a realist camp as well.

Like

Bull’s early work, “the

Control of the Arms Race”(1961) reveals Bull’s great interest in international security,
via dealing with nuclear disarmament.

Also, in his work, “The Anarchical

Society”(1977), Bull did not only reject utopianism, but also adopted the anarchical
nature, that is, the absence of an international government, as international
environment.

On the whole, we can perceive the legacy of realism in the English

School.
As Bull and Wheeler put it, however, there are clear distinguishing lines
between realism and the English School.

For instance, in terms of rule, as for the

English School, if states break the rules, they recognize that they owe other states an
explanation of their conduct in rules which they accept (Bull, 1977: 45 and Wheeler,
2000: 24).

By contrast, as for realism, the rules are just instrumental for their own

interests, nothing more than that.

Unlike realism, the English School states that

whether or not states are Great Powers or Small Powers, they have their duties for
international society.

To put it differently, in international society, states conceive

themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in terms of their relations with one
another (Wheeler, 2000: 25). This aspect can be hardly found in realist logic.

At

this juncture, my point is that we should keep in mind that the English School is
based on the conversation of three traditions, Machiavelian realism, Grotian
rationalism and Kantian revolutionism.
English School into realism.

In other words, we cannot reduce the

Also, Hedley Bull’s nature of anarchy is different from

Thomas Hobbes’s nature of anarchy that reflects war of all against all.

In Hedley

Bull’s concept of anarchy, a certain level of cooperation among sovereign states and
14

society without government can be expected.

As James put it, Bull’s concept of

international society can be understood as a quasi-society, which means the
combination of genuine society and anarchy (James, 1993:281-283).

As a matter of

fact, most English School scholars greatly emphasize international society as
international environment, which can be rarely found in realist logic.

They even

claim that the role of international law should be recognized as a significant
institution in such international society.

In general, the emphasis on the role of

international law and the concept of society can be characterized as the English
School’s strong Grotian rationalist tradition.
Grotian tradition rebuffs Realpolitik as well as the international state of nature
in which there is no binding obligation in the relations among sovereign states (Bull,
2000:98).14 Instead, it asserts the existence of international society and of law in
which there is binding obligation in relations among states.15 Unlike realists, Grotius
greatly stresses the rule of morality and the rule of law in international society.

At

this juncture, Grotius’s concept of international society is not only a society of states,
but also the society of all human kind (Bull, 1990:83).
Indeed, Bull said “the central Grotian assumption is that of the solidarity, or
potential solidarity, of the states comprising international society, with respect to the
enforcement of the law” (Bull, 1966: 52).

When considering that Grotian tradition

greatly puts emphasis on the role of the law and the high possibility of cooperation,
that is, solidarity, the English School is clearly different from realism.

Also, the

English School’s emphasis on ethical and philosophical aspects can be distinguishing
14

Also, as Suganami points out, Grotius argued that even in the absence of a higher authority, the
relations of sovereigns are subject to legal constraints. See Linklater and Suganami (2006), or Grotius
(1646/1925).
15

Ibid.
15

from social constructivism which has never cared about ethical and philosophical
questions such as order, justice or humanitarian intervention. 16 In particular, when
considering John Vincent’s, Jack Donnelly’s and Nicholas Wheeler’s deep concern
about human rights, pretty much, we can say that the English School is different from
social constructivism, even though as mentioned above, constructivism and the
English School are deeply aware of the significance of idea.

However, when

considering that classical realists like Thucydides and neo-classical realists like
Randall L. Schweller, Thomas J. Christensen and William Curti Wohlforth are also
concerned with ethical and philosophical questions, they have shared some ground
with English School scholars.

On the whole, the English School can be understood

with constructivism and realism in a certain way, but it is not accurate to say that the
English School can be reduced to social constructivism or realism.

The English

School is more than just social constructivism and realism. 17 Ole Waever attempts to
draw the location of the English School between a materialist position and a sociallyconstructed position.

16

See Andrew Hurrell (1993).

17

In fact, Suganami attempts to show the distinguishing points between ‘English School’ and
‘Conventional IR theories or Social Constructivism.’ He mentions, using Bull’s approach as the center
of the English School’s approach: “Bull’s approach differs from realism and neo-realism mainly in
drawing special attention to the relevance of rules, norms, common understandings and mutual
expectations in understanding international politics; it differs from neo-liberal institutionalism in
stressing the importance, to the growth of international cooperation, of the historically evolved sense of
community among states; and it differs from constructivism in its interest in the actual historical
evolution of the institutions of international society, the special importance it attaches to international
law as a concrete historical practice, and the extent to which it draws attention to the brute material facts
as constants on practice as well as its analysis”(Linklater and Suganami, 2006:83, fn. 1). The above is a
short summary for the distinctions between English School and conventional IR or constructivism.,
which is very easy to understand each’s distinguishing aspects.
16

Fig. I.
Neo-Realism,

Classical Realism,

ES,

Mainstream Constructivism, Postmodernism

Materialist

Socially constructed

Source: Ole Waever’s paper “The English School’s Contribution to the Study of International Relations, presented at the
24th Annual Conference of the BISA, 1999

As shown in Fig. I., we can see that the English School is located between classical
realism and mainstream constructivism.

We can perceive that the English School

should be more than simply realism or social constructivism.

This is one of reasons

why I choose the English School, and I apply it to the promotion and consolidation of
democracy.

Also, with this reason, in a later section. Main Characters of the

English School, I will demonstrate that the English School is deeper and wider than
any conventional IR theories and social constructivism, while illustrating that it has
gradually become one of predominant IR theories in the 21st century.
2>

The Origin and Evolution of the English School.
In this section, I will primarily investigate the origin of the English School

and its evolution.

When tracing the root of the English School, at first, I can

perceive that today the English School is not able to be present in the absence of the
British Committee’s achievement as well as in the absence of E.H. Carr’s and
Charles Manning’s works.

E.H. Carr and Charles Manning significantly influenced

the British Committee members’ works as well as new-aged English School scholars’
works.

Carr’s historically oriented perspective and his emphasis on the dynamic

mixture of realism/power and utopianism/morality can be easily found in the works
of Classical English School scholars, like Martin Wight, and of new-aged English
School scholar, Barry Buzan.

For instance, we can think of Martin Wight’s three
17

traditions, Machiavellism (realism), Grotianism (rationalism) and Kantianism
(revolutionsim) to study for international relations.

Barry Buzan also claims that in

English School perspectives, the international system, international society, and
world society are in continuous co-existence and interplay (Buzan 2004a:10).

As

we can see so far, E. H. Carr’s works have directly or indirectly influenced both
classical and new-aged English School scholars’ works.

As Tim Dunne put it, we

should keep in mind that E.H. Carr’s contribution to the English School is to
“provoke English School writers into seeking a via media between realism and
utopianism”(Dunne,1998:38).

Also, we should recognize that since we cannot

disregard one of them, conflict or cooperation in studying international relations, one
fundamental aspect of English School, ‘a via media’ reflects that in international
study, theory and practice should be simultaneously considered as well.

Due to this

reason, we say that the English School is deeper and wider than any other IR
theory.18
Along with E.H Carr, Charles Manning’s contribution to English School
cannot be diminished.

Charles Manning’s concept of international society can be

seen in Hedley Bull’s or Alan James’s concept of international society (Wilson,
1989:53).

His concept of international society is an anarchical but orderly social

environment, and this influences Hedley Bull’s concept of anarchical society
(Suganami, 2001a and 2002:4-5).

Also, Manning states “For the person of

international society is typically a sovereign state and this by the nature of its
constitution,” while stressing a pluralist international society (Manning, 1962:166).
18

It is not wise to say that one theory is better than another theory since each theory has its unique
merit. However, when considering that a better theory means its application to more cases in
international politics in a proper way, we can say that English School should be understood as a better
theory, in particular in the post-Cold War era.
18

This is clearly parallel with Bull’s concept of a pluralist international society.
Further, Manning’s emphasis on the role of international law in management of
international order and in well-being of international society have been found in
many English School scholars’ works, like those of Michael Byers, Christian ReusSmit, Gerry Simpson and Thomas Franck.

Along with international law, Manning

puts stress on history as well (Suganami, 2001a: 91-107).

When considering the

English School’s distinguishing aspects that are embedded in international law,
history and philosophy, we cannot deny Manning’s massive contribution to the
English School.
As the foundation of the English School, the British Committee was set up in
1958 and its meetings were funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the Ford
Foundation. 19 The members of the Committee were composed of scholars from
various disciplines, although they were mainly associated with the London School of
Economics (LSE) and the Foreign Office.

Its original members included Herbert

Butterfield (modern history professor at Cambridge), Martin Wight (LSE), Adam
Watson (diplomat), Hedley Bull (Australian Scholar), Donald MacKinnon (moral
philosopher), Desmond Williams (diplomatic historian), F.S. Northedge, Robert
Purnell, Michael Donelan, Michael Howard (military historian), William Armstrong
(Treasury), John Vincent (Australian Scholar), Robert Wade-Gery (Foreign Office),
and Noel Dorr (Foreign Office) (Dunne, 1998:94-95).
category of classical English School scholars.

In general, they are put in the

Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight,

Adam Watson and Hedley Bull chronologically held the chair in the Committee
(Czaputowicz, 2003: 5).

19

The British Committee’s main purpose was to study for

See Watson (1998).
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the relations between states.

To be precise, Herbert Butterfield revealed its purpose

in his letter to Martin Wight.
Not to study diplomatic history in the usual sense, not to discuss
current problems, but to identify the basic assumptions that lie
behind diplomatic activity, the reasons why a country conducts a
certain foreign policy, the ethical premises of international
conflict, and the extent to which international studies could be
conducted scientifically (Watson, 1998).
Along with this purpose, the British Committee consistently contributed to the study
for international relations until its factual end with Hedley Bull’s death in 1985. 20
At the initial stage, the English School started with the British Committee.
It has gone through four stages.

From 1959 to 1966, the British Committee had

been obsessed with the development of international society, and during this period,
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight were key contributors (Buzan, 2001:473).
From 1966 to 1977, the system of states in a world historical context and anarchical
society along with its emphasis on the nature of Western international society had
great attention, and Martin Wight and Hedley Bull were main contributors (Buzan,
2001:473).

From 1977 to 1992, the British Committee had been transformed into

the English School.

The English School received its own official name from Roy

Jones (Buzan, 2001: 473).

From 1992 to the present, the English School has

renovated itself and the new-aged English School has emerged.

At present, the

new-aged English School scholars have adopted the classical English School and
added more to the direction of the classical English School.

They are Andrew

Hurrell, Andrew Linklater, Barry Buzan, Alan James, Alex Bellamy, Chris Brown,
Edward Keene, Gerrit Gong, Gerry Simpson, Hidemi Suganami, Jack Donnelly (the
chair of my dissertation committee), James Mayall, Johnes Roy, Michael Byers,

20

Ibid
20

Nicholas Wheeler, Richard Little, Robert Jackson, Timothy Dunne, Yannis Stivachtis,
Yongin Zhang and others.21 In this section, I attempted to very briefly reveal the
origin and historical mainstream of the English School.

In the next section, I will

reveal the distinguishing characters of English School in order to explain why I adopt
the English School and apply it to the promotion and consolidation of democracy.
3> Main Characters of English School
In section 1, I briefly mentioned some distinguishing aspects of the English
School, but here, I want to disclose other primary traits of the English School.
When considering the facades of the English school, we can easily discern
‘international society,’ ‘the standard of civilization,’ ‘Great Powers’ and ‘outlaw
states,’ as the English School’s distinguishing characters.
look at the concept of international society.

First, let’s take a quick

Conventional IR theorists such as the

neo-realists describe the international environment with the concept of anarchy that is
a Hobbesian self-help system or war of all against all.

However, the English School

depicts the international environment with the concept of international society.
Nonetheless, it does not completely disregard the aspect of anarchy in the
international arena.
different way.

As for English School scholars, anarchy can be interpreted in a

Ronnie Lipschutz explains such character of anarchy well, by saying:

Anarchy has another meaning: the absence of any cohering
principle, as in common standard of purpose.
The
conventional assumption in international politics and law is that
if a system of rule does not have a centralized body enforcing
the rules or law, there can be no cohering principles. This
assumption of anarchy is maintained even when such a set of
principles does exist and is subscribed to by a majority, because,
it is argued, it is impossible to protect against ‘defection’ and the
‘free rider’ (Lipschutz, 1996:109).
21

See “English School.” Available at the website:
http://www.leeds.ac.uk/polis/englishschool/bibliojune05.doc
21

Also, when considering Robert Axelrod’s tit for tat strategy, we cannot only think of
cooperation, but also social elements under the condition of anarchy. 22 In other
words, as Lipschutz puts it, even states in anarchy do not act in a blank social
vacuum (Lipschutz, 1996:109).

Alexander Wendt is used to claiming that even self-

help itself is a rule or an institution that can be endogenous to an international system
(Wendt, 1992: 391-426).

Thus, we can expect even some level of governance under

anarchy, such as “governance without government” in James Rosenau’s term.
Governance refers to a system of rule on the basis of inter-subjective meanings
(Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992: 4).

At this juncture, the rule works only when it is

accepted by the majority or by the most powerful of those, such as Great Powers it
affects (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992:4).

At this juncture, my point is that anarchy

itself does not necessarily mean the absence of social elements.

We should not

expect only the war of all against all or a self-help system from anarchy.
In consideration of social elements in international society, English School
scholars like Hedley Bull introduced and have developed the notion of anarchical
society since the late 1970s.

English School scholars have increasingly stressed the

concept of international society, and have been deeply obsessed with the concept of
international society, which is ultimately distinguished from conventional IR
theorists and social constructivists.

As for them, international society itself must be

prior to any other, since they began with the nature of international society as a
primary groundwork for building up their theory.

However, we should keep in

mind that English School scholars do not disregard any one of three traditions, in
order to study international affairs.
22

See Robert Axelrod (1984).
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Second, the standard of civilization is one of the crucial semblances for the
English School.

The standard of civilization has been used as a criterion for the

membership in international society.

As Simpson puts it, it is a way of imposing a

certain set of values on the international order, and it can be used as to determine
who is the insider or the outsider of the core circle.

At this juncture, I adopt

Lorimer’s metaphor, which reflects that an inner circle is civilization; an outer circle,
barbarianism; and a further outer circle, savagery.

Originally, James Lorimer

divided humanity into three levels: civilized humanity, barbarous humanity and
savage humanity. 23 Hugo Grotius, Martin Wight, Gerrit Gong and Barry Buzan
follow his logic, dividing international society into the civilized society and the noncivilized society as well. 24 Barry Buzan does not use the standard of civilization to
distinguish the insider from the outsider.

However, Buzan divided the whole

international arenas, into inner circles (core) and outer circles (periphery) on the basis
of their level of development (Buzan, 1996:270-271).

Further, he claims that each

state can be relative insiders or outsiders to the extent that they share some of the
values and participate in some of the regimes generated by the core (Buzan, 1996:
270-271).

As Buzan puts it, when considering that the social structure of

international system is described with core-periphery form, the core is relatively
homogeneous than the periphery (Buzan, 2004a: 224-225).

Here, some of the

values which the core generates must be recognized as the standard of civilization.
And the more states comply with the standard of civilization, the wider the core
inside circle has expanded toward the outsider circles, barbarian and savage circles.

23

See James Lorimer (1883: 101)
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See, for more detail, Wight (1977), Bull (1977), Gong (1984) and Buzan (2004a).
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When we face two questions “Who decides the standard of civilization?” and
“How can the standard of civilization be determined?” we observe that the roles of
the Great Powers in international society can answer those questions.

The standard

of civilization has usually been determined by Great Powers, and has reflected the
predominant norm and value of the Great Powers.

For example, in the late 19 th

century, the compliance with international law itself reflected the norm and value of
European Great Powers as the standard of civilization.

Siam, Japan and China

could be good examples to demonstrate that barbarian states could become full
members of international society via their conformity to European-based
international law.25 In the post-war era, also, human rights could in the same way be
perceived as the standard of civilization.

After witnessing massacres during the

world wars, the Great Powers became well aware of the significance of human rights,
and pushed human rights as universal norms, which could be seen as the standard of
civilization.

Now, in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, democracy can be

possibly comprehended as the emerging new standard of civilization.

As Fukuyama

implied in “The End of History and the Last Man”(1992), the collapse of the
communist bloc and that of the Soviet Union have been interpreted as the symbol of
a great victory of democracy over communism.

Also, since the end of the Cold War,

two Great Powers, the US and the UK, have been in pursuit of the promotion and
consolidation of democracy, for the well-being of international society beyond their
narrow interests. In the 21st century, many non-democratic states have increasingly
become democratic, and we can say that democracy has become the emerging new
standard of civilization.

25

On the whole, my point is that the standard of civilization

See Gong (1984)
24

is the criterion for full membership in international society, and it is closely related to
the predominant norm and value of the Great Powers.
Third, English School scholars are well aware of the significant roles of Great
Powers in international society.

English School’s concept and roles of Great Powers

are quite different from conventional IR theories’, in particular, neo-realist concept of
great powers.

Bull defines the concept and role of Great Powers, and in his work,

“The Anarchical Society,” Bull states three characters of Great Powers.

First, Great

Powers themselves entail the existence of two or more powers comparable in status,
and the existence of a club with a rule of membership (Bull, 1977:194).

Second, the

members of this club are all in the highest rank in terms of military strength (Bull,
1977:195).

Third, Great Powers are powers recognized by others to have, and

perceived by their own leaders and people to have, certain special rights and duties
(Bull, 1977:196).

The first one and the second one are shared with conventional IR

theoriests’concept of great powers.

When focusing on Bull’s third concept and role

of Great Powers, the third one is a distinguishing line between English School’s
concept of Great Powers and conventional IR theories’ concept of great powers.

As

he stresses special rights and duties of Great Powers, Hedley Bull attempted to stress
the hierarchical relationship between Great Powers and Small Powers.

In Gerry

Simpson’s term, we can call such a relationship the legalized hierarchy. 26 The
legalized hierarchy is on the basis of mutual recognition between Great Powers and
Small Powers, in order to boost up general interests for whole international society
beyond Great Powers’ narrow own interests.27 At the moment, we should recognize

26
27

See Simpson (2004).
Ibid
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the significance of the role of ‘recognition’ in relationships among states in
international society.

As ‘recognition’ is one of the fundamental elements for

sovereignty, one of the essential aspects for Great Powers is ‘recognition’ as well.
Without mutual recognition between Great Powers and Small Powers, the status of
Great Power cannot be materialized.

Such recognition also determines distinctive

duties and rights of Great Power and those of Small Powers.

Also, via this aspect of

Great Powers, we can assume that the idea of Great Power needs the presupposition
of the idea of an international society which is in opposition to an international
system (Bull, 1977, 202).
As Hedley Bull puts it, also, Great Powers have been recognized as institution
along with the balance of power, international law, diplomacy and war, so as to
maintain whole international society and even boost up the welfare of international
society. 28 This can be hardly found in the neo-realist concept of great powers.

This

is one of the reasons why for Waltz, Nazi Germany is one of great powers but as for
Bull, it is not a Great Power but an outlaw state which poses a great threat to
international society and further to civilization itself. 29 In fact, Nazi Germany should
be recognized as an outlaw state rather than Great power.

Unlike Nazi Germany

that can be categorized as an outlaw state, Great Power itself should imply more than
just superior military or material capability.

We should keep it in mind that Great

Power should embrace mutual recognition of hierarchical relationships between
Small Powers and Great Powers on the basis of their fitting right and duty.

To be

precise, Great Powers must be deeply concerned with general interests or common
28

See Hedley Bull (1977) and Bruce Cronin (1999, 2003).

29

Like Hedley Bull, Gerry Simpson points out the same reason why Nazi Germany cannot be put into
a category of Great Powers, even though it was militarily powerful enough to be called Great Power.
See Simpson (2004).
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good beyond their own narrow self-interests, for international society as a whole and
in turn, they can be given special rights to manage the affairs of international society,
which is to maintain order in international society and to augment the well-beings of
the whole international society in the long run.

As Andrew Hurrell puts it, Great

Powers can manage order through various means such as diplomacy, conferences,
missions and joint intervention, even if it is also hard to prevent any possibility of
Great Powers’ exploitation of hierarchical relationship at a certain level (Hurrell,
1999:254).

However, in Great Powers’ contribution to the order in international

society and welfare of international society, we can see another distinguishing point
between conventional IR theories and the English School.

In other words, unlike

neo-realist disregard of the close relationship between great power and international
society, English School Scholars stress that Great Powers as an institution cannot be
considered in the absence of the consideration of international society.

Great

Powers and international society have had mutually interdependent relationships.
The rights of Great Powers can be guaranteed only within international society, and
Great Powers would be meaningless without the existence of international society. 30
In turn, the duty of Great Powers is to manage international affairs in international
society, that is, guaranteeing the existence of international society and even making
international society better.

Also, the nature and characteristics of international

society reflects the main values and norms of Great Powers.

On the whole, we can

notice the inseparable relationships between international society and Great Powers.
As for the English School, Great Powers are perceived as a meaningful and essential

30

See, for more detail, Bull (1977:196).
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institution in order to maintain the international society and improve the wellbeing of
international society.

I will investigate more about Great Power in Chapter IV.

Fourth, English School scholars have broadly used the concept and
characteristics of outlaw state.

In my dissertation, I give more prominence to the

concept of outlaw state in Gerry Simpson’s term than to any other concept of outlaw
state.

As Gerry Simpson puts it, the outlaw state can be characterized as “indecent,

illiberal and criminal” and they are classified into the outer circle (Simpson, 2004:5,
and Rawls 1999).

The outlaw state rebuffs predominant norms and values of

international society, and so it is not qualified for appropriate membership in
international society (Simpson, 2004:281).

For example, Adolf Hitler’s Germany,

Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea can be put into the category
of the outlaw state, since they are obviously indecent, illiberal and criminal with their
tendency to discount the predominant norms and values of international society
altogether.31
The status of outlaw state implies the withdrawal of ‘recognition’ from the
state, not to mention political and legal rights (Schwarzenberger, 1943:100).

As

Alan James puts it, when considering that one of the significant elements of
sovereign statehood such as population, government, territory and international role

31

Here, I have to mention more about the concept of outlaw states. The indecent, illiberal and
criminal states can be marked as outlaw states, but as Donnelly argues, failed or quasi state can be
marked as the outlaw state as well. As for me, failed or quasi states belong to the circle of savage,
since as savage itself can be hardly recognized as a full human being, quasi-state, failed or quasi states
cannot be the full recognized sovereign states. Thus, if law is applied to the relations between states,
the law can be hardly applicable to quasi-states or failed states. The circle of savage implies outlaw
states, “state outside law.” To sum up, outlaw states can be found in both categories of a barbarian
circle and a savage circle. However, there are clear differences. The member of barbarian circle
does not necessarily mean outlaw state all the time, since some members in the barbarian circle which
have tendency to violate all predominant norms and values of international society on the routine basis,
can be only outlaw states. But, in the savage circle, all members of a savage circle must be outlaw
states.
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is ‘recognition,’ the outlaw state is rejected statehood itself in international society. 32
In fact, as Thomas Franck implies, outlaw states can be excluded from using the UN
Charter (Franck, 1991:169).33 They could be denied legitimization and membership
due to their violation of basic international norms and values (Franck, 1991:169).
This can be interpreted in the way that the use of force can be possibly justified in
dealing with outlaw states.

Thomas Franck even says that “the horrendous sort of

undemocratic regime” might warrant “implementation of collective military
measures” under the Chapter VII of UN Charter, such as an analogue of Hitlerite
Germany (Franck, 1991:170).

However, in dealing with those states in international

society, there are very few constraints on choices of methods to compel them to abide
by the norms and values of international society.

In international society, the

principle of sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention have been still highly
valued and respected in most places and of most times, but the sovereign right of the
outlaw state can be easily overlooked. Especially, as Gerry Simpson put it (2004), it
is more likely to happen whenever the outlaw state confronts Great Powers that have
a sense of duty to maintain order and to enhance the wellbeing of international
society.

Great Powers, however, on and off should pay a high price when they are

unable to legitimize the use of force to a majority of states in international society. 34
However, this shows that how outlaw states can be eventually transformed into full
member states of international society, through the core inner circle members, in
particular Great Powers’ imposition of the standard of civilization on them.
32
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See, for more information, Alan James(1986).

Thomas Franck mentions “pariah.”
outlaw states. See Franck (1991).

But I adopt his assumption of the use of force against the

34

Gerry Simpson clearly made this point. Also, John Rawls share this view with Gerry Simpson.
See, for more detail, Simpson (2004) and Rawls (1999).
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So far, I have briefly presented the English School’s distinguishing facets,
such as international society, standard of civilization, Great Powers, and outlaw states.
This indicates that the English School is different from conventional international
relations theories and mainstream social constructivism.

When considering that it

can explain what conventional IR theories or social constructivism are reluctant to
deal with or unable to do, I can say that the English School is one of predominant IR
theories for its widening and deepening the range of IR.

At this juncture, we can

definitely say that these distinguishing facets of the English School have made
significant contribution to the study for international relations.

In the 21st century,

the English School has already risen as the predominant grand theory in IR, and has
been seriously getting more and more attention in the IR academic arena.
Furthermore, it is even expected to recapture the glory that Martin Wight and Hedley
Bull enjoyed.
Part II. Pluralist, Solidarist and Liberal Anti-Pluralist Facets of International
Society as a Whole and Their Relative Impacts on Paths to Democracy in the
Post-Cold War Era and in the 21st Century.
1> Pluralism
Pluralism leans toward the realist side of rationalism on the basis of statecentrism and empiricism, and respects the co-existence and the ethics of difference
on the basis of consent among states.

We can simply say that it is deeply embedded

in several principles, such as co-existence, equal sovereignty, territorial integrity and
non-intervention.
With its emphasis on the rule of co-existence, pluralism basically guarantees
the preservation and cultivation of political and cultural differences, while respecting
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the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty (Jackson 2000, Mayall 2000,
Buzan 2004a).

Pluralists such as Hedley Bull and Robert Jackson claim political

and cultural diversity as a basic feature of international society (O’Hagan, 2005:215).
It is quite noticeable that certain levels of toleration and respect of differences should
be considered as one of the primary aspects of pluralism.

Among English School

scholars’ works, we can easily notice that Hedley Bull’s work “The Anarchical
Society”(1977) and John Vincent’s work, “Non-Intervention and International Order”
(1974) are embedded in pluralist characters such as toleration and coexistence.

On

a pluralist line, Robert Jackson also claims that states should fulfill their domestic
obligations towards their own citizens and comply with the norms of nonintervention and non-aggression in their external behavior as the essential morality of
the society of states.35
In principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention, let us look at the
principle of equal sovereignty.

As mentioned above, pluralism can be easily

conceptualized with the principle of sovereignty, and the principle of sovereignty
reflects the idea that all states have equal rights to self-determination that has become
paramount in the formal conduct of states towards one another (Zheng, 2004:27,
Krasner, 1999).

To be precise, Simpson claims that sovereign equality is a

guarantee of state autonomy in the domestic sphere, and pluralism and diversity in
the international system as whole (Simpson, 2004:29).

This concept of pluralistic

equal sovereignty had been deeply advocated by many political philosophers.

For

instance, in a pluralist international society, equal sovereignty can be understood as
Vattel’s formulation “A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less

35

See Robert Jackson (1990).
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a sovereign state than the most powerful kingdom”(Butler, 1978: 52).

This can be

also understood in Hobbesian equality in which the weakest is strong enough to kill
the strongest.36 On the whole, in a pluralist international society, no matter whether
they are big or small, all of them are treated as equal sovereign states.

This

emphasis on equality is one of primary aspects of pluralism.
In his work, “The Anarchical Society,” Bull’s priority of ‘order’ over ‘justice’
can be interpreted as one aspect of a pluralist international society.

Because of this,

many English School scholars such as Hedley Bull believe that pluralistic nature can
reduce the level of violence in international society, when recalling the violence of
the medieval world and the increased private violence that is derived from the decline
of the territorial state. 37 Along with this line, Bull stresses the danger of
humanitarian intervention in international society.

As for Bull, the society of states

had not experimented with the right of humanitarian intervention, because of an
unwillingness to jeopardize the rules of sovereignty and non-intervention by
conceding such a right to individual states (Bull, 1984: 193 and Wheeler, 2000: 29).
This shows a fundamental aspect of a pluralist international society.
attempted to identify the principles of pluralism.

So far, I have

We should not forget the key

principles such as equality, sovereignty, ethics of domestic differences, co-existence,
and non-intervention.

In deliberation of pluralistic principles, below, I will

investigate the relationships between pluralism and the standard of civilization,
including the relationship between pluralism and the democratic development as the
standard of civilization.

36

See Thomas Hobbes (1985)

37

See Brad R. Roth (2003).
32

1 A.

Pluralism and Standard of Civilization (Democracy)
In a pluralist international society, the concept of the standard of civilization

can be rarely permitted, since the concept of the standard of civilization itself seems
to violate pluralistic principles, the principle of sovereignty and the principle of nonintervention.

In other words, the standard of civilization can hardly exist in a

pluralist international society and cannot be applied to the members of a pluralist
international society, even if it can be imposed on the outsiders/ non-members of a
pluralist international society.

In a pluralist international society, a type of regime

cannot matter, whether or not Great Powers promote and consolidate democracy, due
to ethics of domestic differences.

In a pluralist international society, thus, any norm

or value such as democracy and human rights can be hardly imagined as the standard
of civilization.

In particular, the imposition of the standard of civilization via the

use of force is almost impossible to be expected in a pluralist international society.
This is the general concept of the relationship between ‘the standard of civilization’
and ‘pluralism’
However, in my dissertation, I claim that the standard of civilization can be
adopted even within a pluralist international society.

In a pluralist international

society, it is true to respect the ethic of differences on the basis of non-intervention
and equality, which has made the relationships between the standard of civilization
and non-intervention incompatible.

However, we should not totally disregard

cultural hierarchy in respect of pluralistic principles.

In other words, even in a

pluralist international society, every culture cannot be treated with equal value and
respect, and some cultures can be recognized as superior whereas other cultures,
inferior (O’Hagan, 2005: 209).

As it is extremely hard to expect equal material

capability among states in a pluralist international society, each culture should be
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understood with a relatively different level of significance in a pluralist international
society, such as Han’s cultural superiority over others’ in China – the Manchus
conquered China in the 17th century and built the Qing dynasty, but Manchu culture
has been absorbed into Han culture, disappearing.

In short, we can perceive that

some values and norms are more likely to become predominant than others.

This

indicates the possibility of certain values and norms as the standard of civilization,
due to their superiority over others in a pluralist international society.
Also, certain values and norms as the standard of civilization in a pluralist
international society can be facilitated by interest-based socialization and valueoriented socialization via a learning process.

As David Armstrong points out, we

should recognize how great the role of socialization has an impact on behaviors of
states and on even domestic forms of government. 38 For instance, if democracy
becomes an institution driven by the consent among states on the basis of ‘rational
calculation-oriented socialization and value-based socialization, democracy can
eventually become one of the universal norms or even the standard of civilization.
At this juncture, we can perceive that in a pluralist international society, there are its
distinguishing ways to impose the standard of civilization.

Instead of the use of

physical force, interest-oriented socialization and value-based socialization can play
significant roles in spreading certain norms or values of international society.

Thus,

in the process of the pursuit of certain interests and values via socialization, the
alteration in the identity and character of states can be possibly expected.

At this

juncture, we can perceive how the identity and character of states have been
gradually changed in a pluralist international society, and how it is possible to make

38

See David Armstrong (1993).
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the promotion and consolidation of democracy as the standard of civilization, even in
a pluralist international society.

In this line, we can highly expect that democracy

can become the emerging new standard of civilization even in a pluralist
international society.

Below, China’s case can help comprehend how democracy

can become the emerging new standard of civilization in a pluralist international
society.
1. B. Pluralism and China (Democratic Promotion)
China’s case can be helpful to understand democratic development as the
emerging new standard of civilization in a pluralist international society, since China
itself represents various pluralist aspects and its recent transformation reflects the
high possibility of democratic development even in a pluralist international society.
Nevertheless, China has been still slowly moving toward democracy.

Such

democratic development in China has been feasible via its distinguishing ways in a
pluralist international society, which is quite different from the paths to promote and
consolidate democracy in a solidarist international society or in a liberal anti-pluralist
international society.
Let us briefly investigate general characteristics of China that reveals why
China belongs to a pluralist international society.

First, China has deeply cherished

pluralistic principles, like non-intervention, equal sovereignty, order and co-existence
rather than cooperation and justice.

Nonetheless, as David Goldfischer (a member

of my dissertation committee) points out, China is not always cherishing pluralistic
principles, in particular when pluralistic principles can hurt China’s national interests
such as economic interests – e.g. the dispute over the Spratly Island.

Since the

Opium Wars (1839-42 and 1856-60), China has been very sensitive to Western Great
Powers’ interventions, and China has relished the traditional Westphalian system on
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the basis of territorial integrity and political independence, with its emphasis on
sovereign rights and on the logic of ‘consent’ among states.

For instance, in 1999,

China aggressively protested against the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia,
insisting on a peaceful solution to the Kosovo crisis, with its stress on Yugoslavian
sovereignty (Yunling, 2000:117-118).
Second, when considering China’s physical power in international society,
China can be classified in the category of great powers due to its material capability
such as its huge territory, 1.3 billion massive population, economic power (the
second largest economy in the world) and military power (around US $90 billion in
2011 for defense budget).

With its physical capability, China has more and more

actively engaged in the international arena, in pursuit of its rank of Great Power,
which can help achieve its past status as the Middle Kingdom in international society.
As a matter of fact, as a regional power, it has been deeply engaged in regional
affairs such as the nuclear issue of North Korea, which has facilitated stability and
order in international society.

China’s status in international society can make it

hard to expect the alteration in its identity and character via the use of force.

Also,

as mentioned in the above, it has been strongly opposed to any regime change in
international society via military intervention, with its emphasis on the principles of
non-intervention and equal sovereignty. 39 This denotes that China obviously belongs

39

Here, my point is that in terms of material capability alone, China can be put into a category of Great
Powers. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, China is becoming one of Great Powers in international
society, in particular, when considering that recently China’s Prime Minister Wen Jiabo has promised $
600 million in aid and loans to Cambodia, mush of it earmarked for the construction of dams and
bridges. See “China gives Cambodia $600m in aid.” BBC News. April 8, 2006. Also, when
considering that China has been a leader of the third world countries, China has been deeply
concerned about international society as a whole, even if China is still reluctant to fully accept human
rights and democracy as predominant norms and values of international society. That is, for certainty,
China cannot be fully recognized as one of Great powers, but it is one of a highly potential Great
Powers.
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to a pluralist international society in which democratization is highly likely to be
accomplished via interest-based socialization rather than the use of force or interestbased socialization.
Third, China is not an outlaw state but an authoritarian regime.

It has been

very often criticized for its violation of human rights such as the Tiananmen Square
massacre and the torture of the members of Falun Gong. 40 China has not yet fully
permitted religious freedom and political freedom.

However, China cannot be put

into any category of “outlaw state” in Gerry Simpson’s term, which is an indecent,
illiberal, and criminal state.

Instead, China has been gradually engaged in

international society, in particular, since Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 Open Door Policy,
through its participating in various international organizations and peace-keeping
operations, such as the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), World Trade
Organization (WTO), the United Nation High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
with many other different international bodies. 41

Furthermore, China had been

supporting the U.N peacekeeping operations such as in Cambodia, Somalia and East
Timor, which displayed liberal traits and strengthened the principle of co-existence
(Hempson-Johnes, 2005:715-717).

All of these clearly indicate that China is not an

outlaw state, but rather has been a progressively engaged state in international society,
cherishing pluralistic principles.
All in all, when considering the above factors, such as China’s cherishing of
pluralistic principles, its material capability, its status in international society and its
40

Falun Gong has been prohibited by Chinese government. Due to this, China could be described as
more than authoritarian regime, that is, totalitarian regime, when considering that as Lawrence W. Beer
put it, the guarantee of freedoms, like freedom of assembly is the most significant feature to distinguish
democracy from the totalitarianism. See Larence W. Beer (1989).
41

See Hempson-Jones (2005).
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decent engagement in international society, we have to think of China’s
distinguishing path for its transformation toward democratic development.

Unlike

South Korea’s case, a majority of Chinese are not likely to voluntarily pursue
democratic norms and values yet, and unlike Iraq’s case, no Great Power can impose
democracy on China via its use of force. 42 To China, the pursuit of rational
calculation-based socialization can be the primary mechanism to alter its behavior
and language against international society and to transform its domestic facets, which
can lead to the change in China’s identity and character toward democratic
development.
China’s economic and political interests via its engagement in international
society such as its participation in various international organizations, in its desire for
Great Power status, can indirectly have an impact on China’s behavior and language
toward international society and can influence its identity and character.

China’s

increasing engagement itself can make China gradually accept the norms and values
of international society, which will be seen in later chapters.

For instance, China’s

engagement in international society has pushed China to increasingly accept human
rights and democracy, such as its 2004 Constitutional Reform.

As in the post-Cold

War era and in the 21 st century, democracy has become a more predominant norm
and value across international society, China’s political liberalization has been
expected, in particular when considering that China is a member of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) that is one of democracy-supporting international organizations.
This entails the feature that even in a pluralist international society, democracy can
be the emerging new standard of civilization.

42

I will deal with South Korea and Iraq in the below.
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2> Solidarism
Solidarism reflects deep concern with justice in international society and
with protection of individuals and non-sovereign communities.

It rejects pluralist

primary principles such as territorial integrity and non-intervention, while denying
the assumption that the state should be recognized as the primary authority over all
matters within its own territory.

It assumes that sovereignty itself should be recalled

to be ultimately derived from people rather than anything else, and also that human
dignity and individual rights should be deeply respected beyond state boundaries. 43
The European Union (EU) can be one solidarist example.

In fact, Marti

Koskenniemi characterized solidarism by a general aversion to the absolutism of
individual rights and an emotional preference for social responsibility (Koskenniemi,
2001, 289).

At this juncture, we can find something missing from pluralism, which

is modern human rights culture and existence of an ethical international society
(Linklater and Suganami, 2006:168).

Thus, we can say that unlike Oppenheim’s

emphasis on positivism, solidarism is primarily based on Grotius’s natural law and
Kant’s morality, like cosmopolitan moral principle, with its emphasis on moral
community of human kind.44
However, at this juncture, I have to say that we should be careful in defining
solidarism.
43

There are several different kinds of solidarism, such as coercive and

Linklater and Suganami made a short good summery on the aspects of solidarism.
Suganami (2006).
44

See Linklater and

The Covenant of the League of Nations, the Kellogg Briand Pact and the Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg can be good examples to demonstrate the existence of solidarist
international society. In the below, I will show more examples to advocate solidarism. But, here,
also, I should mention the historical evolution of pluralist principles, and so we can observe more and
more solidarist aspects of international society, in particular, when national boundaries have been
increasingly more and more permeable for various reasons. However, one primary character of
international society, pluralism cannot be expected to ultimately disappear and the other character of
international society, solidarism cannot be expected to cover the international society either. In my
dissertation, I emphasize on the co-existence of three primary characters of international society such as
pluralism, solidarism and liberal anti-pluralism.
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consensual solidarism in Andrew Hurrell’s terms (Hurrell, 1998:31, Bellamy, 2005:
291).

In this section, I will mainly cope with consensual solidarism, and I will

divide the consensual solidarism into two different ontological solidarisms,
individual-based solidarism and state-based solidarism.

In general, solidarism can

be comprehended as cosmopolitan theory, and it is ontologically based on individuals
rather than states.

This solidarism can be explained well with Westlake’s doctrine:

while states are the immediate members of the society, men are
its ultimate members….The duties and rights of states are only
the duties and rights of the men who compose them…The
consent of the international society to the rules prevailing in its
is the consent of the men who are the ultimate members of that
society (Westlake, 1914:78).45
At this juncture, we can perceive that solidarism is greatly influenced by natural law
rather than positive international law.

Also, solidarism itself reflects a broad degree

of consensus and solidarity (Hurrell, 1998:26).

Solidarism can be grasped as

cooperation or convergence rather than just co-existence in which a pluralist
international society is embedded.46 Further, unlike the pluralist emphasis on the
minimalist goal of enduring an orderly co-existence among states, solidarism
underscores ‘higher’ goals such as international and cosmopolitan justice.

The

concept of justice can be one of the predominant aspects in a solidarist international
society.

Indeed, I do not completely deny the fact that justice tends to be given

priority over order in a solidarist international society, whereas order is more likely to
45

The evidence of Kant’s thought on English School can be seen in the limited progress such as the
abolition of slave trade, disarmament and peaceful settlement of international disputes. Also,
according to Kantian principle, human rights should be respected everywhere. See Linklater and
Suganami (2006).
46

In fact, I have to say that there are several kinds of solidarisms. Buzan mentions cooperation and
convergence as relatively different kinds of solidarism. Andrew Hurrell also mentions two kinds of
solidarism which is based on relatively on consensus and coercion. Further, Alex Bellamy mentions
different kinds of solidarism. See, Buzan (2004a), Hurrell (1998), and Bellamy (2004). In my
dissertation, I will adopt Buzan’s concept of convergence as solidarism, when dealing with South
Korea’s unique path toward democracy. Nevertheless, it seems to be too strong.
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be given priority over justice in a pluralist international society.

As Nicholas

Wheeler puts it, we should keep in mind the assumption that if pluralists stress how
the rules of international society provide for an international order among states
sharing different conceptions of justice, solidarists stress that individuals have rights
and duties in international law, with common conceptions of justice (Wheeler,
2000:11).

However, solidarists also concede that individuals can have these rights

enforced only by states (Wheeler, 2000:11). Thus, as for solidarists, states must
accept a moral responsibility to guarantee the security of their own citizens, but also
the broader one of guardianship of human rights everywhere (Bull, 1966:30 and
Wheeler, 2000: 12).

Along this line, solidarists have been deeply concerned with

the duty to avoid causing unnecessary mental and bodily harms and further to avoid
indifference to the suffering of others or benefiting unfairly from their vulnerability
(Linklater and Suganami, 2006:256).
As known as taboo in a pluralist international society, humanitarian
intervention seems to be permitted in a solidarist international society, even though in
a solidarist international society, intervention itself is far less adopted than in a liberal
anti-pluralist international society. 47 Since the end of the Cold War, more
intervention can be easily noticed.

For instance, the Kosovo humanitarian

intervention in 1999 obviously shows this aspect in international society.

At this

juncture, we can see that solidarism is reflecting the idea that people have common
interests independent of their national or other identities, coming together beyond
national boundaries to address common problems, which can convey the aspect of
global governance without supra-government in international society.
47

The use of force is far more flexible in a liberal anti-pluralist international society than in a solidarist
international society.
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As mentioned in Westlake’s doctrine, we should not forget the significance of
each individual as an ultimate member of international society.

Thus, we can call

solidarism cosmopolitan theory, if pluralism is called communitarian theory.

In

other words, in Suganami-Vincent metaphors, solidarism can be comprehended with
the global community omelette cooking metaphor, if pluralism can be recognized
with an egg-box metaphor (Booth, 1991:542). In a solidarist international society,
for that reason, sovereign states’ boundaries cannot be used as an outer perimeter of
social cooperation (Vincent and Wilson, 1993: 128).

If we pursue this logic, we can

conclude that the adoption of interventionist or coercive politics against a state in
violation of the rights of its subjects as a pariah, against all the other members of
international society, could be justified (Keene, 2002:37).

This is hardly expected

in a pluralist international society, even if it is shared with liberal anti-pluralism in
some level. 48
So far, I have primarily explained individual-based solidarism, but, from now
on, I will illustrate the other consensual solidarism, ‘state-based solidarism.’ When
considering the relationship between pluralism and solidarism, in a certain way, we
can think that solidarism has been built on pluralism, even though it has been
developed in its distinctive way.

Solidarist ontology can be a state as well, not to

mention an individual, and this solidarism’s ontology is anchored primarily in states
rather than non-state actors.49 Nevertheless, it can be recognized as thick concept of
pluralism to some IR scholars.

At this juncture, I do not think that I need to explain

the ontology of individual again.

Instead, I will mention the ontology of state as the

48

Nicholas Wheeler advocates humanitarian military intervention as ethical responsibility.
Wheeler (2000). I will use Kosovo’s case for liberal anti-pluralism later.
49

See Bull (1977) and Wheeler (2000).
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See

feature of a solidarist international society.

As Cronin and Keene put it, a solidarist

international society can be understood with solidarity among states, and this can be
understood with neo-Grotian terms as well.

This solidarism underlines the welfare

of the society of states on the strength of the solidarity of states. 50 This kind of
solidarism can be originally observed in Immanuel Kant’s concept of a federation of
free states. In fact, Kant’s federation of free states can be understood as a modern
capitalist democratic security community in Buzan’s term. 51 Also, this can be
comprehended as Buzan’s term, ‘convergence’ (Buzan, 2004a:160).

According to

Buzan’s logic of convergence, even more than cooperation, like a liberal capitalist
security community in international society can be expected. 52 The Warsaw
Declaration on June 27, 2000 can reveal this aspect.

106 states signed the Warsaw

Declaration, calling itself toward a Community of Democracies and claiming that we
should jointly cooperate to discourage and resist any hazard to democracy from the
overthrow of constitutionally elected governments (Rich, 2001: 30). This can be
clearly an aspect of solidarism, which can be called the facet of “mature anarchy” in
Buzan’s term.53 So far, I have investigated general characters of solidarism, which is
quite different from pluralism.
international society.

This can help understand another appearance of

Below, I will reveal the relationship between solidarism and

the standard of civilization, and will explore democratic development as the
emerging standard of civilization in a solidarist international society in the post-Cold
War era and in the 21st century.
50

Here, non-state actors are individual and transnational actors.

51

See, for more detail, Bruce Cronin (1999, 2003).

52

See Buzan (1991)

53

Ibid.

Also, see, Buzan (2004a).
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See, for more detail, Buzan (2004a).

2. A.

Solidarism and the Standard of Civilization (Democracy)
In the relationships between ‘solidarism’ and the ‘standard of civilization,’ we

can assume that solidarism itself can entail the ‘standard of civilization,’ since it can
overlook the significance of pluralistic principles such as non-intervention and equal
sovereignty.

In a solidarist international society, the key feature is that principles of

equal sovereignty and non-intervention can be often ignored, but it does not
necessarily mean that ‘the use of force’ is the best option to spread certain norms and
values of international society, particularly the promotion and consolidation of
democracy. 54 When considering that the standard of civilization can indicate a kind
of a mission of homogenization and improvement across international society and
when that solidarism displays the solidarity on the basis of the broad acceptance of
common values and norms, we can apparently identify the compatible relationship
between solidarism and the standard of civilization (Salter, 2002:15).

In a solidarist

international society, as mentioned above, the primary mechanism to promote and
consolidate certain values and norms as the standard of civilization, can neither be
‘the use of force,’ nor ‘rational calculation-based socialization,’ but instead, ‘the
legitimacy and belief via persuasion and consensus/ value-oriented socialization,’
which is the most reasonable mechanism to promote and consolidate certain values
and norms.

Nevertheless, once again, like a liberal anti-pluralist international

society which I will explain below, in a solidarist international society, as mentioned
earlier such as the Kosovo case, the enforcement mechanism via the use of military
force can’t be totally denied.

54

In general, as for solidarists, unilateral intervention can be justified in order to prevent genocide or
similar human tragedies. For instance, one of solidarists, Wheeler made a clear point in his work,
“Saving Strangers.” See, for more information, Wheeler (2000).
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When considering that in the post-Cold War era and 21 st century, democracy
has gained more attention across international society and it can be even the
emerging new standard of civilization, we can perceive a certain distinguishing path
toward democracy in a solidarist international society.

Many states in a solidarist

international society have become democratic via ‘its value-based socialization’
rather than ‘interests-oriented socialization’ or ‘use of force.’ As each individual has
been regarded as an ultimate member of international society in a solidarist
international society and each one is deeply concerned with human rights for the
well-being of international society as a whole, democratic development rarely
expects the request of enforcement mechanism and even pure interest-oriented
socialization.

In other words, in a solidarist international society, the best option for

democratic development must be persuasion via the value-oriented socialization,
which can provide strong legitimacy and positive belief toward democracy, rather
than ‘the use of force,’ or ‘the interest-based socialization’.
To sum up, in this section, I displayed the plausibility of the standard of
civilization in a solidarist international society.

Also, I disclosed as well that

democratic promotion and consolidation as the emerging standard of civilization in a
solidarist international society can be achieved via primarily strong value-based
socialization, which can lead to legitimacy and positive belief toward democracy.55
Below, South Korea’s democratic development can help us understand how certain
norms and values such as democracy can be the emerging new standard of
civilization in a solidarist international society.
55

Suganami and Linklater seem to claim that diplomacy alone is the primary mechanism in a solidarist
international society, which is to emphasize dialogue and consent rather than balance of power. See,
Linklater and Suganami (2006). However, such argument seems to be too simple, disregarding many
other mechanisms to facilitate socialization. As for me, many other mechanisms such as transnational
conferences and athletic games should be considered as essential for socialization. Thus, here, I use
socialization in a vague term, rather than use a specific mechanism to assist socialization .
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2. B.

Solidarism and South Korea (Democratic Development)
South Korea’s case can be helpful to comprehend solidarist principles and

democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization in a solidarist international
society.

South Korea itself exhibits evident aspects of solidarism.

In South Korea,

a majority of civilians have voluntarily and authentically accepted norms of human
rights and democracy.

This is not only derived from their experience of resistance

against military authoritarian dictatorship for decades, like the Kwangju massacre in
May 1980, but also from its democracy and human rights-based socialization, such as
its deep engagement with capitalist democratic security community.

This denotes

that unlike China and Iraq, any rational calculation-based socialization or physical
enforcement mechanism cannot be the primary force for democratic development in
South Korea.

All in all, we can see that in a solidarist international society, via

South Korea, democratic promotion and consolidation is different from in a pluralist
international society and a liberal anti-pluralist international society.
Above, I mentioned that a majority of civilians in South Korea have
voluntarily accepted democratic norms, due to their past resistance against military
regimes and to their value-oriented socialization.

At this juncture, I have to mention

more about their past struggle against military regimes, which could help South
Korea enter into a solidarist international society.

South Korean citizens’ past

suffering under military regimes in particular, the Park and Chun regimes, and their
past resistance against those military authoritarian dictatorships have primarily made
them cherish human rights and political freedom.

This could ultimately bring out

their voluntary acceptance of democracy as the decent political regime for
themselves, in the absence of any external military intervention or of rational
calculation-based interest socialization, which could help place South Korea into a
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solidarist international society.

In the post-Cold War and 21st century, South Korea

belongs to a solidarist international society, since its citizens authentically care about
individual rights and human rights, with their belief that democracy is the decent and
legitimate form of government.

This has greatly influenced South Korea’s

promotion and consolidation of democracy.

At this juncture, we can firmly say that

South Korea belongs to a solidarist international society in which democratization is
carried out via legitimacy rather than interest or force.
Above, I explained why and how South Korea can enter into a solidarist
international society.

However, these considerations do not explain enough for

South Korea’s mature democracy and its full membership in international society.
Under the internal pressure and circumstance in South Korea, as mentioned above, its
value-oriented socialization with the capitalist democratic community has brought
out positive belief and legitimacy toward democracy in South Korea as well. 56 For
instance, in its close relationships with the US and Japan, South Korea has been
progressively moved into the capitalist democratic security community in Buzan’s
term.

Via its close socialization with the US and Japan even beyond economic and

political interests, South Korea has transformed itself, with its guaranteeing more and
more political freedom.

Currently, South Korea’s foreign policy has become more

similar to the US and Japan’s foreign policies, which is to promote and consolidate
human rights and democracy.

At this juncture, we cannot deny such the big

contribution of South Korea’s value-oriented socialization with its close democratic
allies to South Korea’s democratic development.

56

We can claim that at present,

I did not mention any other internal pressure such as economic growth. Such internal factors will
be mentioned in an appendix. Here, I intend to briefly describe the key factor to help understand why
I use South Korea as a good example for democratic development in a solidarist international society.
47

South Korea can be seen as a mature liberal democratic regime as well as a full
member of international society, not to mention that South Korea is a good citizen of
international society.57
Also, we can claim that South Korea shows how democracy can be the
standard of civilization in a solidarist international society, exposing how a state can
become mature democracy under solidarist principles.

And, we can see that a

solidarist international society itself implies its own distinctive path toward
democracy, as the fact that South Korea has been engaged with its capitalist
democratic community beyond the purpose of economic and political interests, has,
in large part, facilitated South Korea’s democratic development.

All in all, South

Korea’s democratic development is not only a good example for democracy as the
emerging new standard of civilization in a solidarist international society, but also a
good model for a solidarist characteristic path toward democracy.
3> Liberal Anti-Pluralism
In this section, I will introduce the concept of liberal anti-pluralism, which is
not familiar to most IR scholars.

First of all, let’s start with the relationship between

liberal anti-pluralism and solidarism.
kinds of solidarism.

In Section 2, Solidarism, I mentioned two

One of them, the coercive solidarism can be identified with

liberal anti-pluralism in Simpson’s term.

In his work, “Great Power and Outlaw

57

Liberal democracy can be the litmus test for the good citizenship of international society, in
particular when considering that liberal democratic states, rather than authoritarian and tyrant states,
created the legal convention for individual rights free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment, which is greatly stressed in Article 4 if the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
However, as Linklater and Suganami point out, I admit that it is not true that liberal democracy alone
can determine a good citizenship of international society. See Linklater and Suganami (2006).
Nevertheless, in my dissertation, I primarily emphasize democracy as the new emerging standard of
civilization, which is the criterion of the full membership of international society. In other words, I am
fully aware of other factors such as human rights, which can be the good criteria for full membership of
international society, but here, I attempt to amplify democracy as the new emerging standard of
civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century. Later, I will discuss more on democracy as
the emerging standard of civilization.
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States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order,” Gerry Simpson
introduces the neologism, liberal anti-pluralism with his emphasis on legalized
hierarchy and exclusions operating within the state system on the basis of culture and
ideology rather than power (Simpson, 2004:63).

We can say that liberal anti-

pluralism can be simply understood alongside a legalized hierarchy, laying emphasis
on the legalized hegemony of Great Power, along with the missionary quality and
desire to universalize a particular form of political order, which, in some sense,
violates the principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention (Simpson,
2004:250).
Let us investigate liberal anti-pluralism in more detail.

First, when

considering that liberal anti-pluralism reflects the hierarchical relationship, we can
presume different material hierarchical relationships among states in international
society, especially, in military power and wealth, which reflects the existence of
different levels of influence in free political system (Simpson, 2004:49).

In terms of

that, liberal anti-pluralism shares the importance of material capability with Kenneth
Waltz’s neo-realism, which can help confirm the significant role of material powers
in international politics.

This reveals the significant role of material hierarchical

relationship as one of liberal anti-pluralist principles.
capability does not explain everything.

Nevertheless, material

For instance, Nazi Germany’s military

power and the US military power imply relatively different contexts in international
society.
Second, the mutual recognition of hierarchical relations should be noticed as
a liberal anti-pluralist principle.

The structure of a liberal anti-pluralist international

society reflects a legalized hierarchy.

But such legalized hierarchy is based on

‘mutually recognized order and relation’ between Great Powers, Middle Powers and
49

Small powers, beyond material capability, even if the structure of a liberal antipluralist international society is fundamentally on the basis of the principle of
sovereign equality. 58 In other words, the hierarchical relationship of liberal antipluralism reflects the mutual hierarchical recognition between Great Powers, Middle
Powers and Small Powers, in particular, for their rights and duties.

As Simpson put

it, Great Powers, Middle Powers and Small Powers do recognize their relatively
different roles in international society, in various issues from international lawmaking processes such as international constitutional law and treaty-making, not to
mention the creation of custom, to the maintenance of international order and the
promotion of well-being of international society as a whole. 59 Simpson mentions
“The Great Powers made the law and the middle powers signed the resulting Treaty.
The small powers, meanwhile, were erased from consideration”(Simpson, 2004: 112).
In fact, at this juncture, we can notice the legislative inequality to even
impose norms on non-consenting states, which can help distinguish between Great
Powers and Middle Powers (Simpson, 2004:51).

When recalling Hedley Bull’s

remark that Great Powers assert the rights and they are accorded the rights in
determining the issues that influence the peace and security of international society
as a whole, we can assume the relatively different duties and rights of each state in
international society (Simpson, 2004:223).

At this juncture, we should keep in

mind the mutual recognition of relatively different duties and rights.
Third, ‘the use of force’ can be much more easily justified and tolerated in a
liberal anti-pluralist international society than in a pluralist international society or in
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See, for more detail, Simpson (2004).

59

See Simpson (2004: 112).
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a solidarist international society.

As Gerry Simpson puts it, liberal anti-pluralism

takes domestic structures seriously and promotes a particular form of domestic
political order via intervention (Simpson, 2004:249-250).

Also, liberal anti-

pluralism has a missionary quality and desire to universalize a certain form of
political order, via imposing certain standards on membership to enforce liberalism
within states (Simpson, 2004:250, 260).
post- Charter international order.

This reflects some aspects of a pre- or

Currently, this aspect can be seen obviously in the

US and UK’s attempt to promote and consolidate democracy, not to mention human
rights, across international society, since they believe that the lack of democracy
across international society could lead to instability and insecurity in international
society and that the promotion and consolidation of democracy can be one of ways to
fight against terrorism as well.

At this juncture, the US and UK’s invasions of Iraq

and Afghanistan and their promotion of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan can be
seen in the logic of liberal anti-pluralism.

Simpson points out this aspect for the

intervention in Kosovo as well, by saying:
In the case of Yugoslavia, it became an article of faith among
western policy-makers that the lack of democracy was a
primary cause of Balkan strife. Security Council Resolution
1160 emphasized that the way to defeat violence and terrorism
in Kosovo is for the authorities in Belgrade to offer the
Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process
(Simpson, 2004:208-209).
Actually, as former US President Bill Clinton claimed, the primary goal of the USled NATO’s strike against Yugoslavia was to end “Europe’s last dictatorship” and to
“bring democracy to Serbia” (Yunling, 2000:117).

Indeed, the US-led NATO

intervention in Kosovo can be regarded as opening the new age to a new type of
interventionism.

In general, the use of force had been prohibited under Article 2 (4)

of the UN Charter, and it can be permitted only by Security Council Resolutions or
51

by Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

However, ‘the use of force’ in Kosovo without

Security Council Resolution and Chapter VII of the UN Charter implied the
possibility of a new principle of interventionism. 60 All in all, the US-led NATO
military intervention in Kosovo can be a good example of liberal anti-pluralism.
So far, I have described primary features of liberal anti-pluralism.

At this

juncture, we can see that liberal anti-pluralism is aware of the principles of
‘sovereign equality’ and ‘state as a primary actor.’ But, liberal anti-pluralism very
often disregards the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty, whenever
necessary, along with its great emphasis on legalized hierarchy and on mutually
recognized different rights and duties among states.

At this juncture, we can easily

perceive hierarchical relationships within horizontal relationship in a liberal antipluralist international society.

Also, when considering that the missionary role has

been greatly stressed; outlaw states cannot be tolerated; and intervention can be
easily justified in a liberal anti-pluralist international society, we can notice that Great
Powers’ role on the basis of legalized hierarchy can be more magnified in a liberal
anti-pluralist international society than in a pluralist international society and a
solidarist international society.

Currently, the roles of the US and the UK across

international society, in particular in Afghanistan and Iraq, can be interpreted with
liberal anti-pluralist principles.

At this juncture, under all of these features of liberal

anti-pluralism, the use of force cannot be totally disregarded as one of the plausible
mechanisms for promotion and consolidation of democracy across international
society in the post-Cold War era and 21st century.

60

In consideration of all features of

As a matter of fact, the NATO attempted to rewrite international law in order to legitimize a new
type of interventionism like its military intervention in Kosovo, even if it has been rejected by China,
Russia and others. See Zhang Yunling (2000).
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liberal anti-pluralism, below, I will investigate the relationship between liberal antipluralism and the standard of civilization.
3. A.

Liberal Anti-Pluralism and Standard of Civilization (Democracy)
In the relationships between ‘liberal anti-pluralism’ and ‘the standard of

civilization,’ we can see a close relationship between them.

Gerry Simpson reveals

such relationships, by saying “the standard of civilization can be perceived as an
early example of liberal anti-pluralism” (Simpson, 2004:243).

As Simpson

emphasizes, when considering the primary aspects of liberal anti-pluralism, we can
perceive much common ground between liberal anti-pluralism and the standard of
civilization.

First, we can recall that liberal anti-pluralism reflects the missionary

role, and it should be understood with reformist and revolutionist tendencies.

We

can say that liberal anti-pluralism reflects the radical reformation of the international
order via the imposition of substantive political preferences on every state within the
international system (Simpson, 2004:15).
the standard of civilization.

At this juncture, we can see the aspect of

In other words, the standard of civilization is a way to

impose a certain set of values on the international legal order, and the liberal antipluralism reflects the missionary tendency on the basis of legalized hierarchy such as
unequal sovereignty and role of Great Powers, not to mention its emphasis on
exclusion (Simpson, 2004:243).

In this sense, we can say that liberal anti-pluralism

can be recognized as the most compatible with the standard of civilization, when in
comparison with pluralism and solidarism.

Second, unlike pluralism, liberal anti-

pluralism is rather exclusive, and liberal anti-pluralism denies certain states the rights
to participate fully in international legal life because of some moral or political
capacity such as lack of civilization, absence of democracy or aggressive tendency
(Simpson, 2004:232).

In particular, when considering the circle metaphor, such as
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the civilized, the barbarian, and the savage circles on the basis of the level of the
standard of civilization, we can see the close correlation between liberal antipluralism and the standard of civilization.

Third, the legalized hierarchy and the

roles of Great Powers have been massively stressed in liberal anti-pluralist
international society, and the standard of civilization itself is derived primarily from
values and norms of the Great Powers, especially when considering that the structure
of international society even reflects the norms and values of the Great Powers.
This obviously entails the inevitable relationship between ‘liberal anti-pluralism’ and
‘the standard of civilization.’
Let us briefly look at democracy as the standard of civilization in a liberal
anti-pluralist international society, in deliberation of the above relationships between
the ‘standard of civilization’ and ‘liberal anti-pluralism.’ In the post-Cold War era and
21st century, democracy has become the predominant norm in international society.
It can be called even the emerging new standard of civilization. 61 In a liberal antipluralist international society, the promotion and consolidation of democracy might
appear aggressive, because even ‘the use of force’ is often permissible for democratic
development, even though when we recall the reality that in current international
society, ‘the use of force’ is still reluctantly accepted for political freedom across
international society, and the price for the use of force is still too high to be adopted
for democratic development across international society.

However, in this part, my

point, via liberal anti-pluralist principles, is that we should not totally exclude ‘the
use of force’ from apparatuses of democratic development in international society, as
the US has done so far in Germany, Japan, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, especially
61

Below, I will demonstrate why I call democracy the emerging standard of civilization and the new
wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21st century.
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when the ultimate outcome can end up in a positive way. 62 Below, I will shortly
examine Iraqi democratic development under liberal anti-pluralist principles so as to
help us understand democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international
society.
3. B. Liberal Anti-Pluralism and Iraq (Democratic Development)
Iraq’s case can help take in liberal anti-pluralism, in particular when
considering the US and UK’s invasion of Iraq that could lead to the promotion of
democracy in Iraq.

As shown below Fig-II:“International Society and Democracy

as the New Standard of Civilization,” the US and UK have been core members of
international society as civilized states, and have been recognized as Great Powers
that have their privileges and duties to maintain and promote the order and wellbeing of international society as a whole.

As their missionary role, the US and UK

have made great efforts to promote and consolidate democracy as well as human
rights across international society. 63 In fact, democracy and human rights are the
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I sincerely hope that Afghanistan and Iraq will eventually become mature democratic countries and
be good examples to advocate democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.
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As David Goldfischer points out, a leftist critic might argue that the UK and the US have sought to
impose a world order that can advance the economic interests of their most influential citizens.
Indeed, David Goldfischer shows some examples: “the US strongly backs the Saudi dictatorship today”
and “the US says nothing about Bahrain, even though a democratic movement by the vast majority of
the people was viciously crushed by the U.S supported King.” But, these examples remind me of the
US foreign policy during the Cold War era. As I will mention below, during the Cold War era, on and
off, the US appeared to ignore or even support some dictatorship, due to strategic reason. In other
word, Saudi Arabia is a very important ally to the US in terms of dealing with terrorism. And Bahrain
is also a very important ally to the US in terms of dealing with Iran. As for me, security or order is
prior to justice, since justice cannot be obtained without order and security. However, as a matter of
fact, Saudi Arabia has been slowly changed, when considering that King Abdullah announced that
women are to be given the same opportunities for political participation as men. And there is some
change in Bahrain, when considering that Bahrain’s King, Hamad promised the human rights reform.
Furthermore, unlike some people’s doubt on the US role in promotion of democracy, I can even say
that the US opposed some friendly dictators who supported U.S. interest, when considering that the US
sided with people of Egypt rather than Hosni Mubarak during the Egyptian uprising in 2011, and even
when considering that the US, which harbours its fifth Fleet in Bahrain, has mentioned a $53 m arms
sale to the Bahrain relies on its response to the recommendations of the inquiry, which found that
detainees had been thoroughly abused and in some cases tormented to death. See “Bahrain to review
military court verdicts.” Aljazeera. January 2, 2012.
.
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norms and values of the Great Powers, the US and UK.

Their norms and values

have become predominant even as the emerging standard of civilization across
international society.

When considering this, we can think of the US and UK’s

invasion of Iraq and their assistance to the post-Saddam regime as one way to
promote and consolidate democracy across international society, which could be an
example for democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.
Let us investigate more on Iraq’s democratic development and the relationships
between its democratic development and liberal anti-pluralist principles.

Since

2003, the US and the UK have attempted to get Iraq to conform to the norms of
democracy and human rights, which could be seen as political criteria for
international community.

In their pursuit for democracy as one of universal norms,

the US and UK coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be considered a turning
point for Iraq to kick off toward its distinguishing path toward democracy from its
past cycle of violence, dictatorship and rebellion.

At this juncture, their invasion of

Iraq can be an example for how to spread norms and values of the Great Powers via
their use of coercion in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.
During Saddam’s regime, Iraq could be recognized as the outlaw state that
could pose a great threat to the international community and international order in
international society, when considering its invasion of Kuwait in Aug. 2, 1990 and its
chemical attacks against Iranian and Kurdish civilians between August 1983 and
March 1988, which took the casualty tolls of the ten of thousands, not to mention the
fifteen Security Council Resolutions against Saddam’s regime for more than 12 years.
This can facilitate the legitimate use of force in two senses.

First, as Simpson puts

it, the outlaw state can lose its equal sovereign rights in international society, and
second, the Great Powers have legitimate responsibility to cope with such outlaw
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state, even via its use of force and tend to spread its own values and norms across
international society as well. 64 For instance, in Great Powers’ tendency to spread
their own values and norms, as Richard Falk claims, "George W. Bush administration
has its own vision of a form of global solidarism," via liberal democracy and neoliberal economics (Bellamy, 2005:292).

These assumptions can be seen in the US

and UK invasion of Iraq and their great effort to promote and consolidate democracy
in Iraq, as primary aspects of liberal anti-pluralism.65
However, some scholars still claim that the US/UK invasion of Iraq could be
barely given legitimacy, and some states in international society had been in
opposition to the US/UK coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in the absence of Security
Council Resolution.
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Especially, the use of force for the promotion and

consolidation of democracy itself might be controversial.

But, the assumption that

the use of force can be completely ruled out is almost unrealistic and imprudent in
current international society.

The use of force against certain states might be

justified even for democratic promotion, if they are marked as the outlaw states that
could pose a great threat to national interests and further general interests of
64

See Simpson (2004).
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Neo-conservativism can be similar to liberal anti-pluralism. In fact, Bush administration’s foreign
policy, in particular, Iraqi democratic promotion is deeply derived from neo-conservaitism. Neoconservatives tend to support the assertive unilateralism, and they even believe that the regime change
is considerable via the use of force. See. Lake (2006: 27). And they believe that the use of force is
closely related to the maintenance and promotion of the US supremacy in international arena. See Farer
(2004a). According to neo-conservatives, also, the US can use even the military force to impose its
predominant ideology as a universal norm in international arena and such use of force can maintain and
boost up its primacy on the global arena. Such neo-conservative characters can be observed in the
process of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. For instance, regardless of some states in opposition to the
use of force against Iraq in international society and the absence of Security Council resolution, the
Bush administration which neoconservatives has dominated, could make possible the fall of Saddam’s
regime and facilitate building up a decent democratic Iraqi regime.
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Hedley Bull reveals that the legitimacy of Great Powers’ use of forces is determined by the majority
voice of proportion of states in the international society. Here, international democratization can be
seen in Bull’s notion of legitimacy for Great Powers’ use of force. See, for more detail, Bull (1977:
222).
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international society as a whole, under the condition that the cost and benefit in the
use of force should be well calculated because the regime change itself is still a very
difficult and highly expensive task. 67 Also, we have been well aware of the
limitation of non-military means such as ‘education, economic incentives, financial
and technical assistance’ to democratic movements and improvement of human wellbeing in international society, as a series of UN sanctions against the Saddam’s
regime brought out more than one million innocent deaths in Iraq without any impact
on Saddam’s regime.

This demonstrates the possibility of the use of force as a

legitimate measure for regime change from authoritarian dictatorship (outlaw state)
to democratic regime in international society.

In fact, as Germany and Japan’s

democratic success and Great Powers’ role in democratic promotion across
international society demonstrate, we cannot totally disregard the imposition of
democracy on outlaw states via the external force by Great Powers.
So far, I briefly examined the relationship between Iraq’s democracy and liberal
anti-pluralism.

Via the Iraq case, I tried to emphasize the primary aspects of liberal

anti-pluralism such as ‘hierarchy,’ ‘Great Powers’ and ‘the use of force,’ and the
promotion of democracy via the use of force as a crucial mechanism for democratic
development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

When considering that

Iraq was marked as an outlaw state and that the US and UK as Great Powers have
promoted democracy in Iraq via their use of force, we can understand liberal antipluralist path toward democracy.

In a liberal anti-pluralist international society, the

primary mechanism for democratic development is ‘the use of force’ rather than
67

Kim Jong-il’s North Korea regime can be clearly put into the category of outlaw states, due to its
engagement in international terrorism and crimes, not to mention its violation of NPT treaty.
However, the use of force against North Korea is a very difficult option, when considering the high
potential cost and risk, such as one million troops, the most militarized zone per square in international
arena, its sensitive location (Russia and China), and its close alliance with China, and its potential
possession of nuclear weapons.
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‘interest-based socialization’ or ‘value-oriented socialization.’ Nevertheless, the use
of force is not liberal, but toleration itself is liberal. 68 But, ‘the use of force’ should
not be totally excluded from the apparatuses to alter the identity and character, like
regime change toward democracy in international society, even though the targets of
the use of force should be highly limited to outlaw states.

Also, as mentioned in

previous sections, this suggests that each different structure of international society
as an independent variable can have relatively different impacts on paths toward
democracy as a dependent variable.
Table I. The Coexistence of Three Perspectives within International Society
Pluralism

Solidarism

The
Acceptability
of Standard
of
Civilization
The Level of
Violation of
the
Principles Of
NonIntervention
and
Sovereignty

In principle, no concept of the
standard of civilization is
allowed. However, possibly
democracy as a gradual
universal norm.
The principle of sovereignty and
non-intervention.

Democracy as the Standard
of Civilization

Ontology

No principle
intervention
sovereignty.

nonand

States

Individual

In
general,
the
principle
of
nonintervention
and
sovereignty
are
respected.
However,
the violation of those
principles
can
be
justified in some level.
Legalized
hierarchy
and
legalized
hegemonic order.
State

The Level of
Solidarity

Coexistence

Cooperation/ Convergence.
The Welfare of the
international
society,
democracy, Human Rights.

Cooperation,
the
Welfare
of
the
International society,
Democracy,
Human
Rights

The
Acceptability
of
Enforcement
beyond
boundaries

No enforcement is acceptable
beyond boundaries.

Enforcement
beyond
boundaries is acceptable.

Enforcement
boundaries
acceptable

68

of

Liberal
AntiPluralism
Democracy as the
Standard
of
Civilization.

or State

beyond
is

Tanja. E. Aalberts points out this aspect, such as the lack of toleration. See Aalberts (2006:153).
But as for me, as the primary mechanism, the use of force of liberal anti-pluralism might not be liberal,
but as for me, we should keep in mind that the use of force in liberal anti-pluralism should be applied to
the outlaw states, even though the use of force should be highly limited to the outlaw states alone.
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The Primary
Mechanism

Price or Interest/ Socialization/
Consent/ Order/Particularism

Socialization/ Consensus /
Legitimacy/ Justice/
Universalism

Force

Case Study

China

South Korea

Iraq

Part III. Is Democracy becoming the New Wave Expansion of International
Society and the New Standard of Civilization in the Post-Cold War era and the
21st Century?
1> Democracy
I will start with defining the concept of democracy.

The Greek word

demokratia/democracy (rule/power/control by/of the demos) started being used in the
fifth century B.C. by the Greek historian Herodotus, conveying the meaning of the
rule of people, since in the Greek, demos means ‘the people’ and kratein means ‘rule’
(Holden, 1988:5).

Nonetheless, the word demos can be actually interpreted with

two meanings, the population as a whole or the majority (Carey, 2000: 1).

Thus,

“democracy is a form of government in which the people rule” (Sorensen, 1993:3) or
democracy refers to the location of a state power in the hand of people, that is, “the
will of the people” (Holden, 1988:12).

Also, democracy can be understood as

simply a rule of a majority rather than a rule of population as a whole, in particular
when considering that Greek Athens never extended political rights to women,
resident aliens or slave, and Athens’ democracy is limited to adult Athenian males
alone (Carey, 2000:97).

However, I have to mention that it could be very dangerous

if democracy is misunderstood as just a rule of a majority, since on and off, it could
be misinterpreted as a rule of mob.

As Woodruff puts it, the rule of mob is clearly a

majority tyranny, which frightens, excludes, and puts the minority under the absolute
power of the majority (Woodruff, 2005:12).

The rule of mob kills freedom as dead

as any other form of tyranny, and no freedom can be expected at all, if you have to
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join the majority in order to feel that you are free (Woodruff, 2005:12).
juncture, I have to point out two things.

At this

One is that democracy is not simply the

rule of majority without any constraint on the majority.

Democracy itself implies a

certain level of restraints on the power of majorities via various mechanisms,
especially like the rule of law (Woodruff, 2005:12).

We should not forget the fact

that if the majority is above the law, it cannot be different from tyranny (Woodruff,
2005:12).

Another is that democracy implies the harmony of interests, ensuring that

the interests of minorities should not be trampled (Woodruff, 2005:12).

Woodruff

claims that democracy is not just a majority rule, but also it implies harmonious
interests and toleration.

That’s why democracy itself can be seen to strengthen the

close link among political institutions, political parties and individuals so as to assist
harmonious interests.69 Woodruff defines democracy with the following:
Democracy is a beautiful idea – government by and for the
people. Democracy promises us the freedom to exercise our
highest capacities while it protects us from our own worst
tendencies. In democracy as it ought to be, all adults are free
to chime in, to join the conversation on how they should arrange
their life together. And no one is left free to enjoy the
unchecked power that leads to arrogance and abuse (Woodruff,
2005:3).
Democracy is government by the people and for the people.
That is hardly a definition, but it will do for a start. As a next
step, I shall propose that a government is a democracy in so far
as it tries to express the seven ideas of this book: freedom from
tyranny, harmony, the rule of law, natural equality citizen
wisdom, reasoning without knowledge, and general education.
I might add virtues such as justice and reverence…(Woodruff,
2005:15).
At this juncture, we should keep in mind the fact that the protection of the majority
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David Chandler made good comments on national building and democracy, stressing neo-Wilsonian
Internationalism. Nonetheless, Chandler recommend the regulated promotion of democracy. See
Chandler (2006).
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rights alone can’t be recognized as democracy at all, but instead, it is simply tyranny,
which is quite different from the purpose of democracy.
Several modern political philosophers define the concept of democracy well,
and it is worth looking at some definitions.

Joseph Schumpeter defines democracy

as a method for choosing political leadership, claiming:
the democratic method is institutional arrangement for arriving
at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to
decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote
(Schumpeter, 1950: 250).
Also, David Held avers democracy as system in which individuals are free and equal,
with his or her capacity to determine his or her condition of life (Sorensen, 1993:120).
Held states:
Individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the
conditions of their own lives; that is, they should enjoy equal
rights (and, accordingly equal obligations) in the specification of
the framework which generates and limits the opportunities
available to them, so long as they do not deploy this framework
to negate the rights of others (Held, 1987:271).
Also, Robert Dahl defines democracy with the concept of poliarchies.

The

attributes of poliarchy are 1) elected officials, 2) free and fair elections, 3) inclusive
suffrage, 4) the right to run for office, 5) freedom of expression, 6) alternative
information, and 7) associational autonomy (Dahl, 1971:221).

Dahl greatly stresses

public participation and public competition as the key aspects of poliarchies, which
can bring out the endless responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its
citizens, and he added political and social freedom such as freedom of expression,
access to alternative information and associational autonomy as the precondition for
the successful elections (Dahl, 1971: 1-8).

Dahl states:

Poliarchies, then, may be thought of as relatively (but
incompletely) democratized regimes, or , to put it in another way,
polyarchies are regimes that have been substantially popularized
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and liberalized, that is, highly inclusive and extensive open to
public contestation (Dahl, 1971:8).
As we can see, Dahl’s concept of poliarchy could be seen as the precondition for
liberal democracy.

More accurately, we can say that poliarchy refers to the mixture

of democracy, liberalism and republicanism, even though I have to concede that
liberalism and republicanism are far weaker than democracy (O’Donnell, 2001:124).
Like Robert Dahl, George Sorensen defines political democracy as participation,
competition, and civil and political liberties as well (Sorensen, 1993:16).

And as

Woodruff put it earlier, Sorensen proclaims that the concept of democracy should
reject just the rule by the poor majority that hurts the freedom of people in the end
(Sorensen, 1993: 4).

For example, Lincoln-Douglas debates can demonstrate the

above point that democracy itself does not mean majority rule alone, which can help
comprehend the concept of democracy properly.

Douglas claimed that he cared not

“whether the people voted slavery up or down, as long as the decision reflected the
will of people,” while Lincoln, instead, argued that “slavery in itself violated the
higher principle of human equality on which the American regime was based”
(Fukuyama, 2004:114-115).

As Fukuyama puts it, this clearly refers to the

possibility that democratic majorities can determine horrible things, not to mention
the severe violation of human rights and norms of decency on which their own
democratic order is based (Fukuyama, 2004:114).

Fukuyama interprets it in the

way that the legitimacy of the actions of democracy are not in the end on the basis of
democratic procedural correctness, but on the basis of the prior rights and norms that
are derived from a moral realm higher than that of the legal order (Fukuyama,
2004:115). Tocqueville states “the government of a democracy brings the notion of
political rights to the level of the humblest citizens” (Tocqueville, 1945:255).
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This

sentence does not imply a majority tyranny, but rather an inclusive tendency to
respect the marginalized population.

On the whole, we should not forget that

democracy itself is closely related to liberalism.
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to look into the definition of liberal
democracy, in order to, at least, help comprehend ‘liberal’ and ‘democracy.’ In the
term, ‘liberal democracy,’ ‘liberal’ is aimed at restricting state power over civil
society and ‘democracy’ is aimed at creating structures that would secure a popular
mandate for holders of state power (Sorensen, 1993:5).

Simply, we can say that

‘liberal’ itself refers to the limitation of a state’s power (Holden, 1988:12).

As the

concept of ‘liberal’ implies the constraint of a state power, we can think of free
elections, rule of law, and the protection of individual rights such as “rights to life,
liberty, property, and the pursuit of happiness.”(Plattner, 2001:79-80).
When considering the above concept of ‘liberal’ and ‘democracy,’ we can
easily think of Locke’s democracy that is close to modern liberal democracy.
Platter emphasizes John Locke’s natural rights as the foundation for modern liberal
democracy.

In fact, John Locke’s natural rights such as equality and freedom can be

clearly recognized as the fundamental foundation of modern liberal democracy.
According to John Locke, if men are not equal in their natural rights, that is, if some
men have a right to rule over other men, then men cannot naturally be free, and if all
men are naturally free, then none can have a natural right to rule over others (Plattner,
2001:80).

Further, he mentions that men are born free, and therefore could have the

liberty to choose either governors or forms of government (Plattner, 2001: 80).

At

this point, we can recognize that liberal thought ultimately undermines any attempt to
exclude people from political participation on the basis of such factors as race,
religion, or sex (Plattner, 2001:86).

Also, we can see the close co-relationship
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between equality and freedom, and further the close connection between liberalism
and democracy.

In fact, Sorensen pointed this out well.

As for Sorensen, ‘liberal’

largely reflects individual freedom to pursue his or her own preferences in religious,
economic and political affairs, claiming that state power is only on the basis of the
will of the sovereign people. 70 Sorensen states:
Democracy is desirable as a mechanism for securing that the
majority will decide what the law should be. It is vital,
however, that democratic majorities respect the limitations
on government activity. If they do not, democracy will be
in conflict with liberty………………In summary, it is possible
to point to very early and very recent contributions in the liberal
democratic tradition whose primary concern is with the
restriction of political authority over citizens. Liberty is
individual freedom in the realm of civil liberty. Democracy
can be a means of the way of achieving this end but is not the
end itself. If there is a democratic core in this way of thinking,
it is the principle of the political equality of citizens. In what
follows it will appear that this principle can lead in a quite
different direction from the one taken by the proponents of
protective democracy and can result in much more central and
positive role for democracy (Sorensen, 1993:7).
Fareed Zakaria shares Sorensen’s notion of liberal democracy.

Zakaria states:

liberal democracy is a political system marked not only by free
and fair elections but also by the rule of law, a separation of
powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly,
religion and property (Zakaria, 2004:17).
Via above authors’ notion of liberal democracy, we can see that liberal democracy is
the political system to guarantee civilians’ political participation, rule of law,
separation of powers, protection of basic liberty, transparency, individual freedom
and limited government, not to mention the protection of minority and the guarantee
of plurality.

When considering these characteristics of liberal democracy, we can’t
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Sorensen defines liberalism and democracy, revealing different political writers’ concept of
democracy and liberalism. See, for more detail, Sorensen (1993).
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expect mob rule or the dictatorship which were mentioned as characters of
democracy above.

In my dissertation, my concept of democracy is very close to

that of liberal democracy, even if in my dissertation, I do not restrict the concept of
democracy to the notion of liberal democracy alone.

In other words, I adopt the

concept of democracy in inclusive term rather than exclusive term, avoiding any
mistake derived from any narrow concept of democracy, since I do not claim that a
contemporary democratic regime should only resemble liberal democracy, in
particular when considering Condoleezza Rice’s speech on March 31, 2006:
I do not mean to imply that there is only one model of liberal
democracy. There is not. Even two countries as similar as
Britain and the United States embraced liberal democracy on our
own terms, according to our own traditions and our cultures and
our experiences. 71
Indeed, as Zakaria puts it, currently, the half of democratizing countries in the world
are illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 2004:99).

In consideration of this aspect, I put

some decent illiberal democracies into the category of the standard of civilization,
along with liberal democracy, even if in my dissertation, my aim is ultimately ‘liberal
democracy.’
However, once again, we should keep in mind the fact that an electoral
system itself does not necessarily mean democracy.

When thinking of the range

from democracy to authoritarianism, the four-fold classifications, such as “advanced
democracy,

liberal

democracy,

semi-democracy/electoral

democracy

and

authoritarianism” in Shedler’s terms might be seriously considered (Schedler, 2001:
151).

At this juncture, electoral democracy cannot be seriously considered as the

only criterion for full-membership in international society.
71

As Donnelly puts it,

Former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice made speech at Ewood Park, Blackburn, United
Kingdom (March 31, 2006).
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“elections, no matter how free and open, are merely mechanisms for ascertaining the
will of people, which could be recognized as empty formalism”(Donnelly, 2003:190191).

At this juncture, my point is that an electoral system itself is not a democracy,

but the decent and electoral democracy/decent illiberal democracy (as mentioned
above) should be flexibly considered as the condition for the standard of civilization
such as Turkey (in 2012).72 In this chapter, I adopt John Rawls’ concept of ‘decent.’
Rawls defines ‘decent’ by saying:
decent to describe non-liberal societies whose basic institutions
meet certain specified conditions of political rights and justice
(including the right of citizens to play a substantial role, say
through associations and groups, in making political decisions)
and lead their citizens to honor a reasonably just law for the
Society of Peoples (Rawls, 1999: 3, fn. 2).
Along with this concept of ‘decent,’ my definition of decent illiberal democracy is
democracy with good government, multi-party, fair election, rule of law, human
rights and transparency as systemic mechanism that can prevent any possibility of the
emerging dictatorship and authoritarian government.

In “the Law of Peoples,” John

Rawls introduces four categories of societies, such as liberal society, well-ordered
hierarchical society, burdened societies and out-law states. 73 Rawls implies the
necessity of the toleration for the decent illiberal people under the law of people.
Therefore, as Rawls put it, decent non-liberal states should not be confused with
outlaw states.

Also, toleration itself can be recognized as one of virtues of

democracy, pluralism.

In “Political Liberalism,” John Rawls explains the virtue of

toleration, by saying:
72

Turkey was used to having problem with human rights issue. But the condition of human rights
has been increasingly improved. In the future, even Turkey will be able to join the EU as the first
non-Christian state, which can be very meaningful, in particular when considering that the EU becomes
the symbol of democracy and human rights.
73

See, for more information, Rawls (1999).
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reasonable persons think it unreasonable to use political
power, should they possess it, to repress other doctrines that
are reasonable yet different from their own. These points
may seem too narrow; for I recognize that every society also
contains numerous unreasonable doctrine. In regard to this
point, however, what is important to see is that how far
unreasonable doctrines can be active and tolerated is not decided
by what is said above, but by the principles of justice and the
kinds of actions they permit (Rawls, 1999: 16. fn. 8, and Rawls,
1996: 63-65).
I owed the concept of ‘toleration’ to John Rawls, along with his concept of ‘decent.’
Influenced by Rawls’ arguments, I consider some decent illiberal democracy as the
standard of civilization along with liberal democracy.

However, once again, my

purpose in my dissertation is ultimately to promote and consolidate liberal
democracy in the whole international society, even if as Fukuyama (1992) and Little
(1995) emphasize, illiberal democracy is expected to become liberal democracy in
the long run.74
2> Democracy as the Wave of Expansion of International Society and the Standard
of Civilization
In this section, I will mention ‘the wave expansion of international society’
and ‘the standard of civilization’ for currently predominant democratic movement on
a global scope.
presentation.

First of all, I will define my concept of ‘wave’ as a historical

Samuel Huntington used the term, ‘wave,’ for the level of democratic

development (Huntington, 1991a), but unlike Huntington, I regard each ‘wave’ as
74

As David Goldfischer pointed out, in my dissertation, I did not mention “substantive democracy
with an equitable domestic distribution of wealth.” However, I am aware of “Occupy Wall Street”
movement and I think that “substantive democracy with an equitable domestic distribution of wealth”
is very important. But, accurately speaking, I can say that liberal democracy can be understood as
the standard of civilization, in particular when considering that Great Powers, the US and the UK
belong to liberal democracy, and when considering that I do Not think that Great Powers, the US and
the UK promote “substantive democracy with equitable domestic distribution of wealth” across
international society, even though, as mentioned above, I adopt a broad concept of democracy as the
standard of civilization, and “substantive democracy with equitable domestic distribution of wealth”
has more and more attention and is an ideal goal as the standard of civilization.
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each tide of relatively different norm and value across international society.

Each

wave entails the emerging dominance of each different norm during each different
historical period.

Also, each wave has had impacts on the whole international

society as well as the unit level/state (character of unit).
slave

trade,

the

compliance

decolonization/self-determination,

with

For instance, the end of

Western-oriented

human

rights

and

international
democracy

can

law,
be

acknowledged as a series of relatively different waves that can be strongly felt across
international society during each relatively different historical period, which implies
the limited progress in international society. 75

In other words, for instance, we can

think of the acceptance of ‘Western-oriented international law’ beyond the West as
the first wave expansion of international society; ‘decolonization’ as the second wave
expansion of international society; ‘human rights’ as the third wave expansion of
international society; and ‘democracy’ as the fourth wave expansion of international
society.

The first wave expansion of international society could be the gradual

compliance with the Western-oriented international law by even non-Western states
beyond Western states in the nineteenth century.

The second wave expansion of

international society could be a decolonization movement on the basis of selfdetermination, which started in the post-WWII era and reached the peak point in the
1960s.76 The third wave expansion of international society could be that human
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My conception of the limited progress is influenced by Kant’s concept of progress, such as
meliorism, even though I am aware of realist concept of progress – that is why I said the limited
progress.
76

Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enunciated the universal right of
self-determination. “All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.” Also, Article 27 also advocates self-determination, saying “ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities….shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.”
Available at the website: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm
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rights had become a gradually universal norm in particular in the 1980s.

The fourth

wave expansion of international society can be the post-Cold War and 21st century
global-level democratic movement.77 At this juncture, the fourth wave expansion of
international society entails international society’s deep engagement in a form of
government, with an emphasis on good governance.

The fourth wave expansion of

international society itself reflects the more aggressive engagement to maintain order
and stability and to further augment the wellbeing of the whole international society
than any previous wave expansion of international society. 78
The wave can be understood with the standard of civilization.

For instance,

one of Hedley Bull’s students, Gerrit Gong used international law as the standard of
civilization, while he greatly stresses the role of international law in international
society, revealing non-western states’ compliance with international law as the
primary mechanism to become a member of international society (Gong, 1984).
My dissertation chair, Jack Donnelly used the concept of the standard of civilization,
while examining the question of whether or not human rights could become a new
criterion for full membership in international society (Donnelly, 1998). 79 In addition,
in my dissertation, particularly in this section, like Gong and Donnelly, I adopt the
concept of the standard of civilization as a criterion for full membership in
77

Below, I will touch on democracy again when I emphasizes on democracy as the emerging new
standard of civilization, since this part itself is about democratic promotion.
78

To emphasize human rights as the third wave expansion of international society can be recognized
as aggressive intervention in domestic arena, such as Kosovo. Nonetheless, it does not request a
particular form of government. In terms of that, we can say that the promotion of democracy is more
aggressive than that of human rights.
79

Here, I have to say that I did not mention self-determination as the standard of civilization, since I
already mentioned it earlier, when coping with the second wave expansion of international society and
I do not need to repeat it, even if self-determination/decolonization could be obviously recognized as
the standard of civilization. Thus, I will skip self-determination, and will focus on human rights while
investigating whether or not human rights becomes the standard of civilization, Also, at this juncture,
I intend to reveal the limited progress in international society.
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international society, while investigating whether or not democracy becomes the
criterion for full membership in international society.
There are lots of debates on whether or not democracy can be a predominant
value and norm of international society as much as human rights, and whether or not
it could even become a new emerging standard of civilization in the era of the postCold War and 21st century.

However, as mentioned at the beginning, at present,

more than around 65 % of 192 states in international society can be called democratic
regimes and more states have been expected to become democracies, in particular
when considering democratic promotion in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in 2011.

This

indicates that democracy itself can become a highly probable emerging new standard
of civilization.

Indeed, in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, democracy

has gradually become one of the predominant norms of international society.

Below,

I will prove my position with several data.
Let’s take a look at several reasons why democracy can be recognized as
emerging new standard of civilization in the era of post-Cold War and 21st century.
First, along with the end of the Cold War, the international environment has been
changed, in particular with the end of the ideological struggle of two super-powers.
Due to this reason, there are very few incentives left for Great Powers to neglect or
advocate authoritarian or totalitarian regimes for their own strategic national
interests.80 During the Cold War era, the US and the USSR had been deeply engaged
in proxy wars in various arenas such as in Africa, Central America, and Southeast
Asia (Fukuyama, 2006:219).

The US military interventions had occurred on

80

During the Cold War era, on and off, the US had supported the authoritarian and repressive regimes,
overthrowing democratic regimes for its own strategic interests, which was deeply rooted in its own
fear of the Soviet influence, such as Chile, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. Nevertheless, during the Cold
War era, the US foreign policy had been fundamentally based on human rights and democracy.
71

average once per decade such as in the Dominican Republic, and Lebanon
(Fukuyama, 2006:219).

Nonetheless, the US had primarily preserved the status quo

due to the mutual nuclear threats as well as the pressure of super-power confrontation
(Fukuyama, 2006: 218).

Also, during the Cold War era, the image of democracy

itself could be understood as a just ideological tool to compete against the Soviet
bloc.

By 1978, a strong majority in US felt that a US human rights emphasis had in

fact hurt efforts to achieve an arms control treaty, and even rejected the proposition
that Washington should break off the negotiations due to Soviet human rights
violations (Holsti, 2000:164).

Furthermore, the US had condoned repressive

regimes and their atrocity against their own citizens, undercutting its aspirations for
democracy and human rights in the third world. 81 The US policy-makers assumed
that violation of human rights and the ignorance of authoritarian regime might be
necessary in the fight against communism and terrorism. 82 The US was used to
having friendly tyrant regimes as its good friends such as Saigong in Vietnam, the
Shah in Iran, Ferdinand Marcos in Philippines and the Contras in Nicaragua.

Even,

former President Jimmy Carter who was a strong human rights advocate, mislabeled
the tyrant regime of the Shah of Iran as a good friend, especially when recalling his
friendly visit to the Shah and his extravagant toast to him and when recalling his
praising the Shah of Iran as “an island of stability”(Holsti, 2000:180, Newsom,
1988:101).

At this juncture, we can see that during the Cold War era, there were
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However, we cannot totally demean the US effort to promote and consolidate democracy as well as
human rights during the Cold War period. For instance, there had been a US national consensus to
support policies that had facilitated the freedom of dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe, support
for the emigration of Jewish communities, and pressure for a lessening of the Soviet Influence on
governments and societies in Eastern Europe. Here, my point is that in the post-Cold War and 21st
century, we can see more aggressive tendency of the promotion and consolidation of democracy. See
David D. Newsom (1988).
82

Ibid.
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some limitations to the promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy
as the norms and values of international society.
However, the collapse of the communist bloc itself meant the disappearance
of the ideological conflict between democracy and communism which had been a big
obstacle to the promotion of democracy.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a

sound circumstance for the US effort for promotion of democracy has emerged, and
the US has attempted to alter the status quo position so as to build up a better world
(Fukuyama, 2006:219).

In April, 1990, for the post-Cold War world, former US

President George H.W. Bush defined the new U.S. mission to be the promotion and
consolidation of democracy (Huntington, 1996:193).

In his 1992 campaign, Bill

Clinton constantly proclaimed that the promotion of democracy would be a top
priority of a Clinton administration, and democratization was the only foreign policy
topic to which he devoted an entire major campaign speech, and in his terms, his
central theme of foreign policy was the enlargement of democracy (Huntington,
1996: 193).

The George W. Bush administration’s foreign policy, in particular

toward the Middle East and Africa, could be recognized as aggressive democratic
promotion and consolidation, when considering that it has made its enormous effort
to help build up Iraq’s democracy and Afghanistan’s democracy, and when
considering that the US government spends more than $500 million annually across
over 50 countries. 83 Also, on July 10, 2006, former US President George W. Bush
had approved an $ 80 million fund toward boosting democracy in Cuba, even though
Cuban and US ties had been very strained for nearly 50 years. 84 When considering
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See Thomas Carothers (2000).

84

See “US in $80m ‘Cuba democracy’ plan.” BBC News. July 11, 2006.
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the above factors in the post-Cold War era and the 21 st century, few could dispute
Boutros-Ghali’s assertion that the promotion of democracy is itself an end (Mayall
2000: 82), and as more democracy can be observed in many various arenas on the
global stage, we can perceive that democracy is becoming a new standard of
civilization on the global stage.85
Second, democracy as a norm is not constrained to the West alone.
general, democracy has been regarded as a Western norm.

In

Many believe that

democracy is limited to the West alone and so it cannot be expected beyond the West,
as a universal norm on the global level.

Singapore’s former Prime Minister, Lee

Kuan Yew (1959-1990) used to stress ‘Asian Values’ as distinguished from other
cultural values, claiming that democracy should be considered as a Western value
and it should be limited to the West alone.

However, as we observe the

democratization of non-western states, democracy is not clearly limited to the West
alone, but it should be perceived as a universal norm, such as human rights, in
particular when considering that Japan and South Korea can obviously be marked as
a mature democratic regime and further that Indonesia and Malaysia have adopted
the notion of political freedom and a liberal market economic system.

Jack

Donnelly advocates this assumption, declaring “culture is not destiny”(Donnelly,
2003:88).

Donnelly states:
I also think that it is important to resist the argument that
internationally recognized human rights are a western artifact
that is irrelevant and meaningless in most of the rest of the
world. Ideas and social practices move no less readily than,
say, noodles and gunpowder. If human rights are irrelevant in a
particular place, it is not because of where they were invented or
when they were introduced into that place. Culture is not destiny
(Donnelly, 2003:88).

85

I will touch on this in the below again.
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As Donnelly implies, gunpowder was invented in China, but it has been used around
world.

In other words, we have never said that gunpowder must belong to China

alone since it was invented in China, as we have never said that television and mobile
phone should be limited to the Western society alone, because they were first
invented in the Western world.
state.

Like gunpowder, democracy can be adopted by any

As Donnelly tends to diminish the significance of the cultural impact in terms

of human rights, I have to resist the argument that different cultural values can be a
fundamental obstacle to the promotion of democracy.

For instance, Islam and

Confucianism are not fundamentally incompatible and insurmountable obstacles to
democratic development.86 Nevertheless, each different culture itself can have an
impact on paths toward democracy.
Third, democracy is the outcome of limited progress in international society.
When considering the relations between human rights and democracy, we can hardly
think of democracy without human rights, since human rights itself is closely
interrelated with democracy.

Also, democratic development across international

society can be recognized as the outcome of the limited but continuous progress in
international society like the end of the slavery system, the end of slave trade, selfdetermination, human rights and democracy.

For instance, the development of

international human rights law and of procedures for the international monitoring of
elections highlights the links between national and international efforts to promote
democracy, and this implies that democracy is the predominant post-Cold War and
21st century norm following the predominant Cold War era norm, human rights in
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We can think of Tunisia’s and Egypt’s democratic development. In an appendix, also I claim that
culture is not an obstacle to democratic development.
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international society.87 At this juncture, I primarily emphasize the close connection
among them as limited progress in international society.
As Larry Diamond asserts, democracy should be recognized as an instrument
for freedom, such as political freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of
organization, and freedom of opposition, maximizing the opportunities for selfdetermination and facilitating each individual citizen’s basic rights in order to make
normative choice and self-governing possible (Diamond, 1993:3).

This denotes that

democracy can be understood as a mechanism to guarantee political freedom and
human rights.

Also, as Immanuel Kant emphasizes on a close linkage among

democracy, peace and human rights in his various works, human rights itself
eventually tends to constrain not only totalitarian, but also democratic excessiveness
(Franck, 1992:88, fn. 229).

In fact, when considering the co-relationship between

human rights and democracy, we can easily find several international legal
documents to demonstrate such relationship.

Article 21 of Universal Declaration of

Human Rights obviously reveals the close co-relationship between human rights and
democracy. 88
Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen government….The
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting
procedure (Article 21).89
87

We should recognize the limited progress in international society. As mentioned in this Chapter,
we should recognize a series of norms such as the end of slavery system, the end of slave trade,
decolonization, human rights and democracy on the basis of historical period.
88

As Donnelly points out, the close relations can be repeatedly found in following documents. The
Declaration and Program of Action of the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, General
Assembly resolutions 52/148 (nine preliminary paragraph) and 55/108 (forth operative paragraph) and
Commission on Human Rights Resolutions 1998/72 (Forth Operative paragraph) and 2000/5 (forth
operative paragraph).
89

See the website available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a21
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The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (adopted by the 1993 World
Conference on Human Rights) demonstrates the co-relationship between democracy
and human rights as well.

It said:

Democracy, development and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually
reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed will of
the people to determine their own political, economic, social and
cultural systems and their full participation in all aspects of their
lives. In the context of the above, the promotion and protection
of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and
international levels should be universal and conducted without
conditions attached. The international community should
support the strengthening and promoting of democracy,
development and respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the entire world (8. U.N. Doc. A.Conf..157/23,
1993).90
Jack Donnelly is clearly aware of the inevitable relationship between democracy,
human rights and development, by saying “most obviously, international human
rights norms require democratic government,” even if he seems to put too much
emphasis on human rights over democracy and development (Donnelly, 1999: 609).91
Donnelly shows the relative characteristics of democracy and human rights, which
can help recognize a close relationship between human rights and democracy.
Donnelly mentions:
Democracy aims to empower the people, to ensure that they,
rather than some other group in society, rule. Democracy
allocates sovereign authority to the people who, because they
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See the website available at:
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en
91

As for me, Donnelly tends to emphasize too much on human rights as the overriding goal over
democracy and development, and so he might lose the balance among human rights, development and
democracy. We should recognize that without development and democracy, human rights can be
hardly achieved. As shown in South Korea he mentioned, it needed some level of development until
before human rights started being respected properly as a universal norm. See, for more information,
Donnelly (1999).
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are sovereign, are free, as the Vienna Declaration put it, to
determine their own political, economic, and social and cultural
system.
Human rights, by contrast, aim to empower
individuals, thus limiting the sovereign people and their
government (Donnelly, 2003:191).
At this point, we can catch a glimpse of mutual constraints between human rights and
democracy.

However, we should conceive the relationship as mutually

interdependent and mutually re-enforcing.

For example, democracy and human

rights ultimately share the notion of equal political dignity for everyone (Donnelly,
2003:191).

Besides, we should not forget that democratic government is preferred

for human rights, while human rights are needed to civilize democracy and markets
by constraining their operation to a limited, rights-defined domain (Donnelly, 2003:
202).

In fact, as international lawyer, Fernando R. Teson puts it, when assuming

that the right to participate in government, itself can be a significant human right
itself, not to mention important instrument for the enjoyment of other rights, we can
obviously perceive the inevitable relationship between democracy and human rights
(Teson, 1996: 34).

Therefore, when considering that the close correlation between

human rights and democracy can be well perceived and that human rights have been
already accepted on the global level, we cannot totally discard the possibility that
democracy can be eventually accepted as one of universal norms and as the newly
emerging standard of civilization in the long run.

Accordingly, if human rights

became the post-war standard of civilization, we can unsurprisingly conceive
democracy as the post-Cold War and 21st century new standard of civilization.
Fourth, democracy itself can be recognized as the most decent form of
government in the post-Cold War era and 21st century, and it can be grasped as to
provide the mechanism for the protection of citizens’ fundamental rights, along with
its assistance toward human rights.

We can even say “democracy is more preferable
78

than authoritarian regime,” even if free people may reasonably choose an efficient
benevolent autocrat over a corrupt incompetent democratic regime, which can be
rarely faced (Donnelly, 2003:202, fn.30).

In fact, in the post-Cold War era and 21st

century, around more than 65 % of states can be called democracy, and the tendency
of increasing numbers of democracy indirectly demonstrates that democracy is more
plausible than any other form of government.

In Eastern Europe and the former

Soviet Union, 19, or 70 percent of the 27 states have become democratic, with the
downfall of communism (Brumberg and Diamond, 2003:IX).

In Latin America and

the Caribbean, we are able to observe the fact that 30 of the 33 states are democracies
(Brumberg and Diamond, 2003:IX).92

In Asia, the number of democratic states has

gradually increased from 5 in 1974 to 12 in 2002.

Even in Sub-Saharan Africa, the

number of democracies has increased from 3 to 19, around two-fifth of the 49 states
(Brumberg and Diamond, 2003:IX). 93 According to the 2002 survey, 89 (46.4
percent) of the world’s internationally recognized states was rated free, 55 (28.6
percent) partly free, and 48 (25 percent) not free, whereas in the 1972 survey, the
number of free rated countries was 42 (29 percent), 36 (24.8 percent) partly free
category, and the number of the not free countries was 67 (46.2 percent).94 For
example, Indonesia moved from Partly Free to Free, and Afghanistan has advanced
from not free to partly free (Piano and Puddington, 2006:119).

Also, around 63

percent (120 states) of all states (192 states) were electoral democracies in 1999,
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El Salvador and Honduras are good examples for transition from military dictatorship to democracy.

93

Tanzania is a good example for the model of democracy in Africa.

94

See Larry Diamond, “Advancing Democratic Governance: A Global Perspective on the Status of
Democracy and Directions for International Assistance.” Available at the website:
http://www.law.stanford.com/~ldiamond/papers/advancing_democ_%20governance.pdf
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whereas around 27 percent in 1974.95 When considering the above data, we can say
that in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, democracy has gradually turned
out to be an emerging new standard of civilization.

All in all, all of the above

reasons convey the clear message that in the Post-Cold war era and 21st century,
democracy itself can be highly accepted as the universal value across international
society – i.e. the emerging new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion
of international society.
Conclusion
Chapter I is divided into three parts. Part I was about “English School.”
Part II was to deal with “Pluralist, Solidarist and Liberal Anti-Pluralist Facets of
International Society as a Whole and Their Relative Impacts on Paths to Democracy
in the era of the Post-Cold war and 21st Century.” Part III examined the question,
“Is Democracy becoming the New Wave Expansion of International Society and the
New Standard of Civilization in the Post-Cold War era and the 21st Century?” In Part
I. I mainly introduced the English School as one of emerging predominant
international theories in the post-Cold War era and 21st century.

Also, I attempted to

demonstrate that the English School is different from conventional IR theories and
mainstream social constructivism, even if it shares some common ground with
conventional IR theories and mainstream social constructivism.

In my dissertation,

I adopted and used the English School, due to its pluralistic methodology and
interdisciplinary characteristics, which can make possible the wider and deeper
investigation and explanation on international affairs in international society.

Also,

along with the aspects, its distinguishing facets, like international society, the

95

Ibid.
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standard of civilization, Great Power, and outlaw state can help understand
democratic development.

In particular, when considering that democracy can be

promoted and consolidated via each state’s own path which can be influenced by
their internal and external pressures, such as culture, history, international
organizations, international law, and Great Powers, the English School is plausible
enough for a more accurate assessment and better explanation on democratic
development across international society, than any other IR theories.
The title of my dissertation is “Paths to Democracy, the Post-Cold War and
21st century New Standard of Civilization, The New Wave Expansion of International
Society: China, South Korea and Iraq.” At this juncture, you might smell the odor
of the English School, especially from the terms, ‘international society’ and ‘standard
of civilization,’ even if the concept of “wave” is my own term.

The term, ‘Paths to

democracy,’ indicates the requirement of comparative studies.

When states

eventually end up becoming democratic regimes, but they have their own relatively
different paths toward democracy, the necessity of comparative study can be strongly
felt.

The English School’s adoption of pluralistic methodology and interdisciplinary

attributes can satisfy this and ultimately help explain ‘paths to democracy.’ The
term, ‘international society’ itself can be also recognized as the starting point to build
up the English School’s theoretical construction.

Also, when considering that the

concept of the standard of civilization reflects globalization with homogenization,
cultivation and improvement across international society, and the English School
itself is understood as globalization in some sense, we can grasp the inclination of the
English School in the title of my dissertation.

All in all, in Part I, I tried to divulge

and underline the English School as the IR theoretical background for the promotion
and consolidation of democracy I will touch on in later chapters.
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In the later

Chapters, I will apply the English School to democratic development across
international society so as to demonstrate that democracy is the new starndard of
civilization in the post-Cold War era and 21st century and that each country has its
own unique path toward democracy.
In Part II, I coped with “Pluralist, Solidarist and Liberal Anti-Pluralist Facets of
International Society as a Whole and Their Relative Impacts on Paths to Democracy
in the Era of the Post-Cold War and 21st Century.” I explored three frameworks of
international society, as pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist structures, and
did examine their relative effects on paths toward democracy.

As for me,

international society should be divided into pluralist, solidarist and liberal antipluralist ones, and the coexistence of all of them is a proper way for accurate
assessment and explanation on international affairs in international society, even
though among many English School scholars, in general, pluralism or solidarism is a
major spectrum to observe international society.

In other words, instead of one of

them, all three, pluralism, solidarism and liberal anti-pluralism should be
simultaneously considered so as to appropriately observe and assess international
affairs in international society.

I hope that this can contribute to the study of

international relations, let alone the promotion of democracy.
Pluralist principles are co-existence, equal sovereignty, non-intervention,
respect of differences and order, interest-based socialization and value-based
socialization, consent, etc.

Solidarist principles are human rights, justice, consensus,

cooperation, value-oriented socialization, etc.

And liberal anti-pluralist principles

are legalized hierarchy, legalized hegemonic order, excessive role of Great Powers,
etc. Each structure squeezes its own strategy to promote and consolidate democracy.
Each structure within international society can shape and shove behavior of states,
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and further can alter even identity and character of states on the basis of its own
distinguishing principles. At this juncture, we should recognize that different
principles lead to relatively different methods to change identity and character of
states.
When considering democratic development under three structures within
international society, we can think of three different strategies for the promotion and
consolidation of democracy, which can be derived from each different structure.
Each structure squeezes its own distinctive strategy for political freedom on the basis
of its own principles.

For instance, in a pluralist international society, ‘interest-

oriented socialization’ can be the principal mechanism to promote and consolidate
democracy, even if I have to say that the value-oriented socialization is also
significant.

In a solidarist international society, ‘value-based socialization’ can be a

major mechanism for democratic development, and in a liberal anti-pluralist
international society, ‘the use of force’ can be a prime mechanism for the promotion
and consolidation of democracy.

China, South Korea and Iraq represent relatively

pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist international societies.

China is on the

pluralist path toward democracy; South Korea on the solidarist path toward
democracy; and Iraq on the liberal anti-pluralist path toward democracy.

Three

cases demonstrated that each state has its own path toward democracy on the basis of
relatively distinctive strategies derived from comparatively different frameworks
within international society, and furthermore they facilitate my argument that
democracy has been the emerging new standard of civilization and the new wave
expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21 st century.

All in

all, Part II stresses the different paths toward democracy on account of each different
structure within international society as a whole.
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In Part III, I dealt with the question, “Is Democracy becoming the New Wave
Expansion of International Society and the New Standard of Civilization in the postCold War era and the 21st Century?” I examined the concept of democracy and
described democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization as well as the new
wave expansion of international society.

Democracy itself is not simply majority

rule, but also it requests harmonious interests and toleration to protect the right and
interests of marginalized populations.

In the post-Cold War era and 21st century,

democracy has become the most decent form of government in international society,
and around two-third nation-states of 192 have so far adopted democracy.

In fact,

as the environment of international society in the post-Cold War era, and 21st century
is far better off for the promotion and consolidation of democracy than in the Cold
War era, and the merits of democracy have been increasingly acknowledged across
international society, more and more states are expected to adopt democracy,
regardless of different regions and different cultures.

When considering the above

features, we can assume that democracy can be an emerging new standard of
civilization as well as the new wave expansion of international society.
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Fig. II. International Society and Democracy as the New Standard of Civilization
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Chapter II.

International Law and Democracy

Introduction
In international society, international law can be easily misunderstood as
simply a tool for Great Powers in pursuit of their own interests, or as an incompetent
international institution that Great Powers may easily ignore whenever they feel
necessary.

Also, Kenneth Waltz’s description of anarchy as international

environment, on and off, elicits doubts even on the existence of international law.
However, we cannot deny the fact that international law has played a considerable
role in maintaining international order and security and even in the general well-being
of international society.

Many international relations (IR) and international law

scholars have been well aware of the significant role of international law in
international society.

As IR scholars, English School scholars have greatly

underscored international law as one of the major institutions, highlighting its
contribution to international order and security, and to the welfare of international
society.

Hedley Bull asserts that the expansion of the scope of international law

concerning economic, social, and environmental issues indicates a great contribution
of international law to the international order and the well-being of international
society (Bull, 1977: 147).

At this juncture, I claim that the primary role of

international law is to maintain the co-existence of states and to promote cooperation
among states, which can smooth the progress of order, security, peace and welfare in
international society.
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In this chapter, I will investigate the origin, definition, character and role of
international law, and its contribution to international order and the well-being of
international society.

However, the primary focus is to discover the triangular

relationship among international law, international society and democracy.

Three

case studies, China, South Korea and Iraq, can help grasp this triangular relationship,
and since the three above cases relatively display three different facets of international
society (pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist) we will be able to perceive how
international law can differently influence democratic promotion and consolidation.
Ultimately, we will discern that in the post-Cold War era and 21 st century, democracy
itself has become the new wave expansion of international society and the emerging
new standard of civilization.
1> International Law
In this section, I will briefly mention main characteristics and roles of
international law in international society, let alone the origin and definition of
international law.

International law developed in the fifteenth and sixteenth

centuries, originally started emerging as a result of an intellectual effort to reconstruct
the Stoic/Christian universal human community as a community of territorial states
(Brown, Nardin and Rengger 2002: 312).

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel

Pufendorf (1628-91), Samuel Rachel (1679-1754), Christian Von Wolff (1679-1754)
and Emmerich De Vattel (1714-1767) greatly contributed to the emergence of
international law in international society, as they expanded the scope of natural law
beyond the relations among individuals to the relations among states, while
emphasizing the existence of community beyond the existence of state.

However,

the influence of natural law on international law gradually disappeared, and in the
nineteenth century, international law began to massively reflect the character of
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positive law.

However, I have to say that international law has emerged from more

than natural law and positive law.

There are various sources: (1) the decisions of

the international court of justice such as the outcome of disputes into international
law; (2) international conventions to establish rules which the contending states
recognized; (3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (4)
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the
various nations; (5) customary law; (6) international agreement; and (7) General
principles common to the major legal systems of the world (Carter, Trimble and
Bradley, 2003:3).
Currently, when being asked about the definition of international law, we can
simply say that international law is designed to serve the purpose of governing
relations between states alone, such as the rights and obligations of states, which is the
traditional definition of international law.

Nevertheless the modern definition of

international law includes the rights and obligations of even non-state actors, such as
the conduct of international organizations (Buergenthal and Maier, 1990:1-2).

In

consideration of the above definition of international law, we can perceive that
international law consists of ‘public’ and ‘private’ international law.

“Public

international law” primarily governs “the activities of governments in relation to other
governments,” whereas “private international law” copes with “the activities of
individuals, corporations, and other private entities” when they cross national borders
(Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 2003:2).

This shows that in the modern world,

international law is not limited to the relationship among state actors alone.
In consideration of the definitions of international law, let us investigate the
nature of international law.

When looking at the nature of international law, we can

find three traditions in international law.
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Indeed, Martin Wight claims that

international law should be regarded as a historical tradition, such as realism,
rationalism and revolutionism (Wight, 1992:233-238).

Thus, international law

might be understood with the combination of ‘power,’ ‘legality’ and ‘morality,’ and
one of them cannot properly explain the whole aspect and role of international law at
all.

At this juncture, we should keep in mind the fact that international law is not

just a reflection of power, but also a reflection of morality.
When considering the facet of power in international law, many international
lawyers and IR scholars like Schwarzenberger, Byers, Koskenniemi, Morgenthau,
Knor, Simpson, and Toope assert the intimate relationship between power and
international law. 96 For instance, Martti Koskenniemi contends that law itself, if
reduced to social fact and moral ideas, becomes nothing but a servile instrument for
power to realize its objectives, which fortifies the close relationship between power
and law (Roth, 2003:246).

Also, Alain Pellet mentions “law is the result of

power”(Pellet, 2003: 421). Sir Arthur Watts even states “the international community
prospers when law and power are in partnership, not when they are in conflict”, which
indicates the necessity of power (Watts, 2000:7).

Gerry Simpson underlines the

impact of power on international law, revealing legalized hierarchical relations among
‘Great Powers,’ ‘Middle Powers’ and ‘Small Powers’ well, by saying “All three facets
of legislative equality were heavily compromised at Vienna.

The Great Powers

made the law and the middle powers signed the resulting Treaty.

The small powers,

meanwhile, were erased from consideration” (Simpson, 2004: 112).
can see that power is important in international law.

All in all, we

Indeed, in an excessive

expression, the law itself might be quite often wrongly accused of its bias toward
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See, for more information, Stephen Toope (2003: 304).
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power, in particular when considering that law can be acknowledged as just the
expression of the will of the ruling groups, and the justification of the dominance and
exploitation of international society by a small group of Great Powers (Wilson, 2003,
14).

Under this circumstance, at best, international law itself appears to be just the

reflection of pure power.
However, international law is not just the reflection of pure power.

In the

relationship between international law and morality, we can counter the assumption
that the international law is only the reflection of sheer power.

In consideration of

the relationship between international law and power, we have to simultaneously
conceive of the relationship between international law and morality as well.

As

known as the father of international law, Hugo Grotius stood for the legal community
of mankind on the basis of morality (Keens-Soper, 2001:116).

Alan James asserts

that normative rules such as “the sine qua non” on the basis of prudence, etiquette and
ethics, provide a behavioral framework in international society, which can be easily
found in aspects of international law (James, 1973:66-67).

In moral aspect of

international law, even Koskennieni admits that “law made constant reference to
ethical and moral principles and the successful search for these principles is as
essential for the scientific understanding of international law as of any legal system”
(Koskenniemi, 2001).

In this similar line, Ronald M. Dworkin claims that legal

philosophers have been deeply concerned not only with “law as it is” but also with
law as “it should be”(Dworkin, 1977:9).

In reality, as Nardin puts it, we can

obviously observe moral elements in international law, when considering the general
principles of international association for customary international law.

For example,

we can think of the followings:
the rights of independence, legal equality and self defense, and
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the duties to observe treaties, to respect the immunity of
ambassadors, to refrain from aggression, to conduct hostilities
in war in accordance with the laws of war, to respect human
rights, and to cooperate in the peaceful settlement of disputes
(Nardin, 1983:233).
International human right law, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights or international humanitarian law might help address the above concerns.

All

in all, international law cannot be limited to pure power or morality alone, but instead,
it indicates both of them, power and morality, which entails the features of the
international system, international society and world society – e.g. three traditions.
As another character of international law, international law is inherently not
fixed and given, but has historically evolved.

Louis Henkin states “law is politics”,

since law is made by political actors, through political procedures, for political ends
(Henkin, 1995:4).

He believes that international law is the product of its particular

society (Henkin, 1995:5).

Hedley Bull also claims that we cannot properly perceive

of any law without consideration of social context (Bull, 1977:144).
we can notice two natures of international law.

At this juncture,

One is that international law is not

fixed, but it has continuously transformed itself on the basis of new norms and values
which are dominant in international society.

The other is that on the whole,

international law itself is not only reflecting the context of international society, and it
can be hardly expected in the absence of the context of international society.

As

Peter Wilson puts it, in other words, sense can be made of international law by
making sense of international society, which reflects the close inevitable relationship
between international law and nature of international society.97

As one example, we

can think of the fact that before World War II, international law was silent on the
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See Peter Wilson (2003).
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subject of human rights, but since then there has been a dramatic internationalization
of human rights across international society, which has ultimately made human rights
one of the central issues of international law, such as the 1948 Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Vogelgesang, 1979:241).

This does not only show the evolution

of international law but also the inevitably close relations between international law
and the nature of international society.
For the last time, let us briefly examine the role of international law in
international society.

In general, many people doubt whether or not international law

can play a significant role in international society as much as a law does in a domestic
society, because of the absence of the ‘super-national government,’ of the absence of
an ‘effective world court,’ and of the absence of an ‘international enforcement
mechanism’(Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 2003:25).

Indeed, they might not avoid

the feeling of the incapability of international law to maintain the order of
international society and promote the well-being international society. 98

Thus, they

might conclude that international law might be recognized as just a weak law that can
rarely regulate the behavior of the state in international society.
However, as Lassa Oppenheim argues, we should not forget “a weak law is
still law” (Nardin, 1983: 121).

And, we should keep in mind the fact that a weak law

itself is clearly strong enough not to be completely ignored.

Also, as many English

School scholars and international lawyers point out, international environment cannot
be described with realist logic alone, such as pure anarchy and the self-help system in
which endless power struggle alone can be easily found.

And, international society

does not have any authority of supreme government over states, which could be
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understood as one of the anarchical aspects, but it does not necessarily mean that
states can do whatever they want, even if states are sovereign in international
society. 99

International society itself reflects common values and common norms,

and under the character of international society, international law itself is deeply
embedded in those norms and values.

And, states are also well aware of the fact that

their compliance with such rules in international society is closely connected with
their own long-term interests and moral ground. Due to these reasons, states are
highly likely to comply with international law, and they are reluctant to do what they
can do in international society.

All in all, we can say that international law is not

incompetent to restrain the freedom of sovereign states, even under the circumstance
that there is no international police force for states’ compliance with the rules.

In

fact, as English School scholars put it, international law should be acknowledged as a
major international institution to preserve the international order and promote the
well-being of international society, and so it has been historically recognized as one of
the major elements of international society.
When looking into the relations between international law and international
society, which can help understand the important contribution of international law to
international society, we can notice that the relationship between international law and
international society is mutual re-enforcing relationships.

The primary function of

international law is ultimately to recognize the idea of a society of sovereign states
(Fawn and Larkins, 1996: 6).

As Martti Koskenniemi puts it, international law is

derived from the effect of a common consciousness of the whole international society,
which could be recognized as ‘civilized consciousness’ (Koskenniemi, 2001: 51-
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55).100 And, international law contributes to common goods such as international
order and the well-being of international society, while promoting and consolidating
the norms and values of international society.
Mutual re-enforcing relationships can be more clearly grasped in the
relationship between domestic society and municipal law.

In the relationship

between society and law, John Westlake mentions “no human society can have existed
a day without its law,” and “the breach of no law can be unaccompanied by the
feelings of a wrong and a right” (Westlake, 1914:16).
inevitable positive relationship between society and law.

This remark does imply the
We can expand and apply

this logic to the relationship between international law and international society, and
we can say that international society cannot exist a single day without international
law, even if I have to admit the relatively different level of impacts of domestic law
and international law on domestic society and international society.

In fact, Westlake

declares “when we assert that there is a thing as international law, we assert that there
is a society of states: when we recognize that there is a society of states, we recognize
that there is international law” (Westlake, 1914:2-3).
Also, Hugo Grotius’s concept of law can advocate such co-relationship and
help understand the great contribution of law to international society.
Prolegomena, Hugo Grotius mentions:
Just as the laws of each state have in view the advantage
of that state, so by mutual consent it has become
possible that certain laws should originate as between
all states, or a great many states; and it is apparent that
the law thus originating had in view the advantage, not
of particular states, but of the great society of states.
And this is what is called of nations, whenever we
distinguish that term from the law of nature
100

Customary international law emerges in this way as well.
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In

(Prolegomena, XVII).101
At this juncture, we can clearly see that law itself as an institution can promote the
well-being of international society as a whole rather than only interests of certain
nation states.

Indeed, we can comprehend that to comply with international law

itself can be recognized as to sustain international order and the society of states,
when considering Hugo Grotius’ emphasis on the role of domestic law (see below
XVIII).

Further, we can comprehend in the XVIII that the law can help to reduce the

degree of unpredictability in international affairs via maintaining certain patterns of
behaviors of states.

In Prolegomena, Hugo Grotius mentions:

For just as the national who violates the law of his
country in order to obtain an immediate advantage
break down that by which the advantage of himself and
his posterity are for all future time assured, so the state
which transgresses the laws of nature and of nations
cuts away also the bulwarks which safeguard its own
future peace. Even if no advantage were to be
contemplated from the keeping of the law, it would be a
mark of wisdom, not of folly, to allow ourselves to be
drawn toward that to which we feel that our nature leads
(Prolegomena, XVIII).102
This demonstrates how important international law has been in international society
The significant role of international law has been quite often disregarded as an
instrument of the Great Powers or even as the useless rules of laws which powerful
states can ignore and violate anytime, and international law might be often simply
misunderstood as an instrument for furthering the shared purposes of states or as an
outcome of the transactions arising from the pursuit of shared purposes (Nardin,
1983:309).

However, more fundamentally, international law should be recognized as
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a condition of the pursuit of all purposes and exists only where common procedures
for particular transactions are realized (Nardin, 1983:309).

All in all, we should not

forget the significant role of international law in maintaining the existence of
international society itself and further in elevating the wellbeing of international
society.
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Below, I will investigate the contribution of international law to democratic
development across international society, which can bring out the long-term interests
for the whole international society.

In the process, I will attempt to reveal the close

relationship between international law and international society.

Further, I will

examine the triangle relationship among international law, international society and
democracy.
2>

International Law and Democracy
My dissertation is about democratic development as the new wave expansion

of international society and the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era
and 21st century.

This chapter is about the nature and role of international law, in the

connection of its contribution to international society.

Also, this section in this

chapter is to primarily focus on whether or not international law is closely related with
democratic development and how this can have an impact on democratic promotion
across international society, if they are intimately related.

In addition, I will attempt

to demonstrate that international law will reflect more and more democratic norms in
international society.

Actually, earlier, I already mentioned the co-relationship

between international law and international society, but I want to touch on the
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States often face various issues which cannot be contained within their own national boundaries,
such as disease and environmental problem. This requests international law in international society.
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relationship between international society and international law, further stressing the
triangular

relationship

among

international

society,

international

law

and

democracy. 104
At the end of WWII, the defeat of fascism led to some opportunity for the
international community to make democracy a norm of international law (Rich,
2001:21).

However, during the Cold War era, the theme of democracy had been

regarded as a tool for a power struggle.

As a matter of fact, as Rich points out,

during the period of the ideological conflict, democracy itself could be hardly
accepted as necessary to secure peace in international society and to turn itself to
become an essential norm for the development of international law (Rich, 2001:22).
We can say that during the Cold War era, democracy itself had simply political and
propagandistic uses for the US and against Soviet Union, which was originally
motivated by super-power competition (Rich, 2001:22-25).
However, in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, democracy cannot be
derived from power struggle anymore, and it has been more and more willingly
accepted as the best means to achieve good governance, which can bring out more
peace and security in international society, not to mention the well-being of
international society in the end (Rich, 2001:23). We can say that in the post-Cold
War era and the 21st century, as the predominant force, democracy has obtained more
and more attention in international society.
force of democracy in various areans.

We can clearly notice the predominant

As one of evidences, in the post-Cold War era
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I want to stress the co-relationship among civilization, international law and international society.
Civilization cannot be thinkable without law and also, only civilized people recognize international
law. And international society can hardly exist without international law. See Schwarzenberger
(1955:219), and Westlake (1914:2-3). Here, we can think that if democracy becomes the standard of
civilization, we can think of close relationship among international law, international society and
democracy.
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and the 21st century, international law has increasingly advocated democracy and
international law itself has gradually reflected the predominant force of democracy as
well.105
However, as Steven Wheatley point out, I admit that in international law,
democratic government is still not an official condition of membership in the United
Nations (Wheatley, 2005:133).

But as mentioned above, we cannot deny the fact

that the nature of international law has gradually reflected more and more norms of
democracy, not to mention human rights, which conveys the transformed nature of
international society, uncovering how international law manifests the nature of
international society.

Particularly, the democratic nature of international society can

help comprehend some democratic proclivity in international law.

In turn, the

democratic tendency in international law strengthens democratic development across
international society, via its impact on national constitution.

At this juncture, we can

grasp the triangle relationship between democracy, international law and international
society.
Thomas Franck could be recognized as one of representative international
lawyers to advocate democratic development and get it to become norm of
international law.

For instance, in 1992, Thomas Franck advocated fabricating the

groundwork for the “emerging right of democratic governance” by having national
elections observed and endorsed by the international community that could fabricate
the international legitimacy to governments (Rich, 2001:26).

Especially, Franck

claims that in the post-Cold War era, a pro-democracy movement has been strongly
felt in international society and that democracy has gradually become an entitlement
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in international law (Franck, 1995: 84).

Franck states:

Democracy is becoming an entitlement in international
law and process is due in part to the very recent political
reality of a burgeoning pro-democracy movement
within the states which constitute the world community
(Franck, 1995: 84).
Governments which only a decade ago would have
bridled at the idea not accept that the international
community not only has the power to respond to
occasional invitations to monitor national elections, but
has an interest in seeing that free and fair elections are
held everywhere at regular intervals (Franck, 1995:109).
As shown, Franck is well aware of such close connections between international law
and democracy.

Actually, he even asserts that in the future, democratic government

might be made a precondition for fiscal, trade and development benefits, and for the
protection of UN and regional collective security measure (Mark, 2000: 549).

Also,

Fernando R. Teson advocated the connection between democracy and international
law, even though he is not as strong a supporter as Thomas Franck is.

Teson asserts

that there are fundamentally similar characteristics between international law and
democracy as well.

He believes that one of the primary aims of international law is

to secure the enduring peace in international society, while supposing that
democracies are more peaceful than tyrannies, which could be the shared ground
between international law and democracies (Teson, 1996:35).106 In a similar position,
Lassa Oppenheim is well aware of the close relationship between democracy and
international law on the basis of the evolution or progress of international law,
advocating the norm of democracy in international society as well.

Oppenheim

states:
106

As Teson puts it as well, democracies can be aggressive as much as tyrannies, when it faces nondemocracy, but we can say that in general, democracies tend to avoid war if possible, in particular
among democracies, which is what democratic peace theory claims.
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the progress of international law is intimately
connected with the victory everywhere of
constitutional
government
over
autocratic
government, or what is the same thing, of democracy
over autocracy. Autocracy government, not being
responsible to the nation it dominates, has a tendency to
base the external policy of the state, just as much as its
internal policy, on brute force and intrigue; whereas
constitutional government cannot help basing both its
external and its internal policy ultimately on the consent
of the governed. And although it is not at all to be
taken for granted that democracy will always and
everywhere stand for international right and justice, so
much is certain, that it excites a policy of personal
aggrandizement and insatiable territorial expansion,
which in the past has been the cause of the many wars
(Kingsbury: 1999:75).
As shown, at this juncture, the close relationship between international law and
democracy has been increasingly noticed, and we can see that the nature of
international society has been increasingly embedded in the norm of democracy and
international law itself has been expected to gradually reflect the nature of
international society.
Let us investigate international legal documents to advocate democracy in
order to display the wide-ranging co-relationship between democracy and
international law.

First, we can thik of General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV):

Declaration of Principles of International Law in terms
of Friendly Relations ‘defines a state conducting itself
in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as one’ thus possessed of
a government representing the whole people belonging
to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or
color.107
This resolution indirectly advocates democracy across international society.

Indeed,

Robert Rosenstock advocates this position, claiming that this resolution reflects the

107
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idea of the necessity for governments to represent the governed, which was reexamined in the UN Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action to confirm that
“government must represent the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction of any kind” (Rosenstock, 1971:713, 732, Wheatley, 2005:143).

At this

juncture, Wheatley claims that this government can be characterized with the
assumption that the legislative and other measures of the state should not arbitrarily
favor, or disfavor, any particular group of persons, and ultimately should carry out the
will of people (Wheatley, 2005:143).
The propensity backing of international law toward democracy can be seen in
other legal documents, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.

In particular, Article 1 and Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights strongly indicate the close relationship between international law
and democracy.

Article 1 said “all people have the rights of self-determination.

By

virtue of these rights they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development,” and Article 25 said:
Every citizen shall have the rights and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions and without
unreasonable restrictions:
a. To take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly
or through freely chosen representative,
b. To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot,
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the
electors;
c. To have access, on general terms of equality, to
public service in his country. 108
These articles 1, and 25, clearly reveal the tendency of international law toward
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democracy.

As James Crawford points out, particularly when considering in Article

25 that every citizen has the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or via freely chosen representatives (Crawford, 2000:93), and when
considering that democracy reflects a range of rights to join public life, effective
freedom of speech and the opportunity to organize political parties and other groups
(Crawford, 2000), this is not the only democratic indication in international society,
but also democratic predisposition in international law.

In fact, at the universal level,

the Human Rights Committee drafts a general comment on Article 25 to guarantee
democratic political system in states parties to the Covenant, while stressing the close
relationship between Article 1 and 25, and noting that arbitrary deprivation of
citizenship for the purpose of avoiding or diminishing the political rights of
individuals would violate Article 25 (Crawford, 2000:105).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights demonstrates that the significance
of democracy in international society could not be minimized even during the Cold
War era as well.

The article 21 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly

implies this point.
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the
government of his country directly or thoroughly freely
chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public
service in his country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in
periodic and genuine elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret
vote or by equivalent free voting procedures. (Article
21)109
The Universal Declaration clearly emphasizes ‘basic civil rights’ and ‘political rights,’
109

See “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” Available at the website:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml
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not to mention the right to life, the right not to be held in slavery, not to be tortured,
the right to equal protection of law, the right to due process guarantees, ‘freedom of
speech, assembly and movement,’ the right to privacy, etc. (Buergenthal and Maier,
1990:120).

Indeed, the United Nations Human Rights Committee identifies the

people of existing states as beneficiaries of self-determination, and equates their rights
of self-determination with the existence within the state of a continuing system of
democratic government based on public participation (Crawford, 2000:94-95).

All

of these obviously show the intimate relationship between democracy and
international law.
Also, we can recall Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and General Assembly Resolution 47/135, which guarantees the
interests of minority as the primary aspect of democracy, when considering that as
mentioned in Chapter I, democracy is more than just the rule of majority and that it
should reflect harmonious interests and mutual toleration rather than only interests of
the majority.

Democracy is not only the counting of votes but also the sharing of

reasons and the harmony of interests, reflecting popular sovereignty as well as
political equality and freedom.
guarantee of minority rights.

The accomplishment of democracy requests the

The absence of minority rights itself can bring out the

tyranny of majority, and the will of the majority can’t always determine the will of the
people properly, and democracy should be understood by its underlying principles of
popular sovereignty, the will of the people, political equality, harmonious interests and
mutual toleration rather than simply the rule of majority (Wheatley, 2005).

Thus, the

protection of minority rights should be recognized as very significant in democracy,
and the understanding of democracy in international law has to expand beyond an
institutional and procedural one, in order to acknowledge the significance of political
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participation for the minority groups, which can facilitate democratic development
across international society (Williams, 2000:124, Wheatley, 2005).

Article 27 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights said:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exists, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in
community with the other members of their group,
to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
own religion, or to use their own language. 110
Article 1 (1 & 2), 2 (2) and 5 (1) of General Assembly Resolution 47/135 said as well:
Article 1(1&2): 1. States shall protect the existence
and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and
linguistic identity of minorities within their
respective territories and shall encourage conditions
for the promotion of that identity. 2. States shall
adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to
achieve those ends…………………
Article 2(2). Persons belonging to minorities have
the right to participate effectively in cultural,
religious, social, economic and public life………
Article 5(1). National policies and programmes
shall be planned and implemented with due
regard for the legitimate interests of persons
belonging to minorities. 111
These legal documents support democracy, and they can even rectify the false concept
of democracy, such as the rule and interests of majority alone, with emphasis on
harmonious interests of citizens.

They can also help facilitate the prohibition of

unreasonable and discriminative national constitution, for instance, that the president
and the prime minister should be a member of a particular group such as male or
female; White, Hispanic, Asian, or Black; and Christian, Buddhist or Islamist.112 We
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Available at the website: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm
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“Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic
minorities” adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of December 18 1992. Available at the
website: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/minorities.htm
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These legal documents clearly advocate democracy, and in fact, this aspect can be seen especially in
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can say that the above international legal documents are pretty important, and that the
above legal documents for minority rights can be ultimately comprehended to
advocate democratic promotion and consolidation.
Democratic features of international law can influence national domain such
as national constitutions as well.

We can say that international law can have an

impact on domestic constitutions and that it can influence internal and external
behaviors of states, which can lead to states’ alteration of character and identity in the
end.

For instance, the US Supreme Court wrote:
International law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice
appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their
determination. For this purpose, where there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or
judicial decision, resort must he had to the customs and
usages of civilized nations (Buergenthal and Maier,
1990:209).

This suggests that international law can be adopted as national law, not to mention the
impact of international law on national law.

Also, when considering that Article 12

and 20 of Iraqi new constitution stress the equal rights regardless of gender, sect,
opinion, belief, religion or origin, and that China’s constitution on March 14, 2004
modified itself to guarantee private property and human rights that could be
recognized as China’s progress of democracy, we cannot completely deny that the
wide-ranging norms in international society and international law indirectly influence
national constitutions.

These clearly prove that democratic features in international

law can have great impacts on domestic constitution.

consociational democracy. Steven Wheatley points out this. See, Steven Wheatley (2005:162-164).
Also, Arend Lijphart explains well about the concept and role of consociational democracy. See Liphart
(1995).
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Also, all democratic features in international law and international society can
facilitate even the justification of intervention for democratic redevelopment.

In

1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan mentioned “gross violations of human rights
and denials of democratic fundamentals can no longer be regarded as purely domestic
matters.”(Carter, Trimble and Bradley, 2003:1037).

In addition, when considering

the United Nations’ involvement in promotion of democracy such as the practice of
election monitoring, for the promotion of democracy in Haiti (SC/6300), Namibia,
Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor (SC/1410), and recently Afghanistan (SC/1378), we
can perceive that democracy itself has progressively become a part of the nature of
international society and of international law, even though the use of force for purely
democratic promotion is still hardly approved on international legal basis in
international society.
So far I have intended to reveal the triangular relationships among democracy,
international law and international society via my investigation of the relationship
between ‘international society and democracy,’ ‘international society and international
law,’ and ‘international law and democracy.’ In the post-Cold War era and 21st
century, democracy can be more and more easily found across international society.
When democracy has become the gradually predominant force in international society
and even grown to be an emerging new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War
era and the 21st century, international law is also expected to evolve itself to match the
nature of international society and to reflect increasingly democratic norms and values.
When all things are considered, in the post-Cold War era and the 21 st century, as a
significant institution in international society, international law has played a
significant role in promotion and consolidation of democracy.

To sum up, global

democratic phenomenon shows the positive indication to international law in order to
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promote and consolidate democracy, and international law can be expected to
contribute to democratic development.

The below three cases, China, South Korea

and Iraq can help comprehend how international law can have an impact on
democratic development, not to mention how international law, international society
and democracy can influence each other.
3> International law and Case Studies (Democratic Development)
In the above section, I briefly investigated the triangular relations among
international society, international law and democracy, and I stressed that international
law has had an impact on democratic development.

In this section, three cases,

China, South Korea and Iraq, can demonstrate how international law can have an
impact on each country’s path toward democracy, even if Iraq’s case is still hard to
advocate the assumption that international law can influence Iraq’s democracy.

As

each case represents the different aspect of international society such as pluralist,
solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist facades, we will see how international law can have
relatively different impacts on the promotion and consolidation of democracy in three
states.

They can explicate that international law can lead to some pressure on

democratic promotion and consolidation, which will fortify the triangular relationship
among democracy, international law and international society.
A) China
In this section, I will examine the impact of international law on China’s path
toward democracy.

This will help comprehend why we should deliberate the

considerable function of international law in a pluralist international society, and how
international law can have an impact on the promotion and consolidation of
democracy and further on path toward democracy in a pluralist international
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society. 113 In this section, I will take a look at international legal documents
concerning ‘human rights’ and ‘religious freedom,’ which can ultimately strengthen
democratic development in China.
China was, for the first time, exposed to European-oriented international law
around 1860 when China was not even recognized as a nation (Feng, 2001: 224).
But, China’s serious relationship with international law can be traced in its
compliance with the European-oriented international law in 1943, which helped
guarantee life, liberty and property for foreign nationals. 114 However, China had been
identified with an aggressive revisionist power until the late 1970s, rejecting any
norm and value of international society as the West-oriented biased tool for Western
powers’ interests.

This made China so reluctant to comply with international law,

and this is also why China was struggling for equal status in the international
community of states from 1840 (Feng, 2001: 239).

As for China, international law

itself could be understood as a West-biased mechanism for Western powers’ narrow
interests.

For instance, the Chinese government was used to rejecting international

human rights law, in particular whenever China was criticized for its violation of
human rights, such as China’s poor human rights record in Tibet, and pressure on
China’s compliance with human rights.

The Chinese government claimed that it

seemed to reflect the interest of the West, while using cultural relativism like Asian
values which former Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew raised.

Also, China

was used to defend its position against human rights, claiming that as for the US, the
US national law is prior to international law whenever they come to be in conflict
113

As mentioned in Chapter I, we can see international society with three divisions such as pluralist,
solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist dimensions, which can be seen relatively in China, South Korea and
Iraq.
114

See Gong (1984).
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with each other.

Pointing out the priority of the decision of US Supreme Court over

the decision of the International Criminal Court, China has tended to make its strong
claim that whether or not China adopts human rights should be conceived as its own
domestic issue in which no state and no international authority, in particular the US
can have any right to intervene.
However, China cannot totally avoid the pressure from international law.
China yielded to the European oriented international law in 1943 to protect foreign
nationals, after its series of shameful experiences such as its defeat of the Opium War.
And, importantly, since 1978, Chinese has become interested in international law, due
to China’s four modernization programs (Chiu, 1988:3). To achieve the goal of
modernization, the introduction of Western technology and investment into China is
necessary (Chiu, 1988:39). As for the Chinese, international law serves as a valuable
tool to assist such intercourse between China and the outside world (Chiu, 1988:39).
Indeed, Deng Xiaoping and his successors have been aware of the fact that no country
can be in complete isolation from the international system in today’s world, and so it
is essential for countries to understand and abide by the rules of the international
community (Zonglai and Bin, 2010:193). And so, Deng Xiaoping and his successors
have attached great importance to the role of international law in the reform and
opening-up process (Zonglai and Bin, 2010:194).
Moreover, now that today, China lives in a more favorable legal environment
and does not need to challenge the existing legal order by advocating different
systems of international law as Chinese scholars did in the mid-1950s, China has a
more positive attitude toward international law (Chiu, 1988:39-40). As a matter of
fact, Chinese leaders tend to claim that international law plays a profound role in
China’s peaceful development in three dimensions - i.e. generating a peaceful and safe
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outside environment, creating an equal and impartial competition order, and
proffering a legal safeguard for international cooperation (Deming, Yuan and Hua,
2006:262).

Nonetheless, as a bottom line, they believe that international law is

important since it is beneficial for China’s national interests, in particular its economic
interests and its pursuit of Great Power status.
There are many evidences that China has not rejected international law since
1978.

For instance, today, China is a party to more than 300 international treaties,

whereas before the reform and opening-up it acceded to just over 30 international
treaties (Zonglai and Bin: 2010: 194).

Also, China often uses the rhetoric of

international law to describe its behavior in the international community, even when
that rhetoric is self-serving or hypocritical (Feinerman, 1995:188).

This

demonstrates China’s acceptance of the legitimacy of international law, in particular
UN’s law (Wan, 2007:740).
International law can have an impact on China, as China complies with
international law.

For instance,

although the Chinese Constitution has no express

provision on the relative status of treaties and domestic laws, the general practice in
China is to perceive international law (treaties) as superior to domestic law (Keyuan,
2006:238).

We can think of Article 142 of the 1986 General Principles of Civil Law:

if any international treaty concluded or acceded to by China
contains provision different from those in the civil laws of
China, the provisions of the international treaties shall apply,
unless the provisions are the ones to which China has
announced reservation (Keyuan, 2006:238).
Indeed, also, the international treaties concerning economy and commerce are
superior to China’s domestic law (Guo, 2009:166). Because of this, the principles of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) facilitate China’s legal reforms, such as the rule
of law, which demonstrates that China’s gradual integration into the global trade
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system brought about its increasing acceptance of international law (Wan, 2007:739).
Moreover, some international rules and treaties are incorporated into Chinese laws
(Hsieh, 2010:10).

For instance, China’s Contract Law is mostly consistent with the

UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Good (CISG) (Hsieh, 2010: 10,
fn 26). And, we can think of Article 18 of the Constitution on foreign investment
protection and the Regulations on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunity in 1990 as
examples of incorporation of international treaties and rules (Keyuan, 2006:238).
Moreover, China makes corresponding revisions and amendments of domestic laws in
line with the international treaties which China has ratified or acceded to, like the
1985 Provisional Regulations on Trade Marks after China ratified the Paris
Convention on Protection of Industrial Property (Keyuan, 2006:238).

All in all, we

can say that China is willing to comply with international law and that international
law has some impacts on China.
When considering the triangular relationship among international law,
international society and certain predominant values like human rights and democracy,
international law itself is expected to indirectly and gradually transform China’s
identity and character even under the principles of equality and non-intervention in a
pluralist international society.

As mentioned earlier, China has cherished the

principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, which led to Beijing’s official
criticism of the handling of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (Feng, 2001: 225).

For

instance, China’s former President, Jiang Zemin expressed his stance against power
politics, criticizing the NATO forces’ management of the Kosovo case and claiming
that the UN Charter was far from outmoded yet (Feng, 2001:2005).

However, the

principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention do not necessarily mean that
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there are no mechanisms to alter the gradual transformation in China’s identity and
character.

Under the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention, the best

mechanism in the alteration of China’s identity and character as well as its behavior
and language might be the long-term trend of socialization among states, in particular,
the interest-based socialization, which can gradually blur or eradicate differences in
the political, economic and cultural lives (Feng, 2001:233). This point indicates that
non-violent pressure from international law and international society on the basis of
certain interests, values and norms can be one of plausible mechanisms to alter and
cultivate the identity and character of China.
When considering the close relationship among international law, international
society and certain values such as human rights and democracy, which can help
understand the alteration in China’s identity and character, we can think of several
examples.

First of all, we can chew on China’s membership in the United

Nations.115 China’s UN membership means that China should have been bound by
norms in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and Chinese leaders have been well aware of the fact that most states have been
subscribed to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the UN Charter in
international society.116 Also, in terms of its compliance with international human
rights, China has been gravely criticized by international human right organizations
and non-governmental organizations such as the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights and the Amnesty International.

At this juncture, China has been well aware

of the interests from its integration into international society.

115

China became the member of the United Nations in 1971.
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See, for more information, John F. Cooper (1988).
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In particular, China has

had a great desire to be accepted as a member of the Great Power club whose duty is
to maintain general norms and values of international society and to even promote
them, which can contribute to the well-being of international society in the long run,
in particular via its compliance with international law. 117
Under the above kinds of pressures, China’s gradual engagement in
international society and its acceptance of international law have contributed to the
alteration in China’s identity and character.

For instance, in September 1988, at the

forty-third session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Chinese foreign
Minister described the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the first
international tool for protection of fundamental human rights (Kent, 1993:103).

This

is one of indications to demonstrate that China has gradually changed itself, accepting
international human rights law.

In the past, Chinese had skeptical attitude on the

international law of human rights, while regarding the law as an attempt by Western
countries to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist countries (Chiu, 1988:40).
However, due to the Four Modernizations program and open door policy, China
cannot afford to ignore the human rights issue at home and abroad (Chiu, 1989: 24).
As a matter of fact, China began to join international human rights laws in 1980 (Wan,
2007:739).

Human rights law has been a growing part of international law and so

China could not completely shun the human rights issue in its foreign relations (Wan,
2007:739).

In other words, with the deepening of its economic reform and openness

to the outside world, China started paying sincere attention to international human
rights law (Keyuan, 2006:243).

In particular, now that China is a permanent
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We should keep it in mind that Great Power does not mean just a material superior power, but it is
more than that. Also, in terms of the qualification of membership in international society, the
compliance with international law itself can be recognized as the full membership precondition in
international society. Indeed, Gong uses the compliance with international law as the standard of
civilization. See, for more detail, Gong (1984).
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member of the United Nation Security Council with big power status, it cannot simply
avoid the human rights issue, especially when considering that it has been pursuing
Great Power status (Chiu, 1989: 24).

This is very meaningful since we can assume

that China cannot avoid democracy in the end as well, as democracy becomes the new
standard of civilization in the 21st century.
Now, China had signed 21 international human rights treaties (Lee, 2007b:
448).

China has ratified six of nine core human rights treaties – i.e. the Convention

on Children’s Rights (CRC), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) - and is also considering ratifying the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Guo, 2009:161).

At this juncture,

what is important is that an international convention, once ratified by the Chinese
legislature, becomes part of the Chinese legal system (Wan, 2007:741). In other
words. international human rights laws are lower than the Constitution but equal to
domestic law (Wan, 2007:741).

Because of this, China hesitates to join some

international human rights conventions (Wan, 2007:743).
Moreover, importantly, China launched the 2004 constitutional reform to
permit ‘private property’ and to advocate ‘human rights.’ This 2004 constitutional
reform can be acknowledged as China’s initial big step toward democracy, not to
mention a positive sign that Chinese authority started deliberating on human rights
very seriously, which led to China’s further modification of behavior and language
toward international society.

Nevertheless, now China recognizes the universality of
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human rights protection without questioning the legitimacy of international human
rights law (Wan, 2007:740) but, China has its own unique view on some aspects of
human rights – i.e. the collective and developmental rights of its people rather than
individual human rights (Keyuan, 2006:243).
Let us see several international legal documents, especially, those which China
has supported, so as to help comprehend how international law can have an effect on
China’s democratic development.

As mentioned earlier, international legal

documents such as Articles 1, 25, and 27 of International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 1 of International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), Article 21 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
General Assembly Resolution 47/135, and Paragraph 8 of the Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action obviously reflect an intimate relationship between international
law and democracy.
toward democracy.

These legal documents can have an effect on China’s path
For instance, when considering that China has signed ICESCR

in 1997 and ratified in March 2001, and it signed ICCPR in 1998 and seriously
considers ratifying it, we can assume that these international legal documents have
some influence on China’s identity and character toward democracy (Kent, 2002:353).
Indeed, according to the requirements of the covenant, China submitted its first
implementation report to the UN in June 2003, which passed a UN review in 2005,118
and China also presented its second report on the implementation of ICESCR to the
UN on June 30, 2010.119 Thus, we can say that ICESCR can have an impact on
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See “Let the World Learn of China’s Human Rights Progress,” China News and Report 2010. The
website is available at : http://www.china.org.cn/report/2010-10/08/content_21078130.htm
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See “China submits second implementation report on international covenant to UN,” Chinese
Government’s Official Web Portal. The website is available at http://www.gov.cn/english/201007/07/content_1648171.htm
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China’s gradual alteration in its identity and character.

Also, the Committee on

Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights goads China to have public consultations to
bring about interest and debate on the steps the State Party has carried out in
implementing its treaty obligations under the Covenant; goads it to review the Trade
Union Act to permit workers to organize independent trade unions; and goads it to get
rid of restrictions on freedom of information and expression (Lee, 2007b:451).
These examples show that international law can have an impact on China.
Let us investigate more on the impacts of international legal documents such
as ICCPR as well as ICESCR on China, in particular in terms of China’s democratic
development.

ICESCR and ICCPR can affect China’s democratic development.

When considering “Article 1 of ICESCR,” and Donnelly’s concept of democracy, we
can expect that international legal documents can influence China’s domestic arenas.
For instance, Article 1 of ICESCR states “All peoples have the rights of selfdetermination.

By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and

freely pursue their economic, social and cultural system.” 120 Donnelly defines
democracy with the following: “democracy allocates sovereign authority to the people
to determine their own political, economic, and social and cultural system”(Donnelly,
2003:191).

This indicates that those international legal documents can influence

China’s democratic development.

Also, the ICCPR can clearly show its support of

democracy, when considering that the ICCPR states fundamentals for democracy –
e.g. the right of self-determination (Article 1), prohibition of torture, cruel or
degrading punishment (Article 7), democratic elections (Article 25), freedom of
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See “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” Available at the website:
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm
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movement, thought, religion and expression (Article 18), the right of assembly
(Article 21), and the ability to associate (Article 22).

Due to this, someone can argue

that if China ratifies the ICCPR, then the fundamentals for democracy will be given
the opportunity to develop in China (Lee, 2007b: 473).

This clearly can display how

international law can influence China’s domestic policy, and further its identity and
character.
For the last time, let me examine the impact of international law on religious
freedom in China, since religious freedom is very important for democratic
development.

There are many international legal documents to support religious

freedom in China.

For instance, we can think of Article 2 of ICESCR (Prohibition

on Religious Discrimination) and, Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Prohibition on Religious Discrimination); and Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (the right to have or to adopt a religion or belief of
his/her choice, and to manifest his/her religion or belief); and Article 6 of the
Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination based on
Religion or Belief (DRID). 121 These international legal documents can indirectly
influence religious freedom in China.
Actually, since the 1980s when Deng Xiaoping softened the control of
religions, Chinese civilians have gradually enjoyed religious freedom.
Christian church got back to society after 1978.

For example,

Beatrice Leung made a good

summary about the general improved religious freedom in China, saying:
In 1983, there were 300 Catholic churches in China; by
1987 the number had increased to 2,100, by 1992 to
121

The United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the DRID. See, for Article 6 of the
Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief,
the website available at: http://www.religioustolerance.org/un_dec.htm
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3,900 and by 1997 to 5,000. The number of Catholic
adherents was established to have risen from 3.3 million
in 1986 to over 12 million in 1994 (including both the
official and underground churches). In 2004, there
were reportedly 2,200 priests. This number was up
from 1,500 in 1997; three-quarters of the priesthood had
been ordained in the previous 12 years. Protestant
numbers increased steadily from 5-6 million in 1993 to
10 million in 1997, and to 14 million in 2004. In 2004,
it was estimated that there were 16,000 protestant
churches and 32, 000 meeting points (70 per cent built
within the previous 20 years) (Leung, 2005:905).
Also, in 2006, a poll of 4,600 people by Shanghai University Professors demonstrates
more religious freedom in China.

BBC news mentioned the poll, by saying:

300 million people nationwide could be religious,
compared to the official figure of 100 million…About
200 million believers are Buddhists, Taoists or
worshippers of legendary figures such as the Dragon
King and God of Fortune…. The survey found that
Buddhism, Taoism, Catholicism, Christianity and Islam
are the country’s five major religions – China considers
Catholicism as separate to Christianity, which covers
Protestantism…. A significant rise in Christianity –
accounting for 12% of all believers, or 40 million,
compared with the official figure of 16 million in 2005.
Professor Liu Zhongyu, who helped carry out the survey,
attributed the rise in religious belief to growing
freedoms in the country as well as the upheaval of rapid
social and economic change. 122
Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution advocates this point, by saying:
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy
freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public
organization or individual may compel citizens to
believe in, or not believe in any religion; nor may they
discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not
believe in, any religion. The state shall protect normal
religious activities.123
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See “Survey finds 300m Chinese believers.” BBC News. February 7, 2006.
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This Constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted on December 4, 1982.
website available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html
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See the

The protecting regulation of religious liberty in China can be much more
easily found in rural arenas such as Guangdong than in urban arenas like Beijing. 124
For instance, Article 2 and Article 21 of Guangdong Religious Regulations provide
broad protection of religious liberty:
Article 2: Citizens have freedom of religious belief.
No one is allowed to force others to believe or not
believe or not believe in religion. These should not be
any discrimination against either citizens who believe or
citizens who do not believe in religion.
Article 21: The normal religious activities of approved
and opened places of religious activity are under the
protection of the law. No unit or individual is allowed
to spread atheistic or anti-religious propaganda within
places of religious activity. 125
This demonstrates that citizens in China definitely enjoy more religious freedom than
ever.
At this point, we can also obviously see some parallel among international
legal documents such as Article 2 of ICESCR, and Article 2 and Article 21 of
Guangdong Religious Regulations.

Article 2 of ICESCR states:

the States Parties to the present covenant undertake to
guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of
any kind as to race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.126
When considering this tendency, we can deny the idea that international law and
domestic law are completely separable, not to mention the assumption that
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See the website available at:
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Guangdong Religious Regulations, supra note 97, at 60, 62. See Article 4 and 5 of “Regulations
on Religious Affairs of the Province of Guangdong.” June 30, 2000. Available at the website:
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international society and domestic society are completely separable, as completely
different domains, which is similar to the intimate relationship between international
society and international law.
However, it is not right to say that China completely allows religious freedom.
China still constrains religious organizations, religious activities and places of
worship since Beijing leaders believe that uncontrolled religion can lead to a catalyst
of social revolt, which could explain why the Chinese government has been so
sensitive to Falun Going, and the Chinese government has even taken the step of
choosing Catholic Church bishops, rejecting any authority of the Vatican, even though
around 85% of the official Church's bishops are approved by Rome. 127 Also, Article
36 of Chinese Constitution declares that no one is allowed to use the religion to be
engaged in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere
with the educational system of the state. This indicates that the right to religious
freedom cannot be exercised in a manner that infringes on the interests of the state, of
the society, and of the collective (Evans, 2002: 757-758).

Further the 1982

Constitution does not yet allow citizens to appeal to the procurator for the alleged
violations of their rights by the bureaucracy (Kolodner, 1994:470).
However, we can’t deny the increasing religious liberty in China, even though
it has been limited to activities which the government feels don’t interfere with state
stability and prosperity. 128 Also, we can expect China to continuously increase
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The Vatican has no formal diplomatic contact with China. In other words, Chinese Roman
Catholic Churches have no official connection with Vatican. See, for more information referring to
China’s religious freedom, the website available at:
http://www.cardinalrating.com/cardinal_214__article_4818.htm. Also, see Beatrice Leung (2005).
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Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin had been in pursuit for the accommodation policy between
religious liberty and state stability and prosperity. Hu Jintao continues his predecessors’ policies.
See Beatrice Leung (2005).
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religious freedom, since international law, such as Article 18 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, will continuously give some pressure to China for its
lack of religious freedom.129 In particular, when considering that China will definitely
ratify the ICCPR, we can say that Chinese will enjoy more religious freedom.
Article 18 of the ICCPR is worthwhile to look at. Article 18 states:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to
have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom,
either individually or in community with others and it public
or in private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship,
observance, and practice and teaching; 2 No one shall be
subject to coercion that would impair his freedom to have or
adopt a religion or belief of his choice; 3 Freedom to manifest
one’s religion or belief may be subject only to such
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to
protect public safety, order, health or morals or the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others; 4 the State parties
to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to
ensure the religious and moral education of their children in
conformity with their own convictions. 130
China’s ratification of the ICCPR implies that Chinese must change itself by carrying
out various obligations required by Article 18 of the ICCPR, altering domestic law
where it is incompatible with international standard in terms of individual’s freedom
of religion.
In China, such gradual religious freedom should be recognized as significant
for its contribution to democratic development in the long run, especially when
considering that religious freedom indicates ‘freedom of association,’ ‘freedom of
129

See Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or
belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.” Available at the website:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml#a18
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See “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Available at the website:
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm
121

speech’, freedom of expression’ and ‘freedom of consciousness,’ which are core
values of democracy.

In other words, we can perceive that the increasing religious

freedom itself signifies China’s move toward democracy, even if it is slowly moving.
Also, we can see that international law can ultimately have an impact on China’s
identity and character.
So far, I have attempted to reveal how international legal documents of human
rights and those of religious liberty can indirectly and directly alter domestic
regulations, which might contribute to China’s path toward democracy in the long run.
As the nature of international society displays more democratic norms in the postCold War era and 21st century and international law has been expected to embrace the
increasingly democratic norms in this context, China has been anticipated to gradually
accept democratic norm as well as human rights in the end.

As mentioned above, on

March 14, 2004, the Chinese Constitution was amended so as to guarantee private
property (“legally obtained private property of the citizens shall not be violated”) and
human rights (“the state respects and protects human rights”). 131 This can be seen as
democratic development in China, not to mention a nice gesture to match the standard
of international human rights, even if this might be primarily derived from the newly
created rich class’s and the middle class’s desire for the protection of their own
property on the basis of Chinese economic radical growth, and further such changes
have been dismissed as merely paying lip-service to the idea of freedoms for Chinese
people and to quell social unrest.132 In addition, on October 19, 2005, China White
Paper on political democracy shows that China is slowly moving toward democracy.
131

See “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.” Wikipedia. Available at the website:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_People's_Republic_of_China
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This is very meaningful not only because this document itself is the first time for the
Chinese government to issue a white paper on the political democracy, but also
because it seems to indicate Chinese government’s official admission that it has faced
massive pressure from various directions whose one might be derived from
international law.

China is more anticipated to abide by international law, not to

mention just international human rights law itself.
To sum up, international society and international law have increasingly
reflected democratic norms as well as human rights, and so we cannot totally deny
that China has transformed itself toward democracy since it has faced the increasing
pressure to alter its identity and character from authoritarian regime to democracy, as
it did transform its identity and character from an aggressive revisionist power to a
status quo power since 1978, because China has been well aware of its interests from
its integration into international society, and China has a great desire to become a
Great Power.

Also, China is continuously expected to transform its identity and

character to satisfy the standard of international society.

In China’s case, I

emphasized the triangular relationship among international society, international law
and democracy, and I stressed that international law can have an impact on democratic
development in a pluralist international society. 133
B) South Korea
In South Korea, we can observe the contribution of international law to
democratic promotion and consolidation, and also the effect of international law on
South Korea’s path toward democracy.

At this juncture, as seen in China’s case, the
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Here, I do not stress enough the relationship among economic development, economic
liberalization, political freedom and international law. Nonetheless, I implied the close relationship
between economic development and international human right law.
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triangular relationship between democracy, international law and international society
will be discerned as well, and the relationship between democracy and international
law in a solidarist international society will be stressed.

In the process, I will

investigate international human rights law and international labor law to grasp how
international law can promote and consolidate democracy in South Korea and how it
has had an indirect or direct impact on South Korea’s path toward democracy.
When considering the relationship between international law and domestic law
in South Korea, we can see that some international law can be recognized as domestic
law in South Korea.

For instance, South Korea’s constitution states:

Treaties duly concluded and promulgated under the constitution
and generally recognized rules of international law shall have
the same force and effect of law as domestic laws of the
Republic of Korea (Article 6, paragraph 1).134
In short, if treaties are ratified by South Korea, they have the same effect as domestic
law.

This demonstrates that international law can be very effective in South Korea,

although in South Korea, the constitution is superior to international law. 135 In
consideration of Article 6 (1) of South Korea’s constitution, let us examine the
international human rights law and international labor law.
First of all, let us take a brief look at the role of international human rights law.
In South Korea, currently, the promotion and consolidation of human rights and
democracy can be recognized as one of primary foreign policies, which has been
advocated by a majority of South Korean civilians.

However, during military
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See “Constitution of South Korea.” Wikisource. Available at the website:
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Constitution_of_South_Korea
See, for more information, “한국 법체계에서 국제법의 지위” (the status of international law in
South Korea’s legal system). Available at the website:
http://kin.naver.com/qna/detail.nhn?d1id=11&dirId=1112&docId=66285635&qb=6rWt7KCc67KV6rO
8IO2VnOq1rQ==&enc=utf8&section=kin&rank=2&search_sort=0&spq=0&pid=gMufddoi5TCssvYQ
gyRsss--169783&sid=TOCSQRxq4EwAADvfHWg
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authoritarian regimes, human rights and democratic development had been dismissed
for economic and social development.

For instance, the Park regime thoroughly

believed that South Korea should continue its economic and social development prior
to human rights and democratic development for its national security.
“Every citizen should feel that he is a soldier.

He claimed

Politicians, journalists, religious

people, students, professors, workers, and housewives – all of them should determine
that they are warriors to defend nation.”136 In particular, during his regime, former
US President Jimmy Carter’s projected withdrawal of the US troops, under the urgent
situation of the military stand-off along the 38 parallel in the Korean Peninsula, led to
the uncertain and insecure feeling in the mind of South Korean leadership and the
public.137 With national security reason, human rights and political freedom in South
Korea could be easily dismissed, and socio-economic development was seen as one
way to facilitate national security and to legitimize the authoritarian system. 138

Also,

in South Korea, constitutions such as 1954, 1962, 1972 and 1980 had been antidemocratic, except for 1960, until before 1987, and they were abused as a simple
mechanism for sustaining power for the presidents and the ruling parties (Lee,
1993:707).139 Under these circumstances, the desire and dedication to democratic
development as well as human rights could be hardly thinkable.

These brought deep

concern about human rights encroachment such as ‘illegal arrests and detentions,
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See Richard Halloran (1975), and C.I. Eugene Kim (1978).
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See Eugene Kim (1978).
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This circumstance can be similar to China’s prior policy of economic development and social
stability over political freedom.
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Anti-democratic constitutions can be easily found. In particular, the 1962 constitution is for no
limit terms for presidency and the 1972 constitution was for Yusin system. See, for more information,
the website available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Constitution_of_the_Republic_of_Korea
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tortures, imprisonments without fair trials, unexplained disappearance and death from
unknown reasons,’ from many human rights experts, in particular from international
governmental and non-governmental organizations like Amnesty International, the
International Commission of Jurists and the International League for Human Rights
(Lee, 1993:707-708).
However, since 1987, South Korea has radically transformed itself into a
decent democratic regime.

This radical change in identity and character of South

Korea was ignited primarily by its civilians’ endless effort toward democracy.
Particularly, massive protests in the Spring of 1987 attracted a wide range of the
South Korean population and brought out government acceptance of the eight-point
reform proposals, such as direct presidential elections (Lee, 1993:707, fn. 11).

Also,

on October 29, 1987, the revised constitution could strengthen democratic principles,
augmenting the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (Lee,
1993:711).

The amended constitution was eventually approved in a national

referendum (Lee, 1993:707).

Chung-in Moon, Youngjae Jin and Wook Kim describe

the amended constitution, by saying:
The Present Constitution, amended on October 29,
1987, was the outcome of the continuous struggle of
the Korean people, who were determined to make
democracy prosper and to build an advanced
modern state. Accordingly, it guaranteed maximum
autonomy and independence to the judiciary as a strong
means to promote a law governing principle and to
protect the basic rights of the people (pp 8) The 1987
constitution protects various rights. Chapter II, in
Article 10 to 39, lists the duties and rights of citizens.
Article 21 pertains to speech and association, subject
only to the honor and rights of others who may be
entitled to compensation for unbridled speech. There
are separately a freedom to move and rights to work
and collective action of unions. Entering into the
90s, all the legal and institutional barriers to the
freedoms of speech, association and assembly have
126

been removed. Basically, people feel free to say what
they want to say, and organize a gathering whenever
and wherever they want. The number of demonstrates
has increased considerably, and the way the police
respond to peaceful demonstrations has also changed
from repressive to protective (pp 12)…..Constitutional
Article 11 on equality stipulates there shall be no
discrimination on the basis of religion. Article 20
guarantees freedom of religion, and keeps state separate
South Korea is richly diverse, and has Buddhism,
Confucianism, Christianity both Catholic and Protestant,
Chondogyo, hundreds of minor religions and the long
shaman tradition.140
All of these clearly show that democracy as well as human rights were voluntarily
accepted in South Korea, which cannot be seen in China and in Iraq, since Korean
citizens have been increasingly aware of the significance of human rights and
democracy especially after the Kwangju Massacre of May 1980 that claimed around
2000 innocent lives.

Currently, a majority of civilians in South Korea feel that they

are living in a liberal democratic state in which the rule of law, harmonious interests,
mutual toleration, limited government, transparency, individual freedom, human
rights, equality can be guaranteed in some sense. 141
Due to the above reason, I put South Korea into a solidarist international
society, which seems to demean the external influence on political freedom in South
Korea.

However, South Korea’s voluntary acceptance of human rights and

democracy does not necessarily mean that international law has had no impact on
political freedom in South Korea.

International law has had some impact on South

Korea’s alteration of identity and character, and also South Korea’s voluntary
compliance with international law has been more likely to fortify democratic norms
140

See Chung-in Moon, Youngjae-Kim and Wook Kim, Democracy Report for South Korea. The
website is available at http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South_Korea.pdf pp.13
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Suk Tae Lee points out this as well.

See Lee (1993: 711-712).
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and values across international society, when considering that international society
and international law have increasingly reflected human rights and democracy and
South Korea’s foreign policy has been more and more primarily based on human
rights and democracy.
When considering South Korea’s ratification of International Human Rights
Covenants, we notice that importantly in April 1990, South Korea ratified the
international covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural rights (ICESCR), the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR (Protocol) (Lee, 1993:706).

Also, South Korea has ratified

many significant human rights conventions; for example, the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

Those Covenants

strongly advocate the protection of human rights and basic freedom, which are closely
related to democratic development across international society.

In particular, South

Korea’s ratification of ICESCR, ICCPR and the Protocol to the ICCPR indicates that
South Korea entered into international human rights legal order (Jung, 2006:49-50).
And, South Korea’s participation in CRC (December 20, 1991) and CAT (February 8,
1995) can be interpreted as the assumption that South Korea can’t justify its violation
of human rights in the name of economic growth and national security (Jung,
2006:50).
Also, importantly, at this juncture, South Korea’s ratification of international
human rights covenants indicates the co-relationship between international law and
domestic law rather than the conflicting relationship, which can ultimately grasp the
idea that the impact of international law is strong enough to influence the identity and
128

character of state in some sense.

For instance, under Article 6 (1) of the Constitution

in South Korea, the ICCPR or the CRC has the same effect as domestic laws do and it
can apply to domestic cases (Lee, 1993:712). 142 This refers to the inseparable
relationship between international society and domestic society, and also, this
demonstrates that international law can have an impact on South Korea, in particular
its democratic development.
However, I should admit that there are several conflicting aspects between
international law and domestic law in South Korea.

As an example, we can think of

the National Security Law (NSL) that could lead to the highly possible violation of
international human rights law.

Under the NSL, South Koreans are not allowed to

praise North Korea or disseminate North Korean propaganda.

143

Also, under the

NSL, South Koreans are prohibited from meeting with North Koreans or visiting
North Korea without state permission. 144

Due to these kinds of prohibitions, South

Korea’s NSL often tends to violate the right to freedom of expression and association.
However, international human right law has reduced South Korean
governments’ abuse of NSL that still restricts some basic rights of Korean citizens in
some sense. 145 In other words, Human rights activists and human rights organizations
use international law to criticize any violation of human rights in South Korea, and to
abolish or revise its NSL. For instance, in November 1995, the UN Special
Rapporteur made a statement concerning the NSL to promote the right of freedom of
opinion and expression in South Korea, emphasizing the Universal Declaration of
142

See, for example, Byung-do Park (2007:37).
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See Kay Seok (2010).
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Human Rights and the ICCPR:
a) The Government of the Republic of Korea is strongly
encouraged to repeal the National Security Law and to
consider other means, in accordance with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to protect its
national security.
c) All prisoners who are held for their exercise of the
right to freedom of opinion and expression should be
released unconditionally. The cases of prisoners who
have been tried under previous governments should be
reviewed, due account being taken of obligations arising
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. . .146
Also, Human Right Watch often emphasizes the fact that South Korea is a state party
to ICCPR, while pointing out Article 19 of ICCPR (the Right to hold opinions without
interference).147 This can give some pressure to the South Korean government to
protect freedom of expression, which can make it possible for South Koreans to reveal
their opinions on North Korea.

Nonetheless, South Korea can justify its use of the

NSL on the basis of Article 4 Section 1 of the ICCPR (Kraft, 2001: 644).
As an another example, we can think of the South Korean government’s
prohibition of persons with HIV and AIDS from their entering into South Korea or its
requirement of disclosure of HIV status for entry for short-term stays.

South Korea

categorically refuses entry of persons living with HIV and AIDS or requires
disclosure of HIV status for entry for short-term stay. 148

Human Rights Watch

criticizes South Korea’s policy for its treatment of people living with HIV and AIDS,
emphasizing Article 26 of ICCPR (equal protection of law without discrimination) as
well as Article 7 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (equality before
146

Available at the website: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/commission/country52/39-add1.htm
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the law and equal protection of the law without discrimination).

149

All in all, these

examples can be ultimately understood as the process of consolidation of human
rights and democracy in South Korea, and we can hardly deny the fact that
international law has had some effect on democratic development in South Korea.
As mentioned above, South Korea becomes a mature democracy, but this does not
necessarily mean that international law is not necessary for South Korea’s
consolidation of democracy.
When considering international labor law, we can see that international labor
law has contributed to democratic development, like the contribution of international
human right law to democracy.

In South Korea, governments had been severely

repressing the labor union, without allowing any freedom of association.

As an

example, particularly under Park and Chun’s military regimes, governments did not
hesitate to arbitrarily arrest, imprison and even torture the leaders of labor unions,
even if South Korea’s rapid and enviable economic growth itself had been
predominantly on the basis of its human resources, for instance, its large, literate and
extraordinarily hard-working workforce (West, 1987: 477).

The 1963 labor law

amendments under the Park government imposed harsh constraints on labor autonomy
(West, 1987: 491).

West made a good summary on the 1963 labor law amendments,

by saying:
The 1963 amendments established the corporatist
principle of representational monopoly by prohibiting
recognition of competing unions deemed to hamper the
ordinary operation of an already existing labor unions.
State controls over formation and dissolution of unions
were established. The amendments also expanded the
scope of the essential services section, within which
strikes were prohibited, and mandated procedural
149
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prerequisites including national union approval, for all
strikes. At the time of their enactment, the 1963
amendments were criticized as attempts to restrain the
labor movement for the sake of economic development,
based on their evident purposes of (1) strengthening
government
intervention,
(2)
shaping
labor
administration with an emphasis on the so-called public
interests, (3) restricting labor disputes, and (4)
providing institutions for the relief of unfair labor
practices (West, 1987:491).
This amendment was not only for social stability, but also for economic growth,
which could ultimately legitimize labor exploitation for comparative advantage in
labor costs, domestication of labor unions and the maintenance of low wage, the
ruthless exploitation of teenage girls, various discrimination like wage and promotion
against female workers and long-hours working day (West, 1987:492-532).

Under

Park Chung-Hee’s Yushin system, since 1972, the record of South Korea in protecting
the basic human rights of union members had been so poor (West, 1987:525).
During the Yushin system period, Unionists had been very often harassed, beaten,
arrested, convicted on false indictments and tortured, which could be compared to the
patterns of human rights deprivations under the Greek and Chilean military
governments in the 1970s (West, 1987:525).

This can be one of the façades for the

typical lives of labor unionists in South Korea.
However, since 1985, the South Korean government started revealing its
intention for the membership in the International Labor Organization in which South
Korea would have to conform to the international labor standard.

Its shift was

derived from the lack of legitimacy of Chun’s regime and from the increasing
democratic movement in South Korea, especially the ‘radical democratic movement’
since 1987 (West, 1987: 542).

Along with the Kwangju massacre in May 1980 that

cost around two thousand civilian lives, Chun’s regime rejected the historical flow of
132

an open political and economic system, which led to the lack of legitimacy of Chun’s
regime.150 In South Korea, the request of political freedom from ordinary citizens had
been increasingly strong, along with their antipathy against Chun’s regime.

The

middle class’s participation in the student-led -protest for democratic institutions
brought out democratic reform.

Along with this circumstance, the government had

been more and more sensitive to the criticism from the public and from abroad, for
labor workers’ horrible situation and denial of labor workers’ rights.

As C.I, Eugene

Kim points out, on February 12, 1985, via the 12th National Assembly election,
people made democratic exercise within the military authoritarian context, even
though it did not have anything to do with the transfer of power (Kim, 1986:66-67).151
Eventually, as a result of the 1987 amended constitution, labor rights started being
increasingly protected.

It is worthwhile to take a look at the labor law.

Korean

Labor law declares:
The Constitution grants fundamental labor standards,
such as the right and also the obligation to work (Art.
32 paras. 1 and 2); the workers’ right to freedom of
association, collective bargaining and collective
action (Art. 33), with public officials and employees
of important defense industries being excepted
unless provided for by law; special protection for
working children and working women including
prevention of unjustified discrimination against
women (Art. 32 paras. 4 and 5).152
Also, South Korea eventually became the full member of the International Labor
150
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Organization (ILO) in 1991, along with its full membership in the United Nations.
This has given further pressure on South Korea to conform to international obligations
to protect labor workers.

South Korea ratified around 28 International Labor

Conventions; for example, Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation)
Convention (3/29/2001), Minimum Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention (12/27/2001),
Officers’ competency Certificates Convention (11/04/2003), Medical Examination
Convention (12/9/1992), Labor Inspection Convention (12/9/1992), Employment
Service Convention (12/27/2001), Equal Remuneration Convention (8/12/1997),
discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention (4/12/1998), employment
Policy Convention (9/12/1992), Minimum Wage Fixing Convention (12/27/2001),
Workers’ Representatives Convention (12/27/2001), Minimum Age Convention
(1/28/1999), Human Resources Development Convetnion (1/21/1994), Tripartite
Consultation (International Labor Standards) Convention (11/15/1999), Labor
Administration Convention (8/12/1997), Workers with Family Responsibilities
Convention (3/29/2001), Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled
Persons) Convention (11/15/1999), Labor Statistic Convention (12/8/2003),
Chemicals Convention (11/4/2003), and Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention
(3/29/2001).153 All of the Conventions have given some level of pressure to South
Korea to comply with the standard norms of international society, which can
ultimately contribute to human rights and political freedom.
There are many cases that international labor law can have an impact on South
Korea.

For example, the prohibition of child labor in its domestic law was brought
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See “List of Ratifications of International Labor Conventions: Republic of Korea.” Available at the
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about by International Labor Organization Convention No. 138. In other words, as
South Korea became the member of the ILO in 1991, certain laws have been put into
place to guarantee that the use of child labor is not an issue. 154 According to
International Labor Law, minimum age convention:
aims at the abolition of child labor, stipulating that the minimum
age for admission to employment shall not be less than the age
of completion of compulsory schooling, and in any case not less
than 15 years (14 for developing countries) (Convention No.
138).155
Due to this, South Korea came to have new labor laws concerning child labor.
According to South Korea’s labor law, “A person under the age of 15 shall not be
employed as a worker.

However, this shall not apply to a person with an

employment permit issued by the Minister of Labor” (Article 62, paragraph 1 of the
Labor Standards Act).156 Moreover, we can think of the following:
working hours of a person aged between 15 and 18 shall not
exceed seven hours per day and forty-two hours per a week;
provided, however, that the parties concerned have reached
agreement, the working hours may be extended up to an hour
per day, or six hours per week (Article 67 of the Labor
Standards Act).157
When considering the above, we can see some connection between domestic
labor law and international labor law, which indicates that international law can have
an impact on South Korea.
room for improvement.

However, labor rights in South Korea still have some

For example, we can think of ILO Convention No. 87 that
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expressively protects the rights of unions and federations to affiliate with
international bodies (West, 1987:524).158 ILO Convention No. 87 states “public
authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right of free
association or impede the lawful exercise thereof”159 and further, the ILO Freedom
of Association Committee has repeatedly stressed the right to strike by workers and
their organizations are generally recognized as a legitimate means of defending their
occupational interests (West, 1987:520).

However, laws in South Korea imposed

qualitative and status restrictions to bar millions of workers from forming or joining
unions (West, 1987:510).

In South Korea, the public officials and teachers were

prohibited from their joining labor unions.

Article 31 of the South Korean

Constitution declares “the right to association, collective bargaining and collective
action shall not be granted to workers who are public officials, except for those
authorized by the provisions of law”(West, 1987:508).

However, the ILO

conventions have been continuously rejecting a public/private distinction as
determinative of associative rights (West, 1987:508).

In general, International

Labor Convention No. 87 clearly claims:
workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall
have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the
organization concerned, to join organizations of their own
choosing without previous authorization.160
Also, International Labor Organization Convention No. 87 provides that “neither
workers’ nor employers’ organizations shall be subject to dissolution by
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Ibid, ILO Convention No. 87, art. 2.
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administrative fiat.”161 The ILO strongly requested South Korea to restore the basic
labor rights of public officials and schoolteachers, and termination of government
interference in labor union activities (Kim and Moon, 2000:58).
Due to the above international pressure in South Korea, workers have
gradually become free to organize and join unions, and the external pressures could be
recognized as new catalysts for labor reforms in South Korea (Kim and Moon,
2000:59).

From July 1, 1999, teachers eventually got permission to organize and to

bargain collectively such as the Korean Teachers’ and Education Workers’ Union and
the Korean Union of Teaching and Educational Workers, and additionally from
January 1, 1999, other public officials were permitted to organize workplace
associations, if they are of grade 6 or higher and do not belong to special services.162
Furthermore, Article 33 (paragraph 1) of Constitution claims that the workers’ rights
to collective action, such as strike, are constitutionally guaranteed. 163 At this juncture,
this suggests that international law can directly or indirectly have an impact on
domestic law, and further it can be the valuable mechanism to spread and consolidate
certain norms and values across international society.

Via this logic, we can perceive

how democracy can be ultimately promoted and consolidated across international
society.
However, South Korea has not yet ratified International Labor Organization
Convention No. 87.

When South Korea participated in the OECD in 1996, a

condition of adherence was a commitment to reform its industrial relations legislation
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Ibid, ILO Convention, No. 87, art. 4.
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See the website available at: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ifpdial/ll/kor.htm.

163

Ibid.
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in line with ILO standards.

164

However, there has been no reform.165

In other

words, in spite of its 1996 pledge, current and previous governments have not yet
ratified ILO Conventions No. 87 (freedom of association).

166

But, as Amnesty

International points out, although South Korea has not yet ratified Convention No. 87,
as a member state of ILO, it is obligated to comply with ILO Convention No. 87 to
protect the right to freedom of association for all workers, without distinction
whatsoever, in particular when considering that ILO Convention No. 87 can be seen
in the Constitution of the International Labor Organization. 167 This is one way to
consolidate South Korea’s democracy.
In South Korea, I investigated international laws such as international human
rights law and international labor law in order to reveal how international law can
have an impact on democratic development across international society.

We can see

that these international laws can have an impact on domestic law and further human
rights and democracy.

As a matter of fact, international human rights law and

international labor law can have an effect on the promotion and consolidation of
democracy in the end, as they have been gradually respected across international
society.

For instance, the U.N. Human Rights Commission strongly recommended

that South Korea amend its labor laws which are in violation of U. N. human rights
states (Kim and Moon, 2000:58).

As West points out, also the obligations
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See “International Unions Call for Action on Labor Rights Abuses in Korea.” Available at the
website: http://cms.iuf.org/?q=node/564
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“Republic of Korea (South Korea): Government must respect the right to freedom of association of
all migrant workers.” Amnesty International. Available at the website:
http://www.amnesty.org.nz/archived_news/Republic-of-Korea-South-Korea-Government-mustrespect-the-right-to-freedom-of-association-of-all-migrant-workers
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undertaken by ILO members with reference to freedom of association presume the
efficient protection of “the interdependent rights of personal security, freedom of
thought and expression, and non-discrimination in the administration of justice”(West,
1987:525).

This implies a strong penchant for human rights and democracy.

In

consideration of the above, we can say that international law has not only promoted
democracy but also influenced South Korea’s path toward democracy.

All in all, in

the triangular relationship between international law, international society and
democracy, we can recognize that international law facilitates political freedom in
South Korea.

However, we should not forget the specific circumstances in South

Korea in which a majority of civilians are more likely to accept democracy and
human rights; internal factors are more influential than external factors in promotion
and consolidation of democracy; and solidarist aspects can be strongly felt.
C) Iraq
In Iraq’s case, we can think of the relationship between international law and
its path toward democracy.

In this section, I will attempt to show that in the future,

international law may permit the use of force for the promotion of democracy, as
democracy has slowly become the standard of civilization in the 21st century.
Nevertheless current international law tends to prohibit the use of force for promotion
of democracy without any resolution of UN Security Council.

Unlike previous cases,

this case might indirectly suggest the necessity of transformation in international law
that can allow more aggressive external intervention in domestic affairs and even
regime change, as international society has increasingly reflected democratic norms,
especially when considering that international law itself is not inherently fixed but
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that it has evolved on the basis of the nature of international society. 168 This will
indirectly facilitate the triangular relationship among international society,
international law and democracy.

However, I have to say that the use of force for

promotion of democracy should be applied to outlaw states alone.
I will begin with the question of whether or not international law can plausibly
support the US/UK coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq, which has been dominant debate
since the Second Gulf War in 2003.

In general, in the international law community

(international lawyers and international law scholars), scholars have rarely advocated
the US and UK coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 as legitimate.

Many

international lawyers have strongly disapproved of the military intervention for
democratic promotion as illegal.

Such prohibition of military intervention for

democratic development is deeply embedded in Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.
Article 2 (4) reads:
All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the
United Nations. 169
Nonetheless, the UN Charter does not completely discard the possibility of resorting
to legitimate forms of force.
the lawful use of force.

There are two exceptions under the Charter permitting

Article 51 of the UN Charter allow for inherent rights of

individual or collective self-defense (Palmer, 2004:1).

Intervention is otherwise

possible collectively via the UN as a last resort to maintain international peace and
168

This section will be longer than the previous two sections, since it has been one of the most
controversial issues in international society since 2003, and this can be the turning point in the
character of international society, even if I, in brief, touched on this issue when dealing with liberal
anti-pluralism.
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See “Charter of the United Nation.” Available at the website.:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
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security, if the Security Council determines that there is a threat to the peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (Palmer,
2004:1-2).

With these two exceptions, there is no legal basis for military

interventions, in particular for the restoration or creation of democracy, or for the
relief of humanitarian disasters (Palmer, 2004:54). Thus, in consideration of Article
2 (4), we can easily conclude that the US and UK invasion of Iraq for promotion of
democracy cannot be legal, since the use of force was not authorized by the UN
Security Council.

Indeed, former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi

Annan declared the 2003 Iraq War illegal. 170 This connotes that international law
seems to be deeply rooted in the principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention.
However, we cannot totally disregard military intervention for democratic
development as well as human right across international society – i.e. in particular a
liberal anti-pluralist international society.

Due to this, international law needs to be

changed in order to adapt itself to the changing world.
1999 Kosovo conflict.

It is worth looking to the

The Kosovo war in 1999 can be seen as the first war in which

states declared war on another state to protect the human rights of subjects of that
state (Schwabach, 2003:10).

However, in doing so, we can say that the NATO states

broke with existing international law, since

international law has not yet recognized

any right to go to war to protect human rights, or to intervene militarily in the
domestic human rights practices of another state (Schwabach, 2003:10).

As noted

above, the Charter of the UN does not contain any right of humanitarian intervention,
and prohibits even the UN from intervening in matters which are essentially within
170

See, for more detail, “Lessons of Iraq war underscore the importance of UN Charter-Annan.” UN
News Center. September 16, 2004. Available at the website:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=11953&cr=iraq&Cr1=.Accessed%20may%206,20
05
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the domestic jurisdiction of any state, absent the authorization of the Security Council
(Schwabach, 2003:11).

Thus, we can say that the action of NATO countries

drastically departs from the Charter system for collective security, which hinges on a
rule (collective enforcement action authorized by the Security Council) and an
exception (self-defense) (Cassese, 1999: 24).
However, the principal justification of NATO countries for their military
action was that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) (FRY) had performed massacres and other gross breaches of human
rights as well as mass expulsions of thousands of their citizens belonging to a
particular ethnic group, and that this humanitarian catastrophe would most likely
destabilize neighboring countries such as Albania, Bosnia, and Herzegovina and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, thus, forming a threat to the peace and
stability of the region (Cassese, 1999: 25).

And, the intervention was comprehended

by most democratic governments and numerous scholars to be a legitimate
humanitarian intervention (Heinze, 2006:29).

Also, importantly, today, human rights

are no longer of exclusive concern to the particular state where they may be infringed.
Human rights are increasingly becoming the major concern of the international
society as a whole (Cassese, 1999: 26).

There is a widespread sense that they cannot

and should not be crushed with impunity in any part of world (Cassese, 1999: 26).
Thus, the Kosovo intervention can be perceived as evidence of state practice toward
the creation of a customary legal norm that allows for humanitarian intervention
without UN approval (Heinze, 2006:29-30).

In other words, the 1999 Kosovo

intervention may be taken as evidence of an emerging doctrine in international law
permitting the use of forcible countermeasures to hinder a state from committing
large-scale atrocities and genocides on its own territory, especially in circumstance
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where the Security Council is incapable responding adequately to the crisis (Cassese,
1999: 23).

We often see that the Security Council cannot take any coercive action to

stop massacres or atrocities because of disagreements among the Permanent Members
or because one or more of them exercises its veto power, and so it either refrains from
any action or only restricts itself to criticizing or denouncing the massacres or
atrocities, plus possibly terming the situation a threat to the peace, such as in Rwanda
in 1994 and the Bosnian War from 1992 to 1995 (Cassese, 1999: 23). Thanks to this,
we need a new legal norm to allow the use of force to stop massacres or atrocities
without any authorization of Security Council.

The Kosovo conflict shows that we

need a legal norm for the use of force without any resolution of the Security Council
to stop massacres and atrocities.

At this juncture, for me, the vital question

concerning the use of force is, as W. Michael Reisman put it, not whether coercion has
been applied in the absence of any resolution of Security Council, but whether
coercion has been applied in support of or against community order and basic policies,
and whether it was applied in ways whose net results embrace increased congruence
with community goals and minimum order (Reisman, 1984:645).
Like the Kosovo conflict, the Iraq war in 2003 can be recognized as the wake
up call to promote the development of new international law for the use of force to
promote and consolidate democracy, absent any authorization of the Security Council.
The fact that in the aftermath of the allied victory over Saddam in 2003, no member
of the Security Council or General Assembly has thought to propose that his regime
should be restored as an expression of Iraqi political will indicates that we need a new
legal norm for the use of force for the promotion of democracy even if military
intervention is not authorized by the Security Council (Wedgwood, 2003:582).
However, I have to claim that the use of force for democratic development should be
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constrained to the outlaw states which carry out atrocities and massacres in the
domestic arena and pose an existential threat to regions and the whole international
society – i.e. Saddam’s Iraq.

Let us briefly examine whether or not Saddam’s Iraq

was an outlaw state, which can help us to understand why war was needed to topple
Saddam’s regime in 2003 and impose democracy in Iraq.
First of all, Saddam Hussein was a ruthless and dangerous tyrant.

No one

refutes that Saddam Hussein was a brutal dictator who cruelly oppressed the Iraqi
people, especially the Kurds and Shias, for more than 20 years, - e.g. the 1988 Anfal
genocide, wherein some 100,000 Kurds were killed by the Iraqi government (Winston,
2005:45).

Indeed, the fact that Saddam and his government carried out murder, mass

murder, torture, political imprisonment, denial of fair trial, silencing of political
dissent, and a vast range of other serious human rights violations and abuses had been
widely documented by UN and non-governmental organization (NGO) reports many
years before the US /UK invasion (Winston, 2005:45).

Also, bad enough, before the

US/UK invasion, no one doubted that Saddam’s sons Uday and Kusay would continue
the brutal reign of terror that their father had begun (Winston, 2005:50). Thus, if the
regime was not somehow deposed, there was little hope for any significant
improvement in Saddam’s Iraq’s gloomy and dreadful human rights record, in
particular when considering that even though there were measures to stop Saddam ‘s
brutal repression – i.e. economic sanctions and no-fly zones - Hussein’s flagrant
violation of human rights standards persisted (Heinze, 2006:27, Winston, 2005:50).
Also, importantly, the prospect of political liberalization under Saddam could not be
considered very realistic (Palmer, 2004:10).
Second, Saddam’s Iraq posed an existential threat to the region and further
international society.

On January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush in his state of
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the union address mentioned “the Iraqi regime has plotted to develop anthrax and
nerve gas and nuclear weapons for over a decade….…..States like these, and their
terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world”
(Visser, 2007:54). In particular, according to intelligence services, Saddam’s Iraq
might be able to make a nuclear bomb within three years (Palmer, 2004:32).
Nevertheless, someone might argue that the US-led coalition forces could not find any
weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

However, Saddam’s Iraq still had a stockpile

of scientists and technology, and actual equipment for producing WMDs (Palmer,
2004:25).

In other words, Saddam could rebuild WMDs later, that is, after all

sanctions were lifted, since Saddam had been determined to get WMDs.

Hence,

Saddam’s Iraq posed an existential threat to the region and international society as a
whole, in particular when considering that Iraq would use WMDs if it had WMDs,
since Saddam’s Iraq had a will and history to use WMDs – e.g. gassing Iranians and
Kurds.

Also, If Iraq had WMDs, there would be high possibility of future

nuclearization of the region, and of the leakage of WMD technology and expertise to
terrorist networks (Palmer, 2004:40).
neighboring states, Iran and Kuwait.

Furthermore, Saddam’s Iraq invaded its
These invasions demonstrate that Saddam’s

Iraq were great threats to the region and the whole international society, in particular
when considering that Saddam attempted to make Iraq a hegemonic power in the
region via all necessary means including the use of force, especially WMD.
Third, Saddam’s Iraq had breached all kinds of Security Council resolutions as
international legal obligations for more than a decade.

For instance, just after the

successful conclusion of Operation Dessert Storm, the Security Council adopted two
resolutions that set up the terms of a cease-fire agreement between Iraq and Coalition
partners (Ho, 2003: 81).

Resolution 687 imposed a series of disarmament and
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inspection obligations on Iraq, and also required Iraq to abandon international
terrorism (Ho, 2003: 81).

Resolution 688 banned further Iraqi oppression of its

civilian and refugee populations (Ho, 2003: 81).

However, Iraq violated the

ceasefire requirements of the 1990 Gulf War by denying UN weapons inspections and
failing to convince the US and its allies of disarmament (Natarajan, 2007:408).

As

an example, the Saddam regime still refused to give any credible explanation of the
missing Iraqi weapons inventory that included 31,000 chemical warfare munitions,
600 tons of VX nerve gas precursors, and 17 tons of biological growth media, and the
Saddam regime even refused to allow the interview of Iraqi weapons scientists outside
the country (Wedgwood, 2003:581).

Also, the Saddam regime did not stop

repressing its civilian population, in particular, Kurds.

Thus, Resolution 1441 of

November 2002 recalled previous resolutions including Resolution 687 and
Resolution 688, criticized Iraq’s longstanding failure to cooperate with weapons
inspections and to end repression of its civilian population, and gave Iraq a final
opportunity to abide by its obligations (Palmer, 2004:34).

Nonetheless, nothing had

radically changed.
The above primary aspects of outlaw state show why the war in 2003 was
necessary in order to transform the outlaw state into a decent democratic state, as
according to Kenneth Pollack, practically the only way to remove Saddam from
power was to launch ‘a full-scale invasion’ (Palmer, 2004:32).

Indeed, given

Saddam’s rebuff to give up power even under the threat of military invasion in March
2003, there was more than a realistic chance that other efforts to convince him to give
up - either for purposes of relinquishing WMDs or ceasing flagrant human rights
violations –would have failed (Heinze, 2006:27). Nonetheless, if Iraqis overthrew
Saddam Hussein, and reliably coped with the issue of weapons of mass destruction,
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there clearly would have been no war, which was realistically impossible since the
citizens of Iraq were powerless against Saddam and his henchmen (Roth, 2006:84).
The war in 2003 was for promotion of democracy, that is, transformation of
outlaw state (non-member of international society) into a democratic state (a full
member of international society), regardless of whether or not someone argues that
there were mixed motivations for the Iraq war in 2003 - .e.g. WMDs, Terrorism,
human rights and economic interests – as Nicholas Wheeler clearly claims that we
need not consider the motives of the interveners in judging the legitimacy of an
intervention, but rather whether or not the intervention achieved a positive
humanitarian result (Wheeler, 2000:37-38, Heinze, 2006:23).

Along with human

rights, democracy is also becoming the predominant norm of international society.
Indeed, in the post-Cold War era, a remarkable new international consensus on the
importance of political democracy, in its own right as an indispensable precondition to
the achievement of many other internationally prescribed human rights, and as the
sine qua non of international peace – e.g. democratic peace theory - has appeared
(Reisman, 1995:801, 804).

In this circumstance, the use of force for the promotion

of democracy should be legally allowed absent the UN authorization in the failure of
the Security Council to take action, even if the target states should be outlaw states
since tyrants claim national sovereignty but outlaw states do not have the legitimacy
of sovereignty - sovereignty does not belong to tyrants, but to people - as international
law should adapt itself to the changing international society.

Thus, though today the

use of force against Saddam’s Iraq in 2003 is technically illegal, the use of force to
transform outlaw states to democratic states may be legally accepted in the future, in
particular when considering an evolutionary process of customary international law
and considering that the 2003 war itself was supported by a broad coalition of liberal
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democratic states, including Japan, South Korea, Spain, Poland, Denmark, the
Netherlands, and many others (Heinze, 2006:30).

In other words, the Iraq war in

2003 can form the basis of a new rule of international law, while now it is arguably
illegal.

At this juncture, we can say that we should not indiscriminately condemn all

military interventions, even if they are not authorized by the UN (Reisman, 1984:643).
Also, Great Powers’ use of force against outlaw states, for the promotion and
consolidation of democracy linked with the welfare of international society, can be
gradually added into the nature of international society and international law.
As mentioned above, the use of force for the promotion and consolidation of
democracy is not yet fully acceptable in current international society, and today,
international law still does not advocate the tendency of ‘the use of force’ for the
promotion of democracy.

However, as briefly mentioned above, we should not

forget the evolutionary nature of international law based on the nature of international
society.

According to the evolutionary nature of international law, we might expect

that international law itself will be used in a more aggressive way to justify ‘the use of
force for the promotion and consolidation of democracy’ in the future.

In terms of

the evolutionary nature of intentional law, for instance, we can think that after World
War I, the international legal order transformed itself on the basis of the far-reaching
change which was derived from the decline of Britain’s world supremacy and the
increasing active intervention of the US (Grewe, 1992:253).

Also, after 1919, the

theory of international law used terminology that no longer implied nations being
civilized, but simply spoke of an international community that entails inclusive rather
than exclusive propensity (Grewe, 1992:256). And, since WWII, international law
has been more likely to emphasize the principles of cooperation and solidarity such as
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the 1948 declaration of human rights (Grewe, 1992:273). 171 On account of the
evolutionary nature of international law, in the post-Cold War and 21st century, we
can’t totally disregard the assumption that the use of force for the promotion of
democracy can be legitimized and legalized in the end.
As noted above, democracy has been a more and more predominant norm in
international society.

As Susan Mark put it (2000:532), we can say that the end of

the Cold War has strongly facilitated the assumption that democracy is the foundation
of political legitimacy, whereas the repressive regime has been gradually recognized
by its lack of legitimacy in international society.

It means that the nature of

international society has been increasingly transformed to reflect the norms and
values concerning ‘democracy and human rights,’ and so international law is
increasingly expected to embrace them, at least advocating pro-democratic regimes in
international society.

In this context, we can say that international law can indirectly

and directly influence non-democratic states to accept those norms and values in the
end.

Therefore, democracy itself cannot only be anticipated to gradually become an

internationally recognized legitimate form of government, but also it can be
stimulated by international law in the long run (Mark, 2000: 546).

When

considering this point, we can expect that the promotion of democracy might be
enough of a legal excuse for the use of force in the future.

With this optimistic view,

the use of force for the promotion of democracy can be in the end legitimized and
legalized.

This might indicate the positive sign that the US and UK’s attempt to

171

Nonetheless, international environment cannot be limited to only one of three facets, international
system, international society and world society.
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promote democracy in Iraq can be justified. 172 As a matter of fact, if Iraq’s
democracy can be successfully materialized in the end, international law might highly
advocate the use of force for democracy in the long run, even if I have to say that the
target state must be an outlaw state.
For the last time, I will examine the applicability of ‘the law of occupation’ to
the US-led coalition forces’ occupation in Iraq, while considering that democracy
becomes a predominant norm of international society.

In the process, we can notice

that the law of occupation should be adapted to the changing international society, as
democracy can be regarded as the new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War
era and the 21st century.
Let us briefly look at the law of occupation.

International law governing

occupation and regulating the powers of the occupying power is enshrined primarily
in arts 42-56 of the Hague Regulations, and the Fourth Geneva Convention, in
particular arts 27-34 and 47-78 (Wolfrum, 2005:4).

In other words, the formal

obligations on an occupying power as responsibility and constraints are outlined in
complex

provisions

in

the

Hague

Regulations

and

the

Fourth

Geneva

Convention(Chesterman, 2004: 53). The Hague Regulations of 1899 and later 1907,
in particular Article 43 that outlined the occupants general goals and authority,
envisioned peaceful coexistence between the local population and the enemy’s army,
with minimal interaction and tension (Benvenisti, 2003:21).
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The Hague Regulations

Of course, I admit that the US and UK invaded Iraq in the name of pre-emptive attack which was
lead by their deep concern with Iraqi potential possession of weapons of mass destruction and with the
linkage between Saddam’s regime and terrorist groups. However, we should not disregard the fact
that the US and UK’s foreign policy are deeply engaged in the promotion of democracy. For instance,
President Clinton declared in his 1994 State of the Union address, “the best strategy to insure our
security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere.” The New
York. Times. January 26, 1994. As a matter fact, G.W. Bush clearly mentioned the promotion of
democracy as one of mechanisms to fight against Terrorism. Even before Iraq war, as Fukuyama
mentioned in his work, Bush mentioned the democratic development. See Fukuyama (2006).
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(Article 43) state that an occupier must “take all the measures in his power to restore,
and ensure, as far as possible public order and safety, while respecting, unless
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.” 173 A literal interpretation of
article 43 of the Hague Regulations is to ban any change to the laws in force unless
absolutely prevented from doing so (Fox, 2005:240).

Also, the occupying power’s

prohibition of politically restructuring the occupied state is reflected in Article 43 of
Hague Regulations (Wolfrum, 2005:13).

The Fourth Geneva Convention (Article

64) incorporates the spirit of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations (Charlesworth,
2007:3).

According to the Fourth Geneva Convention, in restoring and maintaining

peace and security the laws in force of the occupied state shall be respected at all
times (Wolfrum, 2005:13).

Nonetheless, it adds that an occupier is able to change

laws and institutions that constitute a threat to the security of the occupying power or
an obstacle to the application of the present Convention (Charlesworth, 2007:3). Thus,
when considering the Hague regulation and the Geneva Convention, we can notice
that most of the Coalition Provisional Authority’s reforms in Iraq would be invalid
(Benvenisti, 2003:32 and Fox, 2005:240).
As we can see above, the law of occupation impedes the active
transformation and the remodeling of the power and other values processes of the
occupied country (Fox, 2005:276).

According to the law of occupation, precisely

speaking. the occupant is not allowed to change the existing form of government, to
upset the constitution and domestic law of the occupied territory, or to set aside the
rights of the inhabitants (Fox, 2005:237).

Here, what is important is that the law of
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See “Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations
concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.” International
Humanitarian Law – Treaties & Documents. Available at the website :
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/195-200053?OpenDocument
151

occupation explicitly prohibits state-building or regime-change (Charlesworth,
2007:9).

Moreover, the law of occupation does not allow democracy-building

ventures.

Thus, according to the occupation law, the US and the UK –the Coalition

Provisional Authority (CPA) - should have interfered as little as possible in the Iraqi
political system during the period of its occupation, in particular when considering
that the UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) explicitly recognized that the
US and the UK – CPA – were occupying powers in Iraq, and called on them to
comply with their obligations under the Geneva Conventions and the Hague
Regulations (Chesterman, 2004: 61 and Wolfrum, 2005:8).
However, we can say that when the goal of occupying state is to remake the
political and legal institutions of the occupied state so as to promote human rights and
democracy, to comply with Hague regulation and Geneva Convention seems to be
anachronism.

The case of Iraq in 2003 is frequently invoked as proof of the

irrelevance of the traditional principle of occupation (Charlesworth, 2007:1).
Regime change and democracy-building were an explicit current in public statements
by the US before its invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Charlesworth, 2007:4). The Iraq war
in 2003 was for the transformation of Iraq from an outlaw state to a democratic state.
To put it differently, the primary aim of the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in
2003 was ‘regime change’ (Chesterman, 2004: 63).

Thus, in this circumstance, it is

almost impossible to fully comply with the law of occupation, that is, ‘Hague
regulation’ and ‘Geneva Convention.’ Where wars are fought to achieve a change of
a particular, political regime, the military occupant cannot be under an obligation to
sustain the regime fought against (Wolfrum, 2005:13).

Indeed, neither the Hague

nor Geneva laws should protect laws and institutions of an outlaw state that fall below
minimally acceptable standards of humanity, especially when considering that the
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laws and political institutions of the Iraqi Ba’ath party were broadly criticized for
horrific human rights abuses (Fox, 2005:199, 270-271)

and when considering that

the change of the political regime – i.e. the Saddam’s regime - was the only effective
means to secure peace in international society in the long run (Wolfrum, 2005:14).
Hence, the law of occupation should be updated, since the Iraq war made the case that
the international law of occupation should be treated as anachronism, particularly
when considering that democracy becomes the predominant norm of international
society (Fox, 2005:199).

All in all, the law of occupation needs an overhaul to

enable an occupant to change the political and economic institutions, along with legal
reform, although the target state must be an outlaw state.
Indeed, in Iraq, the rigours of the law of occupation were considerably
lessened by the United Nations Security Council’s adoption of Resolution 1483 on
May 22, 2003 (Charlesworth, 2007:6).

Resolution 1483 gave the Coalition the

mandate to administer Iraq and to work towards its political and economic
reorganization (Wolfrum, 2005:16).

This mandate went beyond the powers assigned

to an occupant under the law of occupation, which can make it possible for Iraq to
adopt democracy and a capitalist market economy.

In short, Resolution 1483

legalized the efforts of the Coalition to restructure Iraq politically and economically,
let alone legal and judicial reform (Wolfrum, 2005:19). To sum up, the law of
occupation should be adapted to the changing international society, in particular when
considering that along with human rights, democracy becomes predominant in
international society.
Conclusion
In Chapter II, I emphasized the role of international law as a significant
institution, in order to maintain international order and promote the well-being of
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international society, while revealing how international law can have a major effect on
democratic development across international society.

But, in general, international

law has been misunderstood as a simple mechanism to facilitate the narrow interests
for Great Powers, or as a useless and powerless rule of law that can be easily ignored
and violated, whenever necessary.

In particular, for realists, international law itself

merely reflects power relationship, which is derived from their perception on
international environment such as anarchy, self-help systems, and power-struggles.
However, the international environment is not a Hobbesian concept of anarchy,
but rather international society.

International society can be defined with common

values and norms, and international law itself displays such a character of
international society as well, reinforcing the character of international society.

When

considering this point, international law itself is not too weak to be totally disregarded.
In fact, international law is a necessary fixture of the 21st century and it cannot be
ignored today.

We should not forget the fact that international law has some level of

autonomy in international society.

Also, the nature of international law is deeply

embedded in the co-existence of power and morality, and the ratio of power vs.
morality can be altered in each historical period, reflecting the nature of international
society.

This can be understood as the evolutionary nature of international law.
In the evolutionary nature of international law, as democracy has been more

and more predominant norm and value in international society in the post-Cold War
era and 21st century, international law has become embedded in democratic values,
and it is increasingly anticipated to reflect more democratic values and norms.

At

this juncture, we can perceive triangular relationship among international society,
international law and democracy.

In consideration of the triangular relationship that

international society, international law and democracy share, in this chapter, I
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disclosed relatively different roles of international law on the basis of three different
features of international society (pluralist, solidarist, and liberal anti-pluralist
principles).

Each pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist facet of international

society can indirectly determine how international law has an impact on democratic
promotion and consolidation across international society.

China, South Korea and

Iraq relatively represent pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist features of
international society as whole, and they can help understand how international law
can have comparably different effect on paths toward the promotion and consolidation
of democracy.

All in all, as an important institution, international law can greatly

contribute to the promotion of democracy and the consolidation of democracy across
international society, which can ultimately lead to the well-being beyond the
maintenance of order and security in international society.
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Chapter III. Diplomacy and Democracy
Introduction
In general, diplomacy can be misunderstood as only a simple tool to
materialize the goals of foreign policy.

In fact, even some conventional international

relations scholars such as Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Waltz rarely pay attention to
the role of diplomacy in international society.

Besides, as Hedley Bull put it, the

Cold War had served to weaken the effect of diplomacy, in large part since during the
Cold War era “both western and communist diplomats abused their privileges for the
purposes of espionage, and had been subject to the threat and periodic reality of
expulsion as a consequence,” let alone proxy wars like that in Afghanistan and even
hot wars like the Korean War (1950-53) (Bull, 2002:171, Hall, 2006:144).
However, the narrow definition of diplomacy as the tool for achieving the
goals of foreign policy is not enough to properly explain the nature and role of
diplomacy in international society.

Many English School scholars (including Martin

Wight, Adam Watson, Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull, David Armstrong, John
Vincent, Andrew Hurrell, and Geoffrey Wiseman) are well aware of the importance of
diplomacy in international society; diplomacy is absolutely necessary to the existence
of as well as the well-being of international society.

174

174

Diplomacy is more than a

As for English School scholars, diplomacy plays a key role in international politics as a historically
emerging and social phenomenon. See Neumann (2003:341). More importantly, many English School
scholars put great emphasis on the role of diplomacy as an institution in international society.
Nevertheless, they do not agree on the level of importance of diplomacy as an institution, compared
with other institutions, such as Great Power, balance of power and international law. For instance, for
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simple tool for the goals of foreign policy.

Indeed, it is a considerable institution

which, in large part governs international society.

Though its importance has

fluctuated on the basis of historical period and circumstance, diplomacy is absolutely
necessary to the existence of international society.
In this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate how diplomacy plays a significant
role in managing international society.

Also, I will attempt to demonstrate how

diplomacy can have an impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy as
the post-Cold War and 21st century standard of civilization and the new wave
expansion of international society.

In the first section, I will examine the origin and

various definitions of diplomacy.

And, I will investigate the nature of diplomacy,

which is embedded in three traditions, Machiavellian, Grotian and Kantian.

Also, I

will demonstrate why and how diplomacy is closely related to international society,
greatly contributing to international society, as diplomacy can change a state’s identity
and interests, and change the context of international society, while we can say as well
that in turn, diplomacy reflects the fabric of international society.

In the second

section, I will show various diplomacies which have contributed to the promotion and
consolidation of democracy.

In this section, my intention is to reveal that the more

predominant democracy has gradually become as the post-Cold War and 21st century
standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society, the more
various diplomacies we can see to promote and consolidate democracy across
international society.

In the final section, via three cases, China, South Korea and

Iraq, I will show how relatively different diplomacies, such as interest-oriented
Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, and Herbert Butterfield, diplomacy is put into a lower place than the
balance of power, international law and Great Power. In particular, to Hedley Bull balance of power is
the most important institution in international society, and in this sense, without the balance of power,
other institutions such as international law and diplomacy cannot flourish and even exist. Andrew
Hurrell points out this. See Andrew Hurrell (2002: 8).
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diplomacy (Economic Diplomacy), legitimacy-oriented diplomacy (Niche Diplomacy)
and force-oriented diplomacy (Coercive Diplomacy) can be adopted to promote and
consolidate democracy across international society, on the basis of different
circumstances such as a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society
and a liberal anti-pluralist international society, which can help us understand different
paths toward democracy.

All in all, in this chapter, I will demonstrate that as a

significant institution, diplomacy has had a great impact on democratization across
international society so as to improve the well-being of international society as a
whole.
1>

Diplomacy
First of all, I will look into the origin of diplomacy, and I will also define

diplomacy.

But, in the process, I will reveal that diplomacy is not simply a tool for

the aim of foreign policy, but also one of the key institutions to govern international
society.

I will start with the origin of diplomacy.

Etymologically, the word

diplomacy is originally derived from the Greek word diploun (diploma), a folded
document (Sharp, 2004: 211, Neumann, 2003:365).

The Greek diploun is closely

linked to the study of official handwriting and the idea of credentials confirming the
claims of the bearer, and it was carried by heralds and negotiators, certifying and
empowering them as what we would now refer to as diplomats (Sharp, 2004: 211,
Neumann, 2003:365).

When looking into ancient Greek diplomacy as the possible

origin of diplomacy, we can find that in the absence of resident embassies, the envoys
were sent to other Greek cities, which influenced modern diplomacy (Young,
1964:141).

Also, we can find that ancient Greek diplomacy regulated relations

between a small state or group of states and their immediate neighbors via the art of
persuasion and political savor-faire, which can be found in the function of
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contemporary diplomacy (Adcock and Mosley, 1975:121-128).

But, we have to

notice that in ancient Greek diplomacy, in contrast to the modern diplomacy, the envoy
was an amateur who was selected from among the prominent members of the polis for
a particular mission (Wolpert, 2001:75).
The formal diplomatic relationship via permanent and residential embassies
started in the Middle Ages rather than in the Greek city-states (Schwarzenberger,
1964:153).

Accurately speaking, resident embassies were first introduced in the mid-

fourteenth century in northern Italy (Sofer, 1988:195, Russell, 2005:233).

The

introduction of resident embassies marked the movement from sporadic to continuous
exchanges, which greatly contributed to the full development of modern diplomacy
(Keens-Soper, 1999:29).

Also, as another distinguishing aspect of Italian diplomacy,

diplomacy, when diplomacy rests in the hands of a resident, degenerated into newsgathering and espionage (Mallett, 2001:62).

Nonetheless, the introduction of resident

ambassadors emerged due to the growing need not only to send messages but also to
gather information about neighbors among Italian city-states (Jonsson and Hall,
2005:73).

In fifteenth-century Italy, ambassadors were good sources of information,

and they often even presented news to host governments (Mallet, 2001:66). This
feature can be obviously seen in modern diplomats, and in truth the informationgathering role has been one of the most important modern diplomatic functions
(Jonsson and Hall, 2005:74).

As a stunning example, we can easily notice the US

intelligence’s failure on Saddam’s Iraq.

The US intelligence’s failure to gather

accurate information on Saddam’s Iraq – e.g. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) –
was primarily derived from the fact that there had not been any American diplomat in
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Iraq, let alone the absence of US embassy, before the war in 2003.175 This clearly
demonstrates how important the information-gathering role, as one of primary
diplomatic functions, has been.176
Most importantly, above I mentioned the origin of diplomacy, but I have to say
that the origin of diplomacy as ‘an international institution’ is the Peace of Westphalia
of 1648.

In other words, the Peace of Westphalia is very meaningful in diplomacy.

It marked the beginning of the European nation-states system initially composed of
twelve well-defined sovereign states and codified the rules of conduct among
sovereign and equal states.177 The rise of the nation-state ultimately indicates the
change in the pattern of diplomacy, in particular when considering that political
ideologies and conflicting religious faiths had replaced the Christian Europe, and so
Peace of Westphalia must be regarded as a milestone for modern diplomacy
(Thompson, 1984:384).

As a matter of fact, even today there is still considerable

vitality in the Westphalian order of nation-states and state-centered diplomacy. 178 All
in all, owing to such Westphalian order, diplomacy can be recognized as the
mechanism by which nation-states alone, via authorized agents, maintain mutual
relations, communicate with each other, and carry out political, economic and legal
transactions. 179 Hence, as many scholars have claimed, diplomacy could not be
recognized as an institution until the seventeenth century in which there was the

175

See, for more information, Kenneth Pollack (2004) and Geoffrey Wiseman (2005).

176

In the below (the contribution of diplomacy to international society), I will demonstrate how
important the information-gathering as one of primary functions of diplomacy has been.
177

See, for more detail, James P. Muldoon Jr. (2007).

178

See, for more information, Thompson (1984).

179

See James P. Muldoon Jr. (2007).
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formation of permanent embassies and the emergence of a state system, along with the
formulation of a set of ideas about diplomacy and the appearance of diplomatic texts
(Jonsson and Hall, 2005:40).
When looking into the definition of diplomacy, it is worth looking at various
scholars’ definitions of diplomacy.

First of all, according to the Oxford English

Dictionary, diplomacy is the main argument of international relations by negotiation,
the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and
envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist; and skill or address in the conduct of
international intercourse and negotiations. 180 As a British scholar and diplomat to
Japan, Ernest Satow (1843-1929) defined diplomacy as “the application of intelligence
and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent
states” (Satow, 2004:25).
and diplomacy.

Satow also distinguished the line between foreign policy

Satow states:

Although the word (diplomacy) has been in the English
language for no more than two centuries, it has suffered from
misuse and confusion. It has sometimes been made to appear,
for instance, as the equivalent of foreign policy. But foreign
policy is formulated by government, not by diplomatists.
In order to carry out its policy, a government will need to
manage and adjust its international relations by applying
different forms of pressure. How successful these pressures
prove will greatly depend on the real power behind them.
The power must be real, but rather than exercise it explicitly,
the government may prefer to keep it in reserve with the
implication that in certain circumstances it could be used.
Nevertheless, in normal circumstances it will conduct its
international intercourse by negotiation.
This is
180

Here, I have to mention that diplomacy can be described as a sort of negotiation, but that
negotiation itself is not necessarily diplomacy at all. In other words, we should remember that
diplomacy is more than negotiation alone. See Paul W. Meerts (1999:79-80). In fact, Ikle’s
definition of negotiation is worthwhile.
Ikle says, “negotiation is a process in which explicit
proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the
realization of a common interests where conflicting interest are present. It is the confrontation of
explicit proposal that distinguishes negotiation from tacit bargaining and other forms of conflict
behavior.” See R P. Barston (1988:76-77).
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diplomacy (Satow, 2009:3-4).
Harold Nicholson adopted the Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of diplomacy
which can be categorized as a broad conception of diplomacy (Sharp, 2004:211).
Nicolson defined it by saying:
Diplomacy is the management of international relations by
negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted
and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of
the diplomatist……………… Diplomacy is not the art of
conversation, it is the art of negotiating agreements in precise
and rectifiable form (Nicolson, 1988: 4-5, 52).
As for Nicholson, the core element of diplomacy is negotiation within an organized
and ordered framework on the basis of the element of representation to serve the
sovereign authority of a state, in order to manage international relations (Otte,
2001:157).

At this juncture, we can assume that for Nicolson, diplomacy can be

understood as the mechanism that maintains the order and well-being of changing
international society.

Jan Melissen defines diplomacy, distinguishing it from foreign

policy, by saying:
Diplomacy is in the first place about the framework in which
international relations take place, the medium that is both a
necessary condition, and the lubricant, of international politics.
Foreign policy deals with the content as well as the aims and
objectives of a state’s relations with other states and
international actors, and is therefore mainly about the message
(Melissen, 1999:xvii).
We can assume that diplomacy refers to the practical implementation of a state’s grand
strategy, and it was usually carried out by a professional diplomat, while foreign
policy refers to the formulation of a state’s grand strategy (Wiseman, 2005: 410).
Precisely speaking, foreign policy tends to be about theory, for example substance,
strategy, and ends, whereas diplomacy tends to be about practice such as procedures,
tactics and means (Wiseman, 2005:410).

Thus, we can say that diplomacy is one of
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mechanisms to attain the primary goals of foreign policy. 181 To put it differently,
diplomacy constitutes only one element of foreign policy, and it implements foreign
policy via negotiation, making policy understood and, if possible, accepted by other
nations (Sofer, 1988:196).

Nonetheless, we should keep it in mind that the dividing

lines between diplomacy and foreign policy are not always easily drawn (Sofer,
1988:196).
When considering the above definitions of diplomacy, in particular diplomacy
as only a simple tool for the aims of foreign policy, we need some correction.

In

other words, diplomacy is more than a simple tool to materialize the aims of foreign
policy.

Usually, English School scholars clearly reveal this point.

Unlike many

conventional international relations scholars, English School scholars have a deep
theoretical approach to diplomacy, emphasizing their notion that diplomacy is one of
the most considerable institutions to help govern international society.

As for them,

diplomacy - as the institution via which relations between sovereign states are carried
out by ‘discussion’ and ‘agreement’ - is at its core a highly developed system of
communication, aimed at identifying and accommodating different and often
conflicting interests (Otte, 2001:135).

For instance, Martin Wight offers a number of

different lists of which institutions international relations were made of, and he
emphasized diplomacy as “the master institution of international relations,” calling it
“the system of the art of communication between powers” (Wight, 1995:113,
Neumann, 2003:348).

Also, along with the balance of power, international law, war

and Great Power, Hedley Bull regarded diplomacy as one of institutions to govern

181

Adam Watson attempts to distinguish diplomacy from foreign policy, describing foreign policy as
“the substance of a state’s relations” and as “diplomacy as the process of dialogue and negotiation.”
See, Adam Watson (1983:11).
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international society (Bull, 1977).

To Adam Watson, diplomacy as an institution is to

enable other institutions; for example, “the balance of power, international law and
periodic congresses”182 Adam Watson claimed “the central task of diplomacy is not
just the management of order, but the management of change, and the maintenance by
continued persuasion of order in the midst of change”(Watson, 1983: 223).
To sum up, when considering the above English School scholars’ definition of
diplomacy, we can say that diplomacy is not only a simple tool to materialize the aims
of foreign policy, but also a significant institution to help govern international society,
in particular when considering that diplomacy can be understood as a set institution
and a process by which states represent themselves and their interests to one another in
international society. 183 If necessary as a socializing mechanism, diplomacy can
construct, maintain and transform the identities and interests of states and it can even
maintain or change the nature of international society, let alone its contribution to the
existence of international society and to the well-being of international society.184 All
in all, the concept of diplomacy should be more or less inclusive rather than exclusive,
as diplomacy is one of the significant branches for the study of international relations,
beyond a simple tool for the aims of foreign policy, particularly when considering that
according to the narrow conception of diplomacy, diplomats have nothing to do with
policy choices and simply advise and execute (Sharp, 2004:208-210).185 Thanks to

182

See Geoffrey Wiseman (2002).

183

See Paul Sharp (2008).

184

Below, I will touch on the close and positive relation between diplomacy and an international
society.
185

Paul Sharp compared a narrow concept of diplomacy with a broad concept of diplomacy, even if
Paul Sharp contended that there were many problems with the conventional distinction between broad
and narrow conceptions of diplomacy.
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this, we can also postulate that diplomats’ roles should be recognized as pivotal for
governing international society.

Nevertheless, of course, diplomats’ primary concern

appears to be the promotion of the national interest of their own homeland, especially
when considering that diplomats at a foreign capital, stand as its leading protagonist,
protector and promoter in their country (Kennan, 1997:207).

However, we can also

see that, overall, diplomatic activity can nurture regional and trans-regional
relationships, which can ultimately facilitate stability and order in international society
(Talbott, 1997:75).

For instance, multilateral diplomacy via international

organizations such as NATO, NAFTA, the Chemical Weapon Convention, the
Partnership for Peace and the United Nations, obviously demonstrates that diplomacy
does not only bring about each country’s national interests alone as the result of an
execution of foreign policy, but also the existence and the well-being of whole
international society (Talbott, 1997.82).
Let us turn to the nature of diplomacy, which can help us understand why we
have three kinds of international society: a pluralist international society, a solidarist
international society and a liberal anti-pluralist international society, even if all of
three relatively reinforce comparatively different diplomatic relationships among
states as well.

As in other chapters, at this juncture, we need Martin Wight’s three

traditions: Machiavellian/realism, Grotian/rationalism and Kantian/revolutionism in
order to properly understand the nature of diplomacy.

Martin Wight displays these

three traditions as the primary characters of international relations and uses them as
the essences of diplomacy. 186 In other words, we can properly understand the nature
of diplomacy with the combination of three traditions rather than with only one of

186

See Martin Wight (1992).
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them.

Ultimately, I will attempt to demonstrate that three traditions are quite

essential for properly understanding diplomacy.
First of all, in terms of power in diplomacy, we can easily find many evidences
and examples to support the significance of power as one of the predominant
characteristics of diplomacy, in particular when considering that diplomacy is often
construed as a continuation of war by other means, which can be seen as the
realpolitik case (Derian, 1987:92).

As historical evidence, for instance in classical

Greece, alliances and leagues indicate that diplomacy went hand in hand with
hegemony, in particular when considering that Athens could impose a variety of
restrictions and demands on the members of the Delian League due to its naval power
(Wolpert, 2001:77).

More outstandingly, in the Melian dialogue (Book V), “the

strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must” demonstrates the
significance of power in diplomacy. 187 Further evidence is found in the Roman World
(500 BC- AD235). The Romans believed that overwhelming military power and
their superiority in war could be an instrument in preserving peaceful conditions,
while cherishing their superior military power (Campbell, 2001:2, 18).

Thus, the

Romans could often use offensive diplomacy in which the threat of their powerful
army enabled them to get what they wanted without fighting (Campbell, 2001:1).
There are many scholars and diplomats who emphasize power as one of the
most important aspects of diplomacy.

Niccolò Machiavelli exhibited the typical

realist inclination to treat diplomacy as a symptom of the struggle for power among
co-sovereign entities to seek to maintain orderly and peaceful relations among
themselves (Russell, 2005:246).

187

Indeed, the Machiavellian diplomacy can be

Thucydides (1972).
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understood with the following four characteristics: flux or change, fear and greed,
negotiation from strength, and the technique of bargaining (Jackson, 2002;13).

And,

Ernest Mason Satow (1843-1929) even argued that the application of military pressure
was a legitimate tool of Great Power diplomacy, which he dubbed ‘gunboat
diplomacy’:
(the gun boat diplomacy) was used to designate a habit that
consuls had got into of calling in the aid of a gunboat whenever
they had a dispute with the local officials. It was effective, but
liable to abuse. Questions were settled promptly that, without
the application of pressure on the spot, have a tendency to drag
on for months and years. Properly applied, with the sanction
of H.M Government, it would often be useful in these days
(Otte, 2001:142).188
Harold Nicolson was also aware of the role of power in diplomacy, considering that
the major decisions are usually taken by those who possess power and are prepared to
exercise it (Nicolson, 1961:48).189 Kenneth W. Thompson states, “diplomacy most of
the time proceeds without any worldwide moral consensus and few generally accepted
principles of law” and “diplomacy must rest on power”(Thompson, 1981:430, 432).
As for Thompson, power can be seen as one of the most significant aspects in
diplomacy, especially when considering that power expresses itself in peace settlement
or agreement (Thompson, 1981:412).

According to Martin Wight, “diplomacy is the

system and art of communication between powers.”190 Adam Watson is well aware of
the close relationship between diplomacy and power.

Adam Watson emphasizes

power as a significant ingredient in diplomacy and relates diplomatic efficacy to a
state’s material capability and its willingness to use it, by saying:
188

I quoted this from T.G. Otte (2001).

189

In context, power can be understood as the ability of the individual or the group to impose its will
on other. See Kenneth W. Thompson (1981: 410).
190

See Martin Wight (1978:113) or Alan James (1980:946).
167

The extent to which one state can persuade another to act or
refrain from acting in a certain way depends on the power
which each of them commands, including the will to use it, and
the extent to which other states support them – that is, lend their
power to one side or the other (Watson, 1983:52).
It is the larger powers that determine the effectiveness of
diplomacy. This mechanical fact goes far to explain why in
many systems of states special responsibilities for the
functioning of international relations, the management of order
and the leadership of the diplomatic dialogue have been
entrusted by a general consensus to great power (Watson
1983:198).
As Adam Watson put it, we have to admit that the effectiveness of diplomacy can be
determined by the level of power, as Great Power’s diplomatic influence is mostly
greater than Middle Power’s or Small Power’s diplomatic influence, though, as
Watson put it as well, we cannot completely ignore Small Powers’ diplomatic roles in
international society, let alone Middle Powers’ diplomatic roles, which can be
explained in South Korea’s case below (Neumann, 2003:354, 359).
So far, I have attempted to emphasize the significance of power as one of the
primary characteristics of diplomacy, albeit below I will prove that power alone cannot
be sufficient to explain the nature of diplomacy (Derian, 1987:92).

Owing to this

characteristic of diplomacy, today we can see that in the relations of Great Powers and
non-civilized/or outlaw (and often considerably less powerful) states, diplomacy
becomes the art of persuasion not only by oratorical means and but also occasionally
by military means (Otte, 2001:143).

Actually, in the importance of power in

diplomacy, we can see coercive diplomacy, which can be often seen in international
society, particularly a liberal anti-pluralist international society in which outlaw states,
such as Gaddafi’s Libya, Saddam’s Iraq, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea,
military junta’s Myanmar, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s Iran have received
punishment via coercive diplomacy.

In particular, Libya’s decision to turn away from
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weapons of mass destruction was only possible due to both display of the US physical
power and the US persuasive power. 191 As Colin Powell puts it, this clearly
demonstrates that diplomacy without power is just naked pleading. 192 All in all, we
can clearly perceive that without physical power, diplomacy cannot play a significant
role in managing international society, let alone the promotion and consolidation of
norms and values of international society.

This clearly demonstrates the significance

of power in diplomacy.
The other aspect of the primary characteristics of diplomacy we have to
consider is the moral aspect in diplomacy.

As briefly noted above, we cannot fully

explain the nature of diplomacy with the concept of power alone, even though power
can explain more issues than any other aspect of diplomacy in international society.
We should consider the moral dimension in diplomacy as well.

The moral-oriented

diplomacy can be understood as Kantian diplomacy which serves all humankind
regardless of nationality on the basis of moral doctrine as cosmopolitan, with its
attempt to reach a permanent end to war (Jackson, 2002:15).
Diplomacy is, in some sense, embedded in moral elements, such as the moral
duty of honesty in reporting and in exchanging information among ambassadors.193
For instance, above I mentioned that the Romans cherished power and used it when
they practiced diplomacy, but we should not forget that even in the Roman World,
honor and good faith were recognized as crucial to the successive operation of
diplomacy (Campbell, 2001:3, 18).
ignore morality in diplomacy.

In other words, Romans did not completely

Also, as noted above, Satow emphasized the effect of

191

See, for more detail, Colin Powell (2004).

192

Ibid.

193

See Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne (1995:29).
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power on diplomacy, but Satow argued as well that diplomacy has an ethical
dimension – e.g. honesty is the best policy as well as the only sound policy (Otte,
2001:134).

And, although he was aware of the importance of power in diplomacy,

Harold Nicholson emphasized morality as another aspect of diplomacy.

Nicolson

clearly mentioned that the art of negotiation should depend on reliability and
confidence, let alone truth, as eternal principles (Nicolson, 1961:45). 194 More
importantly, Martin Wight emphasizes the following ethical elements for classical
diplomacy: honesty (or truthfulness), moderation and restraint, courtesy/agreement,
and respect for the other side (Jackson, 2002:10).

At this juncture, the ethics of

classical diplomacy stress the importance of maintaining the minimum of human
decency and reciprocity while keeping up international peace and security (Jackson,
2002:10). To Wight, therefore, diplomats should not only defend and promote the
interests or concerns of their own government but also attempt to come to terms with
those of the other governments, while strengthening the common good of international
society by upholding international society, its practices, institutions and values
(Jackson, 2002:10).

For the last time, Herbert Butterfield believes that effective

diplomacy should be based on moral principles, such as self-restraint, empathy and
charity. 195 According to Butterfield, good diplomats should conduct themselves with
restraint and urge a similar restraint upon those who send them (Sharp, 2003:868).

194

Nicolson even claimed that the twentieth century diplomat should have the following qualification:
“a man of experience, integrity and intelligence, a man, above all who is not swayed by emotion or
prejudice, who is profoundly modest in all his dealings, who is guided only by a sense of public duty,
and who understands the perils of cleverness and the virtues of reason, moderation, discretion and
tact.” Also, see Kenneth W. Thompson (1984).
195

See, for more detail, Paul Sharp, “The English School, Herbert Butterfield and Diplomacy,”
Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael.’ The
website is available at:
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2002/20021100_cli_paper_dip_issue83.pdf, pp. 17.
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Also, for him, in recognition of the equal moral worth of others, good diplomats ought
to realize in a spirit of charity that they should conduct themselves with generosity as
well as urge a similar generosity on the part of those who send them, in their
judgments of the actions and arguments of those who receive them (Sharp, 2003:868).
All in all, we should keep in mind the fact that moral principles cannot be excluded in
diplomacy.

Nonetheless, I do not argue that morality alone can explain diplomacy

well without regard to power.
As one of stunning examples for moral diplomacy, we can think of Wilson’s
open diplomacy which reflects former US President Woodrow Wilson’s cherished
Kantian ideal of an international community in which permanent cooperation on the
basis of ethics and rights rather than persistent rivalry between states would prevail
(Jackson, 2002:15-17).

Wilson’s open diplomacy was elaborated in Point One of his

Fourteen Points – “there shall be no private or secret international understandings of
any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view”
(Wiseman, 2002:12).

Recently, as another example, we can look to former South

African President Nelson Mandela’s use of strategic moral diplomacy in order to solve
the stalemate between Libya, the US and the UK, which demonstrates how essential
moral concerns in diplomacy are. 196 The Lockerbie negotiations explicate how
choices between morally salient duties are embedded in political philosophies and
personal psychologies (Boyd-Judson, 2005:77). This example can be a model for
why morality should be included throughout the diplomatic process, which can
ultimately lead to a positive outcome in the long run.
we cannot reduce diplomacy into morality alone.

196

See Lyn Boyd-Judson (2005).
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Nonetheless, as noted above,

All in all, we can say that diplomacy’s primary characteristics are morality and
power.

Nevertheless, the proportionality of characters of diplomacy can be altered by

relatively different circumstances in international society, like a pluralist international
society (pluralist principles), a solidarist international society (solidarist principles) or
a liberal anti-pluralist international society (liberal anti-pluralist principles), even if in
turn the relative different proportion of characteristics of diplomacy reinforce
relatively different international societies.

In this part, my intention is primarily to

emphasize the dynamic relations within characteristics of diplomacy, which can better
explain diplomacy as a whole, rather than one single aspect of diplomacy.

In

particular when considering both power and morality as characteristics of diplomacy,
we might conclude that, on the one hand, diplomacy can be recognized as old hat, but
on the other hand, diplomacy can be seen as bad hat (Sharp, 2004:218). 197 In other
words, we might conclude that the characteristics of diplomacy are similar to
Callieres’s concept of diplomacy as the union of ‘power politics’ and ‘civilized
behaviors’ (Keens-Soper, 2001:122). In fact, Nicholson helps us comprehend the
dynamic logic of diplomacy with his description of a good British diplomat:
The good British diplomatist is tolerant and fair; he acquires a
fine balance between imagination and reason, between
idealism and realism; he is reliable and scrupulously precise;
he possesses dignity without self-importance, demeanour
without mannerism, poise without stolidity; he can display
resolution as well as flexibility, and can combine gentleness
with courage; he never boasts; he knows that impatience is as
dangerous as ill-temper and that intellectual brilliance is not a
diplomatic quality; he knows above all that it is his duty to
interpret the policy of his government with loyalty and common
sense and that the foundation of good diplomacy is the same as
the foundation of good business – namely credit, confidence,
and consideration and compromise (Nicolson,1988:77).
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Bad hat indicates that diplomacy serves a system of power relations, whereas old hat implies that
diplomacy is not completely morally bankrupt. See Sharp (2004:218-219).
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Also, Harold Nicolson contended that the development of diplomatic theory has been
dependent upon both idealism and realism rather than one of them alone (Nicolson,
2004:60).

In other words, diplomatic development is possible in the dynamic

existence of realism and idealism.

Due to this specific condition, we can see

relatively different diplomatic relationships among states, which facilitate each
different international society (pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist), even if
each international society, in turn reinforces such different diplomatic relationships
among states.
For the last time, I will examine the contribution of diplomacy to international
society.

Many scholars assume that the discussion of diplomacy is marginal in

international relations, and they tend to disregard the importance of diplomacy in
international society (Sofer, 1988:196).

In particular, major conventional IR theorists

see diplomacy at most as a secondary phenomenon or even disregard diplomacy
totally (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:12-23).

Some of them even argue that though

diplomacy might exist within international theory, it is still rarely analyzed or
extensively explored (Sofer, 1988:196).

For instance, diplomacy does not appear

among Morgenthau’s six principles of realism; it is merely a technique, along with war
(Jonsson and Hall, 2005:16).198 Morgenthau also claims that along with the decline of
diplomacy set with the end of the First World War, since the end of the Second World
War, diplomacy has lost its vitality, and its functions have gradually withered away
(Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985: 563-569).199 Moreover, Kenneth Waltz does not
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199

Raymond Aron regards war and diplomacy as complementary modality. See Aron (1966:40).

Morgenthau reveals that there have been several reasons why the vitality and function of diplomacy
have faded away. As for Morgenthau, the decline of the significance of diplomacy might be deeply
imbedded in the development of speedy and regular communications in the form of the satellite, the
airplane, the radio, the telegraph, the teletype, the long-distance telephone. Also, he claimed that
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even conceive of any socializing agent beyond the state (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:17).
For Waltz, there is no processional relationship, but units (states) simply act properly
on the basis of the environment they find, or they do not survive (Jonsson and Hall,
2005:17).
However, I have to say that although there has been some fluctuation of the
roles of diplomacy in international society,
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institution cannot be completely diminished.

the important role of diplomacy as an
More accurately, it would be illusory to

presume that we can completely repudiate the importance of diplomacy (Sofer,
1988:207).

For instance, North Korea has greatly emphasized self-reliance and

autarky, which put North Korea into international isolation and economic meltdown,
but even North Korea has cherished diplomatic relations with some countries, like
China.
In fact, some scholars such as English School scholars and diplomats have
emphasized the importance of diplomacy in international society.

For instance, the

members of the British Committee claimed that at the heart of what happens and what
might happen in international relations lies diplomacy, and that at the heart of any
worthwhile theory of international relations must lie a theory of diplomacy (Sharp,
2003:856).

Diplomacy was the heart of the research project of the original members

of the English School.201 And so, we can say that almost, all of the English School

secret diplomacy behind the door led to the depreciation of diplomacy, which reveals his negative view
on diplomacy. See Morgenthau and Thompson (1985: 570-571).
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As David Armstrong pointed out, until the end of the Cold War, it was hard to expect decent
diplomatic relationship between Western and communist states, which was quite different from the
decent solid diplomatic relationship among Western states. However, in the post-cold war era and 21st
century, once again, diplomacy appears to become an important institution in international society, since
as the result of the end to the hostility between two blocs, diplomacy can be more preferable than ever.
See David Armstrong (1999:56).
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See Andrew Hurrell (2006:3).
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scholars are well aware of the importance of diplomacy, particularly to international
society.

Indeed, many English School scholars, like Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, John

Vincent, Alan James, Adam Watson, David Armstrong, Barry Buzan, Andrew Hurrell,
and Geoffrey Wiseman have recognized diplomacy as a significant institution to help
to govern international society, on the basis of their adoption of the historical
sociology of international relations. 202 For them, therefore, as an important institution
of international society, diplomacy is perceived as significant and necessary to
international society and so, for them, the relationships between diplomacy and
international society can be inseparable, particularly when considering that due to
diplomacy, governance without government becomes possible, and due to diplomacy,
international society exists and is developed (Lose, 2001:188).
Let us take a look at several functions of diplomacy, in order to reveal how
diplomacy has contributed to international society.

First, we can easily notice that

diplomacy has close relationships with sovereign states and international society
membership, especially when considering that, once, diplomacy could be regarded as
the standard of civilization.

Usually, sovereign states most idealistically practice

diplomacy, and diplomacy most idealistically works within international society as
well.

In other words, if a state joins a diplomatic system in international society, let

alone it is diplomatically recognized, it means that the state is an independent and
autonomous sovereign state as a highly possible civilized member of international
society, especially as the self-determination/decolonization was once a criterion for
membership in international society (Keens-Soper, 1999:34). To put it differently, if
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Barry Buzan regards diplomacy as one of primary institutions about communication, negotiation
and the sanctity of agreements. Barry Buzan explained well about the primary institutions of
international society well. See Barry Buzan (2002). Also see Barry Buzan (2006:82).
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the non-member states of international society practice diplomatic relations with the
member-states of international society on the basis of diplomatic norms and rules, it
can greatly determine whether or not the non-member states can become members of
the international society.

In the past, on and off, we could see that diplomatic

recognition determined whether or not polities were civilized (or whether or not they
were the full members of international society).

For instance, during the age of

imperialism, diplomatic recognition was denied to uncivilized polities (Jonsson and
Hall, 2005:127).

Also, the Congress of Vienna in 1815 established the rule that

polities would not be seen as sovereign if not diplomatically recognized by other
powers, particularly Great Powers (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:127).

As non-European

polities/states gradually had diplomatic relations with European countries on the basis
of diplomatic rules and norms, they were accepted as the full members of international
society, which expands international society.

All of these evidently indicate that

diplomatic recognition can be viewed as a criterion to judge whether or not polities are
the full members of international society.

And so, diplomatic recognition implies a

willingness to deal with a new state as a member of international society, and
diplomatic recognition of non-member states of international society can be a parallel
to the expansion of international society (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:126).

All in all,

diplomacy can be used as a criterion for some level of membership in international
society, especially when considering that diplomatic relations themselves imply the
legitimacy of governments.

This demonstrates the absolute necessity of diplomacy

for the existence and expansion of international society.

At this juncture, we can

certainly see the close co-relationship between diplomacy and international society.
Second, diplomacy is understood as a peaceful means rather than aggressive
means to resolve some conflicting interests among states, and so we can assume that
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diplomacy civilizes international relations.

In other words, diplomacy itself can be

recognized as the civilized pursuit of the national interest in the relations among states,
while softening the naked aggressiveness of power politics or even replacing the use
of force, the primeval manner of conducting international politics, with persuasion,
which can be often seen in international arenas (Otte, 2001:134, 141).

Due to this

aspect, we can assume that diplomacy civilizes international affairs, while constantly
searching for mutually acceptable terms and conditions (Otte, 2001:134).

Adam

Watson revealed that diplomacy has facilitated the civilizing and civilized process in
international society, while making a good summary of the relationship between
diplomacy and international society.

Adam Watson stated:

Diplomacy is an organized pattern of communication and
negotiation, nowadays continuous, which enables each
independent government to learn what other governments want
and what they object to. In a developed international
society it becomes more than an instrument of
communication and bargaining.
It also affects its
practitioners. It is an activity which even if often abused has a
bias towards the resolution of conflicts. It is a function of the
diplomatic dialogue to mitigate and civilize the differences
between states, and if possible reconcile them, without
suppressing or ignoring them. Conflicts of interests are a
major subject of diplomacy, which can function effectively only
when the necessary level of understanding exists between the
parties to the dialogue about the maintenance of the system as a
whole and about the rules for the promotion of their separate
interests within the system. The diplomatic dialogue is thus
the instrument of international society: a civilized process
based on awareness and respect for other people’s points of
view; and a civilizing also, because the continuous exchange
of ideas, and the attempts to find mutually acceptable
solutions to conflicts of interest, increase that awareness and
respect. The civilizing tendency visibly goes not prevent
diplomacy from being perverted and misused – its methods
lend themselves to duplicity.
But the bias towards
understanding other points of view and other needs, toward a
search for common ground and a resolution of differences, is
unmistakably there (Watson, 1983:20-21).
All in all, at this juncture, as Adam Watson put it, diplomacy is the instrument of
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international society for the civilization process, which leads to the continuous
exchange of ideas and the acceptable solutions to conflicts of interest.

At this

juncture, we can see that diplomacy is pretty much inclusive rather than exclusive,
rejecting Huntington’s obsession with conflict-soaked cultures, 203 especially when
considering that diplomacy has been used as an institution to push many different
cultural or regional states to work together and find peaceful solutions, which helps to
ultimately sustain international society and to promote the well-being of international
society.

Thus, diplomacy might be one of the best institutions to modify states’

language and behavior, which helps to sustain the existence of international society, in
particular in the nuclear age in which any nuclear war itself can severely damage or
destroy international society.
Third, we can think that diplomacy spreads the standard of civilization across
the international arena, as diplomacy promotes and consolidates certain values and
norms as universal, such as human rights and democracy, across international society.
Diplomacy can encourage states to accept certain norms and values of international
society as the standards of civilization, so as to make the states become full members
of international society, which most clearly demonstrates the inseparable relationship
between diplomacy and international society.

In the process, diplomacy can

transform states’ identities and interests, which can help to consolidate international
society or to alter the fabric of international society.

In other words, the world has

increasingly become a more civilized place and international society has been
expanded, as via diplomacy, more states adopt norms and values of international
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Samuel P. Huntington (1996).
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society as the standard of civilization. 204 In short, diplomacy has transformed
barbarian and savage states into civilized states, as diplomacy has encouraged or
forced non-member states of international society to comply with predominant norms
and values of the international society, such as human rights or democracy, as the
standard of civilization, and in the end, it has made them become full members of
international society.

Therefore, diplomatic relations themselves can be ultimately

responsible for spreading the standard of civilization, and also they can sustain,
expand or transform international society.

At this juncture, we can see the

contribution of diplomacy to the existence of international society, the expansion of
international society and the well-being of international society.

In addition, we can

say that diplomacy clearly plays a significant role in managing international society.
Fourth, when considering that relations between sovereign states bound by no
common authority have been traditionally regarded as having a tense and potentially
violent character, diplomacy has addressed and managed such relations as its prior.205
In other words, as one of the primary functions of diplomacy, although diplomacy
cannot completely prevent war nor completely guarantee peace and security in
international society, diplomacy facilitates order and stability in international society,
such as “the minimization of the effects of friction in international relations” (Bull,
1977:165).206 In fact, we can even say that diplomacy can be seen as a task to sustain
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See Maurice Keens-Soper (1975).
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See Paul Sharp (2008).
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Hedley Bull mentioned several functions of diplomacy in relation to order within the modern state
system, such as communication, negotiation, the gathering of intelligence, minimization of the effects
of friction, and symbolizing the existence of the society of states. But, in my dissertation, I want to
stress diplomatic functions for the existence of common goods of an international society, including
order and stability, even if Bull’s all functions are closely related with order and I admit that I used
some of them, such as the minimization of friction as examples for diplomatic functions for order and
stability. At this juncture, as for Bull, what constitute order are the primary goals of states – security,
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the order and stability in which progress towards civilization (more civilized states and
more developed international society) can be obtained. 207 Because of this, diplomacy
should not be recognized as a mechanism to pursue states’ own national interests alone
at the expense of the existence of international society or the well-being of
international society, since via diplomacy, it is very hard to accomplish states’ own
interests in the absence of order and stability in international society.
As mentioned above, we should notice that diplomacy contributes to order and
stability in international society, preventing the prevalence of the rule of the jungle in
international society, in particular when considering that as power management,
diplomatic alliance can be used to counter the imbalance of power so as to keep
stability and order.208 In fact, in some sense, diplomacy and diplomats can be defined
with the concept of ‘the balance of power,’ as the tendency for states to counter anyone
that was becoming strong enough to threaten the independence of all the others, which
demonstrates how diplomacy manages the balance of power to maintain order and
stability in international society. 209 This indicates that order and stability in

the sanctity of agreements (pacta sunt servanda) and territorial property rights. See Bull (1977:163166).
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See Paul Sharp, “The English School, Herbert Butterfield and Diplomacy,” Discussion Papers in
Diplomacy, Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael.’ The website is available at:
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2002/20021100_cli_paper_dip_issue83.pdf pp. 20.
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At this juncture, we can see a close connection between diplomacy and balance of power. We
might even think that loyalty to the principle of the balance of power and attention to its operation
might be regarded as the responsibilities of diplomacy and diplomats. See Paul Sharp (2003:861).
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Unlike Hedley Bull (1977), in my dissertation, I do not mention balance of power and war as
primary institutions to manage an international society. As for me, today, the balance of power and
war seem outdated. To me, integration seems more effective than balance of power to manage
international society, which can be seen in Germany’s integration with the European Union as the
solution to Germany problem after WWII. In fact, today integration seems to be a more effective
mechanism than balance of power to deal with China. Also, today, war has become so costly, so
destructive and so dangerous. In particular, nuclear war itself cannot be regarded as an institution of
an international society, since its destructive power can kill not only states but also even an
international society. Nevertheless, I am not completely opposed to the war as an institution, as I tend
180

international society are not things bestowed by nature, but are a matter of refined
thought, careful contrivance, and elaborate artifice (Sharp, 2003:861).

Owing to this,

we can say that diplomats themselves are skillful and good managers governing
international society so as to sustain international society and even to promote the
well-being of international society (Sofer, 1988:207). To sum up, as a significant
institution, diplomacy contributes to upholding order and stability in international
society.
Fifth, let us turn to information-gathering as one of the primary functions of
diplomacy.

Via diplomatic intelligence based on the accurate gathering and relaying

of relevant information, we can constantly reassess events and developments with a
view to our interests, let alone our understanding the identity and interest of other
states, and the context of international society as a whole (Otte, 2001:133).

As a

function of diplomacy, to put it differently, the flows of information can help one state
to achieve a detailed picture of another, which can provide opportunities and motives
that may induce its government to stay or change course (Keens-Soper, 1999:45).
This can eventually help to keep or change the identity and interests of states and the
context of international society in the long run.

In other words, as we can

acknowledge the identity and interest of other states on the basis of accurate
information via diplomacy, we can find the most effective way to keep or change
states, which can be seen in my three different and effective ways – i.e. power, interest
and legitimacy - to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.
As a matter of fact, Hedley Bull was well aware of the importance of the gathering of
intelligence or information about foreign countries as one of primary functions of
to support the war to cope with outlaw states in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.
Sharp (2008).
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See Paul

diplomacy (Bull, 1977:164).

According to Bull, diplomats are uniquely skilled in

gathering a particular kind of information which is essential to the conduct of
international relations (Bull, 1977:181).

To him, information via diplomacy is

primarily about the view and policies of a country’s political leadership, now and in
the near future (Bull, 1977:181).

For Bull, information is knowledge of the current

situation and how it is likely to develop rather than the pattern of past regularities
(Bull, 1977:181).

More importantly, to him, the information can be derived from

day-to-day personal dealings with the leading political class in the country to which a
diplomat is accredited (Bull, 1977: 181).

When considering all of these, diplomacy

has had decisive impacts on states’ incentives, interests and behavior, which eventually
shapes the nature of international society in the long run.

As briefly noted before, the

US intelligence failure in 2003 regarding Saddam’s Iraq is an outstanding example to
prove how important the information-gathering as a key role of diplomacy has been.
Geoffrey Wiseman supported the crucial diplomatic role of collection of information,
by pointing out the fact that there was no US diplomatic presence in Iraq leading up to
the 2003 invasion, which led to the intelligence failure about Saddam’s Iraq (Wiseman,
2005:423).210
When considering the above, information-gathering as a function of diplomacy
should be recognized as significant to govern international society.
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As a matter of

Wiseman mentioned:“The United States’ historical rejection of this ‘talk-to-the-enemy’ norm is
evident in the US-Iraq relationship. Iraq suspended diplomatic relations in 1967 after the Middle
East War and only reestablished them under a 1984 agreement, at which point the U.S. embassy in
Baghdad was reopened, only to be closed again in January 1991 during the First Gulf War. In
other words, beginning in 1967, there was no American embassy in Baghdad for 29 of 36 years,
including from 1991 to 2003…………the important point is that there was no US diplomatic
presence in Iraq leading up to the 2003 invasion, which allowed the pro-war faction in
Washington to present its case knowing that there was no embassy – nor the media, intelligence,
business, and humanitarian presences......to contradict it.” See Wiseman (2005:423). Also,
Kenneth Pollack pointed out an embassy’s pivotal role of collection of information, saying that US
intelligence failures in Iraq came largely from the absence of a US embassy in Iraq. See Kenneth
Pollack (2004).
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fact, if the information-gathering can ultimately facilitate diplomatic recognition, the
diplomatic function of information-gathering should be seen as essential to manage
international society.

In particular, we realize that diplomatic recognition is a pre-

requisite for reciprocal exchange in international relations, and that diplomatic
recognition determines the relations among states.

And so, we can even say that

diplomatic recognition is the key element to shape an environment of international
society or a certain type of international society, which means that informationgathering as a primary function of diplomacy has greatly contributed to international
society.
Sixth, as mentioned above, information-gathering as a primary function of
diplomacy has been very important to international society.

However, we have to

realize that it is extremely hard to get accurate information without any
communicative action, that is, socialization, which can be felt in the absence of the US
embassy in Saddam’s Iraq before the war in 2003.

In fact, many scholars, especially

English School scholars, are well aware of the significance of communicative action
as a primary function of diplomacy.

For instance, Martin Wight seemed to stress the

important role of communicative action as a primary function of diplomacy, as Martin
Wight called diplomacy “the system of the art of communication between powers”
(Wight, 1995:113).

Alan James also contends that diplomacy is, at bottom, the

communication system of international society (James, 2004:201).

Hedley Bull

claims that diplomacy facilitates communication between the political leaders of states
and other entities in world politics, and that without communication, there could be
neither international society, nor any international system at all (Bull, 1977:163-164).
More importantly, according to David Armstrong, diplomacy itself is originally the
dialogue that takes place among sovereign states as the members of international
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society (Armstrong, 1993:245).

All in all, when considering above English School

scholars’ perception on communicative action as one of significant diplomatic
functions, we can notice the significant role of communicative function in
international society.
In general, when considering common rules, values, norms and interests via a
system of communicative action or a system of negotiation as a definition of
diplomacy, we can see the co-related relationships between diplomacy and
international society, in particular when considering that international society is
defined with common norms, rules, and interests. 211 In short, international society
cannot exist without diplomacy, and diplomacy cannot exist without international
society, especially when considering that, as Adam Watson put it, diplomacy can be
properly comprehended in the context of international society, in which states are
engaged with each other, and diplomacy itself reflects a particular façade of
international society (Watson, 1983:13).
As communicative action, diplomacy can be used to even persuade or convince
other states that they should keep or change their views of the world, their normative
beliefs, and their preferences.

In other words, via communicative action,

socialization constructs, maintains, or transforms the identities and interests of states,
which can eventually influence the fabric of international society, the expansion of
international society, and even the promotion of the well-being of international society
(Sharp, 2004:227).

At this juncture, we can understand that diplomacy has played a

crucial role in shaping particular international societies (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:121).
For example, the Treaty of Westphalia established the foundation for the gradual
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See Bull (1977:13).
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emergence of the territorial, sovereign state, and this led to state-centered international
society (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:125).

As another example, the fact that US and

German leaders had been continuously engaged in the process of friendly persuasion
via communication with Shevardnadze and Gorbachev, could eventually lead to
German unification in 1989, since persuasion, via communication, on the basis of a
normative claim of self-determination could alter the Soviet leadership’s preference
over policies and outcomes in the course of the diplomatic relations, although the
Soviet leaders had been strongly opposed to German unification prior to 1989 and at
that time even the Soviet Union could have provoked an international crisis and
confrontation with Bonn and Washington by fully insisting on its legal rights over
Germany as an allied power (Risse, 2000:24-25). Furthermore, this could ultimately
not only strengthen the idea of self-determination, but also facilitate the ripple of
democracy across international society in the late 20 th century and the 21st century.
Diplomatic communication among states is one of the core characteristics of
diplomacy to modify the languages and behaviors of states, even influencing domestic
economic and political structure, ultimately states’ identities and interests, which can
change the context of international society in the long run (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:37).
In other words, as David Armstrong pointed out, diplomacy as a socializing function
can make possible the gradual modification and transformation of states, which is a
change in states’ identities and interests.212 This can help to sustain or alter the fabric
of international society, contributing to the well-being of international society as well
as the expansion of international society.

All in all, because of this socializing

function of diplomacy, diplomacy has contributed to the process of producing,
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See David Armstrong (1999).
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reproducing or transforming particular international society, and so we can certainly
say that diplomacy constitutes, re-produces or transforms international society,
although, in turn, diplomacy reflects the fabric of international society as well
(Jonsson and Hall, 2005:37).
Thanks to communicative action, we can say that diplomacy might be one of
the best institutions to promote and consolidate a certain norm and value across an
international society, particularly when considering that diplomacy can be seen as a
process of learning (Lose, 2001:191), and that communicative action over time has
brought about the development of similarity, which can be interpreted as the expansion
of international society or the expansion of civilization.

As Adam Watson put it, this

indicates that the development of international society has been closely related to the
diplomatic process of interaction, as norms and values are endlessly amended by
negotiations to meet pressures of change, and the better norms and better rules as the
requisites of international society are continuously established by diplomatic
communication such as negotiations or persuasion, among states (Watson, 1983:213).
To sum up, via functions of diplomacy, we can say that as one of the primary
institutions of international society, diplomacy contributes not only to the existence of
international society, but also to the character of international society, as diplomacy
can construct, maintain or transform the identities and interests of states, along with its
contribution to both national well-being and the well-being of international society, let
alone the expansion of international society.

Indeed, without diplomacy, we cannot

even imagine international relations, nor the existence or development of international
society, and so, we cannot disregard the role of diplomacy in an inseparable and
inevitable relationship with international society (Langhorne, 2008:58). In short, all
functions of diplomacy clearly imply the close relationship between international
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society and diplomacy, and these help us understand that as a primary institution,
diplomacy plays a significant role in managing international society.
Let us turn to the evolution of diplomacy on the basis of the evolution of
international society, even if in turn, the evolution of diplomacy strengthens the
evolution of international society as well.

First of all, we should be aware of the fact

that diplomatic culture and the nature of international society are closely related, and
we should also acknowledge that the type of diplomacy reflects the context of
international society.

In short, diplomacy reflects the context of international society.

At this juncture, I have to say that diplomacy has not been fixed, but has evolved on
the basis of the evolution of the fabric of international society.
scholars are well aware of this point.

Many English School

As for Martin Wight, diplomacy is a sphere of

human relations with its own distinctive norms which reflect the complexities,
uncertainty, and anxieties of different members of international society (Jackson,
2002:4).

More importantly, Hedley Bull made a good point about diplomatic culture,

by saying:
In considering the role of such common cultures in relation to
international society, it is worth distinguishing between the
diplomatic culture….---the common stock of ideas and
values possessed by the official representatives of states --and the international political culture by which we mean the
intellectual and moral culture that determines the attitudes
toward the state system of the societies that compose it. It is
clear that the European international society of the 18th and
19th century was founded upon a diplomatic and an
international political culture that do not now underpin the
world international society of today (Hurrell, 2002:6-7).
In fact, Bull ultimately defines a diplomatic culture as the common stock of ideas and
values possessed by the official representatives of states, which is part of a wider
international political culture as a necessary precondition for the emergence of
international society (Neumann, 2003:349).
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Also, Christian Reus-Smit claims that a

different social condition brings about a different type of diplomacy, while answering
the question of why different societies of sovereign states, such as the ‘ancient Greek
polises,’ ‘Renaissance city-states,’ ‘absolutist Europe’ and ‘modern world,’ create
relatively different kinds of diplomacy, such as ‘third party arbitration,’ ‘oratorical
diplomacy,’ ‘old diplomacy’ and ‘multilateralism’ (Reus-Smit 1999).

All in all, when

considering the above, we can see that diplomacy has not been fixed, but has been
historically evolved on the basis of the fabric of international society.
There are many examples to demonstrate that diplomacy reflects the context of
international society.

At this juncture, I will briefly touch on old diplomacy,

multilateral diplomacy, and poly-lateral diplomacy in order to demonstrate that
diplomacy reflects the context of international society.

First of all, we must consider

the international environment in which the old diplomacy emerged.

The international

environment for the old diplomacy is the absolutes of the Westphalian system, such as
territorial fixed states where everything of values lies within some state’s borders, a
single, secular authority governing each territory and representing it outside its borders,
and no authority above states.213 The Peace of Westphalia brought about a new
diplomatic arrangement such as an order created by states, and for states, while
replacing most of the legal vestiges of hierarchy, at the pinnacle of which were the
Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor, in particular when considering that the Peace of
Westphalia is generally seen as the death knell for a Christian society of polities
(Jonsson and Hall, 2005:36).

This ultimately indicates that a new international

environment requests the emergence of a new different kind of diplomacy; that is a
state-centered diplomacy called old diplomacy as a primary type of diplomacy in the
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See James P. Muldoon Jr. (2007).
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seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century, which can also be referred to as
bilateral diplomacy or secretive diplomacy (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:41).

Thus, we

can see that a new type of diplomacy usually emerges because of the change of the
context of international society.
Because the practice of diplomacy reflects the context of international society,
open/new/multilateral diplomacy cannot be exceptional.

The new diplomacy

emerged in the nineteenth century and reached the zenith in the twentieth century
(Sofer, 1988:197).

As a symptom of the new diplomacy, there was a crisis in the

system of the European balance of power (Sofer, 1988:197).

Also, since the

nineteenth century, the strong reaction against the aristocratic international club of
diplomatists and particularly against what was called old or secret diplomacy, in which
sovereignty was given to few, had gradually emerged (Otte, 2001:157).

Moreover,

since the nineteenth century, there had been the gradual acknowledgement of the
importance of the public opinion (Nicolson, 1950:74).

And, old/bilateral/secretive

diplomacy could not sufficiently address the new emerging regional and global
problems – e.g. terrorism, narcotics trafficking, intra-state conflict, free trade and
investment, economic development, self-determination, democratic development,
growing inequalities and disparities in the globalizing world economy, global financial
and economic crisis, climate change and other pressing global environmental issues,
infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, Bird Flu and drug-resistant tuberculosis), disarmament,
arms control, failed states, gross violation of human rights and increasing
humanitarian crisis. 214 All of these contributed to the transformation from the
old/bilateral/secretive diplomacy toward the new/open/multilateral diplomacy.
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In the post-Cold War era, we need a new type of diplomacy due to the new
kind of fabric of our current international society.

In the post-Cold War era, as a new

phenomenon, NGOs and other non-states actors, like Greenpeace, Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch and others, have rapidly increased in number, and
they are expected to continuously increase. 215 Today, more than 20,000 transnational
NGO networks are already active across international society (Leonard, 2002:54).
This indicates that as a new kind of international environment, we can see that
boundaries are becoming increasingly porous rather than being fixed and permanent
(Hocking, 2004:151).

In other words, recently, the rigid state-centered diplomacy is

often rejected due to the involvement of non-state actors.

The representatives of

increasingly important and successful non-states actors have emerged as new
diplomats, and so, this environment requests a new kind of diplomacy such as
polylateral diplomacy which can be marked as the 21st century diplomacy (Sharp,
2003:876).

In general, diplomacy has been known to be limited to only a relationship

among states, rather than between states and non-state actors, but today we cannot
ignore the relations between states and non-state actors as non-diplomatic relationship
any more, such as Greenpeace’s vigorous campaign against French nuclear testing in
the South Pacific and its anti-whaling efforts against Japan (Cooper and Hocking,
2000:363-364).
Up to now, I have demonstrated the close relationship between diplomacy and
international society, showing how diplomacy can change the nature of international
society and how the evolution of diplomacy has been greatly influenced by the
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evolution of the context of international society.

However, at this juncture, most

importantly, one thing has never been changed or evolved.

It is diplomacy as a

considerable institution that has played a significant role in the governance of
international society, no matter what kind of diplomacy – old diplomacy, new
diplomacy or polylateral diplomacy.

In the next section, I will demonstrate how

various kinds of diplomacy have helped to govern international society, while
promoting and consolidating democracy across international society.
2> Diplomacy and Democracy
In general, adherence to common norms and principles of state behavior in
international society has rendered independent states a part of a society of civilized
nations (Otte, 2002:234).

And so, compliance with human rights and democracy as

universal can render independent states full members of international society,
especially in the post-Cold War era and 21st century in which there has been much
lower tolerance for undemocratic states in international society than in the Cold War
era, and in which even liberal democracy has been slowly but steadily conceived as a
principle all states are expected to move towards (Jordaan, 2003:171).

At this

juncture, we can guess that there have been various mechanisms to promote
democracy across international society, as they have goaded non-democratic states to
accept democracy as well as human rights.

As one of mechanisms, diplomacy has

played a significant role in promoting and consolidating democracy across
international society.

In particular as diplomacy contributes to the recognition and

reproduction of similar polities, while delegitimizing other types of political
formations, we can expect that diplomacy can have a great impact on democratic
promotion and consolidation across international society (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:136).
In fact, once Martin Wight insisted that diplomacy played a significant role in
191

diffusing the ideas and practices of the European system of states to every new part of
the globe (Neumann, 2003:349).

As Wight put it, we should recognize that today,

diplomacy has been playing a crucial role in promoting human rights and democracy
across international society, which has led to the expansion of international society as
more states have become increasingly democratic as civilized states.
Nevertheless, the fact that diplomacy has played a very significant role in
promoting and consolidating democracy across international society is not new at
all. 216 For instance, after the First World War, democratic constitutions and guarantees
for minority rights were added to the diplomatic recognition criteria adopted by the
victorious states, along with former US President Woodrow Wilson’s plea to “make
the world safe for democracy” (Jonsson and Hall, 2005:128).

Also, in the aftermath

of World War II, through diplomacy, the US helped to transform devastated countries,
Germany and Japan, into prosperous peace-loving democratic states.217
However, we can hardly deny the fact that in the post-Cold War era and 21st
century, diplomacy has been more often adopted for the robust democratization across
international society, supporting democratic ideas and institution and alleviating
poverty, than ever, especially when considering that the US has often used its various
diplomatic policies to change the repressive regimes in international society, such as
the US adoption of conditional economic and security aids and its adoption of political
investment to push non-democratic states to accept human rights and democracy in
particular currently in African and Arab countries as well as Latin American
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countries. 218 In this section, therefore, I will primarily attempt to examine how
diplomacy can promote and consolidate democracy across international society.
In general, we can often see that via diplomacy as a socializing institution,
many states are socialized into international norms, like human rights and democracy.
Through diplomatic processes such as argumentation, persuasion or communication,
many states are exposed to international norms, and they have been gradually engaged
in them.

In particular, the communications between norm-violating governments,

norm-complying governments, transnational advocacy networks and domestic
opposition groups can ultimately get the norm-violation states to conform to
international norms, which can be seen in Condoleezza Rice’s transformational
diplomacy, albeit norms-violating governments initially reject the validity of
international norms and are not interested in engaging in a serious dialogue with their
critics (Risse, 2000:29).
When norm-violating governments experience increased diplomatic pressures
via the communicative behavior/ socializing function as one of the diplomatic
functions with norm-complying governments, along with their transnational and
domestic critics, they usually feel that they must make some concessions in order to
increase their international legitimacy or simply to regain foreign aid, and so they
eventually no longer deny the validity of the international norms, which is often seen
in China’s case (Risse, 2000:29).

Also, as already noted before, at this juncture, as

diplomatic relations can be understood as a learning-socializing process, norm-
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violating states can gradually change their interests as well as their identities, via their
gradual acceptance of international norms, like human rights and democracy.

This

indicates how norm-violating governments might reach the consensus that
international norms like human rights and democracy obtain authentically
international validity beyond tactical concession, which can be seen in South Korea’s
case (Risse, 2000:31).

We can confirm that states’ identities and interests are not

inherently fixed but are subjected to change, and such change in states’ identity and
interests can be possible via diplomacy.

As a matter of fact, in terms of change in

state’s identity and interests, we can think of diplomacy based on a hierarchical
relationship and limited use of force, which is known as coercive diplomacy, as well.
This type of diplomacy was evident in Iraq’s case, although only partially successful.
In other words, via coercive diplomacy, even outlaw states might become a better state,
in particular when considering that after more than 13 years of U.S. sanctions and 7
years of UN sanctions, plus the US’s air strikes on Libya in 1986, Libya which was
once a terror sponsoring outlaw state, had taken important steps on the road to
normalizing its relations with the international community, beginning with its
renunciation of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, in order to ultimately
become a better state. 219 When considering this change in states’ identities and
interests via diplomacy let alone states’ acceptance of human rights and democracy, we
can say that diplomacy is a good institution to promote and consolidate democracy.
All in all, we can see how throughout diplomacy, non-democratic states can become
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democratic states in the end, and we can see that they can become full members of
international society, or good citizens of international society.
There are many kinds of diplomacy that have been adopted to promote and
consolidate democracy across international society, such as summit, public diplomacy,
and transformational diplomacy, with which I will briefly deal in this section.
of all, I will start with the role of summit for democratization.

First

According to Jan

Melissen, summit can be understood as a masterpiece in the art of compromise.220 The
term ‘summit’ is accurately applied to meetings between incumbent heads of
government and heads of state, or political leaders, and the highest representatives of
an international organization. 221 Also, as an international meeting, summit has more
than one purpose, and requires the time and location of a meeting, such as the
European Union (EU) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 222 The
summit is the expression of the direct political ties between the leader and his people,
since the leader’s policy is greatly influenced by the media and his/her people’s
preference, and the political leader is perceived as the elected diplomat-in-chief.223
There are two kinds of summits: “ad hoc summits that are called as the occasion seems
to demand, such as the Camp David summit on the Middle East in September 1978”
and “serial summits which usually have their origin in ad hoc summits but then
become part of a regular series,” such as European Union (Berridge and James,
2003:255-256).

Some summits have contributed to democratization across
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international society.

For instance, known as the effective center of global

governance, the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized democracies (Grieco and
Ikenberry, 2003:305),

224

albeit Russia is not a rich democracy, has been known to

advance the universal values of human dignity, democracy, economic opportunity, and
social justice, in particular for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa
(BMFNA).

225

In particular, there are several cases for the promotion and

consolidation of democracy via such a summit.

For example, whenever former US

President George W. Bush and former Russian President Vladimir Putin met, Bush
raised his concern about Russia’s poor democratic record such as no free media,
undemocratic fashioned rule of law, and severe human rights violation, not to mention
Putin’s Russia crossing back across the line from Partly Free to Not Free in 2004. 226
Also, Russia’s membership in G-8 itself has directly or indirectly given some pressure
to Russia toward human rights and democracy.

Moreover, the G-8 made its

commitment to train 20,000 peacekeeping troops for good governance and democracy
in Africa at the 31st G8 Summit from July 6 to July 8, 2005.227 And the G-8 has
provided conditional aid on the respect for democracy and good governance in the
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recipient countries. 228 All in all, the G-8 has contributed to the promotion of
democracy across international society, and it has worked as a primary diplomatic
mechanism for democratic development across international society.

Nonetheless, in

the mid-1970s, the G-8 was originally set up as a forum for economic and trade
matters.229
As another example, I can think of the ministerial meeting of the Community
of Democracies, even though, accurately speaking, I cannot call it a summit but rather
multilateral diplomacy.

The ministerial meeting of the Community of Democracies

(CD) demonstrates how diplomacy can enhance the solidarity of democracies, let
alone the promotion of democracy across international society.

As a unique global

forum, the ministerial meeting of the CD has brought together those nations
committed to promotion and consolidation of democracy across international
society. 230 More accurately, this meeting has contributed to the strengthening of a civil
society; to the reduction of poverty, development and democracy; to development of
democracy caucuses at the UN and other regional organizations; and to regional and
inter-regional cooperation for democracy. 231 Currently, more than 120 nations have
come together: first in Warsaw, Poland in 2000; second in Seoul, South Korea in 2002;
third in Santiago, Chile in 2005; and fourth in Bamako, Mali in 2007. 232 Through
these meetings, they have had a chance to confirm their commitment to consolidate
228
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Available at the website:

their own democratic institutions and work with other countries regionally and
globally to assist them on their transition toward democracy. 233 The basic principles of
the group can be seen in the Warsaw Declaration.234 More importantly, the 2005
Santiago Commitment improved the Community’s agenda by facilitating regional and
inter-regional cooperation for democracy promotion, as well as global efforts, via
support for the UN Democracy Fund and the UN Democracy Caucus. 235 Overall,
diplomacy such as ministerial meetings as well as summits can be used to facilitate
and consolidate a community of democracies, as democratic states together promote,
protect and consolidate their shared democratic principles, practices and values, and
their political, social and economic freedom across international society.
Let us turn to public diplomacy for democratization across international society.
The term ‘public diplomacy’ was first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, who was
once a diplomat and dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University, contributing to establishment at the Fletcher School of the Edward R.
Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy (Wolf and Rosen, 2004:3).

At that time (1965),

the Murrow Center revealed the definition of Public Diplomacy, by saying:
public diplomacy…deals with the influence of public attitudes
on the formation and execution of foreign policies. It
encompasses dimensions of international relations beyond
traditional diplomacy….[including] the cultivation by
governments of public opinion in other countries; the
interaction of private groups and interests in one country with
those of another…(and) the transnational flow of
233
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information. 236
In short, public diplomacy is “the process by which direct relations with people in a
country are pursued to advance the interests and extend the values of those being
represented”, which, as Melissen put it, is the most succinct definition of public
diplomacy by Paul Sharp (Melissen, 2007:11, Sharp, 2007).

However, more

importantly, as an integral component of transformational diplomacy which I will
explain below, public diplomacy can be understood to:
foster a sense of common interests and values with the people of
other countries; to isolate, marginalize, and discredit violence
extremists; and to foster a positive vision of hope and
opportunity that is based on universal values like a belief in
freedom, equality, the dignity and worth of every human
being. 237
In other words, public diplomacy has contributed across international society to the
promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy as norms and values of
international society, especially when considering that democratic change can be
almost impossible without citizens’ access to accurate information and that tyrannical
regimes are secured when they tightly control knowledge. 238 In fact, we can easily
find some examples for the contribution of public diplomacy to democratic
development across international society.

For instance, the US has used public

diplomacy to promote democracy across international society, while advocating
broadcasts, print media, and other outlets, such as Voice of America, Radio Free Asia,
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Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Sawa, Alhurra, and Radio and TV Marti, in
order to equip people in closed nations with open truth. 239 In particular, during the
time of the Soviet Union, Radio Liberty was one of the only ways for the people to
hear accurate news and information about their own society and the world. 240 Also,
when considering that the two primary things which brought down totalitarian regimes
in the Eastern bloc, were ‘the Helsinki Accord in 1975’ and ‘Radio Free Europe,’241
we can hardly deny how effective public diplomacy has been in promoting and
consolidating democracy across international society. 242
Most importantly, let us examine transformational diplomacy.

During the

Cold War era, Russians - with their uniform policy of destroying the influence of
capitalism everywhere and by any means - could afford to send agents into every
Laotian village to persuade the headmen of the philanthropy of the Soviet creed, and it
might be that by the ‘cell’ method they could create disturbance, organize riots and
demonstrations, and even topple governments (Nicolson, 1961:42).

This kind of cell

method can be compared to transformational diplomacy in the post-Cold War era in
order to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.

As a

primary diplomacy for freedom for all people in international society, Condoleezza
Rice’s transformational diplomacy is to elevate democracy-promotion activities inside
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countries, with the following objectives: “to work with our many partners around the
world to build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that will respond to the
needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international
system.”243As one of the outstanding aspects of transformational diplomacy, at this
juncture, transformational diplomacy is deeply rooted in partnership rather than in
paternalism.

In other words, transformational diplomacy implies that via diplomacy,

we are working, “not for people, but with people” in order to “help foreign citizens
better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own
future.”244 Thus, we can say that transformation diplomacy is about closely working
with, sharing experiences with, and collaborating with local people on democratic
change.245 Also, as transformational diplomacy can be understood as partnership with
a local population to build their own democratic societies, we can say that
transformational diplomacy indicates partners’ ownership of change toward
democracy. 246 Due to this aspect, transformational diplomacy is different from
traditional diplomacy which is based on the relationship between diplomats as the
representatives of states.247 All in all, we can obviously see that various diplomacies
have been used to promote and consolidate democracy across international society, as
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diplomacy has become a considerable institution to push or civilize non-democratic
states to accept human rights and democracy as norms and values of international
society.
In consideration of diplomatic role in democratization across international
society, let us take a look at how diplomats have contributed to the promotion and
consolidation of democracy across international society.

Many diplomats have made

great efforts to promote and consolidate democracy across international society,
especially in their host countries.

Nonetheless, someone might argue that diplomats

do not even define democratization as part of their job description even in the rare
moment when they are engaged in promotion of democracy (Adesnik and Mcfaul,
2006:8).

However, certainly we can observe that many diplomats are deeply engaged

in promotion and consolidation of democracy, albeit often quietly behind the scenes
(Adesnik and Mcfaul, 2006:8).

In fact, former US Secretary of State Condoleezza

Rice had directed Ambassadors to give priority to democracy promotion, to make it
central to mission strategies and their daily diplomatic activities. 248 Like this, in
general, US diplomats such as ambassadors and consulate staff have been instructed to
meet regularly with local political and religious leaders, dissidents, journalists,
activists, and other voices for democratic values across international society, while
making it clear that the US will stand with them if democracy activists peacefully
speak out or stand up for freedom, 249 which is a good example to implement
transformational diplomacy.

Because of this, U.S. diplomats have played a special

role in democratization in countries ruled by dictatorships, while helping to build up or
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strengthen the democratic opposition and to weaken or divide the autocrats in power,
especially when they adopt transformational diplomacy to challenge autocratic
regimes (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:7-8).

For instance, in despotic regimes,

diplomats can provide legitimacy to democratic challengers by meeting with them,
appearing in public with them, inviting them to diplomats’ countries, and affirming
their importance (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:23). Also, diplomats can warn of their
intent to withdraw support from autocratic incumbents, while serving as intermediaries
or channels of communication between the autocratic regimes and the democratic
oppositions, in particular during moments of transition (Adesnik and McFaul,
2006:23).

Diplomats’ engagement with social and political opposition leaders

against the autocrat can help protect them from harassment and imprisonment, and
diplomats can even help to get democratic leaders released from prison in authoritarian
regimes, if authoritarian regimes have friendly relations with diplomats’ countries
(Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:23).

All in all, we notice that as diplomats from

democratic countries, like the US, reach out to opposition party leaders, democratic
leaders and societal leaders in authoritarian regimes, they can ultimately help
democracy take root in authoritarian regimes. 250
There are many successful examples for how diplomats have contributed to the
promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society.

In particular,

many ambassadors have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of
democracy across international society.

First, Mark Palmer the American

Ambassador to Hungary, during Hungary’s swift transition from 1986 to 1989, greatly
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contributed to Hungary’s democratization. 251 Known for his advocacy of democracy
and human freedom, Mark Palmer often marched with the dissidents and the people
who were working for democracy, rather than with the oppressive government.252
Palmer also has been frequently approached by young Iranians, Libyans, Belarussians,
Chinese and others asking who they can approach in the U.S. government for advice
and support concerning democratic change.253 And in Moscow in the late 1960s,
Palmer was responsible for dealing with dissidents, Jews, actors, writers and others the
Communist Party oppressed, while smuggling out dissident literature. 254 When
considering all of the above, Palmer is one of the diplomats who have practiced
transformational diplomacy.
Second, from 1986 to 1988, the Reagan administration endorsed five UN
resolutions critical of Pinochet’s record on human rights, and at that time, the US
Ambassador to Chile, Harry Barnes continuously encouraged Chile’s economic
reforms, while promoting free and fair elections in Chile (Adesnik and McFaul,
2006:18).

In fact, Ambassador Barnes in Chile was, in a large part, contributing to

bringing down Pinochet, while respecting Chilean civil society, meeting publically
with representatives of opposition political parties like Christian Democrat leader
Gabriel Valdes and civil society figures, and even warning the Pinochet regime not to
251
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interfere with the 1988 plebiscite, which could ultimately get Chileans to restore their
democracy. 255 At that time, Valdes even said “the embassy has changed completely
for us.”256
Third, the US Ambassador Smith Hempstone (to Kenya, 1989-93) made a
great effort to almost succeed in uniting Kenyans to replace Daniel arap Moi who was
the corrupt and undemocratic Kenyan President, while campaigning for multi-party
elections and an end to persecution of dissidents. 257 Hempstone’s (and Washington’s)
pressure eventually prevailed in Kenya, along with the international tide of democracy
across international society, and so, in 1992, Kenya held its first genuine multi-party
election. 258 At that time, the Kenyan opposition, Ndolo Ayah called Hempstone the
“second hero of the liberation.” 259
Fourth, US Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, Stephen Young greatly supported the
desire of the Kyrgyz to live in a free society. 260 Throughout his time in Kyrgyzstan,
Ambassador Young very often met with civic activists around the country, speaking
with journalists, students, businessmen and political party leaders to enunciate US
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support for democratic development, while urging President Akayev publically to
respect the international commitment of Kyrgyzstan to democratic reforms. 261
Fifth, along with many other US officials, Michael Armacost, the US
Ambassador to the Philippines helped to democratize the Philippines under autocrat
Marcos’s rule (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:12). Armacost worked with the opposition
against the autocratic regime, while standing with the Pilipino people rather than
Marcos.

For example, Armacost attended Aquino’s funeral in September 1983, even

though Marcos instructed him not to go (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:22).
When considering the examples above, we can see how diplomats can have a
great impact on democratization in non-democratic states, and we may even think that
embassies can be recognized as ‘islands of freedom,’ which could be seen in Budapest,
Moscow and Bucharest in 1985 when many dissidents were accustomed to ardently
going to the embassy because they knew that the ambassador would stand with
them. 262 Also, more importantly, we can clearly see the role of diplomats as “a
delicate kind of engagement to promote democracy” especially in countries ruled by
dictatorship (Adesnik and Mcfaul, 2006:8).

Overall, we can easily observe that

diplomacy has greatly contributed to democratic development across international
society.

Due to, in large part, diplomatic efforts for democracy, today we see an

increased number of democratic states in ever-growing international society, especially
when considering that the last decades of the 20th century, and the first decades of the
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21st century can be called an era of liberty. 263 This has not only brought about certain
countries’ national interests, but also the common good of international society in the
long run, as democratic peace theory emphasizes.

Therefore, as Condoleezza Rice

implied, the promotion and consolidation of democracy via diplomacy across
international society might be very difficult and might take a very long period of time,
but we should not forget that what is certain is “democracy is always worth it.”

264

To

sum up, diplomacy has greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of
democracy across international society and so democracy has slowly but steadily
become the post-Cold war and 21st century new standard of civilization and the new
wave expansion of international society.

Nonetheless, in turn, the more

democratization across international society has occurred, the more different kinds of
diplomacy have been adopted to promote and consolidate democracy across
international society.

In other words, initially, few states like the US started using

diplomacy for promoting and consolidating democracy across international society as
their aims of foreign policy, but as democracy has been gradually predominant in
international society in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, many kinds of
diplomacy have been used for democratization across international society, which has
boosted up the long-terms common interests or the well-being of international society
as a whole.

In short, the more democratic states have appeared in international

society, the more different kinds of diplomacy have been adopted to promote and
consolidate democracy across international society, as in this chapter I try to show as
many kinds of diplomacy as possible for democratization across international society.
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Below, through three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq, I will demonstrate how
relatively different kinds of diplomacy have variously promoted and consolidated
democracy on the base of relatively different kinds of circumstances: a pluralist
international society, a solidarist international society and a liberal anti-pluralist
international society.
3> Case Studies for Diplomacy and Democracy
a>

Diplomacy and China’s Democratic Development
China had been one of late-comers to the world of international diplomacy, and

its eventual adoption of established diplomatic procedures had been slow and often
difficult process, sometimes at great personal danger, in particular when considering
that Mao rejected the rules of the international system and even sought to overthrow it,
in pursuit of change via revolution, along with his harsh rhetoric against Great Powers
- especially the US - while choosing relative isolation and economic autarky (Otte,
2001:129).265
However, Chinese diplomacy has been rapidly changed since the late 1970s.
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s four modernization policies could push China to lean
toward the West, and he initiated China’s first major diplomatic transformation by
launching the reform and opening movement, while promoting China’s engagement
with international society via its increasing participation in intergovernmental and
non-governmental organizations, in particular financial ones. 266 Its current numerous
diplomatic relations across international society are hard to miss.
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In fact, the number

Also See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).
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Nevertheless, Deng’s diplomatic transformation was still only partial, in particular considering that
Deng feared multilateral institutions which ,as for Deng, could be used to constrain and even punish
China. See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).
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of countries establishing diplomatic ties with China has steadily increased, for
example, from around 60 countries in 1971 to more than 160 countries currently. 267
Also, China shares borders with 14 countries: Russia, North Korea, Mongolia,
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan,
Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam.

Among them, around ten countries used to or still

have territorial disputes with China. 268 And, China is very close to the latent hot spots
in international society such as the Korean Peninsula and it has had a strategic
competitor, ‘Japan’ which has been supported by the US – e.g. the US-Japan joint
development of theater missile defense systems (TMD).269 Due to these, for China,
diplomacy has been a significant mechanism to guarantee its security and sovereignty,
let alone its own economic development and even its responsibility as a potential
Great Power, as China’s pivotal aims of policy. 270
In terms of China’s character of diplomacy, we come to see pluralistic
principles in its practice of diplomacy. 271 China has cherished pluralistic principles,
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because they best support China’s interests, in particular when considering the Opium
War and its past unfair treatment by the West. As noted several times in previous
chapters, China belongs to a pluralist international society in which the rigid concept
of sovereignty, sovereign equality, and the principle of non-intervention in other’s
internal affairs have been deeply embedded.

Due to this position, we see some limits

of diplomacy in changing China’s identity and character.

For example, whenever

facing some diplomatic pressure about its poor domestic record of human rights, some
Chinese leaders have often said that state sovereignty cannot be undermined under the
pretext of international human rights protection (Kent, 1999:153). In short, human
rights are principally a matter of state sovereignty (Kent, 1999:154).

Also, they often

raise Asian values, contending that we should accept different understanding,
explanation and purposes of a state human rights, as each state has differences in
politics, economy, culture, society, history and religion (Kent, 1999:154).

Below is a

summary that can help understand why China has cherished even anti-hegemony and
principles of a pluralist international society for its justification of rejection of human
rights and democracy.
The diversity of civilization is a basic characteristic of
human society.
There are naturally differences among
countries or nations in social systems, values, development
routes, tradition, religious beliefs and culture. To create a
colorful world with different civilizations, all countries must
respect each other, exist harmoniously, seek common points
while reserving differences and seek common progress.
Different histories, cultures, and economic and social systems
should be a driving force of mutual supplementation and
progress, rather than a source of mutual isolation, hostility and
conflicts. Different civilizations can co-exists for and pursue
common development by learning from each other. The
thinking of not accepting and respecting the diversity of the
world and attempting to force its own social system,
development methods or values on others are actions of
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hegemonism and go opposite to the laws of history. Of the
nearly 200 countries in the world that combine to have a
population of more than 6 billion, they all have their historical
traditions and development patterns. A uniform framework
is impossible to pull them together, erasing their own
characteristics. Undeniably, there may be disputes or even
conflicts among different civilizations due to their different
values. Such circumstances are not rare, happening in the past
and the present, but these could have been prevented.
Today,
mankind has entered a time where different civilizations
should learn how to coexist in peace, not only to prevent
misunderstandings, tension and conflict, but also to seek
common prosperity in harmony. Otherwise, it could only
bring about tragedy. 272
Furthermore, on June 28, 2004, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao said for the 50 th
anniversary of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence:
China will firmly safeguard its sovereignty and territorial
integrity, tolerating no one to interfere in its internal affairs. At
the same time, the country will respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of others.273
In fact, when considering China’s diplomatic relations with the third world countries
including many repressive regimes like North Korea, Myanmar and Zimbabwe, we
can obviously see that China has rarely cared about their form of government and their
record of human rights, insisting that its diplomacy has been based on the pluralist
principles, which has been mostly welcome to many poor and repressive countries in
Africa and in the Middle East, let alone North Korea, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. 274
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Even someone argues that North Korea, Sudan and Zimbabwe are China’s friends and China won’t
dump its friends, pointing out the fact that they had helped China not only in economic and political
arenas. For example, they argue that Burma was one of countries that supported China’s cracking
down democratic movement in 1989; that Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe was a hero who greatly
contributed to the end of British colonial rule; and that there had not been any genocide in Sudan.
Nevertheless, their arguments does not sound reasonable and acceptable, in particular considering that
China’s support for repressive regimes might bring about its short-term interests rather than its longterm interests like a responsible Great Power which maintains the existence of an international society
and promotes the well-being of an international society. Also, Myanmar, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan,
and Zimbabwe have received small arms and dual-use and conventional weapons technologies from
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Chinese themselves have strongly believed that China has shown an absolute respect
for sovereignty and independence of other states, irrespective of their size and status in
the international system (Kim, 1977:740), and they might even claim that people of
each nation should have the right to choose their own state system and way of life
without interference from other nations (Shao, 1986:497).

All in all, it’s clear that

China’s practice of diplomacy has been deeply embedded in pluralistic principles, such
as non-interference in others’ internal affairs, with its emphasis on the rigid concept of
state sovereignty, which appears to make it hard to influence China’s behavior and its
perception.

Nevertheless, there were some controversial cases to reject Chinese

claims, like China’s occupation and colonization of Tibet in 1950, China and North
Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950, and China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979. 275
However, China’s obsession with pluralistic principles does not necessarily
mean that diplomacy cannot be effective enough to alter not only the behavior of states
but also the identity and character of states in a pluralist international society.

In

other words, it would be wrong to say that diplomacy cannot have any impact on
China’s identity, character and behavior, like China’s democratization in international
society, simply because China has been embedded in the principles of a pluralist
international society.

In fact, as an institution for socialization among states,

diplomacy can encourage China to gradually accept human rights and democracy as

economic and military actors in China, and in particular, China has been the largest arms supplier to
Sudan since 2004. Jonathan Fenby, Professor Athar Hussain, Matin Jacques and professor Chen Jian
had a debate on “China After the Olympics,” in The London School of Economics in December 2008.
The website is available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/resources/podcasts/publicLecturesAndEvents.htm.
Also see Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small (2008).
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China’s intervention in the Korean War in 1950 is clearly a violation of the sovereign right of
Korea, in particular, when considering that the Korean War was a kind of civil war. I do not bother to
mention Tibet to demonstrate how hypocritical China’s self-claim for its absolute respect of sovereign
rights of other countries has been.
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universal, as long as the interest- oriented diplomacy can be applied to China, in
particular when considering that economic development has been the most cherished
goal in China’s policy as the source for the legitimization of the rule of Chinese
Communist Party (CCP).

In this section, thus, I will demonstrate how diplomacy can

push China toward human rights and democracy, while revealing how economic
diplomacy has had an impact on China’s path toward democracy.

Nevertheless, at

the end, I will briefly touch on political interests such as China’s desperate desire for
its good membership in international society and for its status as a responsible Great
Power, which could influence China’s attitude toward human rights and democracy.
Overall, in the process, I will emphasize the assumption that interest-oriented
diplomacy can directly or indirectly facilitate China’s democratic development, as I
show that China’s behavior, identity and characteristic have been swayed by China’s
national interest, which can strengthen China’s economic development and its status as
a potential responsible Great Power in international society.
Economic diplomacy can be defined as “diplomacy which employs economic
resources, either as rewards or sanctions, in pursuit of a particular foreign policy
objective,” even if once again I have to say that diplomacy is more than a simple tool
for achieving the goals of foreign policy (Berridge and James, 2003: 91).

This

economic diplomacy is most likely adopted not only to integrate China into
international society, but also to get it to gradually accept human rights and democracy
as universal norms and values of international society, albeit economic diplomacy
should continuously bring about China’s national interest.

As for China, economic

development is the key to China’s success and the basis for the growth of China’s
comprehensive national power (Soeya, Wang and Welch, 2003:196).

Thanks to this,

in its diplomacy, China has given great weight to economic consideration (Soeya,
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Wang and Welch, 2003:188).

Also, now that regional and global stability and peace

are the preconditions for China’s economic and political interests, China has been
more willing than ever to compromise, coordinate and cooperate with other states,
especially capitalist democratic states like the US and Japan, and China has become
increasingly sensitive to human rights and democracy, as a result of pressure from
many democratic countries, in particular the US and Japan (Soeya, Wang and Welch,
2003:201, Kent, 2001 and Fleay, 2008).

Moreover, as China has been increasingly

financially and politically engaged in international society, and so its economic and
political stake has increased, China has been gradually forced to act as a responsible
stakeholder, with its contribution to stability and peace in international society, while
clearly rejecting its past revisionist position against international society, since
Chinese authorities understand well that the continued rise in China’s economic clout
relies on an atmosphere of cooperation rather than confrontation (Soeya, Wang and
Welch, 2003:188).

Overall, when considering the above, we can see a bright future

for China’s democratization, as economic diplomacy can have an impact on China’s
democratization.
Let us take a look at some examples for economic diplomacy that has
influenced China’s behavior and its identity and characteristics.

First of all, as one of

outstanding examples of the impact of economic diplomacy on China, we can see the
strong reaction of democratic states against China’s crackdown on the democratic
movement in 1989.

In general, the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 and its

aftermath raised a negative image of China across international society, like an
international pariah.

Democratic states imposed unilateral and bi-lateral sanctions on

China after the Tiananmen Square massacre as punishment for the massacre (Kent,
2001:592, Fleay, 2008:237).

Also, as the most prominent expression of concern over
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human rights abuse, democratic states supported the draft resolutions critical of the
Chinese government’s human rights practices at the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights (UNCHR) (Fleay, 2008:238).

Among democratic states, as an ardent

critic of China’s brutal crackdown on democratic movement, the US has used
economic sticks and carrots to change China to gradually accept human rights and
democracy. 276 The US imposed economic sanctions on China due to China’s brutal
crackdown on the democratic movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989, along with its
support of UN resolutions, and the US was even opposed to China’s full membership
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)(Kent, 2001:592).

Beside

China’s suppression of the democracy movement in 1989, thanks to its missile exports
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When we look at the history of diplomatic relationship between China and the US, we can find that
in the past, successive US administrations refused to recognize the communist government of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China, while supporting the claim
of the nationalist government of Taiwan to represent all China, which was one of reasons why the PRC
could not take its seat in the UN Security Council until 1971. See Jonsson and Hall (2005). In
particular under the Eisenhower administration, the US refused its recognition of the PRC and further
was in opposition to China’s membership of the UN, and even under the Kennedy administration the
US had very dark view of China’s nuclear development, in the consideration of the joint nuclear attack
on China with the Soviet Union in order to destroy China’s atomic capacity. See Hsu (2000:720).
However, such hostile relationship has been gradually altered since on July 15, 1971, President Richard
Nixon declared the dramatic change in Sino-American relations. Under the tutelage of Henry
Kissinger, former Harvard professor and expert on diplomacy of the nineteenth century Austrian
statesman Clemens von Metternich, who specialized in the balance of power among states and the
limited security, President Richard Nixon terminated the policy of containment in pursuit of the
establishment of equilibrium between China, the Soviet Union and the US. See Hsu (2000:722). In
February 28, 1972, China’s Premier, Zhou Enlai’s and the US Secretary of States, Henry Kissinger
signed the Shanghai Communiqué, which was the milestone for normalizing relations between two
countries. This opened to China the great opportunity for the US recognition of PRC, purchase of the
US airplanes and scientific instruments and the deterrence against the Soviet possible attack. See Hsu
(2000:724). On December 15, 1978, eventually, the US and China established diplomatic relations,
while ending around three decades of official estrangement. The official diplomatic relations between
the US and China started on January 1, 1979. And, in February, 1979, Deng’s visit to the US helped
to fabricate the positive Sino-US relations and his observation to the US democracy and modern
economy could help shape China’s future. See Hsu (2000:795). Since 1979, the diplomatic relationship
between two countries has been gradually intensified, and such diplomatic relations between the US
and China could gradually transform their identities and characters from enemy to rivalry. Further,
China’s diplomacy has been outstandingly active, in particular since its outbreak of its post-Tiananmen
isolation, because China’s leaders came to acknowledge that China could and should play a role in
working toward a stable international environment, which can bring out China’s national interests in
the end. See Ingrid d’Hooghe (2007:7). Also, see Kent (2001). Moreover, See “Thirty Years
Later: Normalization of U.S. –China Relations,” Brookings, December 6, 2008. The website is
available at: http://www.brookings.edu/events/2008/1210_China_normalization.aspx?p=1
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to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, the US imposed special restrictions on supercomputer
and satellite technology exports to China (Wang, 1993a:639).
Eventually, China had to face the diplomatic isolation imposed by democratic
states, especially the West, let alone economic loss due to sanctions, following the
bloody suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations in the spring of 1989 (Gill,
2007:3).

In terms of China’s economic loss, after the Tiananmen Massacre, Chinese

government’s tight control did not facilitate, but rather hindered economic growth
(Cooper and Lee, 1992:37).

Also, due to Chinese government’s dreadful crackdown

on the 1989 Tiananmen Square democratic movement, Chinese people had to suffer
from deep reduction or nearly stop in foreign aid and investment in China, let alone a
rapid reduction of Western tourists (Cooper and Lee, 1992).

As a matter of fact, for

China, 1989 had been the worst year in terms of economic growth since the Maoist era,
at four percent, and the inflation rate for the same year was 17.8 percent (Cooper and
Lee, 1992:42).

During 1990, China had to severely suffer economically, due to

foreign countries’ withdrawal or limited aid and investment and other economic
shrinks (Cooper and Lee, 1992: 43).

Even owing to the slip in Western tourists’ visit

in China, in April, 1990, many hotels fell into bankruptcy, let alone considerable
layoffs (Cooper and Lee, 1992:45).
Because of this economic meltdown in 1990, the Chinese government made
great efforts to repair China’s badly tarnished image and diplomatic isolation coming
from the Tiananmen Massacre, by adopting lenient policies, like lifting martial law in
Beijing and releasing 573 people imprisoned for their participation in the democratic
movement in 1989 (Cooper and Lee, 1992:48). Via this difficulty, also, Chinese
leaders thoroughly realized that China’s cooperative, coordinative and compromising
diplomatic relations with other states along with its contribution to peace and stability
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in international society were the best way to protect and promote Chinese economic
interests and enhance their security. 277
Eventually, some countries started resuming their economic relations with
China during 1990, due to their expectation that China would eventually improve
human rights and democracy (Cooper and Lee, 1992:44).

Beijing hoped that the

lifting of martial law could result in the end of economic sanctions imposed on China
(Cooper and Lee, 1992:50).

And, in January, 1990, when the Chinese government

lifted martial law in Beijing, the US announced that it would start backing China’s
applications to the World Bank for loans that satisfy basic human needs (Cooper and
Lee, 1992:44).

On December 4, 1990, the World Bank also lifted some restrictions

on loans to China in order to help human needs, and approved a U.S. $114.3 million
loan for technological improvements in rural industry (Cooper and Lee, 1992:46).
Nonetheless, the US’s gesture did not necessarily mean that the US government
forgave and forgot China’s misbehaviors.

For example, on January 30, 1990, the U.S.

Senate voted 98 to 0 on legislation for trade sanctions against China, which should be
regarded as a warning and an expression of disapproval of China’s human rights
record (Cooper and Lee, 1992:44).

Also, in September 1991, the US Customs

Service announced that the US government blocked imports of spanners, socket
wrenches, steel pipes, and other things which were made by Chinese prisoners,
probably Chinese political dissidents like students at Tiananmen Square, in labor
camps and prisons (Wang, 1993b:451-452).

However, surprisingly enough, on

August 8, 1992, China even agreed that U.S. inspectors may visit convict-labor
facilities in China when evidence is presented regarding the export to the US of
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products made in the prison-labor facilities, which could indirectly contribute to
China’s improvement of human rights (Wang, 1993b:453).

More importantly, even

Western human rights delegations were allowed to visit China in July 1991 and in
November 1992, and they had informal discussions with Chinese diplomats in Beijing
for their relations, which could ultimately lead to some level of improvement in human
rights in Chinese perspectives through a process of their mutual education and learning
(Kent, 1999:160).

All in all, we can say that economic diplomacy has slowly

changed China’s attitude toward human rights and democracy.
As an impact of economic diplomacy on China’s democratization, we cannot
dismiss Japan’s economic diplomacy on China’s democratization.

Economic

relations between Japan and China involve trade, investment and economic
cooperation, though mainly Official Development Assistance/Aid (ODA) (OkanoHeijmans, 2007:29).

Japan’s development aid to China began in 1979, just after the

signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China in 1978
(Okano-Heijmans, 2007:36).
began rapidly increasing.

Also, in the late 1980s, Japanese investment in China

For example, Japanese investments in China totaled $1.226

billion in 1987, more than five times the amount in 1986 and the number of investment
cases increased to 171 in 1988 from 101 in 1987 (Wang, 1993a:630).

However,

Japan has increasingly used its aid to China, as a diplomatic weapon to counter the
aggressive and disruptive behaviors by the Chinese government, even though, due to
this, the Chinese government has openly criticized Japan for its using ODA as a tool of
economic diplomacy (Okano-Heijmans,

2007:37-38).

For instance,

Japan

condemned China’s brutal crackdown of a democratic movement and suspended its
aid to China, which was following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre (OkanoHeijamans, 2007:20, 38).

Also, huge Japanese investments in China were dampened
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by the Tiananmen Square massacre, such as the suspension of a Japanese loan package
valued at ¥ 810 billion (Wang, 1993a:634).

And there were many other examples:

the unilateral suspension of grant ODA to China in protest
against nuclear tests (August 1995- March 1997); brief
postponement of a special loan package by the Liberal
Democratic Party’s (LDP) Foreign Affairs Committee to protest
against the increasing number of Chinese naval incursions in
Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (August-October 2000); and
delay of the disbursement of the fourth yen loan package
following China’s military intimidation of Taiwan (MarchDecember 1996).278
Moreover, in April 1991, Japan set forth the “Four Principles for ODA” which would
determine whether or not a target state could get ODA: “the ratio of military
expenditure as percentage of the economy; the procurement of destructive weapons;
arms export policy; and the pace of democratization and economic liberalization”
(Wang, 1993a:635).

Nevertheless, I do not think that these principles were effective

enough to push China to accept human rights and democracy, and in fact, we observed
that Japan was condemned for its pursuit of selfish economic interests at the expense
of high moral principles such as human rights, when in 1990, Japan resumed ODA to
China (Wang, 1993a:639).

However, in January 1990, Japan’s Cabinet Secretary

Masumi Moriyama said that the lifting of martial law would be a significant factor in
Japan’s decision whether or not to start resuming economic assistance to China
(Cooper and Lee, 1992:44).

And on July 9, 1990, Japanese Prime Minister Kaifu

announced that Japan would gradually resume its economic assistance to China,
including a loan package which was stopped due to the Tiananmen Massacre,
revealing his motivation by saying “China’s human rights record is insufficient by our
standard, but the loan would encourage political and economic reform.”(Cooper and
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Lee, 1992:45).

In early November 1990, due to the same reason, Japan announced

approval of $280 million as economic aid to China (Cooper and Lee, 1992:45).

In

addition, Japan has used the East Asia Summit (EAS) to contain China and to
downplay historical issues, while emphasizing democratic values (Okano-Heijmans,
2007:44).

All in all, we cannot deny the fact that Japan’s economic diplomacy to

China has indirectly or directly pushed China toward human rights and democracy,
though in general Japan’s adoption of economic diplomacy mostly has not had a big
impact on China’s behaviors because the amount of most grant aids has been limited
and so it was more likely symbolic and political (Okano-Heijmans, 2007:39).
The most-favored nation (MFN) provides another stunning example of the
impact of economic diplomacy on China.

The MFN trade status for China was one

of the key issues in US-China diplomatic relations (Wang, 1993b:441). 279 Via this
issue, we can see that economic diplomacy successfully pressed China to gradually
accept the norms and values of human rights and democracy as universal (Wang,
1993b:442).

Originally in 1979, just after establishing diplomatic relations, the US

signed its first trade agreement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and most
importantly, they had the mutual granting of MFN trading status (Wang, 1993b:442).
Owing to this MFN, China could enjoy exporting goods to the US at the lowest tariff
rates applied to US imports (Wang, 1993b:442).

This economic interest was the

primary reason why China has desperately sought for its MFN status.

Nevertheless,

China’s MFN status was subject to a list of requirements listed by the U.S. Trade Act
of 1974 and to annual renewal by the president in accordance with the Jackson-Vanik
279
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Amendment (Wang, 1993b:442).

Most importantly, China’s MFN has been often

used to push China to accept human rights and democracy.

Just after the Chinese

government’s crackdown on June 4, 1989, a number of U.S. legislators proposed that
the US administration consider China’s human rights record before it issued the
required certification for renewing MFN status (Wang, 1993b:442).

For instance, as

economic diplomacy, on October 18, 1990, the US Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi of
California even offered an amendment tying the issue, “the renewing of the MFN trade
status for China” to the harassment of Chinese students in the US by agents of the
Chinese government (Cooper and Lee, 1992:59).

And, US Congressman Solarz

mentioned in mid-1991:
The issue of MFN and China involves a particularly complex
set of questions. How can the US best promote human rights
and democratization in China, as well as a range of strategic
and political interests? Where specifically does MFN fit into
that calculus? Do we have a better chance of promoting our
multiple interests by revoking MFN, by renewing it, or by
imposing some sort of conditionality. 280
Interestingly, former US President George H. W. Bush also mentioned in a
commencement address at Yale University, “The most compelling reason to renew
MFN and remain engaged in China is not economic, it’s not strategic, but moral.

It is

right to export the ideals of freedom and democracy to China.” 281 The Clinton
administration also deeply considered China’s low record of human rights whenever
dealing with China’s most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status.282 In fact, the Clinton
administration considered even the withdrawal of China’s MFN or nondiscriminatory
status in the trade with the US, and in mid-1993, Clinton set additional human rights
280
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conditions for the renewal of China’s MFN status in mid-1994.283 But, the impact of
such a move on financial markets had to gnaw at it, and eventually the administration
came to support China’s MFN trade status, even delinking the MFN renewal from
human rights and other conditions. 284 However, the Clinton administration’s support
of China’s MFN could be rooted in the idea that China’s deep economic engagement
in international society and its rapid economic growth via its engagement could help
change China’s language and behavior, which would lead to China’s gradual
acceptance of human rights and democracy as universal norms in the end.

All in all,

we can see that MFN status could be used to directly and indirectly goad China’s
gradual acceptance of human rights and democracy.
What is more, between 1990 and 1991, China attempted to influence the debate
in the USA about whether to grant MFN trade status to China (Wachman, 2001:272).
Nonetheless, China has recognized well that it has not had many cards to move the US,
and so China has used the release of prisoners as a political card.

Due to the MFN

status, as economic diplomacy, on May 10, 1990, the Chinese government released
211 people, mostly intellectuals and students arrested for their connection with the
Tiananmen demonstration, but this release was announced only weeks before US
President George H. W. Bush’s decision to renew the MFN trade status for China
(Cooper and Lee, 1992:57).

In fact, China released many individuals associated with

the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square; martial law was lifted in Beijing; Fang Lizhi
– a senior activist in the US embassy as a refugee - was permitted to leave the PRC;
Han Dongfang –a labor activist dying in prison – was released; and China offered the
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U.S. assurances that it would not prohibit individuals from going abroad for political
reason (Wachman, 2001:272).

Also, many prisoners were released on the eve of

President Clinton’s decision about whether to grant MFN status to China in 1993,
albeit some of them were jailed again (Wachman, 2001:272).

This demonstrates how

economic diplomacy can change China’s behavior and possibly get China to accept
human rights and democracy as universal, though diplomacy should bring about
China’s economic or political interests.

As Ann Kent pointed out, China has become

more and more compliant, even if its compliance does not result from internalized,
learned behavior, but instead from its adaptation at offering gestures of compliance in
exchange for its national interest (Kent, 1999:247; Wachman, 2001:258).

This

reminds me of Dale C. Copeland’s argument that the expectation of future economic
gains between nations helps to reduce political tensions and puts off the onset of
hostilities (Copeland, 2000).

In other words, as long as there are economic benefits

and future economic gains via its engagement in international society, China has been
most likely to adjust itself to the standards of international society, like human rights
and democracy.

Therefore, we can say that the more China has become engaged in

international society, the more China has adjusted itself to the norms, values and rules
of international society, such as, possibly, human rights and democracy, even though
its engagement generally originates in its pursuit of political and economic national
interests.
However, we should also consider the international order in which China
cannot benefit any longer in the future.

In this case, most likely, China will attempt

to undermine the international economic, political and legal order, with its rapid
growing political, economic and military influence, which the US has dominated so
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far.285 Also, as a matter of fact, in 30 or 50 years, let alone in 100 years, if China
maintains the speed of the last 20 years in its development and concentrates its efforts
on economic construction, China is expected to reach the level of a middle-developed
country in per capita average and secure a place among the top three in the world in
total aggregates, along with its grasp of the status of Great Power.286 By then, China
might try to build up the new international political and economic order in
international society, which might be greatly profitable to China’s national interest.287
Nevertheless, now, China still remains a developing country, 288 not to mention its
shortage of smart power (hard power and soft power) to become a Great Power. In
fact, on November 2, 2008, China’s President Hu Jintao urged world leaders to learn
from the global financial crisis and work towards the establishment of a new
international financial order that is fair, just, inclusive and orderly. 289 Also, Hu said at
the APEC summit in Peru, on November 2, 2008 that Asia Pacific was now an
important driving force for global economic growth and would exert increasing
influence in the world economy. 290 This clearly indicates that China will challenge the
current structure and will build up a new structure which will be more likely to bring
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about China’s national interests.291 This reminds me of Deng Xiaoping’s maxim: “tao
guang yang hui”(“hide one’s capabilities and bide one’s time”) that clearly
demonstrates China’s desire not only to become a Great Power, but also to change the
order of international society (Soeya, Wang and Welch, 2003: 197).
However, China is continuously expected to adjust itself to current
international society, while ultimately accepting norms of international society, as long
as it can get its substantial national interests in the current international order, and
more importantly, as long as China’s adaptation to norms of international society
brings about more national interest than its rejection against them. 292 Nonetheless, this
can help us understand why China will undoubtedly have close diplomatic
relationships even with outlaw states, if such diplomatic relationship brings about
China’s national interests.

For instance, China’s diplomatic relationships with Sudan

and Iran demonstrate China’s unconditional and narrow self-interest oriented
diplomacy, in particular when considering that in 1996, unlike Western oil companies
that pulled out of Sudan due to Sudan’s status as a sponsor of terrorism, Chinese
companies purchased a 40 percent majority share in the Greater Nile Petroleum
Operating Company and since then, they have increased their stakes in Sudan’s oil
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sector.293 Also, in 2004, Iran was already one of China’s primary suppliers of crude oil
and even agreed to sell to a Chinese corporation $20 billion worth of natural gas per
year for 25 years.294 In June, 2009, China National Petroleum signed a $5 billion deal
to develop the South Pars natural gas field in Iran, and in July 2009, Iran invited
Chinese companies to participate in a $ 42.8 billion project to construct seven oil
refineries and a 1,019-mile trans-Iran pipeline.295 Moreover, in August 2009, Tehran
and Beijing struck another deal for $3 billion, that would pave the way for China to
help Iran expand two more refineries. 296 All in all, China’s economic links to Tehran
are growing rapidly, and Iran has built China into one of its largest trading partners,
especially when considering that China is estimated to have $120 billion committed to
Iranian gas and oil projects and China has been Iran’s biggest oil export market for the
past five years, and that in return, Iran has loaded up on imported Chinese machine
tools, factory equipment, locomotives and other heavy goods. 297 These examples
certainly demonstrate that China’s nice gesture like the release of political prisoners is
primarily for instrumental interests, like economic and political interests, especially its
evasion or at least reduction of international isolation (Risse and Sikkink, 1999: 25).
Furthermore, they demonstrate that China tends to put its priority to its national
interest over the common good of international society.

All in all, we can say that

China’s diplomacy is primarily driven by well-calculated assessment of self-interests.
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Nonetheless, in calculation of self-interests, China has gradually adopted human rights
and democracy, since, overall, its accretion of norms of international society can help
China gain long-term national interests, such as its pursuit of Great Power status.
Owing to this, as Thomas J. Christensen put it, we can change China’s identity and
characteristics via diplomacy as a mechanism to shape its choices, in particular by
altering its rational calculation on its national interest.298 In other words, we can say
that diplomacy can ultimately contribute to China’s gradual acceptance of human
rights and democracy as norms and values of international society.
Above, I mentioned that, on and off, China even has a close relationship with
outlaw states on the basis of its national interests, especially economic interests.
However, we can see as well that due to national interests such as political interest,
China often tries to distance itself from outlaw states, particularly when considering its
pursuit of status of a responsible Great Power.

For example, China has urged North

Korea to sit at the negotiating table of the six-party talks and it has persuaded North
Korea to completely abandon its nuclear weapons programs, while supporting strong
measures in the United Nations.299 Also, in another nuclear issue, China joined the
UN in condemning Iran’s nuclear activities by voting for UN Security Council
Resolution 1696 in July 2006, declaring that Iran should not obtain nuclear weapons
capability, and in December 2006, China even joined the UNSC’s unanimous vote in
favor of UNSCR 1737, which imposed sanctions under Article 41, Chapter VII on
Iran’s nuclear program. 300 More importantly, China has condemned a brutal
government crackdown on peaceful demonstrators in Myanmar, supporting the
298
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statement from the UN Security Council deploring the junta’s use of force against
peaceful civilian protestors, and pushing the junta to grant the UN special envoy
Ibrahim Gambari access to the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi as well as senior
generals. 301 In January 2007, China even called on the regime to listen to the call of
its own people and speed up the process of dialogue and reforms, encouraging the
junta to use less confrontational language and attitude to international organizations
such as the UN, and even Chinese officials made their efforts to reach out to the
democratic opposition by hosting its representatives for a meeting in China. 302 Most
importantly, the Chinese government has issued public calls for stability, democracy
and development in Myanmar. 303 This is not everything.

There are many other

examples for China’s contribution to the existence of international society and wellbeing of international society, just like China’s active participation in the UN
peacekeeping operations in many countries: Burundi, Cote d’lvoire, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leon, Sudan and
West Sahara in Africa304; Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo in Europe; Timor-Leste
and Afghanistan in Asia; Haiti in the Americas; and Lebanon in the Middle East.305
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And, as of January 2007, China was contributing 1,861 peacekeepers to twelve UN
operations, and today, China ranks twelfth in the total number of troop contributions
by country to UN missions.306 Nevertheless, China has more peacekeepers operating
under the UN flag than any other permanent member of the Security Council
(Kurlantzick, 2007:230).

This can bring about a positive image of China, like a good

citizen of international society and a potential responsible Great Power that advocates
peace and security in international society, and more importantly, this can alleviate the
fears of other countries about China’s rapid rise in an international arena, while
demonstrating Chinese people’s love of peace and Chinese army’s importance in
safeguarding world peace. 307 Recently, many Chinese politicians and strategists began
to openly speak of China as a fuzeren de daguo (responsible Great Power), while
rejecting the persistent emphasis on China’s 150 years of shame and humiliation as the
primary lens via which Chinese view their place in modern international affairs (Gill,
2007:6).308 In fact, due to its economic success, today China has the second largest
economy in the world, and it is not any more the victimized developing nation of the
Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping eras, but instead it is a slowly emerging potential
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Great Power, in particular when considering that the successful 2008 Olympic Games
in Beijing did not only push China closer to the world, 309 but also, via the Games,
China was given a good opportunity to convince the world that China can become a
responsible Great Power in the long run, let alone a good citizen of international
society, which can satisfy China’s great desire for its good membership in international
society and for a status of Great power.310 Among Chinese, today a Great Power
mentality has replaced China’s victim mentality derived from its loss of the Opium
Wars (1839 to 1842 and 1856 to 1860) and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), and
often unfair treatments in international society.

As for Chinese, a responsible Great

Power indicates the following meanings: “less victimized, less aggrieved, and less
alienated,” and more actively supporting and operating within international norms and
multilateral institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the
ASEAN Regional Forum, etc.(Gill, 2007:6).

Due to the above reasons, China

becomes more active, more cooperative and more pragmatic than ever before in
international society, while Chinese abandon their long-held and reactive
“victimhood” complex, put their historical legacy of shame aside, and identify their
view with a Great Power mentality befitting China’s larger and more secure position in
international society (Gill, 2007:7).

All in all, China has gradually constrained

China’s unconditional and narrow self-interest oriented diplomacy, pursuing common
goods of international society beyond its own immediate and narrow interests, while it
has slowly accepted human rights and democracy as norms of international society.
In other words, China’s interest-oriented diplomacy can ultimately get China to slowly
309
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but gradually accept human rights and democracy as norms of international society.
Ironically, the more national interests China pursues, the deeper China has to get
involved in international society, and the deeper China is engaged in international
society for its national interests, the more China has to accept norms of international
society, such as human rights and democracy, albeit China has been reluctant to accept
those norms.
b) Diplomacy and South Korea’s Democratic Development
South Korea’s diplomatic relations with democratic countries, in particular the
US and Japan have greatly contributed to South Korea’s democratization.

There

were many examples of democratic states like the US assisting South Korea’s
democratic development.

The Rhee Syngman regime would have never been

overthrown without the withdrawal of U.S. support in 1960, and Washington
intervened to save the life of Kim Dae Jung, a prominent democracy activist, from the
murderous Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the mid-1970s (Kim and Lim,
2007:74).

Also, the US helped South Korea’s pro-democracy movement during the

1970s through various civil society assistance programs for religious organizations and
human rights groups (Kim and Lim, 2007:74).

More importantly, when former US

President Carter visited South Korea in June 1979, he advised the late South Korea
President Park Jung Hee to respect human rights and to return to democracy, and he
even pressured Park by tying the withdrawal of the US troops to the improvement of
human rights situation in South Korea (Im, 2006:168).311 Most importantly, the US
played a pivotal role in promoting South Korea’s 1987 democratization.

James Lilly,

former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea sought to enhance the statue of the two
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opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, and their allies by making it
known that they were friends of the embassy (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:16).

With

Shultz’s active support, Gaston Signur, former Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asia pushed Chun Doo Hwan to allow the direct election of his successor (Adesnik
and McFaul, 2006:16).

When South Korea reached the highest point of the riots and

Chun considered mobilizing the armed forces to crush dissent, which could have killed
hundreds, US President Ronald Reagan called for Chun’s restraint to use the armed
force and Chun pulled back at the last moment (Adesnik and McFaul, 2006:17).
Also, when Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary of the State for Asia-Pacific Affairs
made a speech before the US Korea Society in New York on February 6, 1987, Sigur
sent a cautionary warning to Chun that the US-Korea relations depends on the Chun
government’s creating a more open and legitimate political system, along with his
emphasis on civilizing the government and his urge on the Korean military to
concentrate on its primary mission of national defense (Sigur, 1987; Im, 2006:171).
Furthermore, Senator Edward Kennedy and others introduced legislation for economic
sanctions against South Korea until free and fair elections took place (Im, 2006:172).
All of above show how in the past, diplomacy could influence South Korea’s
democratic development.

Since 1987, South Korea has gradually become a stable,

prosperous and democratic state with its respect of human rights, and so, South Korea
has become a full member of a solidarist international society.
However, South Korea does not stop there, simply enjoying the selfsatisfaction with its status as a full member of a solidarist international society.

Like

many Middle Powers, such as Canada, Norway and Australia, South Korea started
diplomatically contributing to the existence and well-being of international society.
More specifically, as a Middle Power, South Korea has slowly but increasingly
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contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international
society, via its diplomacy which is recognized as Niche diplomacy or Middle Power’s
diplomacy, as to ultimately help to maintain order and security in international society
and promote prosperity in international society.

In this section, I will demonstrate

that South Korea belongs to the club of the Middle Powers in international society, and
will examine how South Korea can facilitate the promotion and consolidation of
democracy

across

international

society

via

its

distinguishing

diplomacy.

Nevertheless, before that, I will define the Middle power and Niche diplomacy, while
showing how a Middle Power has used its Niche diplomacy to help to maintain
international society and promote the well-being of international society, albeit any
Middle Power cannot be comparable to a Great Power as an institution which governs
whole international society.312 In this section, we will ultimately examine how as an
institution, Niche diplomacy can help to govern international society, with its
contribution to the existence of international society and to the promotion of wellbeing of international society, let alone the promotion and consolidation of democracy
across international society.
First of all, I will start with the definition of the Middle Power (traditional
concept) and that of Niche diplomacy.

First, though it is very difficult to

satisfactorily define Middle Power, we can simply define Middle Power as a power
that is neither great nor small, but fits somewhere between the two on the basis of
some criteria such as physical capability (land mass, geographic position, natural
resources, etc.), military capability (armed forces, technology, leadership, national
character, etc.), and economic capability (gross national product, labor, education, etc.)
312
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(Holbraad, 1984:2, Robertson, 2007:152).

In short, Middle Powers can be

understood as states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power,
capacity and influence.
Second, Middle Powers are more likely to support Great Powers’ order, norms
and values than to challenge them as revisionists, since they are interested in the topdown dissemination of hegemonic values and practices, and they are interested in how
their conformity with the international standards of hegemonic order provides
domestic legitimacy (Jordaan, 2003:174). In other words, in general, Middle Powers
accept and support the norms and practices of the hegemon and the world order it
seeks to impose by a strategy, and so it is ok to even say that Middle Powers are
generally royal followers of Great Powers, particularly in security urgent cases
(Jordaan, 2003:173-174).

Gerry Simpson points out this hierarchical relationship, by

saying, “the Great Powers made the law and the middle powers signed the resulting
treaty.

The smaller powers, meanwhile were erased from consideration”(Simpson,

2004:112).

Due to this, currently, in international society in which democracy has

been gradually accepted as a universal principle, we can understand why traditional
Middle Powers are stable democracies and why they tend to promote liberal
democracy across international society (Jordaan, 2003:171).

We can also understand

that the state cannot be seen as a Middle Power, if any state deviates from hegemonic
orthodoxy such as democratic norms as well as human rights, although it has enough
hard power to be called a Middle Power (Jordaan, 2003:167). In other words, if
states are not democratic, rejecting human rights and democracy in the current
international society, albeit they are between Great Powers and Small Powers in terms
of hard power, we should not think of them as Middle Powers.

For example, when

considering this characteristic of the Middle Power, Iran, let alone North Korea,
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Myanmar, or Zimbabwe, cannot be recognized as a Middle Power, even if Iran has
been recognized as a regional power in the Middle East since in the region, except for
Israel, no state can match Iran in terms of hard power.

All in all, in lieu of revisionist

powers, as ardent followers to Great Powers, Middle Powers play a supporting role in
a hegemonic order, as they advocate the norms, values, rules, and practices of Great
Powers, and so eventually such hegemonic order appears as a universal national order
(Cox, 1989:825-826).

Nonetheless, I have to say that on and off, Middle Powers

adopt their own independent and different policies from Great Powers’ policies, which
is one of characteristics of Middle Powers as well.313 In general, Middle Powers tend
to support Great Powers’ general management in affairs in international society, and in
particular during periods of heightened security tension, Middle Powers tend to align
themselves to Great Powers’ policies, but during periods of lower security tension, the
Middle Powers are highly likely to pursue independent policies that can be different
from Great Powers’ policies. 314 For example, throughout the Cold War era, most
Middle Powers had been ardent followers to Great Powers, such as the US, since they
had faced great threats from communist countries, like the Soviet Union, but during
the post-Cold War era, Middle Powers are more likely to adopt their independent
policies, even often challenging Great Powers’ policies than ever, since there is no
immediate and major threat to them any more. 315
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Third, Middle Powers generally bring about not only their national interests,
but also the common good in international society via their distinguishing diplomacy
(Hamill and Lee, 2001:34).

As a matter of fact, Middle Powers think of themselves

as even “a helpful fixer, honest broker or peacemaker” (Henrikson, 1997: 49).

And,

we can often see that Middle Powers such as Australia and Canada have contributed to
the welling-being of international society via foreign aid and peacekeeping operations,
while helping to promote cohesion, stability and prosperity in international society
(Robertson, 2007:152, Jordaan, 2003:165). In fact, Middle Powers’ self-interest can
be located at a deeper and more dispersed level than a Small Power, and so we can
often see that the Middle Power tends to interfere in global issues beyond their
immediate interests, though Middle Powers interfere far less than Great Powers
(Jordaan, 2003:166-167).

Because of this, Middle Powers have a good reputation,

such as a good international citizen. 316 Also, because Middle Powers can afford to
take morally superior positions in the absence of any desire for a world hegemonic
position, they have stronger credibility among other Middle Power states and Small
Power states, than Great Powers, without any hypocritical, threatening or unduly selfinterested behavior, and so Middle Powers may even have better diplomatic footwork
than Great Powers.317
Fourth, as indicated above, like middle-range material capability, despite
Middle Powers’ contribution to stability and prosperity in international society, I have
to say that Middle Powers have obvious limitations in their management of conflicts in
international society because of their lack of smart power.
316
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have enough resources to unilaterally and single-handedly shape global outcomes in
any direct manner.

Due to this, Middle Powers are most likely to focus on certain

issues rather than broad issues, and they are most likely to utilize and assert
themselves through international organizations for multilateral cooperation, so as to
help to manage affairs and promote prosperity in international society (Jordaan,
2003:169).

In particular, when comparing Middle Powers with Great Powers, we

notice that Middle Powers benefit from a more focused, narrower international agenda,
and correspondingly less responsibility in international security as well as greater
freedom to pursue core national interests than Great Powers.318 Also, international
organizations can be seen as the vehicles for diplomacy via which Middle Power can
contribute to peace, security and prosperity in international society (Cox, 1989:835837).

Owing to this, we can even say that Middle Powers act as good multilateralists.
All in all, when considering the aforementioned characteristics of a Middle

Power, we can possibly say that the Middle Power thesis is regarded as an amendment
to a realist perspective on world politics, in particular when considering Kenneth
Waltz’s view on world politics as politics of great powers and his complete disregard
of middle powers and small powers in an international system (Cox, 1989:827).
Nonetheless, maybe, Waltz might defend his view on world politics, by saying
“Denmark doesn’t matter… Sure people in Luxembourg have good ideas, but who
gives a damn.

Luxembourg ain’t hegemonic” (Higgott, 1997:35).319 Also, I have to

say that in comparison with Great Powers’ management of international society,
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See Jeffrey Robertson (2008).
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Kenneth Waltz was so obsessed with the roles of great powers in international management, and so,
he came to completely exclude the roles of Middle Powers in international management. See, for
more information, Kenneth Waltz (1979), Richard Higgott (1991) and (1997), and Alan K. Henrikson
(1997:49).
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Middle Powers’ can be nothing, even if Middle Powers’ roles in management of
international society are noticeable enough in international society.
Let us turn to the definition of Niche diplomacy.

Niche diplomacy was given

its name by Gareth John Evans, Australian politician who served as Attorney-General
and Foreign Minister of Australia during the Hawke and Keating Labor governments
(Henrikson, 2005a: 67).320 Due to the above distinguishing aspects of Middle Powers,
they have practiced their own distinguishing diplomacy.
diplomacy has been called Niche diplomacy.

Such Middle Powers’

As Alan K. Henrikson put it, Niche

diplomacy has usually been fully developed by countries with sufficient size and
capacity so as to play notable roles in international society, even if they are not strong
enough to impose their positions or solutions (Henrikson, 2005a:67). In general, as
Middle Power’s diplomacy, Niche diplomacy can be understood as an instrument to
concentrate Middle Powers’ own limited resources in specific areas best able to
generate returns worth having, rather than trying to cover the field (Evans and Grant,
1995:323; Cooper, 1997:5).

In other words, as implied above, now that Middle

Powers do not have enough material capabilities to cover as many issues as Great
Powers, they tend to select some issues and focus on them with their own limited
capabilities.

However, as we can extrapolate positive aspects of Niche diplomacy

from the characteristics of Middle Powers, Niche diplomacy has been known as an
international good citizens’ tool, since it has been adopted to boost up common goods
in international society, via various ways, such as ‘mediation,’ ‘peacekeeping
operation,’ ‘humanitarian aid,’ or ‘promotion and consolidation of human rights and
democracy.’ In short, we can conclude that, as Middle Powers’ diplomacy, Niche
320

See “Gareth Evans.” Wikipedia. The website is available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gareth_Evans_(politician)
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diplomacy has been used to contribute to the well-being of international society
beyond Middle Powers’ own national interests.321
From now on, in consideration of the characteristics of Middle Powers and
those of Niche diplomacy, I will demonstrate that as a Middle Power, South Korea has
contributed to the order and prosperity of international society, while promoting
human rights and democracy in international society, via its Niche diplomacy.

When

considering characteristics of traditional Middle Powers, we can say that South Korea
can be put into the category of traditional Middle Powers. South Korea’s population
is 48,754,657 as the 26th rank in the world (July 2011 est.),322 and its Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is $ 787.627 billion (2005 est.) (Robertson, 2007:155).

South Korea

is a member of the economic club of developed nations, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and around a $ 20,000 per capita
income country (2004 est.), let alone the thirteenth largest economy in the world and
the fourth largest economy in Asia. 323 South Korea is a member of the G-20, which
brings together finance ministers and central bank governors of systemically important
countries within the Bretton Woods System, 324and more surprisingly it took over the
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We can find some examples for Middle Powers’ contribution to the well-being of international
society, like Norway’s contribution to the Middle East - the Oslo process. We can name several
Middle Powers which have boosted up common goods in international society, such as Canada,
Australia, Norway, South Africa and so on. See, for more information, Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A.
Higgot and Kim Richard Nossal (1993), Evan H. Potter (1996/1997), Alan K. Henrikson (2005a), and
James Hamill and Donna Lee (2001).
322

See “East & Southeast Asia: Korea, South.” Central Intelligence Agency: the World Factbook. The
website is available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html
323

In 1996, South Korea became a member of OECD, which means that South Korea reached the
status of developed countries; Victor Cha made his speech on “South Korea’s Democracy and
Diplomacy” at the Brookings Institution: Center For Northeast Asian Policy Studies on March 23, 2004.
324

See Jeffrey Robertson (2008).
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presidency of the G20 in 2010.325 South Korea’s military expenditure is $16.4 billion,
ranking eleventh in the world (2005 est.) (Robertson, 2007:155), and its military is
recognized as the tenth strongest military power in the world military rank, with its
fifth rank in terms of the world ground force and with its tenth rank in terms of the
world air force. 326 Thus, when considering its physical, economic and military
capability, South Korea is strong enough to be classified as a Middle Power, and in
fact it even outranks many Middle Powers (Robertson, 2007:156).
However, I often notice that there are some arguments that South Korea’s
behavior is not enough to satisfy the criteria for the status as a Middle Power
(Robertson, 2007:153-155).

However, I can demonstrate that South Korea is no

longer an emerging Middle Power, but a traditional Middle Power (Robertson,
2007:154-155). 327 For instance, in 2007, South Korea’s official development
assistance (ODA), for the construction of roads, ports and vital social service
infrastructure in poor countries, amounted to US$ 672 million, as the 19 th rank in
terms of international assistance among the 30 OECD members states, excluding
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See “South Korea To Help Forge Global G20 Improvement Plan.” The website is available at:
http://www.zibb.com/article/4389554/SOUTH+KOREA+TO+HELP+FORGE+GLOBAL+G20+IMPR
OVEMENT+PLAN
326

See “World Military Rankings – Strongest Armies.” Canadian University Forum. The website is
available at: http://www.univforum.com/canadian-universities/viewtopic.php?p=51857
327

Robertson defines emerging middle powers, saying “emerging middle powers are less stable
democracies, having emerging from authoritarian, or one party rule, with the end of the Cold War.
They have greater levels of social inequality and less established socio-political values. Emerging
middle powers are not as integrated into the world economy and can be on its periphery. With the
combination of social inequality and less integration into the world economy, emerging middle powers
have relatively less interest in the maintenance of the status quo.” Because in the above, I already
described the characters of the traditional middle power, I won’t say them in detail here. Nonetheless,
I can make a summary on the traditional middle power, with the following: stable social democracy; a
high level of social equality (in particular under Rho Moo Hyun’s regime); established socio-political
values; the core of the world economy with the majority of citizens highly integrated into the world
economy; and a vast interest in the maintenance of the status quo. See Jeffrey Robertson (2007).
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Mexico and Turkey, and as 27th in terms of the ODA ratio of gross national income.328
And, South Korea has actively participated in the UN peacekeeping operations in
various countries like East Timor, Lebanon, Somalia, Angola and Western Sahara, not
to mention the India-Pakistan border and Georgia as military observing missions.329
Indeed, it plans to even expand its troop participation in the United Nations
peacekeeping operations to over one thousand from the current 400.330
Moreover, in August 2004, South Korea dispatched 3,400 troops (Zaytun
Division and Daiman Unit) to Iraq in a peace-keeping operation, and in 2002, it sent
60 medics from the Dongui Medical Unit and 150 engineers from the Dasan
Engineering Unit to Afghanistan to aid in the reconstruction effort. 331 And, the South
Korean government approved a plan to provide 56 billion won as part of its measure to
expand reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, such as building a hospital, a job training
facility and a taekwondo instruction center, while sending 100 ambulances and 300
police patrol motorcycles to Afghanistan by July 2009.332 Also, on October 30th 2009,
South Korea announced a plan to send out hundreds of troops and police to
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See “S. Korea’s aid to underdeveloped countries jumps in 2007.” Yon-Yonhap News Agency of
Korea. April 8, 2008. The website is available at:
http://www.accessmylibrary.com/comsite5/bin/aml_landing_tt.pl?purchase_type=ITM&item_id=028634276635&action=print&page=aml_article_print
329

See “Military of South Korea: UN peacekeeping operations.” Wikipedia. The website is available
at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_South_Korea
330

See “Government to Expand Peacekeeping Efforts.” KBS Global. December 31, 2009.
website is available at http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_view.html?No=69283&id=Po
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See “Military of South Korea: Peace-keeping operations in Iraq, and Reconstruction in
Afghanistan.” The website is available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_South_Korea
332

See “Gov’t Approves 56 Bln Won for Afghan Reconstruction.” KBS Global . May 5, 2009. The
website is available at:
http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_print.html?No=63292&id=Po&prn=Y
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Afghanistan with the mission of the protection of its civilian aid workers there. 333
More importantly, President Lee Myung-bak revealed a “New Asia Initiative” in
Jakarta, Indonesia, on March 8, 2009, which indicates that South Korea will play a
critical role in representing the interest of Asian nations in the international arena. 334
This does not only indicate that South Korea deeply cares about the entire Asian
region beyond Northeast Asia, but also that the scope of cooperation will be extended
from economy to security, culture, energy and other sectors (Zhu, 2009).

Under such

initiative, the key point is that, as a good model for less developed Asian nations in
economic development and democratization, South Korea has a goal to speak for
Asian nations in the international arena, while playing a leading role in resolving
transnational problems like the financial crisis and climate change, which can greatly
contribute to peace and prosperity throughout Asia (Zhu, 2009).

All in all, the above

clearly shows how South Korea has contributed to peace, security and prosperity in
international society as the precondition for promotion of democracy across
international society.
South Korea has been actively engaged in international organizations in its
pursuit of multilateral solutions to problems in international society, which
demonstrates that as a Middle Power, South Korea has enough diplomatic energy,
creativity and agility to even outmaneuver some major powers (Robertson, 2007:172).
For example, during the late 1990s, the Kim Dae Jung administration made the
significant efforts to effectively position South Korea as a key diplomatic instigator of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus Three processes (Robertson,
333

See “S. Korea to Send Troops to Afghanistan to Protect Aid Workers.” The Seoul Times. November
2, 2009.
334

See “President announces New Asia Initiative.” Korea.net Gateway to Korea. The website is
available at: http://www.korea.net/news/issues/issueDetailView.asp?board_no=20334
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2007:172).

Also, South Korea has had a special relation with ASEAN via S.Korea-

ASEAN Special Summit. 335 For instance, at the South Korea-ASEAN Special
Summit in 2009, South Korea and ASEAN agreed to expand bilateral trade volume to
$150 billion, and more importantly South Korea agreed to increase its official
development assistance (ODA) for ASEAN countries by $400 million. 336 Also, at the
summit, President Lee Myung-bak said that South Korea would provide $200 million
in assistance to ASEAN countries via the East Asia Climate Partnership Agency to
help them address climate change.337 This clearly helped South Korea to solidify its
status as a Middle Power.

And, when looking at the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM),

we can notice that South Korea has gradually gained a leadership role in inter-regional
organizations (Park, 2000: 78).

For instance, from October 19 to 21, 2000, Seoul

hosted the third ASEM, which demonstrated South Korea’s leadership role in interregional cooperation.338 At the ASEM summit on October 24, 2008, President Lee
vigorously called for concerted global efforts to combat the financial crisis, while
endorsing the free market economy but opposing protectionist trade policies.339 Also,
at the ASEM summit in Beijing on October 25, 2008, South Korean President Lee
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ASEAN consists of Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei, Laos, Myanmar,
Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia.
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See “S. Korea-ASEAN Special Summit ends.” KBS Global. June 2, 2009. The Website is available
at: http://english.kbs.co.kr/News/News/News_view.html?No=63959&id=Po
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See, for more information, “The Third Asia-Europe Meeting in Seoul (October 19-21,2000),”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. The website is available at:
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asem/asem3/index.html
339

See “Widens role in fighting crisis through ASEM diplomacy,” Asia Pulse Data Source via
COMTEX. The website is available at:
http://www.zibb.com/article/4240185/ROUNDUP+Lee+widens+role+in+fighting+crisis+through+AS
EM+diplomacy
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Myung-bak asked Asian and European leaders to actively endorse his policy bid to
denuclearize North Korea via the stimulation of various inter-Korean economic
cooperation projects.340In addition, by 1997, South Korea had played an instrumental
role in the development of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and
as a member of APEC, South Korea has contributed to international economic
cooperation. 341 At the 16th APEC summit in Lima, Peru on November 23, 2008,
President Lee Myung-bak emphasized the need to boost domestic consumption via
increased government spending and reduced taxes, in opposition to trade
protectionism, in order to overcome the wide spreading financial crisis. 342 More
importantly, South Korea has been very actively engaged in six-party talks,
simultaneously using international organizations, like the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Security Council, in pursuit of a multilateral
solution to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while North Korea’s nuclear
program has clearly posed a serious existential threat not only to South Korea, but also
to East Asia and to entire international society. 343 On November 21, 2008, South
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See “Lee Asks for ASEM Support for NK Denuclearization,” The Korea Times, October 25, 2008.
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See Jeffrey Robertson (2008).
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See “Pres. Lee Suggests New Ways to Fight Crisis,” KBS Global, Sunday, November 23, 2008.
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Six participating states are China, South Korea, North Korea, the US, Russia and Japan. These
talks started due to North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
2003. Often, I personally feel that South Korea should not exclude military action, if necessary, to
remove North Korea’s nuclear capabilities – under the condition that North Korea does not have
nuclear weapons yet and that the cost is not too expensive. North Korea’s identity and character have
not been changed at all for more than a half century, and I do not expect any change in North Korea via
peaceful measures in the future. In fact, North Korea has resisted any kind of change. North Korea
launched a long-range missile (April 2009), even if North Korea claimed that it did for a
communications satellite, and most problematically, North Korea conducted a second underground
nuclear test (May 25, 2009), which clearly demonstrates that North Korea does not have any intention
to change its identity and character, as an outlaw state that poses a great existential threat not only to
the Korean Peninsula but also to the whole international society. I firmly believe that North Korea is
a barbarian and dangerous outlaw state, and so we should treat it differently from other civilized full
members of an international society. The use of force should not be excluded in dealing with North
Korea, if North Korea does not yet have nuclear weapons but it does not give up nuclear program, and
244

Korea supported a U.N. committee’s resolution to urge North Korea to improve its
human rights conditions, which reveals South Korea’s unprecedented strong voice for
human rights.344 And on December 19, 2008, South Korea voted for the resolution of
the United Nations General Assembly which condemned and called for an immediate
end to North Korea’s systemic and serious human rights abuses. 345 These examples
demonstrate that South Korea seeks multilateral solutions, with its deep engagement in
international organizations as a vehicle for diplomacy.

Nevertheless, South Korea’s

pursuit of multilateral solutions does not necessarily mean that South Korea has
completely rejected bilateral solutions, such as the 2000 inter-Korean summit between
Kim Dae Jung and Kim Jong Il, which could be seen as one of the positive outcomes
of the Sunshine Policy of reconciliation with North Korea (tendency towards
compromise).346

if the cost of military action is not too expensive. Civilizing methods, such as gentle and soft talks
cannot work for the barbarian criminal. If necessary, we should even kill the criminal for the whole
international society (I am not talking about regime change, but about the removal of North Korea on
the world map, in particular when considering that North Korea is a part of South Korea).
Nevertheless, first of all, we should use coercive diplomacy to deal with North Korea, rather than any
other kind of diplomacy – e.g. at least the six party talks with coercive mechanisms – especially when
considering that Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy and Rho Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity policy
(gentle and soft talks) only resulted in North Korea’s possible possession of nuclear weapons if Robert
Gates’ remark is correct – North Korea has built several nuclear bombs. See Robert M Gates (2009).
Also see Dr. Han Sung-Joo former Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea made statement in
Singapore, July 26-28, 1993, The Website is available at: http://www.aseansec.org/4809.htm
344

In the past, South Korea was concerned about North Korea’s reaction against its criticism on North
Korea’s human rights violations, such as what if North Korea would reject the Six Party Talks.
Thanks to this, South Korea adopted a quiet diplomacy on North Korea’s human rights violation. See,
for more information, Sook-Jong Lee made a speech on “U.S. Policy toward Japan and Korea in the
Second Bush Administration,” at the Brooking Institution: Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies,
January 27, 2005. Also see “UN Committee Passes Resolution on NK Human Rights,” KBS Global.
November 22, 2008.
345
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See “UN Adopts Resolution Condemning NK Human Rights.” KBS Global. December 19, 2008.

Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy revealed South Korea’s independence from the US’s North
Korea policy, particularly during George W. Bush’s first term in office, which can be explained
enough with Bush’s remark of “an axis of evil” for North Korea in his State of the Union Address on
January 29, 2002. The George W. Bush administration (first term) had taken a decidedly harsh line
against North Korea, even revealing its intention to use pre-emptive military force against North Korea,
whereas the Kim Dae Jung administration and the Roh Moo Hyun administration had preferred to use a
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Most importantly, in the 21 st century, South Korea has clearly been a stable,
prosperous and democratic state as a full member of international society, in particular
a solidarist international society, and it has tried to promote human rights and
democracy across international society, which does not only facilitate norms and
values of Great Powers but also expands the community of democracies in
international society.

For example, former President Kim Dae Jung had been an

ardent supporter for human rights and democracy as universal values, like his support
of Aung San Suu Kyi’s fight for human rights and democracy in Myanmar and his
appeal to the Korean people for peacekeeping operation in East Timor in order to
protect human rights (Park, 2000:85).

Also, in Warsaw on June 26-28, 2000, with

democracy and preservation of human rights as the main policy objectives, seven
countries – i.e. South Korea, the U.S., Poland, the Czech Republic, Chile, India and
peaceful diplomatic method (not even coercive diplomacy) which could be understood as only carrot
without stick. At that time, the pivotal point of the disagreement between South Korea and the US in
dealing with North Korea was that some of the U.S. options were unthinkable to South Korea mainly
because of its geographical proximity to North Korea and also because of some South Koreans’
optimistic and sympathetic views of North Korea as a poor brother country. Also, as Robertson put it,
the possible cost of re-unification might be still too high for South Korea to bear, ranging from $ 260
billion to 3.2 trillion, if peaceful reunification is possible, and the cost might make the 1997 financial
crisis seem insignificant (2007:159). As the worst case, the military option such as the US –South
Korea’s pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility might escalate into a full scale
war whose cost would be extremely high to both North Korea and South Korea like more than 2
million casualties, massive refugee flood, and economic meltdown, even if the US and South Korea
would ultimately win the war. Nevertheless, Kim Dae Jung’s and Roh Moo Hyun’s North Korea
policies completely failed, when considering that as Robert Gate put it, North Korea has had several
nuclear weapons, let alone North Korea’s tests of nuclear devices and missiles in 2006, North Korea’s
purchase of weapons with money given as financial aid by South Korea, and an incident of a South
Korean tourist shot dead by a North Korean solider in the North’s Mt. Kumgang on July 11, 2008. By
the way, at this juncture, the important thing is South Korea’s independent policy as one of the
characteristics of a Middle Power. In other words, South Korea’s independent policy on some
issues from the US policy should not be misunderstood as anti-American, but as a signal of South
Korea’s achievement of traditional middle power status. Thus, as Kim and Lim put it, the US
should feel proud of its past economic and political contribution to today South Korea’s status as
a grown-up traditional Middle Power, rather than the US is concerned about South Korea’s
independent policy (2007:80). The US should be glad to see South Korea’s achievement of a
traditional middle power and to have South Korea as a grown-up royal follower to the US. All
in all, Sunshine policy can be seen as a chance for South Korea to demonstrate its Middle-Power
diplomacy. See, for more information, Jeffrey Robertson (2007) and (2008). Also, see Robert Gate
(2009), and Sunhyuk Kim and Wonhyuk Lim (2007). Moreover, see “Korea Rebuilds: from crisis to
opportunity.” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The website is available at:
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/korea_rebuilds/economicpolicies.html
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Mali - came together for the preparation of the first International Conference of the
Community of Democracies (Park, 2000:79).

And, in 2002, Seoul hosted the second

International Conference of the Community of Democracies under the auspices of the
Korean NGO network, the Sejong institute and the International Planning Committee
composed of an NGO from each of the ten Convening Group Countries. 347 Two
hundred fifty NGOs, trade unions, business representatives, political leaders and other
practitioners of democracy from 60 countries attended the conference. 348 Its theme
was “Democracy: Investing for Peace and Prosperity”, and the attending countries
endorsed the Seoul Plan of Action for the continuous development of democracy
domestically and the promotion of democracy regionally and globally. 349 Furthermore,
the US and South Korea have shared a strong mutual support of democratic promotion
and consolidation via diplomacy.

For instance, former US Secretary of State,

Condoleezza Rice and former South Korea Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon (current
UN Secretary-General) set a dynamic agenda for future discussions within the
framework of the strategic consultations, with their emphasis on creative initiatives.
The initiatives are documented as follows:
Cooperation and coordination of efforts to promote freedom,
democratic institutions and human rights worldwide,
demonstrated by their successful shared effort in Iraq and
Afghanistan; Strengthened cooperation on fighting terrorism,
and exerting common efforts for the observance and
implementation of international security cooperation regimes
347

We should not forget that conference should be recognized as an effective type of diplomacy, even
if it cannot be a traditional type of diplomacy. See “Seoul Conference,” Council for a Community of
Democracies, the website is available at: http://www.ccd21.org/seoul.htm
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See “2002 Seoul Ministerial.” U.S. Department of State. The website is available at:
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/c10711.htm. Also, see “Seoul Plan of Action – Democracy: Investing for
Peace and Prosperity.” U.S. Department of State.
The website is available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/15259.htm
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for the prevention of proliferation of weapons of Mass
Destruction and Their delivery means; coordination and
combination of efforts to develop comprehensive international
strategies to fight transnational strategies to fight transnational
pandemic disease; maintaining a strong U.S.-ROK alliance to
contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia, leading
possibly to an eventual regional multinational mechanism for
security cooperation; Developing common approaches to
reinforcing peace and stability through multilateral
peacekeeping and improved collaboration on crisis responses
and disaster management.350
Also, via former US President Bill Clinton and former S. Korean President Kim Dae
Jung’s remarks, we feel the consolidation of the community of democracies. 351
Clinton said, “Your work matters.

Bill

You help transform nations and end tyranny.

You save lives.”352 And Kim Dae Jung said, “Today, the triumph of democracy in
Korea is also a victory for the democracy-loving people of America.”353 Further,
Clinton mentioned, “there are still people who say that democracy is a luxury people
can afford only when times are good.

But Korea is proving that democracy can

provide the necessary support for action when times are difficult.” 354These remarks
demonstrate the consolidation of democracy in South Korea as well as democratic
solidarity between South Korea and the US.
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See “U.S.-South Korea Relationship Enters New Era, State says.” U.S. Department of State. The
website is available: http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/tp-20060123-15.html
351

See, for example, “White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by President Clinton and
President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea at Arrival Ceremony,” June 9, 1998. The website is available
at: http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980609-3059.html. However, I have to say that during
the cold war era, as for the US, the protection of S. Korea from the aggression of the North Korea was
prior to the promotion of democracy, whenever they collided. See Hyug Baeg Im (2006:162).
352

See “White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by President Clinton and President Kim
Dae Jung of South Korea at Arrival Ceremony,” June 9, 1998. The website is available at:
http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19980609-3059.html
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See “White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by President Clinton and President Kim
Dae-Jung in Exchange of Toasts, Blue House, Seoul, Republic of Korea.” November 21, 1998. The
website is available at: http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/Pacific/19981121-25757.html
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All of the above clearly demonstrate how, as a Middle Power, South Korea has
played a leading role in proliferating democracy across international society and
consolidating a community of democracies.

South Korea’s promotion and

consolidation of democracy across international society have obviously advocated
Great Power (the US)’s norms and values as universal values across international
society, let alone the expansion of a community of democracies as well as the
consolidation of a community of democracies.

Also, when considering South

Korea’s overall achievement as a Middle Power, particularly in development, human
rights, democracy, and its contribution to order and prosperity in international society,
let alone its promotion and consolidation of human rights and democracy, we can say
that South Korea is a good citizen as a full member of international society.

Owing

to this, South Korea can be regarded as a model country that should be emulated by
developing countries, and it can give some hope for the same success to the
developing countries (Park, 2000:78).
c)

Diplomacy and Iraq’s democratic development
Saddam’s Iraq had belonged to a liberal anti-pluralist international society in

which a hierarchical relationship among states can be very clearly seen and even the
use of force can be justified, in particular when a target state is an ‘outlaw state.’ In
this environment, coercive diplomacy is the best option to deal with an outlaw state,
bearing in mind that the total use of force or war is a last resort against the target state.
When considering Saddam’s Iraq, we can obviously see how coercive diplomacy was
applied to Saddam’s Iraq in order to alter its identity and character, let alone its
behavior.

Nonetheless, overall, such coercive diplomacy failed, as, in March 2003,

war as a last resort was adopted to topple Saddam’s regime and impose democracy in
Iraq.
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In this section, I will start by examining coercive diplomacy which reflects a
hierarchical power relationship among states.

And I will reveal how coercive

diplomacy attempted to manage Saddam’s Iraq as an outlaw state, so as to examine
whether or not coercive diplomacy could have been successful in changing Iraq’s
behavior, and its identities and character from an outlaw state to a prosperous
democratic state.

All in all, in this section, I will explore whether or not coercive

diplomacy modified Iraq’s aggressive behavior, with its attempt to alter Saddam’s
regime.

However, at this juncture, most importantly, we should recognize that

coercive diplomacy can be regarded as an institution to maintain international society
and promote the well-being of international society.

Furthremore, we should

conceive diplomacy as one of essential institutions for international society.
Nonetheless, as noted above, in Iraq’s case, the war was eventually adopted to deal
with Saddam’s regime, which means that coercive diplomacy was not successful
enough to radically alter Saddam’s Iraq.
According to Alexander George, coercive diplomacy can be defined as a
strategy to “back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for
noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to
comply with the demand” (George, 1992:4).

Coercive diplomacy involves four basic

variables: “the demand, the means used for creating a sense of urgency, the threatened
punishment for noncompliance, and the possible use of incentives.” 355 There are also
five types of coercive diplomacy on the basis of differences in basic variables: “the
ultimatum, the tacit ultimatum, the try-and-see approach, the gradual turning of the
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See Tanya Glaser, “Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War by
Alexander George,” Conflict Research Consortium Book Summary. The website is available at:
http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/example/geor2638.htm
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screw, and the carrot and stick approach.”356 The goals of coercive diplomacy, as
George put it, are:
to use the threat of force or limited force to persuade an
adversary to stop short of the goal of an action currently under
way; to persuade the adversary to undo an action already carried
out; and to achieve a cessation of the opponent’s hostile
behavior through a demand for change in the composition of the
adversary’s government or in the nature of the regime (George,
1994:8-9).
In general, when considering coercive diplomacy, we can grasp power
relationships or asymmetrical relationships in diplomacy.

Due to this, coercive

diplomacy can be very often adopted by Great Powers to deal with outlaw states in a
liberal anti-pluralist international society, although this does not necessarily mean that
every coercive diplomacy is successful. 357 Thus, coercive diplomacy can be seen as a
punitive military action against those who violate the norms and values of
international society, including the concept of deterrence.

In some sense, nonetheless,

due to such asymmetrical and coercive aspects, coercive diplomacy can be simply
356
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understood as “a euphemism for the threat or use of force against an opponent to foster
a more cooperative case of mind” (Berridge and James, 2003:40).

In other words,

coercive diplomacy is aimed at influencing behavior by manipulating the costs and
benefits of the policies available to the target not by influencing its capability to carry
out certain courses of action. 358 And, as part of the strategy of coercive diplomacy,
force is often used to raise the costs of non-compliance. 359 At this juncture, force can
be used to achieve either an offensive (aggressive) or defensive (status quo) agenda. 360
At this point, coercive diplomacy is usually defensive in nature, and is an effort to
persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action it has already embarked upon,
whereas blackmail strategies are offensive in nature (George, 1992:5).
However, as one of the important aspects of coercive diplomacy, we should
keep it in mind that coercive diplomacy is still diplomacy that embraces ‘negotiation’
and ‘persuasion’ as essential, 361 even if asymmetrical and coercive aspects might
appear as dominant aspects of coercive diplomacy, and even coercive diplomacy itself
affirms the significance of ‘power’ as an essential element in international society.

In

other words, we should not reduce coercive diplomacy to the concept of ‘pure power’,
like the naked threat of force, and coercive diplomacy still should include the
possibility of negotiation, compromise, and accommodation as parts of coercive
diplomacy. 362 Nevertheless, we cannot realistically deny the fact that the ultimate
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source of coercive diplomacy is ‘the threat of force.’363Also, we should keep it in mind
that coercive diplomacy adopts the use of ‘selective and limited force’ rather than
‘unlimited and full-scale use of force’, since any large-scale use of force is a clear
failure of coercive diplomacy. 364 Nonetheless, as coercive diplomacy is the threat of
use of force to coerce an opponent to undertake an action they do not wish to, coercive
diplomacy covers a wide range of instruments from diplomacy to military, including
the use of strategic bombing, the use of aerial warfare to strike at targets in an enemy
state, and sanctions, in order to convince the enemy state to change its policies (Lang,
2006: 394, Art and Cronin, 2003).

However, at this juncture, ‘the unlimited and full-

scale use of force’ or ‘war’ indicates the failure of coercive diplomacy, in particular
when considering that coercive diplomacy itself is alternative to war.365
In consideration of the characteristics of coercive diplomacy, let us take a look
at how coercive diplomacy could be applied to Saddam’s Iraq, examining whether
coercive diplomacy succeeded or failed.

As a prologue to the war, coercive

diplomacy was one of the most plausible means to deal with Saddam’s Iraq, with
hopes for regime change, since Saddam’s Iraq was a source of regional instability and
a danger to the region and international society as a whole, as long as Saddam or his
designated heirs remained in power without any radical change, such as their authentic
acceptance of human rights and democracy as universal values, which was nearly
impossible.

Coercive diplomacy seemed to be the most plausible one of diplomacies,

especially when considering the potential of a nuclear-armed Saddam Hussein via
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Iraq’s continuous pursuit of nuclear weapons; Iraqi link to terrorism including an
assassination attempt on former US President George H.W. Bush; Saddam’s regime’s
direct threat to the US citizens as one aspect of Iraq’s belligerence toward the US; and
the high cost allocated to maintaining the policy of containing Saddam’s Iraq, like over
eighty billion dollars annually for protecting the southern Gulf states.366
However, the Iraq wars (1990-1991 and 2003) seemed to demonstrate how
coercive diplomacy failed to stop Saddam’s aggressive ambition, let alone its failure to
transform the characteristics of the regime as an outlaw state into a decent democratic
state.

First of all, let us take a look at several reasons for the failure of coercive

diplomacy to Saddam’s Iraq before the first gulf war.

As Iraq’s military buildup

against Kuwait grew throughout the last two weeks of July in 1990, the Bush
administration warned Saddam Hussein about the possibility of US intervention
(Schultz, 2001:54).

On July 24, 1990, a State Department spokesperson warned Iraq

against using coercion and affirmed that the US had a commitment to the individual
and collective-defense of our friend in the Gulf with whom we had deep and
longstanding ties (Freedman and Karsh, 1993:51-52, Schultz, 2001:54).
However, Iraq’s response was to rebuff such a warning.

In fact, on July 25,

1990, Saddam called the US Ambassador to his office and told her that he was not
scared by the US threats, saying “yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead
in one battle” (Schultz, 2001:54). To Saddam, the US operated under constraints
against the use of force, which made him more willing to ignore the warning from the
US (Schultz, 2001:54).

Saddam thoroughly believed that the US could not stomach a
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long and costly war, such as the possible casualties of thousands of American soldiers
and the supposedly irresolute American public, in order to restore Kuwait’s
independence, which ultimately shaped much of Saddam’s strategy in this crisis and
the consequent war (Schultz, 2001:54).
simple bluff.

Thus, Saddam regarded the US threat as a

This is one of primary reasons why coercive diplomacy failed.

And,

as Alexander George put it, this confirms the idea that the success or failure of a
coercive diplomacy is, in large part, determined by the adversary’s perception of the
coercing power’s motivation and commitment, and the adversary’s assessment of the
credibility and potency of its threat.367 Also, Saddam was even convinced that he had
to stand up to the US and that Iraqi victory was by no means impossible. 368 Saddam
might have believed in the assumption that in the Arab world, having the courage to
fight a superior foe can bring political victory, despite a military defeat. 369 This is
another primary reason for the failure of coercive diplomacy.

Furthermore, because

Saddam was intoxicated by the elixir of power and the acclaim of the Palestinians and
the radical Arab masses, Saddam might have been on a euphoric high and
optimistically overestimated his chances to win the war.370 Due to these, Saddam
might not change his confrontation against the US, even though in retrospect, his
judgement was completely wrong.

This ultimately led to the failure of coercive

diplomacy.
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Shortly after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the US had
attempted to induce Saddam to stop or undo one form of undesirable behavior. 371 US
President George H.W. Bush started deploying US army, navy, marine corps, air force
and coast guard units to Saudi Arabia, while building the US-led coalition forces.372
The international community requested Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait; on 2
August, 1990, SCR 660 demanded Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal;
four days later SCR 661 froze Iraqi assets and put in place comprehensive economic
sanctions until Iraq withdrew; and finally, SCR 678 of 29 November issued an
ultimatum, demanding that Iraq withdraw no later than 15 January 1991 and
authorizing after that date ‘all means necessary’ to compel compliance. 373 President
Bush stood before Congress in January 1991, declaring “the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
will not stand” (Schultz, 2001:43).

On January 9, 1991, Secretary of State James A.

Baker III met Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, and attempted to deliver a letter of
warning from George H.W. Bush to Saddam Hussein (Alterman, 2003:281).

The

letter said “what is at issue here is not the future of Kuwait-it will be free, its
government will be restored – but rather the future of Iraq….Iraq cannot and will not
be able to hold on to Kuwait or exact a price for leaving” (Alterman, 2003:281).
Also, former Secretary of State James A. Baker III explicitly mentioned in his
memoirs that the U.S. government’s actions in August 1990 were intended to deter an
Iraqi move into Saudi Arabia and to undo Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by the pursuit of a
371
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policy of coercive diplomacy against Saddam Hussein, while increasing economic
pressure and later military pressure such as gradually increasing American troop
strength in the Gulf. 374 Also, on January 12, 1991, the US Congress authorized the use
of military force to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, with 52-47 votes in the Senate and 250183 votes in the House of Representatives. 375 At that time, many leaders, particularly
American leaders in a coalition of states expected that war was the most likely and
necessary option to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. 376 All in all, as application of
coercive diplomacy to Iraq, the demands to Iraq were clear, and the threat was direct,
credible and potent (Alterman, 2003:281).
However, even just before the first gulf war, Saddam did not make any move to
withdraw his troops from Kuwait, while raising pan-Arab and pan-Islamic symbols
and preparing Iraq for war, not to mention his dealing with Fahd and Mubarak by
calling for their violent overthrow (Herrmann, 1994:252).

Saddam’s Iraq did not take

the ultimatum seriously, regarding it as a simple bluff.

Thus, even at that time,

Saddam might not have properly judged the motivation of the US-led coalition.377
Also, Saddam seemed to believe that Iraq’s best chance for political success would
come via war, with his huge miscalculation that Arab countries would eventually side
with him and war would expand to include Israel (Herrmann, 1994:256).
Furthermore, when considering Saddam’s character, Saddam’s interest in his own
survival had trumped the well-being of his country to an overwhelming extent, which
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was one of the reasons why coercive diplomacy could not work properly (Alterman,
2003:296).

Also, in some sense, Saddam might reject the ultimatum since he

regarded acceptance of it as humiliating, as incompatible with honor, and as too
damaging politically (George and Simons, 1994:276).

In other words, to Saddam,

any withdrawal from Kuwait might have created a perception of weakness, which he
could not afford in his tense, ethnically divided nation.378 Maybe, from the beginning,
Saddam might have believed that the American goal was to remove him from power,
which could be, in large part, rooted in his paranoid orientation, although in 1991
former US President George H.W. Bush was clearly opposed to regime change via
occupying Iraq, rejecting any policy to divide Iraq into several parts.

Nevertheless, I

admit that former President George W. Bush had obviously pursued the Iraqi regime
change, in particular since the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Due to all of these,

coercive diplomacy could not properly work for Saddam’s withdrawal of his troops
from Kuwait.

We can say that coercive diplomacy through the use of sanctions might

not only completely fail, but also through threatening war, failed to eject Iraq from
Kuwait (Herrmann, 1994:257).

All in all, as for coercive diplomacy and Saddam’s

Iraq, we might even easily reach the conclusion that the application of the coercive
diplomacy to Saddam’s Iraq was the most grievous failure, when considering the
ultimate full-scale war between the US-led coalition forces and Saddam’s Iraqi forces.
However, I have to say that coercive diplomacy was not a complete failure.
There are several reasons why coercive diplomacy had to be adopted at first and it
worked in some sense.

For example, there were ‘legitimacy,’ ‘a preclude to war (war

should be the last resort),’ ‘prevention of Iraqi further aggression beyond Kuwait as
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well as Iran,’ ‘Iraq’s inability to possess nuclear bombs,’ and ‘Saddam’s refrainment
from the use of the chemical and biological weapons due to his fear for the US’s
possible response by using nuclear weapons.’379All of these partially demonstrate that
coercive diplomacy did not completely fail.
Coercive diplomacy was applied again to Saddam’s Iraq after the 1991 Persian
Gulf War, in order to change Iraq’s identity and characteristics, let alone Saddam’s
giving up WMD.

Operation Vigilant Warrior (1994) could be recognized as a

successful application of coercive diplomacy, since it was primarily intended to
preempt future Iraqi action, even though it seemed to lie between coercive diplomacy
and deterrence (Alterman, 2003:286).

In particular, the fact that the US action took

place in a relatively confined time frame, the demands were specific, and the threat of
force was real (Alterman, 2003:286), helped facilitate successful coercive diplomacy.
Let us take a brief look at Operation Vigilant Warrior as a successful example of
coercive diplomacy:
On October 5, 1994, US intelligence analysts noted the massing
of two Iraqi Republican Guard armored divisions near the
Kuwaiti border, numbering some fifty thousand soldiers….The
move became public on October 7. In response to the Iraqi
troop movement, the US swiftly deployed thousands of troops
to the area and began moving tens of thousands more. The
UK and France also sent token naval assets to the Gulf. The
administration made its move public by leaking it to CNN
correspondent Wolf Blitzer on the morning of October 9. The
next day Iraq announced that the troops were being withdrawn
from the border area…..What is clearer was that the US took
the threat seriously and acted to move forces with extreme
speed. Because of the forward deployment of so much
materiel in the region, a US threat to meet an Iraqi invasion
forcefully was credible (Alterman, 2003:286).
As another example of coercive diplomacy, let us take a look at “Operation Desert
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Fox” (1998). In general, it was regarded as not completely successful, and it was
also widely misunderstood in the West as a pointless exercise, which is rooted in the
failure of intelligence in the West.380 However, via Operation Desert Fox as a good
example for coercive diplomacy, we can see that the threat or the limited use of force
could compel a state to reverse an action already taken (Lang, 2006:396).
As Iraq suspended its cooperation with UNSCOM in August
1998 and then announced unilaterally in October that all
UNSCOM work in Iraq should cease. The inspectors left Iraq
on November 9-12. After US warplanes were in the air to
bomb Iraq on November 14, Iraq announced that inspectors
could return and that the Iraqis would cooperate fully.
Inspections resumed on November 18, with a warning that the
US and its allies would strike if, in fact, full Iraqi cooperation
was not forthcoming. In his report to the Security Council on
December 15, UNSCOM chairman Richard Butler noted
several instances (out of several hundred inspections) in which
the Iraqi did not fully comply with UNSCOM demands. USBritish air strikes began shortly after midnight on December 17
and lasted four days, ending just before the Muslim holy month
of Ramadan. In all, something like hundred sorties and four
hundred missiles strikes were carried out against one hundred
or so targets in Iraq (Alterman 2003:289).
There were the six primary targets of Operation Desert Fox:
(1) Iraq’s air defense system; (2) the command and control
system that Saddam Hussein uses to direct his military and
repress his people; (3) the security forces and facilities to
protect and hide his efforts to develop or maintain the deadly
chemical and biological weapons; (4) the industrial base that
Saddam Hussein uses to sustain and deliver his deadly
weapons; (5) the military infrastructure, including the elite
Republican Guard forces that pose the biggest threat to his
neighbors and protect his weapons of mass destruction
program; and (6) airfields and the refineries that produce oil
products that Iraq smuggles in violation of economic sanctions
(Lang, 2006:397).
As previously mentioned, as a punitive purpose, the US and UK’s military strike
against Iraq in December 1998 was a strategic bombing as part of a campaign of
380
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coercive diplomacy (Lang, 2006:395-396).381 More precisely, on December 17, 1998,
Operation Desert Fox was launched by the US and UK’s military strike against Iraq,
while bombing the sites identified with Iraqi attempts to produce weapons of mass
destruction, in order to force Iraqi compliance with specific UN resolutions that
banned Iraq’s development and possession of WMDs (Lang, 2006:396).

In

questioning whether or not Operation Desert Fox was successful, we can conclude that
the coercive diplomacy was successful.

In particular when considering that Saddam

had complied with UNSCOM’s demands in some cases under specific military threat,
we can say that coercive diplomacy was successful (Alterman, 2003:290).

Also, in

retrospect, as Thomas Ricks put it, Iraqis abandoned their WMD programmes, due to
the success of Operation Desert Fox in 1998, when the US and British warplanes
bombed the sites where WMDs were being developed, which obviously demonstrates
the success of their coercive diplomacy. 382
Most importantly, in terms of Operation Desert Fox, we can assume some
indirect relationship between diplomacy and democracy.

When considering that the

above primary targets in Operation Desert Fox were not limited to military assets,
importantly we can notice that as a punitive military action, the operation was against
Iraq’s violation of the norms and values of international society, such as ‘human
rights,’ ‘democracy,’ ‘non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,’ and ‘no
381
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aggression,’ -Saddam’s Iraq violated the human rights of Iraqis, obtaining WMDs and
waging wars against its neighboring states, beyond Iraqi incompliance with the UN
resolutions (Lang, 2006:397).

In fact, this punitive military action could be in part

recognized so as to overthrow the regime in the long run (Lang, 2006:397). In
particular, when considering “the Iraq Liberation Act of October 1998,” just before
Operation Desert Fox, which was “the policy of the United States to support efforts to
remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the
emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime,” we cannot totally deny
that coercive diplomacy could be used as a tool to promote human rights and
democracy, even though as coercive diplomacy, the primary purpose of Operation
Desert Fox was primarily to degrade Saddam’s weapons of mass destruction program
(Lang, 2006:396-397).383 In other words, though coercive diplomacy was not able to
directly push Saddam’s Iraq toward democracy, it could be seen as a prelude to goad
Saddam’s Iraq toward democracy, in particular when considering that the US primary
aim had been to remove the threat of Iraqi aggression from the region, which
eventually resulted in eradicating Saddam as the source of the problem. 384 In short,
coercive diplomacy, in the end, was part of a long journey to alter Iraq’s regime
toward democracy.
this point.

In fact, after December 1998, the US policy on Iraq demonstrates

After December 1998, the US policy was not to coerce the regime in

Baghdad but rather to simply get rid of it (Alterman, 2003:276-277).

Alterman

mentions:
After December 1998, U.S. policy was not to coerce the regime
383

The Iraq Liberation Act in October 1998 called for around US$2 million to support a Radio Free
Iraq and US$97 billion for military aid to opposition groups. See Anthony F. Lang, Jr (2006).
384

See Captain William S. Langenheim (2002).
262

in Baghdad but rather to remove it. That month, high-ranking
U.S. officials announced that a primary goal of U.S. policy was
to achieve regime change in Iraq. Given the repressiveness of
the regime at home and its isolation abroad, regime change
would seem to represent a death sentence for Baghdad’s brutal
leaders (Alterman, 2003:276-277).
However, in some sense, I admit that in the Iraq case, diplomacy could not be credited
for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, since instead of diplomacy, war
turned out to be the primary mechanism to initiate democracy in Iraq.
On March 17, 2003, US President George W. Bush warned “Saddam Hussein
and his sons must leave Iraq within 48 hours.

Their refusal to do so would result in

military conflict.”385 This clearly indicated that the US goal was more than Saddam’s
Iraq’s giving up its WMD.

However, as for Saddam, even in 2003, the US threat did

not seem to be credible, since the US’s decision to topple Saddam’s regime via its use
of force would likely jeopardize relations with its allies including even Kuwait and
other strategic partners, which indicated that the US’s adoption of the use of force
would be too expensive for the US to bear.386 In fact, Arab states were reluctant to
advocate the deposing of Saddam, even disdaining the US strategy to isolate Iraq until
the regime collapsed, in particular when considering Iraqi populace’s suffering. 387
Owing to these, Saddam might miscalculate that the US threat against his regime
could be another simple bluff rather than a credited threat.

All in all, coercive

diplomacy appeared to fail, and there was no plausible option left to change Saddam’s
Iraq.

As US President George W. Bush put it on May 1, 2003, the US used all the
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tools of diplomacy, and as the last resort, only a full- scale war for regime change was
left.388 In other words, we can think that the 2003 Iraq war was destined to happen
due to the failure of coercive diplomacy.
However, in retrospect, we cannot say that coercive diplomacy completely
failed, but instead we can say that coercive diplomacy was partially successful,
particularly when considering that coercive diplomacy can be understood as an effort
to ‘persuade an opponent to undo an action’389and no one has found any WMDs in
Iraq since the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In other words, Iraq

may not have developed WMDs, as an international community requested Iraq to
destroy WMDs and to abandon the program of WMD in Iraq, like Security Council
Resolution 1441 on November 8, 2002 which was the final opportunity for Iraq to
comply with its disarmament obligation. 390 In short, there were ‘no substantial gains’
in its nuclear, biological and chemical weapon programs (Alterman, 2003:275).

Also,

as one of the effects of coercive diplomacy on Iraq for more than twelve years, there
had been no serious attack by Iraq on its neighbors (Alterman, 2003:275).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to recognize a partial success of coercive diplomacy.
There are some plausible reasons why we could not recognize it.

First, as noted

earlier, there was lack of information on Saddam’s Iraq, since there had not been any
American diplomat, not to mention a U.S. Embassy in Saddam’s Iraq, which led to
various false assumptions on Saddam’s Iraq.
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demonstrates how important the role of diplomacy is in terms of information-gathering.
Second, Saddam’s Iraq regarded the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and
missile programs as vital to its national security. 391 In particular, Iraq’s chemical and
ballistic missiles were seen as key to Iraq’s survival in the Iraq-Iran war.392 Also, now
that Saddam’s Iraq had pursued the regional hegemon, it was continuously expected to
keep developing nuclear weapons, at least to counter the Israeli nuclear capability.

In

short, Saddam’s Iraq clearly had many reasons to keep pursuing WMDs, and in reality,
once it had some of WMDs and missiles.

Due to this, no one expected that Saddam’s

Iraq would give up WMDs and missiles easily.

Third, Iraq had posed an existential

threat not only to its neighboring states, but also to international society as a whole,
especially when considering Saddam’s Iraq’s habitual invasion of its neighboring
states, such as its invasion of Iran and Kuwait, and when imagining Saddam’s Iraq’s
possible possession of nuclear weapons.

Fourth, the willingness of Iraq to challenge

the UN seemed to have increased over time, culminating in 1998 with an Iraqi refusal
to continue with UNSCOM inspections, let alone no 100 percent verification for
Saddam’s Iraq’s compliance with the UN resolutions. 393 All of these were primary
reasons why many people jumped to the conclusion that coercive diplomacy
completely failed, supporting the war against Saddam’s Iraq in 2003.394 Due to these
kinds of reasons, also, the goal of ‘regime change’ moved to center stage after
Operation Desert Fox in 1998, and it became increasingly predominant after the
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September 11, 2001 attacks.395 Nevertheless, in retrospect, most of Iraq’s weapons
appeared to be destroyed in 1991; for the most part the nuclear program seemed to be
already stopped; and the biological weapons program was revealed in 1995, 396 even if
there was always a possibility that Saddam’s Iraq might try to rebuild WMDs again,
and even if its identity and character as a brutal despotic regime could not be altered as
long as Saddam held power in Iraq, which means that WMDs were only one of many
reasons for the use of force against Saddam’s Iraq.

All in all, in terms of WMDs,

coercive diplomacy was successful, but it had never been influential enough to change
Saddam’s Iraq’s identity and character as a brutal despotic outlaw state which, at any
time, could pose an existential threat, particularly to its neighboring states and possibly
to the whole international society, as long as Saddam firmly held power in Iraq.
However, as mentioned above, some scholars like Jon B. Alterman argued that
coercive diplomacy did not work since regime change in Iraq was the ultimate goal of
the US policy (Alterman, 2003:290).

Also, other scholars like Geoffrey Wiseman

criticized the Bush administration for its use of force against Saddam’s Iraq rather than
its adoption of diplomacy, by saying “the first transgression of diplomatic cultures was
the United States’ eagerness to use force rather than to exhaust diplomatic negotiation”
(Wiseman, 2005:419).

But such arguments do not seem to be rational.

There was

no possibility that Saddam’s Iraq would stop and change its unconstrained aggressive
behaviors, without the external use of force, as its past behaviors demonstrated, in
particular when considering that even coercive diplomacy failed to make Iraq
withdraw itself from Kuwait.
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See Susan B. Martin (2004).
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In other words, coercive diplomacy did not work for
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some issues, not because the goal of the US policy on Saddam’s Iraq was regime
change, but because nothing could change Saddam’s Iraq except for a full-scale war.
That was why the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 came to be a necessary and
plausible option, since coercive diplomacy was not enough to alter Saddam’s Iraq to
become a full member of international society.

In terms of war as the last resort, the

Bush administration’s use of force is not quite wrong, when considering ‘the UN’s
continuous sanctions leading to the loss of more than one and a half million Iraqis
lives for more than a decade,’ ‘Saddam’s Iraq as a despotic outlaw state with no future
for Iraqi change toward democracy,’ and ‘the failure of coercive diplomacy.’
Furthermore, as Mr. Malone, a Canadian diplomat, put it, overall, patience with
Saddam’s regime had pretty much run out.397 Thus, there was no carrot for Saddam’s
regime any longer, since the carrot itself might result in Saddam’s nuclear-armed Iraq,
especially when considering that ‘carrot’, like Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine policy and
Rho Moo Hyun’s Peace and Prosperity policy on North Korea, resulted in Kim Jong
Il’s nuclear armed North Korea.

Due to the failure of coercive diplomacy, war in

2003 became the last resort, even if, as noted above, coercive diplomacy was not a
complete failure.398 In fact, we can see that the appliance of coercive diplomacy to
Iraq facilitated the legitimacy of the full-scale use of force in the end, since after
coercive diplomacy did not work, the public became more likely to perceive that all
other options were exhausted before the war began.

In other words, the failure of

coercive diplomacy against Saddam’s Iraq helped to justify the US-led coalition forces
to wage war against Saddam’s Iraq, while indicating that the Iraqi regime’s belligerent
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See, for more information, Barbara Crossette (2002).
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See, for more information, Captain William S. Langenheim (2002).
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and intransigent attitude, not US warmongering, was the primary cause of the war.399
The limit of coercive diplomacy ultimately necessitated the US-led coalition forces’
invasion of Iraq in 2003 so as to overthrow Saddam’s regime and build up a new,
prosperous and democratic Iraq.400
Conclusion
In general, diplomacy is easily misunderstood as only a simple tool to
materialize the goals of foreign policy.

However, as many English School scholars

put it, diplomacy should be recognized as a considerable institution which plays an
important role in managing international society as a whole.

As an institution,

diplomacy is absolutely necessary to the existence and the well-being of international
society.

We can certainly understand it if we simply consider the definition of

international society in Hedley Bull’s term.

Also, as democracy has slowly become

the standard of civilization in the 21 st century as well as the post-Cold War era and
diplomacy has greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy
across international arena, we can see how diplomacy ultimately helps to promote the
standard of the civilization and expand international society.

399

Ibid
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At this juncture, the unlimited use of force or war in 2003 can be understood as punishment for
violations of international norms, such as human rights and democracy (Lang, 2006:394). Thus, war in
2003 can be regarded as an institution to maintain the existence of international society and to promote
welling-being of international society, while maintaining and promoting norms and values of
international society like promotion of human rights and democracy across international society.
However, as noted before, as for me, in general, ‘war’ and ‘balance of power’ have been increasingly
negatively recognized and they seem even outdated in a current international society. Instead of
balance of power, today integration seems efficient to manage international society, when considering
that China’s deep integration with international society is a more proper solution than the balance
against rising China, which could be seen in Germany’s and Japan’s deep integration with an
international society after WWII. Also, any war in the nuclear age should be recognized as very
dangerous to even the existence of an international society. As mentioned before, because of this
reason, I am cautious with using war along with balance of power as an institution in my dissertation.
Nonetheless, in my dissertation, I tend to support some wars to cope with outlaw states, like Saddam’s
Iraq, which pose the existential threat to a whole international society, in a liberal anti-pluralist
international society.
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Diplomacy has various functions to help to govern international society.

As a

socializing mechanism, such as communicative action, diplomacy can produce,
reproduce, or transform states’ identities and interests, which is closely related to the
production, reproduction or transformation of the fabric of international society, as via
diplomatic socialization states increasingly come to sustain or change their behavior
and language, and to keep or accept norms and values such as human rights or
democracy as the standard of civilization.

However, at this juncture, we can see as

well that diplomacy is influenced by the fabric of international society.

This

indicates the inevitable relationship between diplomacy and international society.
Furthermore, owing to this, we can say that the more predominant democracy has
gradually become as the post-Cold War and 21st century standard of civilization and
the new wave expansion of an international society, the more various diplomacies
have been adopted to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.
Thanks to this, in section 2, I attempted to show as many diplomacies as possible for
democratic development.
As I examine the nature of diplomacy with three traditions, in terms of
diplomacy’s contribution to democratization, I intend to show how three different
diplomacies (power-oriented, interest-oriented and legitimacy-oriented), can promote
and consolidate democracy.

And so, I have shown three paths toward democracy via

three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq.

I hope that these three cases can help to

explain how different diplomacies, ‘Economic Diplomacy’(interest-oriented), ‘Niche
Diplomacy’ (legitimacy oriented) and ‘Coercive Diplomacy’ (power-oriented) can
contribute to democratization in relatively different international societies, ‘a pluralist
international society,’ ‘a solidarist international society’ and ‘a liberal anti-pluralist
international society.’ All in all, as a primary institution, diplomacy has had a great
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impact on the promotion and consolidation of democracy as the post-Cold War and
21st century standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international
society.
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Chapter IV. Great Powers and Democracy
Introduction
In Chapter IV, I will define the concept of Great Power, and examine the role
of Great Power as a significant institution in international society, even if in Chapter I,
I briefly dealt with ‘Great Power’ as one of English School’s distinguished features. 401
Also, I will examine the intimate relationships between Great Powers’ values and the
nature of international society, but I will largely focus on Great Power’s contribution
to democratic development across international society, which can help demonstrate
that democracy can become the emerging new standard of civilization and the new
wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21st century.
Great Power has historically contributed to the limited progress as the
evolutionary nature of international society, such as the end of the slave trade,
decolonization, human rights and currently possibly democratic development in
international society. 402

This indicates Great Power’s contribution to the well-being

of international society as well as the maintenance of international society, beyond its
401

Like Gerry Simpson (2004), I distinguish “G”reat “P”ower (capital letters) from small, “g”reat
“p”ower (small letters). I use Great Power in a positive sense, whereas I use great power in a negative
sense.
402

In fact, US President George W, Bush claimed in November 2003 ‘liberty is both the plan of
heaven for humanity, and the best hope for progress here on Earth…It is no accident that the rise of
so many democracies took place in a time when the world’s most influential nation was itself a
democracy.’ The above is one of evidences that predominant norms are, in large part,
determined by Great Powers. Bush made the above statement at the 20th Anniversary of the
National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington DC, 6
November, 2003. The website is available at:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html
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pursuit of narrow interests alone.

In this chapter, I will attempt to stress Great

Powers as a significant institution that maintains international order and security, and
furthers the welfare in international society, by their contribution to democratic
development across international society.
In Great Power’s contribution to democratic development, we should
examine how Great Powers can have relatively different effects on democratic
promotion and consolidation under three different façades of international society,
‘pluralist’, ‘solidarist’ and ‘liberal anti-pluralist’ and under its different relationships
with lesser powers such as ‘hegemony,’ ‘primacy’ and ‘dominance.’ Great Powers
tends to choose its relatively different apparatuses for democratic promotion and
consolidation under each different feature of international society and under its
relationships with lesser powers, like ‘interest-based socialization,’ ‘value-oriented
socialization’ and ‘use of force.’ In this chapter, three cases, China, South Korea and
Iraq are chosen to demonstrate how Great Power adopts comparatively different
mechanisms to promote and consolidate democracy in international society, since
these cases reflect their own distinctive characteristics.
1> Great Power
In this section, first of all, I will define the concept of Great Power, comparing
various scholars’ definitions of Great Power. 403

For instance, I will compare

conventional IR scholars’ definition of great power with English School scholars’
notion of Great Power.

In my dissertation, nonetheless, I will advocate Bull’s

concept of Great Power in a broad sense, while rejecting Buzan’s categories of Great
Power.

In general, as for conventional IR theorists, great power can be defined as a

403

In Chapter I, I already touched on definition of Great Power, but here, I will primarily focus on
material capability, mutual recognition and soft power as the criteria for Great Powers.
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state that has ‘enough material powers’ such as economic, political and military power,
to dominate its relationship with other states and influence the behavior of states.
We can see that material capability is a necessary condition for great power.

For

instance, in his work, ”The Great Powers,” Ranke claims that a country can be
defined as great power when it can sustain itself against all others, when they are
united against it, classifying the military status of great power in terms of selfsufficiency or independence of allies (Ranke, 1950: 203, Bull 1977:195).

Also,

Kenneth Waltz states as well:
The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations
cannot be sectored and separately weighted. States are not
placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or
another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of
the following items: size of population and territory,
resource endowment, economic capabilities,
military
strength, political stability and competence….Ranking
states, however, does not require predicting their success in
war or in other endeavors. We need only rank them
roughly by capability (Waltz, 1979:131).
A Great Power that is one among many learns how to
manipulate allies as well as adversaries. Great Powers
have to accommodate some of their number in order to gain
strength vis-à-vis others. In dealing with near equals, they
design their policies to influence the actions of others (Waltz,
1986:333 ).
As for Kenneth Waltz, by and large, great power is defined as power with substantial
industrial and military potentials, along with its domination of relationship with other
states and its impact on behavior of other states. At this juncture, as his concept of
international structures, such as ‘anarchical organizing principles,’ ‘no functional
different units,’ and ‘distribution of different capabilities’ demonstrate, we can see that
his notion of great power is deeply embedded in material resources. 404 In particular,

404

See, for more information, Waltz (1979).
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when considering Waltz’s remark on the bipolar systems and multi-polar systems that
can be recognized as international political structure determined by the distribution of
capabilities among states, we can perceive material resources as significant for the
criterion of great power.405

Fareed Zakaria also emphasizes material powers as

fundamental sources for great power, by saying:
with greater wealth, a country could build a military and
diplomatic apparatus capable of fulfilling its aims abroad;
but its very aims, its perception of its needs and goals, all
tend to expand with rising resources (Zakaria, 1998:5).
Moreover, John J. Mearsheimer clarifies the definition of great power in a similar way,
stating:
Great powers are determined largely on the basis of their
relative military capability. To qualify as a great power, a
state must have sufficient military assets to put up a serious
fight in an all-out conventional war against the most
powerful state in the world. The candidate need not have
the capability to defeat the leading state, but it must have
some reasonable prospect of turning the conflict into a war
of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously
weakened, even if that dominant state ultimately wins the
war. In the nuclear age great powers must have a nuclear
deterrent that can survive a nuclear strike against it, as well
as formidable conventional forces (Mearsheimer, 2001:5).
Specially, I argue that power is based on the particular
material capabilities that a state possesses……States have
two kinds of power: latent power and military power.
Latent power refers to the socio-economic ingredients that
go into building military power….Great Powers need money,
technology, and personnel to build military forces and to
fight warts, and a state’s latent power refers to the raw
potential it can draw on when competing with rival states
(Mearsheimer, 2001:55).
The above clearly indicates that the concept of great powers especially in American
IR, is overall obsessed with material capability, and it is determined by material

405
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superiority, while disregarding any character of states.

We can simply say that in

American IR, the status of great powers can be determined by how many more guns
they have.

When considering Zakaria’s remark, “from the Peloponnesian War over

two thousand years ago to the rise of Germany in this century, almost every new
addition to the ranks of great powers has resulted in global instability and war”, we
can see that at this juncture, the concept of great power does not include character of
states, stressing material capability (Zakaria, 1998:3).

In other words, according to

the above concept of great power, German expansionism from 1933 to 1945 put
Germany into the rank of great power, even though Nazi ideology itself determines
identity and character of state, which led to total destruction of civilization in the 20th
century (Zakaria 1998:17).

Edward Keene points out this disregard of character of

great power, by saying that Nazis can be regarded as the new barbarianism, being
guilty of genocide, but also of the crime of aggressive militarism (Keene, 2002:139).
During WWII, unlike Great Britain, Nazi Germany did not protect and promote
civilization, but destroy it.

When considering this aspect, material capability alone

cannot be enough to explicate Great Power properly.

Nevertheless, I do not demean

significant weight of material capability to determine Great Power, especially when
considering the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
However, my point is that military capability alone cannot correctly explain
any international affair in international society.

Jack Donnelly points out this, by

saying “aggressiveness of great powers cannot be explained by the distribution of
capabilities

independent

of

substantive

motivational

assumptions”(Donnelly,

2000:114), and “polarity simply does not determine whether a great power is a status
quo or a revolutionary (imperialist) power”(Donnelly, 2000:116).

Great Power does

not mean simply a power with substantial material capability, since substantial
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material capability alone can be nothing in some sense.

This clearly confirms that

material capability alone cannot illustrate international affairs properly in international
society.
English School scholars, such as Hedley Bull, rectify the above concept of
great power. They claim that other factors should be added to the criteria for Great
Power, such as ‘social relationship,’ and ‘soft power.’ For instance, Martin Wight
argues that Great Powers are defined more by their relationship to the states-system as
a whole than by the quantity or the ingredients of power (Wight, 1978: 50). 406 Also,
Hedley Bull defines Great Powers as those states to “assert the right and are accorded
the right, to determine the rights that influence the peace and security of the
international system as a whole” (Bull, 1977: 201, Simpson, 2004:223).
states in a similar way to Martin Wight’s concept of Great Power:
Great Powers are Power recognized by others to have, and
conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain
special rights and duties. Great Powers, for example, assert
the rights, and are accorded the rights, to play a part in
determining issues that affect the peace and security of the
international system as a whole.. They accept the duty, and
are thought by others to have the duty of modifying their
policies in the light of the managerial responsibilities they
bear (Bull, 1977:196).
Bull continues to argue:
It may be noted that it is a mistake to define great powers
or super powers in terms of possession of strategic
nuclear weapons. Although military nuclear capability is
today a necessary condition of super-powerhood or great
powerhood it is not a sufficient condition, as is shown by
the cases of Britain and France. Moreover, the United
States and the Soviet Union were recognizable as super
powers before their strategic nuclear arms were fully
developed, and in the case of the latter before it had
acquired them at all (Bull, 1977:197).
406

Jack Donnelly points out this as well.

See Donnelly (2000:97).
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Hedley Bull

Also, as Donnelly points out (2006:153), Barry Buzan states in note of Superpower:
Superpowers must possess first-class military-political
capabilities (as measured by the standards of the day) and
the economies to support such capabilities. They must be
capable of, and also exercise, global military and political
reach. They need to see themselves, and be accepted by
others in rhetoric and behavior, as having this rank (Buzan,
2004b:69).
This clearly demonstrates that mutual recognition as social factor should be
considered as one of criteria for Great Power, along with material resources.

Like

Hedley Bull, Barry Buzan is well aware of social features as a necessary condition for
Great Power, saying that the definition of Great Power needs material capabilities and
social roles (Buzan, 2004b:59).

In other words, a mutually recognized identity of

state should be seriously considered to be a necessary condition for Great Power.
For instance, the US and the UK have been recognized as Great Powers by other
members of international society.

By contrast, Nazi Germany was acknowledged as

an outlaw state rather than a Great Power by other states, and North Korea won’t be
recognized as Great Power by others in international society unless it alters its identity
and character via its social role, even if North Korea may have strategic nuclear
weapons in the near future, along with its 1.2 million troops as the fourth largest
military in the world. 407 At this juncture, we can see that the mutual recognition as a
social feature is one of criteria for Great Power as well.

Also, we can comprehend

that a mutually recognized identity among states brings out their reciprocally realized
duties and rights in international society.

In other words, the interplay of self-

perception and perception by others determines Great Power, Middle Power and

407

See the website available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr1997/n04251997_9704251.html
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Small Power’s duties and rights.408 We can confirm the assumption that Great Powers
have a material benchmark, but they are more concerned about socially constructed
roles in the international system (Buzan, 2004b: 60).

All in all, we can clearly

perceive a sociological aspect to define Great Power, and we can easily notice the
significance of mutually recognized special rights and duties of Great Powers, which
is fundamentally different from conventional IR’s concept of great power.
Soft power should be deliberated as one of criteria for Great Power as well.
Besides hard power which I mentioned in the above, soft power cannot be excluded as
a necessary condition for Great Power.

Soft power is the ability to promote cultural

values and ideology via non-violent means such as debate and dialogue, to influence
others’ belief and behavior. 409 Joseph Nye points out the significant role of soft power.
Nye mentions:
What is soft power? It is the ability to get what you
through attraction rather than coercion or payments.
It arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture,
political ideals, and polices (Nye, 2004:X).
I first developed the concept of “soft power” in Bound to
Lead, a book I published in 1990 that disputed the thenprevalent view that America was in decline. I pointed out
that the United States was the strongest nation not only in
military and economic power, but also in a third dimension
that I called soft power (Nye, 2004:XI).
The indirect way to get what you want has sometimes been
called ‘the second face of power.’ A country may obtain
the outcomes it wants in world politics because other
countries – admiring its values, emulating its example,
aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to
follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the
agenda and attract others in world politics, and not only to
force them to change by threatening military force or
408

I will touch on this in the below again, when I deal with the role of Great Power.
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See the website available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_(international)
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economic sanctions. This soft power – getting others to
want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather
than coerces them.
Soft power rests on the ability to
shape the preferences of others. At the personal level, we
are all familiar with the power of attraction and seduction
(Nye, 2004:5).
This indicates that soft power should be considered as a necessary condition for Great
Power.

For instance, when considering China’s history, we can find one interesting

case that Mongols conquered the Han people via the use of force but that weirdly
enough, Mongolians themselves were, by contrast, absorbed into the Han culture.410
This clearly demonstrates that material power is not omnipotent, and soft power
should be deeply considered as one of criteria of Great Power.

Currently, in

international society, human rights and democracy that the US and UK have promoted
in the post-Cold War era and 21st century, have been gradually predominant and even
universal, 411 and this obviously implies that soft power can greatly help facilitate the
legitimacy of the role of Great Powers in international society.

All in all, the

significance of soft power should be deeply considered along with material capability
for the criteria for Great Power.

I will explain this point in the below again, when

facing the question about “how do Great Powers promote and consolidate democracy
in international society?”
In consideration of the above definition of Great Power, let us take a brief
look at classification of Great Powers that Barry Buzan revealed in his work, “The
United States and the Great Powers: World Politics in the Twenty-First Century.”

410

Zhao also makes a similar point.

See, for more information, Zhao (2004:228).

411

I have to admit that it might be too early to say that democracy itself can be one of universal norms
and values in international society. But as for me, in the post-cold war era and the 21st century, we
cannot deny the global phenomenon that democracy is increasingly becoming one of predominant
values and norms in international society.
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Barry Buzan uses Bull’s notion of Great Powers with different name tags, such as
hyper-power, super-power, great power and regional power.

Buzan states:

A hyper-power is simply a sole superpower viewed in
critical perspective…..super-power posses first-class
military political capabilities and the economies to
advocate such capabilities….Superpowers will also be
fountainheads of universal values of the type necessary
to underpin international society. Their legitimacy as
superpowers will depend substantially on their success in
establishing the legitimacy of such values….Great Powers
need not necessarily have big capabilities in all sectors,
and they need not be actively present in the
securitization or economic processes of all areas of the
international system. Great Power status rests mainly
on a single key: What distinguishes great powers from
merely regional ones is that they are responded to by
others on the basis of system-level calculations, as well as
regional ones, about the present and near future
distribution of power…..Regional Powers define the
polarity of any given regional security complex…..The
capabilities of regional powers loom large in their regions,
but do not register much in a broad spectrum way at the
global level (Buzan, 2004b. 69-72).
In some sense, I do agree to Buzan’s division of Great Powers into hyper-power,
super-power, great power and regional power.

In particular, when considering that

the US share of Global GDP is around 31.2%, of Global Defense Spending around
36.3%, of Global Spending on research and development around 40.6 % and of
Global movies box office revenues around 83. 1%, not to mention that the US military
spending of more than $600 billion is as much as the next twenty top-spending
countries combined, we obviously need to call the US more than a Great Power,
which is obviously a hyper-power.412 Such categorization of Bull’s broad concept of
Great Power can be recognized as a great contribution to the development of the
concept of Great Power.
412

This is reported in Newsweek (July 21, 2003).
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However, in my dissertation, I prefer to use Bull’s broad concept of ‘Great
Power,’ rather than hyper-power for the US, and ‘Great Power’ for the UK, rejecting
Buzan’s classification.

The reasons are following.

First, Barry Buzan mentions

that the promotion and consolidation of certain values and norms in international
society are constrained to the role of hyper-power or super-powers alone.

However,

we can clearly notice that the UK is ranked as Buzan’s narrow definition of great
power, but that its role to promote and consolidate certain predominant values and
norms like human rights and democracy in international society cannot be discounted
at all.

In particular, in the 21 st century, the UK’s active role can be easily observed in

its aggressive promotion and consolidation of democracy in international society.
Second, in terms of the measure of duties and rights, the UK should be ranked above
Buzan’s rank of great power into which Germany, Japan, China and Russia are fitted,
since the role of the UK is clearly far greater than any state Buzan puts into the
category of great power. Third, in my dissertation, I adopt democracy as the new
standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society, that is,
the criterion of full membership in international society.

When considering this one,

it is hard to expect any contribution yet from Russia and China to promote and
consolidate democracy as well as human rights across international society.
Nevertheless, two states have been in transition toward democracy, gradually
accepting human rights as a universal norm in international society.

In other words,

they are still within a barbarian circle rather than a civilized circle in a pluralist
international society, so we need to distinguish the UK from China and Russia.
Japan and Germany emerged from a barbarian circle into a civilized circle in a liberal
anti-pluralist international society, but their contribution to international society is far
less than the UK’s.

Overall, in my dissertation, I adopt Bull’s broad concept of Great
281

Power in order to demonstrate the close relationship between the role of Great Powers
and the promotion of democracy in international society.

Below, I will uncover the

close relationship between international society and Great Power, and scrutinize how
Great Powers can affect the maintenance of order and security in international society
and the well-being of international society.

This will help us understand how Great

Powers can have an impact on democratic development with their various
mechanisms.
Great Power’s role has been historically considered as significant, since it can
largely determine the nature and structure of international society.

The role of Great

Power has been massively stressed by many IR scholars such as realists, neoconservatives and English School scholars.

As for realists, IR theories are about

theories of great power politics rather than general theories of international politics in
some sense (Donnelly, 2000: 100).

Nevertheless, realists seem to be too much

obsessed with and exaggerate the role of great powers in international system.

For

instance, Kenneth Waltz’s “Theory of International Politics” (1979) and Robert
Gilpin’s “War and Change in World Politics”(1981) clearly demonstrate how
significant great powers have been in the international arena.

Also, English School

scholars’ works, Hedley Bull’s “Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World
Politics”(1977) and Barry Buzan’s “The United States and the Great Powers”(2004b)
regard Great Power as an important institution to maintain order and security across
international society and to promote well-being of international society as a whole.
Nevertheless, realists and English school scholars have quite different perspectives on
Great Powers’ role, as they have different views on international environment.

For

instance, realism is overwhelmingly obsessed with pure anarchical environment, such
as self-help system and power struggle, whereas the English School notices societal
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aspects along with anarchical feature as international environment, which displays
certain common values and norms in international society.

Like this, the English

School emphasizes social aspects in Great Powers’ role, whereas realism stresses antisocial elements of great powers.

In my dissertation, I will embrace the English

School’s notion of the role of Great Powers.
According to English School scholars, Great Powers’ primary responsibility is
to maintain international society and to promote the well-being of international
society.

They assume that international society reflects Great Powers’ primary

values and norm.

At this juncture, we can say that their co-relationships have been

known as inevitable.

In deliberation of co-relationship between international society

and Great Power, Hedley Bull claims:
the idea of a great power, in other words, presupposes and
implies the idea of an international society as opposed to an
international system, a body of independent political
communities linked by common rules and institutions as
well as by contact and interaction (Bull,1977:196).
This clearly indicates the co-relationship between international society and Great
Powers, in particular when considering that one of Great Power’ roles is for
preservation of international society and for the wellbeing of international society. 413
Also, as above, Great Powers can shape and form certain nature and character of
international society, as a large portion of nature and character of international society
have historically reflected Great Powers’ values and norms, like ‘the end of the slave
trade and slavery,’ ‘compliance with international law beyond Western states,’ ‘self-

413

As mentioned in Chapter I, Hedley Bull revealed the roles of Great Powers such as “preservation of
the general balance; seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another; seeking to
limit or contain wars among one another; exploiting their local preponderance; agreeing to respect one
another’s spheres of influence; and joint action” See Bull (1977:200).
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determination’ and ‘human rights.’414 This can be understood as Great Powers’ role to
spread the standard of civilization at each historical period.

In the early nineteenth

century, the end of the slave trade and that of slavery system could be regarded as the
outcome of the roles of Great Powers, in particular, the UK’s role, after the slave trade
was abolished in the British Empire in 1807 and slaves were emancipated via the
British Parliament in 1833, even if the slave trade itself had led to enormous
economic interests.415 In the late nineteenth century, compliance with international
law itself could not be possible without the roles of Great Powers.

In the 1960s, the

self-determination and decolonization were derived from the effect of the role of
Great Powers, even if as the primary normative ideas, they emerged in some sense
that Great Powers, that is, Western colonial powers lost their confidence in their
normative right to rule (Zacher, 2001:240, Russett 1993:35, and Jackson, 1993).416
As Jackson puts it, also we can easily perceive that if the leading colonial powers had
been authoritarian states and not democracies, the world would look far different from
the world we have now, not to mention the possibility that colonialism might still be
widespread (Jackson, 1993:137).

In the late 20th century, human rights has been one

of primary US foreign policies for decades; it has been increasingly accepted as
universal norm across international society; and human rights is one of primary
features of a solidarist international society.

In the post-Cold War era and the 21st

century, democracy has become the norm and value which Great Powers such as the
414

In Chapter I, I already mentioned some of them, when I dealt with the standard of civilization and
wave expansions of international society.
415

See the brief history concerning the end of slavery and of the slave trade, available at the website:
http://demo.lutherproductions.com/historytutor/basic/modern/genknow/end-slavery.htm
416

In fact, material reasons should be considered to explain why the western powers gave up their
colonies, such as the increasing resistance against the colonial powers, and the high cost to maintain
their colonies via using military forces. See, for more detail, Jackson (1993).
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US and the UK have chosen and promoted across international society.

As Larry

Diamond points out, as mentioned in Chapter I, when considering that in the 1970s,
less than 30 nation-states were democracies, but currently, more than 120 nationstates are democracy, democracy is continuously expected to become a primary
dimension of international society in the 21 st century.

At this juncture, we should not

diminish the role of Great Powers in the transformation of the nature of international
society.

417

This clearly illustrates co-relationship between Great Power and

international society.
Also, when we think of Great Power’s primary contribution to international
society, as implied above, we can think that the role and function of Great Powers are
mainly to manage the affairs of international society as a whole, and to provide certain
direction in international society.

Bull states:

The steps the great powers take to manage their relations
with one another lead directly to the attempt to provide
central direction or management of the affairs of
international society as a whole; the steps they take to
exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of
international society presupposed some effective
management of their relations with one another (Bull,
1977:201).
For instance, in 1815, Great Powers sought to manage and order European affairs,
even formulating international law whenever necessarily, and forging a concert
system, which reflects a legalized hierarchical aspect in international society
(Simpson, 2004: 91-92).

At this juncture, it is worthwhile to take a look at Bull’s

points concerning role of Great Powers in more details, even if briefly mentioned in
Chapter I.

I will examine Bull’s notion of the roles of Great Powers:

417

Larry Diamond spoke on “can the whole world become democratic?” at New York Democracy
Forum. The Video concerning his speech is available at the website: http://www.ned.org/
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preservation of the general balance; seeking to avoid or
control crises in their relations with one another; seeking to
limit or contain wars among one another; exploiting their
local preponderance; agreeing to respect one another’s
spheres of influence; and joint action (Bull, 1977: 200).
First, ‘preservation of the general balance’ can be obviously recognized as Great
Powers’ cardinal contribution to international society, via their management of
relations among states (Bull, 1977:201).

This role is primarily to preserve the

existence of international society, and this leads Great Powers to have special rights
and duties.

Bull states:
They perform in relation to international order that is most
widely recognized in international society at large, and
which provides the basis of the willingness of other states to
accept the notion of the special rights and duties of great
powers (Bull, 1977:201).

This is quite different from realist perception, especially offensive realist perception
on the role of great powers that great powers are focusing on maximizing relative
power in pure anarchical environment (Mearsheimer, 2001:22).418 At this juncture,
we can see that as for the English School, Great Powers’ interests are more than
simply their narrow self-interests like maximization of their own interests alone, to
sustain international society as a whole.

In turn, Great Powers can be given

legitimate special rights to decide important issues by Middle Powers and Small
Powers.

As mentioned several times, Gerry Simpson advocates this, explaining a

legalized hierarchical relationships among Great Powers, the Middle Powers and
Small Powers well.

He claims “All three facets of legislative equality were heavily

compromised at Vienna.

The Great Powers made the law and the middle powers

418

In terms of the preservation of balance, we might think that English School and defensive realism
seem to have similar positions for great powers to sustain international order. However, it might be
dangerous guess, since as for English School, Great Powers are not only concerned with their own
national interests, but also with broad interests of international society as whole, whereas as for
defensive realism, great powers are deeply concerned about their own interests alone.
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signed the resulting Treaty.

The small powers, meanwhile, were erased from

consideration”(Simpson, 2004: 112).

Jack Donnelly added:

At San Francisco, though the lesser powers had a more
active role, the basic structure was decided by the US, the
UK and the USSR. The Great Powers have also been
formally predominant in peace and security organizations
such as the Concert of Europe and the Security Council
(Donnelly, 2006:153).
We can evidently perceive that Great Powers are primarily engaged even in the lawmaking process, which is parallel with the role of the members of the Security
Council in producing resolutions as a binding international law.

Also, we can see

that via such legal process, the hegemony of Great Powers has become increasingly
legitimized in international society, which can be called even legalized hegemony.
However, we can perceive that the existence and role of Great Powers itself in
international society can be interpreted as the tension between two principles,
sovereign equality and hegemony.

But, what is important is historically that we

can’t deny such a hierarchical relationship in international society.

As Lassa

Oppenheim points out, states should be, in principle, treated as equal before law, but it
is hard to deny the reality that in politics, Great Powers have louder voice than Small
Powers in international society.419 Oppenheim states:
Legal equality must not be confounded with political
equality. The enormous differences between states as
regards their strength are the result of a natural inequality
which, apart rank and titles, finds its expression in the
province of policy (Oppenheim,1920:198).
Gerry Simpson went further, blurring a clear distinguishing line between the legal
arena and the political arena.

Simpson states:

The powers represented a legislative elite and the law was
419

See, for more information, Lassa Oppenheim (1920).
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obligated to recognize this fact.
Political inequality
rendered a strong form of sovereign equality null or
fictitious or purely theoretical. The reality of international
law was that states were unequal and had unequal rights.
Sovereign equality was an ideal but one that could never be
realized (Simpson, 2004:121-122).
As shown above, we can see the hierarchical relationship among states in
international society.

At this juncture, we can perceive the distinguishing roles of

Great Powers via the inevitable hierarchical relationship between Great Powers and
Small Powers, and further via the radial hierarchical relationship between Great
Powers and outlaw states.

All in all, in international society, via such hierarchical

relations, we can see the inevitable correlations between the role of Great Powers and
the management of international society.
Second, Bull mentioned ‘Avoidance and Control of Crisis’ as the role of Great
Powers’ in order to underscore the necessary actions for the interests of international
order, while pointing out several crisis management events, such as the 1967 Middle
East Crisis.

Bull regarded ‘the avoidance and control of crisis’ as a central element

in the management of Great Power relations as well.

This aspect seems similar to

Waltz’s concept of great powers that I mentioned in the above (1986:333), in
particular when considering his emphasis on accommodation among great powers.
However, we have to notice that his motivation of emphasis on accommodation
among great powers started from great powers’ self-interests alone on the basis of
realist logic, whereas Bull’s stress on ‘avoidance and control of crisis’ is derived from
not only Great Powers’ concern with their own self-interests, but also their concern
with general interests of international society as a whole.

In particular, Waltz’s

remarks that great powers’ accommodation is basically to gain strength via-a-vis
others and that in dealing with near equals, their policies are ultimately to influence
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the action of others, advocate the fundamental difference between Bull’s role of Great
Powers and Waltz’s role of great power (Waltz, 1986:333).

Currently, the US

engagement in the North Korea nuclear issue, along with other states, cannot be only
rooted in the US concern with its own national interests, but also in its deep concern
with general interests of international society as whole, such as the US foreign
policies against nuclear proliferation, terrorism and human rights violations.
Third, Bull underscored ‘Limitation of War’ as the role of Great Powers, so as
to avoid war, in particular nuclear war, or limit war if it occurs, via possibly unilateral
policies such as the enunciation of strategic doctrines and the development of
weapons systems (Bull, 1977:207).

As Bull points out, this is directly related to

Great powers’ management of the affairs of international society as a whole (Bull,
1977:206).

Nevertheless, as for Bull, war itself can be recognized as one of

significant institutions in some sense.

However, when considering international

affairs in current international society, Bull’s argument seems obsolete.
Simpson made a good argument for Great Power’s interventionism.

Gerry

He said that

current international society can be described as the progenitor of the new order, with
his emphasis on the Kantian belief in the link between internal conditions of states
and their external behavior (Simpson, 2004: 203).

In particular, in the post-Cold

War era and 21st century, the international environment has transformed itself to
reflect more democratic norms, and interventionism has been more likely justified.
Nevertheless, I do not mean that Great Powers do not care about the limitation of
random violence anymore.

For instance, the US has so far chosen a diplomatic

solution rather than a military solution to deal with Iran and North Korea’s nuclear
issues.

Iran has become a rising regional hegemonic power as OPEC’s second

largest oil producer and as the most powerful military state in that region, while
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directly confronting the US influence in the Middle East since Saddam’s regime
collapse.

North Korea has the fourth largest army in the world, and on Oct 9, 2006,

it had nuclear test, which has caused a large amount of tension with its neighboring
states.

The US has been very careful to constrain wars with Iran and North Korea,

while preventing nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and East Asia regions which
are recognized, along with Europe, as economic and political hubs in international
society.
Fourth, Bull put stress on ‘the Unilateral Exercise of Local Preponderance’ as
Great Powers’ role.

The preponderance of Great Power can be understood as

habitual and uninhibited military intervention in internal affairs and external relations
of the local states, including prolonged military occupation, and in failure to pay more
than lip service to notions of the sovereignty, equality, and independence of these
states (Bull, 1977:207).

As mentioned above, we can observe a hierarchical

relationship under official horizontal principles in international society.

Bull

introduced three types of unilateral exploitation of preponderance, ‘dominance,’
‘primacy’ and ‘hegemony’ (Bull, 1977:207).

Bull states:

dominance is a relationship in which a great power,
while stopping short of the establishment of imperial
sovereignty over the areas in question, treats the small
states or quasi-states within its hinterland as second-class
members of international society.
Dominance is
characterized by the habitual use of force by a great
power against the lesser states comprising its hinterland,
and by habitual disregard of the universal norms of
interstate behavior that confer rights of sovereignty,
equality, and independence upon these states; At the
opposite extreme to dominance there exists what may be
called primacy.
A great power’s preponderance in
relation to a group of lesser states take the form of primacy
when it is achieved without any resort to force or the
threat of force, and with no more than the ordinary
degree of disregard for norms of sovereignty, equality
and independence.
The position of primacy or
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leadership which the great power enjoys is freely
conceded by the lesser states within the group
concerned, and often expresses the recognition by the
latter of the disproportionately large contribution which the
great power is able to make to the achievement of common
purposes; where a great power exercises hegemony over
the lesser powers in a particular area or constellation,
there is resort to force and the threat of force, but this is
not habitual and uninhibited but occasional and
reluctant (Bull, 1977:208-209).
In fact, in a similar way, Watson uses hegemony, suzerainty, dominion, and empire.
Watson states:
By a hegemony I mean that some power or authority in a
system is able to lay down the law about the operation of the
system, that is to determine to some extent the external
relations between member states, while leaving them
domestically independent; In international law, it
(Suzerainty) usually means that one state exercises
political control over another.
In many historical
contexts, it means a shadowy overlordship that amounts to
very little in practice; dominion covers situations where
an imperial authority to some extent determines the
internal government of other communities, but they
nevertheless retain their identity as separate states and
some control over their own affairs; and there is empire, no
more absolute in practice than independence, meaning
direct administration of different communities from an
imperial centre (Watson, 1992:15-16).
Jack Donnelly made distinctions among empire, hegemony and dominion as well.
Empires control both the internal and the external
policy of the subordinated policy; the imperial center
rules over peripheral units. Hegemons control only
external policy, allowing internal autonomy to their
hegemonized followers, within the limits, as the ancient
Greeks put it, of having the same friends and the same
enemies. Hegemony, being defined by the interest of the
dominant power rather than ideological solidarity, is more
like
protection
or
guarantee
than
common
security……Between Hegemony and empire lies what
Adam Watson calls dominion – an imperial authority to
some extent determines the internal government of other
communities, but they nevertheless retain their identity
as separate states and some control over their own
affairs (1992:15-16) (Donnelly, 2006:156).
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In consideration of the above, we can notice that the role of Great Powers in current
international society might be described with ‘dominance,’ ‘primacy’ and ‘hegemony’
in Bull’s terms; hegemony and dominion in Watson; and hegemony and dominion in
Donnelly’s terms.

At this juncture, I will examine hegemony, primacy and

dominance for current international society, which might help explain democratic
development for a pluralist international society, a solidarist international society and
a liberal anti-pluralist international society.
Afghanistan and Iraq.

Dominance can be seen in Kosovo,

This generates the strong image of ‘the standard of

civilization’ when considering that it had been often used for the relationship between
European states (Christian civilization) and non-European States (Bull, 1977:208).
The use of force in dominance can be far more easily justified than in hegemony or
primacy.

Dominance itself can be pretty often seen in a liberal anti-pluralist

international society.

Hegemony can be seen in the US adoption of economic

pressure and diplomatic pressures on other states like China, with US recognition of
the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty.420 Hegemony can be seen in
a pluralist international society, when its primary aspect is “there is resort to force and
the threat of force, but this is not habitual and uninhibited but occasional and
reluctant” (Bull, 1977:209).

We can see this kind of Great Powers’ exercise of

preponderance in a large portion of international society.

Primacy can be seen in

capitalist democratic security community (a solidarist international society) in Buzan

420

Unlike Bush administration, I do not put Iran into the category of ‘axis of evil’ or ‘outlaw state.’
Nonetheless, Iranian regime cannot be called liberal democratic regime. Besides, realistically, the US
adoption of the use of force against Iran has been hardly persuasive and expected, and it cannot be
tolerated in international community, in particular, when considering that Iran did not invade its
neighboring countries, even if it has been supporting Hezbollah that has been transformed into a
political party. As for me, current Hezbollah in Lebanon should be recognized as a strong nationalist
party rather than a simple terrorist group.
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term, like between the US and South Korea.
Huntington’s concept of primacy.

Here, it is worthwhile to look at

Huntington defined international primacy as a

government to exercise more influence on the behavior of more actors with respect to
more issues than any other government (Huntington, 1993a:68).

Also, he claimed

that primacy is an alternative to war, since primacy is to achieve the state’s goal
without recourse to war (Huntington, 1993a:68-70).
of primacy.

This is similar to Bull’s concept

As mentioned above, Bull claimed that a Great Power can command

powerful bargaining levers in disputes with lesser states without any coercion under
the confines of a normal degree of acceptance of basic norms of international
behavior, since the position of primacy or leadership is conceded and recognized by
the lesser states for the achievement of common purposes (Bull, 1977:208).
aspect can be seen in a soldarist international society.

This

So far, I have briefly

illustrated three different types of Great Power’s exercise of preponderance, and
below, I will apply them to three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq.
Fifth, Bull highlighted ‘spheres of influence, interest or responsibility’ as
Great Powers’ role.

Bull claimed that Great Power tends to establish the sphere of

influence, interests or responsibility on the basis of agreement among Great Powers
(Bull, 1977:212).

The spheres of influence can be simply understood as the

recognition of special rights, such as the Monroe Doctrine (Donnelly, 2006: 153).

It

could be easily recognized during the Cold War era, as the US and the USSR had
been reluctant to intervene in each other’s sphere of influences for their co-existence
such as the Johnson and Brezhnev doctrines (Bull, 1977: 217, Donnelly, 2006:153).
However, in the post-Cold War era and 21st century, it is little bit harder to recognize
the spheres of influence, since the US influence has been felt across international
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society, even at the corner of global world, such as North Korea, Iran and Sudan. 421
But, I do not totally disregard regional powers’ effects in some levels, such as China’s
influence in Asia (on North Korea’s issue) and Iran’s influence in the Middle East (on
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq’s issues).

Nevertheless, we should not forget the

US deep engagement in all of these issues, in particular, North Korea’s issue,
regardless of whether China can have a great impact on North Korea. The role of
the US has been increasingly and widely felt across international society.
Sixth, Bull underlined ‘Concert’ or ‘Condominium’ as a role of Great
Powers.

Bull claimed that Great Powers tend to join forces in promotion of common

policies via the international system, saying “Concert is the principal historical model
of joint management by the Great Powers, the Concert of Europe”(Bull, 1977:218).
Bruce Cronin , Gerry Simpson and Jack Donnelly briefly mentioned the concert
system, and their argument can advocate Bull’s role of Great power.

Cronin

mentioned that in a concert system, the mutually recognized Great Powers get
together to collectively manage security affairs within a given region (Cronin,
1999:10).

In a concert system, consultation and joint action are the patterns of

behavior, and congress and summits are primary institutions (Cronin, 1999: 13).
Also, Simpson mentioned that at the Congress of Vienna, Great Powers were
successful in forming a Concert system in which they had played a predominant role,
and argued that this could be, in some sense, acknowledged with the competition
between Great Power’s dominance and sovereign equality (Simpson, 2004: 92-93).
Jack Donnelly claimed that concert involves collective, internationally recognized

421

Over the last decade, USAID has provided over $1 billion in humanitarian assistance to Sudan.
See the website available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/20053.pdf.
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Great Power management, such as post-Vienna Europe, the Security Council (if
‘increased permanent membership’) and the Group of 8 (Donnelly, 2006:155).
From now on, I want to examine the Security Council and the Group of 8 as
Great Powers’ collective management institution for current international society.
As Donnelly puts it, when considering current international society, the Security
Council’s permanent membership might be recognized as Great Powers’ collective
crisis management mechanism and their formal concert system, which reflect the
legalized hierarchy under the principle of equal sovereignty.
problems.

However, it has its own

For instance, Security Council permanent members can hardly reach the

consensus, whenever any issue is related with their own interests, like their inability
to reach a common position on Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo (Penttila, 2003:3435).

Besides, I do not put China (South and East Asia), Russia (Europe and Central

Asia), France (Africa and Europe) into the category of Great Powers but to the
category of regional powers, since as mentioned above, Great Powers should have
hard power (material capacity), soft power (Human Rights and Democracy) and
recognition (recognized hierarchical relations).

Furthermore, when considering that

there are ten non-permanent members of the Security Council – e.g. Argentina,
Congo, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Qatar, Slovakia, United Republic of
Tanzania in 2006,- and they can influence decision-making process of Security
Council Resolutions in some level, we cannot say that the Security Council (increased
permanent members if possible) can be called a condominium of Great Powers to
collectively deal with international affairs.
As a matter of fact, the Group of 8 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the United Kingdom, the United States and Russia) might be much closer to Great
Powers’ autonomous collective management institution than the Security Council
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(permanent members), in particular because the Group had been recognized as the
largest industrialized and richest democratic group (65% of the world economy) to
deal with major political and economic issues. 422

Especially in the 1990s, in the

most significant innovation in the G-7/G-8 process, the summit leaders have acted to
set up an array of task forces and working groups to tackle specific international
problems such as drug-related money laundering and financial crime (Grieco and
Ikenberry, 2003:309).

Also, the G7/G8 has anchored Russia in the West, and via the

G8, the Western powers and Russia have been given a chance to have common voice
to deal with various issues, such as trade in small arms and light weapons, illicit
dealing in diamonds, a UN-certified international civilian police force, terrorism,
democracy and AIDS (Penttila, 2003:5-6).
Its security role since its founding at Rambouillet, France, on 15-17,
November, 1975 has been noticeable with its formidable economic, political and
military resources (Penttilla, 2003:7-9).

For instance, the 1983 Williamsburg

Summit demonstrated that Group of 8 has been deeply concerned with international
order and peace.

The joint ‘Declaration on security’ states:

1. We shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter
any attack, to counter any threat and to ensure peace.
2. We wish to achieved lower levels of arms through serious
arms-control negotiations.
3. Arms control must be based on equality and must be
verifiable.
4. Attempts to divide the West will fail (referring to Soviet
attempts to make separate deals with France and the UK on
intermediate-range nuclear forces).
5. Should there be no agreement on such forces, the
countries concerned will proceed with the planned
deployment of the US systems in Europe beginning at the
end of 1983.

422

See, for a brief information, the website available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G8
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6. Our countries are united. Attempts to avoid serious
negotiations by seeking to influence public opinion in our
countries will fail.
7. We are committed to removing the threat of war.
(Penttila, 2003:40).
Also, in June 2006, the G-8 Strelna Summit dealt with the following agendas:
international energy security, terrorism, non-proliferation,
crisis management, Middle East (Iraq and Palestine) and
Military Proposals (NATO to use Russian military transport
aviation), not to mention health, education, migration,
demography,
aid
and
development,
trade
and
environment.423
The above indicates that G8 has become the de facto centre of global governance as a
concert system, in particular when considering the G8’s peace-building role in
Kosovo (Penttila, 2003:34-35).
However, it cannot be a proper way to say that the G8 can be compatible with
Bull’s concept of a concert system, due to its lack of ability and recognition as a sort
of concert system, in order to deal with international affairs.

For instance, the G8

did not yet even include China that is a vital regional power and potential Great
Power, even if in my dissertation, I regard the US and UK as Great Powers, and place
others such as Russia and China into the category of regional powers.

Also, the G8

is still marginalized and has been dismissed by the US, for a loose coalition of the
able and willing (Penttila, 2003:47).

But I cannot deny the high possibility that the

Security Council and the Group of 8 may be Great Powers’ collective internationally
recognized management as a concert system in the future, in particular when
considering “the preservation of Kuwait’s sovereignty could be attributed to the
special privileges and powers of the Security Council”(Simpson, 2004:171).

423

See the website available at:
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations/2006stpetersburg/2006agenda.html#prep
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So far, I have briefly explored the roles of Great Powers.

On the whole, the

significant roles of Great Powers have been historically recognized, and the post-Cold
War era and 21st century cannot be exceptional.

We can notice the historical fact that

Great Powers have had a great impact on the evolutionary natures of international
society.

This can reveal a close relationship between Great Power’s norms and

values and the natures of international society.

Also, Great Powers have played a

significant role in the maintenance of international order in international society and
furthermore in the promotion of the well-being of international society via their
various mechanisms.

In the post-Cold War era and 21st century, as democratization

of international society has elevated the public good in international society as a
whole, the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society
have become one of Great Powers’ roles.

In the 21st century, the US and the UK are

actively promoting and consolidating their own norms and values, ‘democracy’ and
‘human rights,’ across international society from the Middle East to Africa, for both
their own interests and general interests of international society as a whole.

Below, I

will look into Great Powers’ specific role in democratic development.
2> Great Power’s Role in Democratic Development across International Society
In this section, I will primarily focus on the relationships between the role of
Great Powers and the promotion and consolidation of democracy that can become the
emerging new standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international
society in the 21st century.

Also, I will investigate the assumption on whether or not

Great Powers’ promotion and consolidation of democracy can be justified in
international society.

This will help understand Great Power’s impact on China,

South Korea and Iraq’s paths toward democracy, which I will examine in the next
section.
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In general, for realists, Great Powers’ promotion and consolidation of
democracy is not worthwhile for their own interests unless it can be a tool to
maximize their own interests.

For instance, John Mearsheimer obviously rejects the

significant role of democracy.

Mearsheimer mentions:

When one looks at how the decision not to fight was
reached in each case, the fact that both sides were
democracies appears to have mattered little.
There
certainly is no evidence that the rival democracies had
benign intentions toward each other. In fact, the outcome
each time was largely determined by balance of power
considerations……….. No democracy can be sure that
another democracy will not someday become an
authoritarian state, in which case the remaining democracy
would no longer be safe and secure. Prudence dictates that
democracies prepare for that eventuality, which means
striving to have as much power as possible just in case a
friendly neighbor turns into the neighborhood bully
(Mearsheimer, 2001: 368).
However, unlike realists, the promotion and consolidation of democracy itself should
not be used as a simple instrumental excuse to achieve national goals and interests.
In fact, as I mentioned in Chapter I, unlike Mearsheimer’s argument, the effect of
democracy can be strongly felt across international society, which can advocate
democratic peace theory.

We know that if the Soviet Union was a liberal democracy,

even the Cold War itself might not have emerged at all.

Also, during the past 150

years, democracies have not fought against each other, with very few exceptional
cases.

Bruce Russett claims “the more democracies there are in the world, the fewer

potential adversaries we and other democracies will have and the wider the zone of
peace” (Russett, 1993:4). Currently, we can point out various peaceful zones in
international society such as Scandinavia and EU members.

And, we can expect that

as the circle of the democratic core members has widened, the security of
international society has in the long run become more guaranteed.
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At this juncture,

Great Powers’ role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy can be
understood as a great contribution to international security and the welfare of
international society as a whole in the long run.
When considering Great Powers’ mechanisms to promote and consolidate
democracy, we can imagine multiple ways, such as ‘interest-based socialization’ like
change in price, ‘value –oriented socialization’ and ‘the use of force,’ which can be
mentioned relatively in ‘pluralist,’ ‘solidarist’ and ‘liberal anti-pluralist’ international
societies.

They can be in a large part determined by the relatively different

relationship between Great Powers and the lesser powers, like ‘hegemony,’ ‘primacy’
and ‘dominance.’ In this consideration of Great Powers’ mechanisms for democratic
development, below I will look into Great Power’s role in democratic development in
international society.

In the post-Cold War era and 21st century, the increasing

numbers of states have become democratic, but this cannot be expected without Great
Powers’ role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

At present, we can

observe that Great Powers’ effort to promote and consolidate democracy has made
democracy the emerging new standard civilization in the post-Cold War era and the
21st century.

In particular, the US has been playing a greater role than any other state

in the promotion and consolidation of democracy.
However, the US great role for democratic development is not new at all, but
it can be traced into the US 28th President, Woodrow Wilson’s idealism, “democracy
must someday be the universal rule of political life” (Link, 1974:13-14, Ikenberry,
2000a:105-6).

His thought has greatly influenced his successors like Ronald Reagan,

George, H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

The 40th US President

Reagan, speaking before the British parliament on June 8, 1982, proclaimed that
governments founded on a respect for individual liberty exercise restraint and
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peaceful intentions in their foreign policy, announcing a crusade for freedom and a
campaign for democratic development.424 Also, he announced that the day of the
dictatorship is over and the people’s right to democracy must not be denied. 425 The
41st President Bush, on October 1, 1990, in an address before the United Nations
General Assembly, declared “the Call for democracy and human rights are being
reborn everywhere” (Ikenberry, 2000a:22).

The 42nd US President Bill Clinton had

greatly emphasized democratic development across international society.

Clinton’s

1994 State of the Union Address clearly demonstrates that the US foreign policy is
primarily based on the promotion and consolidation of democracy, with his remark
that “ultimately, the best strategy of our security and to build a durable peace is to
support the advance of democracy elsewhere”, which clearly shows that democracybuilding worldwide became a key plank of the Clinton years (Rich and Newman,
2004:7).

And, the 43rd US President, George W. Bush’s foreign policy had been

more deeply embedded in the promotion of democracy across international society
than ever.

Even the nature of his decision to invade Iraq gradually transformed to

advocate the promotion and consolidation of democracy, with his emphasis on the
close connection between the promotion of democracy and the war against terrorism.
Also, as mentioned before, on July 10, 2006, Bush approved an $80 million fund
toward boosting democracy in Cuba, even if Cuban and US ties have been very
strained for nearly 50 years.426

424

See President Regan’s speech. Available at the website:
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm. Also see Michael Doyle (2000:21).
425

See Michael Doyle (2000:21, fn2).

426

See “US in $80m ‘Cuba democracy’ plan.” BBC News. July 11, 2006.
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All of the above Presidents believe that the promotion of democracy across
international society can encourage our hopes for a more stable, more peaceful, more
prosperous world, not to mention the US interests, which clearly prove that the US
can be put into the category of Great Powers.

Also, many policy-makers claim that

democracy can be the best option to bring out peace and security for the US and for
the whole international society as well.

For instance, former National Security

Council Director Anthony Lake in 1995 claimed:
We led the struggle for democracy because the larger the
pool of democracies, the greater our own security and
prosperity. Democracies, we know are less likely to make
war us or on other nations. They tend not to abuse the
rights of their people. They make for more reliable trading
partners. And each new democracy is a potential ally in
the struggle against the challenges of our time – containing
ethnic and religious conflict; reducing the nuclear threat;
combating terrorism and organized crime; overcoming
environmental degradation. 427
Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott mentioned as well:
Our answer to the skeptics, the critics and the self-styled
realists is straightforward: look at history, and look at the
world around us. Democracy contributes to safety and
prosperity, both in national life and in international life – it’s
that simple. The ability of a people to hold their leaders
accountable at the bail box is good not just for a citizenry so
enfranchised – it is also good for that country’s neighbors,
and therefore for the community of states.428
However, I should assert that the US foreign policy has never been naïve
enough to literally accept Wilson’s idealism.

As Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi point

out, many US policy makers have tended to advocate democracy, but we cannot deny

427

See Anthony Lake’s remarks on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Center for Democracy,
in Washington, D.C. on September 26, 1995. Available at the website:
http://clinton2.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/speeches/tlcfd.html
428

See Strobe Talbott’s remarks on Democracy and the International Interests, in Denver on October
11, 1997. Available at the website: https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/talbott.htm
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the fact that many like Acheson and Kissinger have preferred order to freedom and
stability to choice as well (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000:4).429 Especially, the
Nixon and Kissinger period can be marked as the period of Real-Politik foreign policy.
Michael Cox even claimed that Bill Clinton could not be regarded as “a liberal
Rambo,” but instead, that Bill Clinton’s emphasis on promotion of democracy was
pretty pragmatic and kept to assuage domestic constituencies, and further it should be
recognized as a policy instrument to advance the US power rather than a pure moral
duty (Cox, 2000:221).
However, in general, we can neither deny liberal aspects in the US foreign
policy, such as the promotion of liberal democracy and human rights, nor the US
immense role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

Also, as John

Ikenberry puts it, we should think that the US democratic development derived from
its pragmatic, evolving, and sophisticated understanding of how to create and
maintain a stable international order and sound security environment in which the US
is better able to obtain its interests by reducing the security threat.430 This is not only
just for narrow national interests, but also ultimately for general interests of whole
international society.

So to speak, we should not forget that Great Powers, in the end,

bring out common interests for a whole international society beyond their narrow
concept of national interests.

The US has been spending a massive amount of

resources and time on the promotion and consolidation of democracy, such as its
devotion of $720 million to democracy assistance in 1998 especially in the fields of

429

Dean Acheson did not care about the form of government, in making friends. For instance,
Acheson did not disapprove the Portuguese dictator, Salazar in the early 1950. See, for more
information, Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (2000:4, fn. 23). I do not bother to
mention that Henry Kissinger has been recognized as the master-mind of real-politik
430

See John Ikenberry (2000a).
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elections, legislatures, rule of law, civil-military relations and civil society (Carothers,
1999:54).

On the average, the US government spends more than $500 million

annually, in over 50 countries, on democratic development, and a number of
government agencies ranging from the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) to the Department of Defense have sponsored democracy
assistance (Carothers, 2000:181-182).431 It also claims that the US foreign economic
aid should match the condition for democratic development (Carothers, 2000:181182).

This is clearly related with the US long-terms interests and further general

interests for international society as a whole.
Carothers describes the role of the US in the promotion and consolidation of
democracy across international society.

Carothers mentions:

In the 1990s, democracy assistance mushroomed, driven by
a confluence of trends including the fall of communism in
eastern Europe, the demise of the Soviet Union, the
surprisingly widespread trend of political openings in subSaharan Africa, further democratic transition in Asia, and a
mild but recognizable liberalization trend in parts of the
Middle East. For the most part, where democracy seemed
to be emerging, the United States attempted to be supportive,
both diplomatically, economically, and with democracy
aid……….American democracy aid explained most rapidly
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as an
integral part of the Bush and then the Clinton
administration’s policy of supporting the transition away
from communism. Under the Support of Eastern European
Democracy Act of 1989, the US government has provided
significant amounts of democracy aid to eastern Europe
since 1989. Similarly, under the Freedom Support Act of
431

Carother explains well about how the US governmental agencies have had great impact on
democratic development. For instance, the State Department, the Department of Defense, and
Department of Justice have been relatively greatly influencing democratic development across
international society. The State Department’s Bureau for democracy, human rights, and labor has
responsibility for democratic development. The Department of Defense has foreign military training
programs to advocate democratic development. The Department of Justice has judicial and police
programs such as the overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training (OPDAT)
programme that trains foreign prosecutors. All of these have contributed to democratic development
across international society. See Thomas Carothers (2000).
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1991, large amounts of democracy aid have gone to the
former Soviet Union since 1991. Russia and Ukraine have
been by far the largest recipients of such aid in the former
Soviet Union, with major programmes on elections, parties,
rule of law and civil society……Although US aid officials
were initially skeptical at the beginning of the 1990s about
the idea of democracy-related aid to sub-Saharan Africa,
they were brought around to it by both policy-makers and
Africans themselves who sought help from Western donors
for their attempted democratic transitions…..In Latin
America, the United States continued to be heavily involved
with democracy assistance. The initial focus on elections
assistance in Latin America faded as elections became more
regularized.
The additional strong emphasis on
programmes of judicial and legal reform largely
continued……A major elections programme established by
USAID aided almost every transitional election in Africa in
the first half of the 1990s…..Democracy assistance
increased to Asia, at least to those countries attempting
democratic transitions, such as Cambodia, Mongolia, and
Nepal (Carothers, 2000:184-185).
This clearly shows that as a Great Power, the US has made a great effort on
democratic development across international society.

Most outstandingly, during the

George W. Bush administration, we could observe its enormous effort on global
democratization across international society more than ever.

This can help us

understand how democracy might possibly become the 21 st century-emerging new
standard of civilization in the end.

At this juncture, we can even assume that Great

Powers have contributed to the cultivation of good citizenship in international society,
via the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society, in
particular when considering that democracy is the litmus test for good citizenship in
international society.432

432

Linklater and Suganami revealed several conditions for a good citizenship of international society.
The promotion and consolidation of democracy can clearly contribute to the cultivation of a good
citizenship of international society as whole, in particular, when, as mentioned earlier, considering that
liberal democracy has been more concerned with human rights than any other type of government.
See, for more detail, Linklater and Suganami (2006).
305

However, we might face one question on whether or not the US promotion of
democracy and consolidation can be justifiable, even good enough to use force.
From now on, let us investigate whether or not Great Powers’ promotion and
consolidation across international society can be justifiable, looking into some
potential obstacles to Great Powers’ effort to the promotion and consolidation of
democracy.

First, many scholars in departments of political science and departments

of international relations, like Benjamin Barber, Michael Walzer and Joseph Nye
claim that democracy should not emerge via external force or external influence, since
democracy itself reflects freedom of choice and so no external force should impose a
certain form of government on other states.

Benjamin Barber states:

A people corrupted by tribalism and numbered by McWorld
is no more ready to receive a prefabricated democratic
constitution than a people emerging from a long history of
despotism and tyranny. Nor can democracy be someone’s
gift to the powerless. It must be seized by them because
they refuse to live without liberty and they insist on justice
for all (Barber, 1996:279).
This is similar to Michael Walzer’s argument.

Walzer claims that regime change

should not happen via any external intervention, but via internal voluntary and natural
movement.433 Using John Stuart Mill’s notion of self-determination, Walzer mentions
self-determination as “the right of a people to become free by their own efforts”
(Walzer, 1977: 88).

As for Walzer, therefore, there is no rights to be defended

against the outcomes of domestic failure, even against a bloody repression (Walzer,
1977:88).

Along with this logic, we can assume that Walzer would be very reluctant

to advocate external influence, in particular military intervention for the promotion
and consolidation of democracy.

433

Also, Joseph Nye claims that democracy should be

See, for more information, Michael Walzer (1977).
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gradually accomplished without any external military intervention.

He states:

Democracy cannot be imposed by force. The key to
success will lie in policies that open regional economies,
reduce bureaucratic controls, speed economic growth,
improve educational systems, and encourage the types of
gradual political changes that are taking place in small
countries like Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait and Moroco (Nye,
2004:120).
Nye clearly rejects any possibility to use the force in promotion and consolidation of
democracy.

All of three share common ground to reject external influence and

intervention for democratic development.
However, what if its cost is too high to domestically and internationally
disregard the illiberal, indecent and criminal state, and what if democracy cannot
emerge by itself without any strong stimulus such as a military intervention? In
particular, what if powerless citizens have been tortured and killed under brutal
dictatorship as a systemic way? If we follow Barber’s logic, do we have to ignore
them because democracy should not be imposed by external forces? At this juncture,
I will make several points why Great Powers should promote and consolidate
democracy via even their use of force, attempting to answer the above questions.
First, there are many states like Iraq (Saddam) and North Korea where democracy is
hardly expected to take root due to their entrenched social, economic, and political
structures. In this case, the external influence and even external military intervention
can’t be completely disregarded, especially if the regime itself can be listed on the
category of an indecent, illiberal and criminal state, that is, ‘outlaw state.’ It might be
unethical and immoral to keep ignoring such regimes.

Nevertheless, the price for the

use of force and the price for its outcome and responsibility for international society
should be prudently and simultaneously considered before Great Powers’ adoption of
the use of force.

Besides, as the nature of international society has become more and
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more liberal and even democracy has become the emerging standard of civilization to
distinguish legitimate governments from non-legitimate governments such as outlaw
states, we can think of the potential justification of the use of force in democratization
across international society.
Second, as Bull and Simpson claim, Great Powers “assert the right, and are
given the right, to play a part in determining issues that have an effect on the peace
and security of the international system as a whole”(Bull, 1977:202, Simpson,
2004:223).

Great Powers’ police action including military action against outlaw

states like Serbia, Iraq (Saddam), North Korea and Afghanistan (Taliban) can be more
and more justified (Sellers, 2005: 950-952). In international society, the US claims
itself a liberal democratic hegemon, and it has been recognized as democratic
hegemon by others in international society, which has improved democracy at home
and indoctrinated democracy abroad.434 In particular, following the end of the Cold
War, the promotion of democracy has become a cornerstone of US foreign policy,
which has been greatly helpful to promote the well-being of international society in
the long run.

This suggests that the promotion and consolidation of democracy

across international society can be seen as Great Powers’ privilege and responsibility.
Third, when comparing historical data for the number of conflicts in democratic
zones with the data of the number of conflicts of non-democratic zones, we can
observe how Great Powers’ contribution to democratic development can bring out the
well-being of international society, beyond stability and order.

In international

society, among 50 interstate wars between 1816 and 1965, except for two marginal
cases, democracies had no wars between them (Small and Singer, 1976, Rummel,
434

See, more information, “The Liberal Power.” The New Republic, Vol. 228, Issue 8. March 3, 2003.
pp.7 and pp.1.
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1983: 42).

Further, in the late 1970s, none of the 22 democracies was engaged in

war (Weede, 1984:659).

This advocates Rummel’s ‘joint-freedom proposition,’

“Libertarian systems mutually preclude violence (violence will occur between states
only if at least one is non-libertarian) and Freedom Proposition: Freedom inhibits
violence (the more libertarian a state, the less it tends to be involved in violence)”
(Rummel, 1983: 29).

However, this does not necessarily mean that democracy itself

guarantees peace.

In other words, I do not totally dismiss some level of danger from

democratization.

As Mansfield and Snyder put it, democratization might increase

the probability of war, which is saying:
though mature democratic states have virtually never fought
wars against each other, promoting democracy may not
promote peace because states are especially war-prone
during the transition toward democracy (Mansfield and
Snyder, 1995:94).
Besides, Erich Weede’s remark appears to reveal incoherent relationship between
democracy and peace.

Weede states:

Findings for the entire 1960-1980 period as well as for the
1960-1974 period replicate Rummel’s (1968) earlier
conclusion that regime type and war involvement are
unrelated. By and large, the findings for the 1975-1980
period replicate Rummel’s (1983) more recent conclusion
that democracies successfully stayed out of war in the late
1970s (Weede, 1984: 659-660).
This appears to show that the regime type is not closely related with the causation of
war.

However, at this juncture, we should consider that there were around less than

25% democratic states in international society before 1980, and currently, more than
65 % of states in international society can be called democracy.

In consideration of

this fact, we can think of a more peaceful international society on the basis of
democratic peace theory, in particular, if more democratic states have become mature.
For instance, Europe had been known as conflict zone due to the two world wars, but
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now, in Europe, there is a lack of opportunities for war, since the level of democracy
in Europe is higher than ever before and higher than any other zone (Gleditsch and
Hegre, 1997:306).

This indicates that we should not deny the co-relationship

between peace and mature democracy, even if a transitional period itself might cause
instability and even war, no matter which direction like transition from authoritarian
regime to democratic regime, or from democratic regime to authoritarian regime.

As

a matter of fact, as Rousseau puts it, even democratic transitions should be welcomed
rather than feared, since promoting democratization will eventually contribute to a
decline in the amount of violence in an international system in the long run (Rousseau,
2005:15).

Also, we should not forget that democratic institutions can often prevent

the emergence of a crisis, regardless of the regime type of the opposing state, because
of domestic political opposition, especially on waging war and because of their
tendency to wage the war when they can only win (Rousseau, 2005:129).

All in all,

democratic promotion and consolidation across international society is worthwhile in
the long run, even if it might be expensive in some cases.

However, in consideration

of the merits of democracy, we should be aware of the high possibility that democracy
might wage wars with non-democratic regimes, primarily outlaw states, which might
be one of Great Powers’ tasks, along with their military intervention and their other
various assistances for democratic development, such as democratic transitions in
Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Fourth, as mentioned several times in previous chapters and an appendix,
democracy is not limited to the West alone.

This assumption was already countered

earlier, but once again, as Nye points out, we should keep in mind the fact that
cultural differences did not prevent democracy from taking root in any state beyond
boundaries and cultural differences, like Japan or South Korea (Nye, 2004:120).
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Also, we should keep in mind the fact that within the same culture, very different
ideological objectives can be found, like Fascism, Democracy and Communism as
Western thoughts, and that the shared beliefs can be easily found from different
cultures as well.

This indicates two primary points.

First, there cannot be problem

with Great Powers’ promotion and consolidation of democracy beyond cultural
differences and national boundaries, for the general interests of international society.
Second, some prejudices such as against Great Powers’ enormous effort for
democratic development from particularly non-Western states can be melted down.
Let us investigate these two points.

For instance, as for Islamic fundamentalists,

liberal democracy is used to being understood as an invention of the infidel West in no
connection with Islam, which is parallel with corruption, sex, violence, and American
films and television (Nye, 2004:120, Charfi, 2005: 33).

This is one of reasons why

Islamic fundamentalists have been opposed to liberal democracy, while claiming that
the only legitimate form of government is the caliphate (Charfi, 2005:33).
Nevertheless, we can observe the increasing positive secular elements in the Islamic
community, such as the protection of woman rights, in particular when secularism can
be interpreted as mutual toleration along with material progress.

At this juncture, it

is worthwhile to take a brief look at Hass’s remark ”the greater the ideological
differences dividing decision makers across states, the higher the perceived level of
threat” and “the greater the ideological similarities uniting leaders, the lower the
perceived threat” (Hass, 2005:4).

In other words, we can think of the following:

the greater the ideological differences among leaders, the
greater the hardship they will have in communicating
effectively with one another, and the more likely these
individuals will interpret one another’s actions and
proclamations in the worst possible light (Hass, 2005:17).
This can explain Islamic fundamentalists’ view on Great Powers’ role for promotion
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of democracy in the Middle East.

Islamic fundamentalists fear democratic

development across international society which can be compared to American leaders’
concern and obsession with the domino theory of communism during the Cold War
era, especially the Vietnam War era (Hass, 2005:7).
However, we cannot say that the entire Islamic community hates the West.

As

Nye puts it, many Arabs have feared, misunderstood and been opposed to American
policies, but nonetheless have admired some aspects of American culture, and they
shared many values such as family, religious belief, and desire for democracy (Nye,
2004:121).

For instance, in the BBC interview with former Iranian President,

Mohammad Khatami, he revealed his opposition to Western style of democracy. 435
But, in fact, he has never been opposed to democracy itself, saying “We have no other
choice but to establish democracy in our country,”436 and implying that each state has
its own distinguishing ways toward democracy, such as an Islamic type of democracy,
which could be ultimately parallel with Condoleezza Rice’s remark, “I do not mean to
imply that there is only one model of liberal democracy.” 437 Also, in the past, the US
military interventions to save Muslim lives in Bosnia and Kosovo and its assistance to
Muslim countries to advocate development and combat AIDS, can help properly
understand the US incentive to promote and consolidate democracy (Nye, 2004:122).
This can lessen a big gap of misunderstanding between both sides, and also, this can
prove that Great Powers’ role for democratic development should not be discouraged,
due to cultural and geographical differences, in particular when considering Indonesia,
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See “Khatami labels US policy ‘a joke.’” BBC News. November 2, 2006.

436

See “Khatami: Iran must have democracy.” BBC News. March 11, 2001.

437

Former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice made speech at Ewood Park, Blackburn, United
Kingdom on March 31, 2006.
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Turkey, Malaysia, Egypt, Tunisia and Libya’s democratic transitions, and when
considering massive civilian deaths in Syria in the absence of Great Powers’
intervention in 2012.
So far, I have made several points to advocate Great Power’s promotion and
consolidation of democracy.

Torture under repressive regimes, Great Powers’ rights

and responsibility, democratic peace and unconstrained democratic development can
help justify Great Power’s role in the democratic development across international
society.

Below, China, South Korea and Iraq will help us understand the significant

role of Great Powers in the democratic promotion and consolidation.

Each country

conveys relatively different characteristics, such as pluralist, solidarist and liberal
anti-pluralist façades within international society as a whole. 438 According to
different features of international society, Great Powers also adopt their different ways
to promote and consolidate democracy, such as socialization in change of price,
socialization in legitimacy, and the use of force, which can be relatively understood
with hegemony, primacy and dominance.

This can confirm Great Powers’

contribution to the welfare of international society via Great Powers’ role in the
promotion and consolidation of democracy in the long run.
3> Case Studies: China, South Korea and Iraq (Great Power and Democratic
Development)
In the above section, I briefly mentioned the role of Great Powers in the
democratic development.

In this section, I will examine how Great Powers can have

an impact on democratic promotion and consolidation in three states, China, South
Korea and Iraq.
438

Because each state represents a comparably different facade of

We should keep in mind the fact that unit’s identity cannot be ultimately separated from the
character of structure. In fact, Wendt’s three cultures of anarchy can explicit this aspect. See Wendt
(1999).
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international society and each of them has relatively different relationships with Great
Powers, Great Powers have adopted relatively different mechanisms to promote and
consolidate

democracy for

three

countries,

like

hegemony (interest-based

socialization), primacy (value-oriented socialization) and dominance (use of force) as
well.

In China’s democratic development (pluralist international society), we can

expect Great Power, the US - its reluctance of military confrontation - to pursue
interest-based socialization on the basis of the US hegemonic relationship with China.
In South Korea’s democratic development (solidarist international society), we can
observe Great Power, the US tremendous support of material support toward South
Korea and its value-oriented socialization with South Korea on the basis of the US
primacy over South Korea. In Iraq’s democratic development (liberal anti-pluralist
international society), we can see the US use of force on the basis of its dominant
relationship with Iraq.

In Great Power’s role in Iraq’s democratic development, we

can expect a more flexible use of force for alteration in identity and characteristics in
post-Cold War era and the 21st century.
At this juncture, as Great Power has had direct and indirect impacts on the
promotion of democracy in other states, it can greatly contribute to regional security
and further international security in the long run, when considering that Japan,
Germany and South Korea’s democratic successes have elevated the well-being of
international society.

As for Great Powers, democratization of international society

might be the best option for the maintenance of peace and security and for the longterm welfare of international society.

Also, Great Powers’ promotion and

consolidation of democracy can be the process for the emerging standard of
civilization in the post-Cold War era and 21st century.
dealing with three states, China, South Korea and Iraq.
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Below, I will explore these,

3. A) Great Power’s role in Democratic Development in China
In this section, I will show how Great Power can have an impact on China’s
democratic development.

But, before starting Great Power’s role in democratic

development in China, we should ask ourselves about whether or not China can be put
into the category of Great Powers.

On one hand, we might think that China can be

categorized into Great Power status, but on the other hand, China can be recognized
as a simple regional power.

Below, I will investigate this issue.

In the end, I will

demonstrate that China is a rising potential Great Power, as well as a regional power,
but I will claim that China is not a Great Power yet.
a. Is China a Great Power ?
In international society, China has been known as a regional power and
sometimes as even a great power.439 As Buzan put it, China might be ranked as a
great power in various ways, when considering its material capability and recognition
by others in some sense, and also, I cannot completely deny the fact that it has
gradually transformed itself to become a Great Power.

But, in my dissertation, I

prefer to say that China has been a regional power rather than a Great Power.
Since the beginning of the Cold War era, China has been recognized as a
regional power in Asia, and even the leader of the third world in some sense, for
example, in its influence on African states.440 There are several reasons why I put
China into the category of regional powers.

At the beginning of this chapter, I

rejected Buzan’s category of Great Powers, and instead, I intended to adopt Bull’s
concept of Great Powers, while emphasizing ‘material capability/hard power,’ ‘mutual

439

See Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver (2003:28).

440

In fact, Buzan and Weaver tend to describe China as a great power rather than a regional power.
See Buzan and Weaver (2003:60).
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recognition’ and ‘soft power’ as essential elements for Great Power in a broad sense.
When considering the above those elements, ‘material capability/hard power,’ ‘mutual
recognition’ and ‘soft power’ for Great Power, China cannot be fully recognized as a
Great Power yet.

The reasons are following.

The first is ‘material capability/hard

power.’ China is obviously a rising potential Great Power, when considering its
material capacity such as the second largest world economy in international society
and its potential economic supremacy over the US by 2025. 441 Former President
Jiang Zemin and President Hu Jintao’s remarks can support China’s status as a
potential Great Power. In his political report to the sixteenth National Congress of
the Chinese Communist Party in November 2002, former President Jiang Zemin said
that China’s per capita share of GDP should jump from US $800 to approximately
US$3,000 in 2020, and President Hu Jintao said at the 2005 Fortune Global Forum in
Beijing that China would quadruple its GDP to around US$4 trillion by 2020 (Zhu,
2006:89).

Also, in terms of military power, China has the largest military in the

world, with around 2.3 million active forces and with about 10 million organized
militia members across China.442 According to the 2004 US Department of Defense
assessment, China had around 20 inter-continental ballistic missiles that can target the
US, and China has around 400 to 430 nuclear warheads. 443 China’s defense
expenditure in 2012 is $110 billion. 444 When considering these aspects, that is,
China’s material capabilities, China might be called a great power.
441

See, for more information, Oded Shenkar (2004).

442

See “Annual Report to Congress, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China.”
Department of Defense of the United States of America (2005). Available at the website:
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf
443

See the website available at:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People's_Republic_of_China_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction
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See “China boosts defense budget 11 percent after U.S. pivot.” Reuters. March 4, 2012.
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However, China is still a developing country.

As a developing country,

China has still too many problems to be called a Great Power, like chronic poverty,
population growth, environmental deterioration, ethnic separatism, increasing
unemployment, and neglect of the rule of law (Zhu, 2006:101).

Despite China’s

economic rapid growth, only 44 % of China’s population had sustainable access to
improved sanitation in 2002, and around 23% of the population in 2002 still did not
have sustainable access to improved water sources (Gill and Huang, 2006: 28).

In

the medical system, health insurance cannot cover almost 80% of rural residents and
approximately 55% of urban residents (Gill and Huang, 2006:28).

In fact, as one of

the most serious problems, the widening income gap has brought out instability and
corruption in China.

20 percent of China's population is at the poverty level,

accounting for only 4.7 percent of the total income or consumption, and 20 percent of
China's population is at the affluence level, accounting for 50 percent of the total
income or consumption. 445 By 1995, the richest 10 percent of the urban population
have been garnering 60 % of privately owned housing assets (Khan and Riskin,
1998:245).

In particular, between 1988 and 1995 income inequality increased

sharply in China, which gets China to become one of the most unequal of Asian
developing countries (Khan and Riskin, 1998:245).

State Press wrote that “in the

first quarter of the 2005, China income gap widened with 10 percent of the nation’s
richest people enjoying 45 % of the country’s wealth,” and the Xinhua news agency
reported as well that “China’s poorest 10 percent had only 1.4 percent of the nation’s

445

See “Income gap in China reaches alert level.” China Daily. September. 20, 2005.
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wealth.”446

Further, Fan Gang, a leading economist at the Nationalist Economic

Research Institute of China stated “the income gap issue will not become smaller in
the next 10 years, but probably will increasingly widen.” 447
As another serious problem, the urban and rural unequal development can
shake social and political stability and the great urban-rural gap is still the
predominant contributor to overall inequality (Khan and Riskin, 1998:245).

In

modern China, the greatest unfairness can be the rural-urban divide and urban based
policy.

For instance, Chinese peasants are continuously expected to suffer from

absolute poverty, under-funded education, poor social welfare and security, and
backward human development conditions (Xia, 2006:205).

In spite of the increase

in urban poverty, most poor population in China – almost 90% in 1995 – are living in
rural areas (Khan and Riskin, 2001: 148). The ratio of urban-rural per capita income
has increased from 1.86 in 1985, 3.11 in 1990, 2.47 in 1997, 3.11 in 2002, to 3.22 in
2005.448 Tony Saich states:
In urban areas real income was also consistently higher,
with Shanghai enjoying real income approximately twice
that of the northwest and 60 percent higher than that in the
southwest. Per capita net annual income for rural
households in Shanghai was 5407 yuan, for Beijing 3952
yuan, Jiangsu 3377 yuan, Sichuan was 1789 yuan, Xinjiang
was 1600 yuan, Gansu 1425 yuan, Guizhou 1335 yuan, and
Tibet 1232 yuan (Saich, 2001:150).
All of these, on and off, cause China’s instability, as 58,000 riots have been breaking
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See the website available at: http://pundita.blogspot.com/2005/06/riots-in-todays-china-peasantsfight.html
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See the website available at http://www.undp.org.in/MEDIA/2006/Jan/Raising_HBL_3Jan.pdf.
Also, see “Party Plenum to Focus on Social Harmony.” China Daily. October 9, 2006.
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out across China from 2003 to 2005. 449 This indicates that China cannot be
acknowledged as a Great Power yet, in particular, when considering that there were
26 million people living in poverty in the countryside in 2005(Zhu, 2006:101); tens of
million of workers are unemployed in the cities, while from 60 to 100 million surplus
rural workers are drifting between the village and cities, living on part-time lowpaying jobs (Zhu, 2006:102); and China will have to attain at least an urbanization
rate of 50 % in order to build up its modern well-off society, and it is expected to
obtain it by 2020.

In fact, on January 29, 2007, Chinese News Paper, People’s Daily

said “in 2015, China will have modernized to the level of developed nations in
1960s.”450 John Mearseimer shares this point, saying that China cannot achieve great
power status, since it is not as wealthy as Great Powers, like the US and the UK
(Mearsheimer, 2001:62).

All in all, China can be recognized as a potential Great

Power in terms of the criterion of material capability, but we cannot say that it obtains
a Great Power status.
The second is ‘recognition’(social role).

As Hedley Bull points out (1977),

the state should greatly contribute to the maintenance of international society and the
promotion of well-being of international society, in order to be recognized as a Great
Power by other members of international society.

In consideration of this

assumption, we can assert that China can be possibly recognized as a potential Great
Power in some sense by other states in international society, since it has greatly
contributed to international society in various ways.

For instance, since the late

1990s, China has become more active in UN peacekeeping missions, along with
449

See the website:http://pundita.blogspot.com/2005/06/riots-in-todays-china-peasants-fight.html.
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China’s increasing membership in international organizations.

In fact, China has

been engaged in 15 UN peace-keeping operations since 1990, sending out 6,000
troops or policemen to global hotspots such as Congo and Liberia. 451 In August, 2005,
China sent 4,999 soldiers and police to join 14 UN peacekeeping operations, and in
2005, China was ranked as the fifteenth largest contributor of peacekeeping personnel
to the UN (Gill and Huang, 2006:22).

Recently, 125 Chinese peacekeepers were

dispatched in Haiti. 452 Also, Beijing announced that it would increase its troops in
Lebanon to 1,000 on a United Nations peace mission, while advocating the
implantation of UN Resolution 1701.453 And China is expected to train 15, 000
African professionals, setting up a development fund for schools and hospitals (Gill
and Huang, 2006:23).

Financially, in 2002, Beijing pledged $150 million to assist

Afghanistan for its reconstruction, and in 2005, offered $83 million to the countries
hit by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami (Gill and Huang, 2006:23). Even Beijing
offered $5.1 million in aid to the US when it suffered from Hurricane Katrina’s
disaster (Gill and Huang, 2006:23).

Furthermore, on November 4, 2006, Chinese

President Hu Jintao announced that Beijing would proffer US$3bn in loans and
US$2bn in export credits over the next three years, as he opened a summit of the
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing attended by around 50 African leaders
of state and ministers.454 And China has made increasingly serious effort to follow

451
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many international norms such as free trade, nuclear non-proliferation, and
furthermore, even environmental protection (Gill and Huang, 2006:23).
All of these show that as a potential Great Power, China has been gradually
concerned with international society.

Xiong Guangkai, author of the article "Firm

Adherence to Peaceful Development and Appropriate Response to Diversified
Security Threats," advocates this assumption. 455 He said that China has attempted to
create a peaceful international environment for the benefit of its own growth, while
trying to make its due contribution to world peace, stability and prosperity. 456 Also,
Xiong emphasized China’s major role in multilateral frameworks, including the APEC,
the ASEAN plus China (10+1), and the ASEAN plus China, Japan and the Republic
of Korea (10+3).457 At this juncture, we can see that Beijing has sought a policy of a
peaceful rise or peaceful development rather than the competitive inducing policies of
Weimar Germany, Imperial Japan and the former Soviet Union (Gill and Huang,
2006: 23).

All of these contributions can help bring out special rights for China’s

Great Power status.

All in all, we can say that China’s role in international society

can facilitate the escalation of China’s rank as a Great Power and get other states to
recognize China as a potential Great Power in international society in the 21 st century.
However, its contribution to international society is still short, when being
compared with Great Powers such as the US and UK’s contribution to international
society.

Also, the record of China’s compliance with human rights is still

problematic, like Falun-Gong, and China’s level of political freedom can hardly
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See “Chinese president says wide-ranging consensus reached during Beijing Summit.” People’s
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match the US and UK’s, like the Tiananmen square massacre and the Tibet issue.
For instance, in September 1989, because six Tibetan Buddist nuns shouted the slogan,
“independence for Tibet,” they were arrested and five of them were sentenced to three
years of hard labor (Saich, 2001:127).

Also, even in the post-Cold War era, Beijing

has been reluctant to cut political and economic deals with corrupt and brutal dictators,
such as its lavishing honors on Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, while
claiming “business is business”(Gill and Huang, 2006:28), and China has been a very
close ally to North Korea that has been recognized as an outlaw state to pose various
threat against international society.

This indirectly advocates anti-democratic

environment as well as anti-human right in international society.

What is more

dangerous is that China has transferred nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea,
Pakistan and Algeria, not to mention the sales of 11 M-9 missiles to Syria, which has
damaged international security and international well-being.
China difficult to become a Great Power.

All of these have made

As a matter of fact, according to a Pew

Global Attitudes Survey in 2005, more than 12 % people in Western European
countries see the US as “the major power to come to the aid of people under threat of
genocide,” whereas only “3% said that they would turn to China”(Gill and Huang,
2006:29).

Also, as Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel put it, China’s political

system is still opaque and can threaten the economies and livelihoods of its neighbors,
in particular as Chinese leaders focused on internal stability and ignored the SARs
epidemic crisis, facilitating its spread by withholding information – China’s foreign
policy still serves the domestic goals of its leaders like supporting, reforming, and
securing the survival of a Leninist political system. 458 Nevertheless, China’s past
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See Evan S. Medeiros and M. Taylor Fravel (2003).
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victim mentality has been gradually transformed into a Great Power’s mentality. 459
This indirectly implies that China is a highly potential Great Power, but it needs
further transformation and development in various ways, to obtain the status of a
Great Power from international society.
The third is soft power.
Great Power.

China does not have enough soft power to be called

As mentioned above, Nye claims that soft power is derived from the

attractiveness of a country’s culture, political idea, and policies (Nye, 2004:X).
Thompson states that soft power can include the followings:
a country’s culture, political values, foreign policy, and
economic attraction as essential components of national
strength, providing the capacity to persuade other nations to
willingly adopt the same goals (Thompson, 2005:1).
As Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang put it, soft power can be obtained only when
many other states respect and emulate aspects of a certain state’s civilization (Gill and
Huang, 2006:17).

In the post-Cold War era and 21st century, unlike the US

democratic development across international society as its grand strategy, China has
made no such effort, nor does it seem to have any intention to export its ideas, not to
mention its inability to replace the former Soviet Union as a global threat to US
interests and to the security of regions across international society (Zhu, 2006:91).
The US and the UK’s norms and values, human rights and democracy have been
gradually accepted across international society.

By contrast, China’s norms and

values like Confucianism can’t be easily spread across international society, and they
cannot compete with the US and UK’s norms and values.

However, I have to admit

that from the Tang Dynasty (618-906 AD) through mid-Qing (1855 AD), Chinese
459
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civilization could be voluntarily accepted by its neighboring states such as Korea,
Japan and Vietnam, and during the Cold War era, China had been recognized as the
leader of the have-not states of the Third World, competing with the USSR for the
leadership of spreading communism across international society, in its struggle
against superpower hegemonism (Bull, 1977:198, Gill and Huang, 2006:17-18).
Furthermore, China’s soft power in the Middle East and Africa can be still felt in
some sense, such as the 1960s and 1970s liberation movements in several African
states, which is derived from China’s pluralist principles, ‘equal sovereignty’ and
‘territorial integrity’(Gill and Huang, 2006:24). As mentioned above, however, we
can say that China’s soft power is not strong enough to call China a Great Power, in
particular when compared with the US and UK’s soft power.
As a matter of fact, although democracy has gradually become the accepted
norm and value of international society and even the emerging criterion for
membership in international society in the post-Cold War and the 21st century, China
has been reluctant to allow political freedom.

This indicates that China is only

partially fitted into the category of full membership in international society, without
the full satisfaction of the qualification of Great Power.460 All in all, I attempted to
demonstrate that China can be put into the category of regional powers rather than
Great Powers, even if China can be, for certainty, recognized as a highly potential
Great Power in the 21st century.

When Great Powers’ criteria, ‘material

capability/hard power,’ ‘mutual recognition,’ and ‘soft power’ are applied to China,
China cannot fully satisfy all three criteria.
460

Nevertheless, China’s material and soft

As implied in Chapter I, in terms of the standard of civilization, China is far better than Nazi
Germany. However, it is not good enough to be recognized as a full member of international society,
since China has not fully accepted general norms and values of international society, such as human
rights. For this reason, China cannot be called a Great Power.
324

powers cannot be completely disregarded at all, not to mention the recognition of
China by others as a regional power.

The above unique condition makes us consider

China’s distinguishing path toward democracy.

Below, I will demonstrate how as a

Great Power, the US can have an impact on democratic development in China under
its distinguishing status in international society.
b. Great Power’s impact on China’s Democratic Development
From now on, in the above assumption that China is a potential Great Power
and regional power rather than a Great Power, I will display Great Power’s impact on
China’s democratic development.

In the process, I will reveal the idea of the

inevitable relationships between the predominant norm of international society and
the role of Great Powers.

In particular, I will illustrate how Great Powers can

influence democratic development under pluralistic principles, which is interestoriented socialization.

At this juncture, I will avoid explaining why China reflects a

pluralist international society.461 But, I will investigate how the US as a Great Power
can put an impact on China’s democratic development in a pluralist international
society, via its using interest-based socialization, under the consideration of the US
hegemonic relationship with China.
First of all, I have to mention the relationships between the US and China as
hegemonic.

We can think of strong hegemony and moderate hegemony.

As

mentioned earlier, Bull mentions Great Power’s three types of unilateral exploitation
of preponderance, ‘dominance,’ ‘primacy’ and ‘hegemony’, and claims that Great
Power exercises hegemony over the lesser powers in a particular area or constellation,
and if necessary, with its use of reluctant and occasional force (Bull, 1977:207-209).

461

I mentioned this in Chapter I.
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This sounds like strong hegemony.

On the other hand, hegemony can be understood

as leadership among equals, which could be moderate hegemony. 462 In my
dissertation, I prefer to use the term hegemony closer to ‘moderate hegemony,’ than to
strong hegemony, for the relationship between the US and China, which can be seen
in “American relations with Canada, Mexico and most of South America” in some
sense (Donnelly, 2006:162).

Nevertheless, the US relationship with China can be

recognized as more competitive than its relationship with Canada.

Watson advocates

moderate hegemony as well, saying:
a hegemony is not a dictatorial fiat. The hegemonies
which I have looked at, whether exercised by an individual
power or a small power, involve continental dialogue
between the hegemonial authority and the other states
(Watson, 1992:15-16).
In a simple way, as mentioned above, moderate hegemony can even be understood as
leadership among equals. 463 This can satisfy pluralist principles, such as equal
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
In the post-Cold war era and the 21 st century, the US remains as a hyperpower
in Buzan’s term, or a Great Power in Bull’s term.

China can’t be in a position to be

called a Great Power and has been unable to challenge American military,
technological and economic supremacy yet (Zhu, 2006:89).

In particular, China

does not yet have enough projective power on the global level, and it has deployed its
troop in its own immediate vicinity alone (Bull, 1977:108).

This clearly indicates

power in inequilibrium between the US and China, which makes very hard China
fully challenge the US supremacy in international society (Bull, 1977:108).
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See, for more information, Donnelly (2006:162).
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In the

post-Cold War era and 21 st century, the US can be recognized as a Great Power, when
considering that the wide spread of norms of liberal multi-lateralism is heavily related
with U.S. military and economic dominance in international society.
However, China has become a rising economic and military power, even
challenging the U.S in some sense, since one of principles of China’s foreign policy is
to weaken the global hegemonic power.

Even the international community can

expect China to become an increasingly forceful challenger to the existing norms and
rules of international society, as China’s economic and military power is getting
stronger and stronger (Shambaugh, 1996:187). As a challenger against the US, on
the basis of its real-politik perspective, China could vocally raise its voice against the
US about two cases, Kosovo and the 2003 Gulf War.

China criticized the 1999

Kosovo case and the Persian Gulf War in 2003 as the outcomes of real-politik in
international system.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Kong Quan said that the US-led

military campaign in the 2003 Gulf War greatly damaged the U.N. constitution and
international law, and that it would lead to regional and global instability. 464 At this
juncture, we can perceive that the relationship between the US and China is, in some
sense, a rivalry rather than friend or enemy in Wendt’s terms, even though I said the
US relationship with China as a hegemonic, in particular when considering that the
George W. Bush administration labeled China as a ‘strategic competitor’(Zhu,
2006:123).

My point is that we are aware of US leadership in the relationship

between the US and China, but we should not totally disregard some level of
competitive challenging relationship between China as a regional power (a potential
Great Power) and the US as a Great Power, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.
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Under the above relations between the US and China, it is hard to expect the
use of force for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, in particular when
considering that China represents a pluralist international society.

In a pluralist

international society, we can perceive how China has benefited from its direct and
indirect interest-based social relationships with the US as a Great Power.

This can

bring out certain pressure to China to accept the norms and values of international
society, and has caused China to accept Great Power’s norms and values such as
human rights and democracy, which have been gradually accepted as the norms and
values of international society.

Nevertheless, China does not seem to officially

accept its slow movement toward democracy.

Below, I will look into how interest-

oriented socialization can get China to adjust itself to the norms and values of
international society.
First of all, it is worth looking at definitions of socialization and engagement,
even if I should have done it in Chapter I. Socialization can indicate an important
indicator of proclivities and learnings (Shambaugh, 1996:203).

As a matter of fact,

socialization can be understood as “the process of learning” in which “norms and
ideals are transmitted from one party to another” (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:289).
To be precise, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, Socialization refers to:
the process of forming associations or of adapting oneself to
them; esp. the process whereby an individual acquires the
modifications of behaviour and the values necessary for the
stability of the social group of which he is or becomes a
member. 465
In consideration of this concept of socialization, at this juncture, I will use
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See the website available at:
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50229739?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=Socialization
&first=1&max_to_show=10
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socialization and engagement interchangeably.

Engagement can be translated in

Chinese with jiechu, which means the verb to ‘engage’ (as in engaging the enemy),
but its common usage reflects ‘contact’ (Shambaugh, 1996:208).
engagement

can

be

understood

containment’(Shambaugh, 1996:208).

as

‘peaceful

evolution’

In general,
or

‘soft

I prefer to use ‘peaceful evolution through

contact.’ All in all, we can assume that the goal of engagement and socialization is
to transform international and national behavior on the basis of rules and norms of
international society, and to smooth the legitimization of the hegemonic power to
maintain international society and promote the well-being of international society.
In the consideration of concepts of socialization and engagement, I will
examine the Sino-US relationship in the post-Cold War era and the 21 st century, which
will reveal how the US as a Great Power has influenced China’s path toward
democracy.

As mentioned above, the inequilibrium relationship between the US and

China does not necessarily mean that the US can easily use its force to install
democracy in China, because China is not only strong enough to defend itself but also
it can greatly damage America itself, with its conventional and absolute weapons in
the worst case, and because it is not at all an outlaw state.

China is not one of them,

Saddam’s Iraq, Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea and Ahmadinejad’ Iran, which were put
into the category of the middle size outlaw states that can be easily defeated by the US
hyper military power.

Nevertheless, many people do not think that in some sense,

Iran can be an outlaw state.
In this circumstance, the US should adopt its engagement policy on the basis
of interest-based socialization to China, as it has done so far since 1971, as the US
primary policy toward China, which has brought out China’s more positive attitude
and language toward international society and has ultimately led to democratic
329

development in China.

Zhu explains how norms and values can be spread under this

relationship between the US and China, saying:
If the hegemonic power can incorporate the challenging
power, through multilateral approaches, into the
international community where they share vital interests,
wars will be less likely between them during the power
transition. Weaving a rising power into an interdependent
world also exposes it to international norms and practices.
If the challenging power can benefit from these norms and
practices, it may well accept the existing rules and is less
likely to challenge the status quo violentarily (Zhu,
2006:92).
The interest-rooted socialization can lead to China’s integration in international
society, which gets China to accept the norms and values of international society.
China, in fact, has benefited from the international environment dominated by
the US and it has already become part of the international establishment (Zhu,
2006:95).

The growing political and economic interdependence between the US and

China raises the costs and the disincentives for any military conflicts.
China won’t tolerate US intervention in the Taiwan issue.

Nevertheless,

For instance, we can think

of the increased trade volume between the US and China from US$1 billion (1978) to
US$100 billion (2003), along with the US increased trade deficit with China from
$161.9 billion in 2004 to $201. 6 billion in 2005 (Total $ 725.8 fn). 466 Also, since the
early 1980s, US businesses have rushed to supply China with everything from
financial services to convenience stores; at the end of 2004, the US had become

466
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China’s number two trading partner; and according to China’s Ministry of Foreign
Trade, at the end of 2005, the US could overtake Japan as China’s largest trading
partner (Zhu, 2006:116).467 The US has favored China in various ways, such as MFN
status and WTO membership in order to integrate China into international society.
All of these have provided China with the incentive to be engaged in international
society.

This will help understand why China has become a more acceptable

member of international society.

Furthermore, this can facilitate China becoming a

decent and respectable Great Power.

Nevertheless, this might be an outdated

argument that economic interest-socialization can bring out China’s alteration.
cannot be ignored.
slowly.

It

China has transformed itself toward democracy, even if very

According to the 1996 survey, around 73.5 % of Chinese students advocated

democracy as the best political system to protect civil rights, even if 63.8 % of
students are afraid of social instability derived from radical transformation from
authoritarianism to democracy (Chan, 2000: 220). To become a decent, respectable
and responsible Great Power, China is supposed to allow political pluralism as well as
human rights.468 In particular, when considering that many scholars are, on and off,
used to comparing China’s past revisionist position (Mao’s China) to Germany’s past
revisionist position (pre-WWI Germany and Nazi Germany), it might be inevitable to
make China a more moderate, decent, and even democratic Great Power, which will
continuously bring out a more sound environment for its capitalist market dynamism
in the long run. 469 Nevertheless, China officially claims that its economy is a socialist
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By the end of 2004, China

market economy rather than a capitalist market economy, and most of Chinese leaders
have been reluctant to adopt democracy as their ideal form of government.
As another interest-incentive type of socialization, we’d better look at security
interest, to demonstrate that socialization can alter China’s domestic structure.

From

1971 to 1991, the US had been an ally against the USSR, and in the post-Cold War era
and the 21st century, it is still an ally against regional and even global threats such as
terrorism and nuclear proliferation.

But, China is not seeking the promotion of a

specific ideological vision of the world and does hardly put other states under its
ideological leadership, while the US has been promoting and consolidating
democracy across international society, and so we can say that ideological struggle
between democracy and communism is officially over (Zhu, 2006:91).

In the 21 st

century, the US and China have shared more common ground to sustain regional
stability in the Asia Pacific region, and even at the global level on the basis of the
US’s hegemonic relationship with China.

The US has been a good controller and

leader in the Asia pacific region, constraining arms race via looking out China, Russia
and Japan’s potential military capabilities, and taking on the burden of regional
security, especially from North Korea nuclear issue.

Nevertheless, the regional

security issues have been shared with China, Russia, Japan and South Korea.

The

US hegemonic power has been used to indirectly and directly push China toward
democracy, by providing material incentives and new insight on international society
as well. 470 George W. Bush stated:
In this new century, America will remain engaged in Asia,
because our interests depend on the expansion of freedom
470

John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan point out the significant role of material incentives to promote
certain vales across international society. See Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:299).
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and opportunity in this region. We hear voices calling for
us to retreat from the world and close our doors to these
opportunities. These are the old temptations of isolationism
and protectionism, and America must reject them. 471
This implies that China’s socialization with the US itself has produced some pressure
on China’s moving toward democracy.
As a matter of fact, as Buzan mentioned in Regional Security Complex
Theories (RSCT), the regional distinguishing characteristics emphasizing the lower
level of the formation of regional alliances or institutions in Asia than in Europe,
reveals that the US is still needed to play a significant role in the Asia Pacific, which
has brought out Chinese interests.472 Nevertheless, I have to add two ideas: one is that
each region is slowly getting similar to the EU, such as the Association of South East
Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) agreement for a closer political unit and a free trade zone by
2015473;and the other is that each state has its own distinguishing characteristics - e.g.
differences between China and Japan, even though each region has its own
distinguishing characteristics.

For instance, as mentioned in Chapter I, China itself

has rarely accepted any kind of collective security system, even with its reluctance to
give South Asian Nations a forum (Saich, 2001:276).

In November 2006, at the

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Hanoi, “the US–backed
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President Bush spoke at the National University of Singapore on the way for 21 nations Apec
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proposal to create a huge region-wide free-trade zone” has met severe resistance due
to practical hardship as well. 474 In consideration of different circumstances between
Asia (more pluralist international society/more bilateral relationship) and Europe
(more solidarist international society/more multilateral relationship), we can see
China’s interests from its bilateral relationship between China (regional power) and
the US

(Great Power) in dealing with security issues.

As mentioned above, due to

the lack of the institutions for collective management of crisis in Asia, China’s
socialization with the US for security issues can help manage regional issues, such as
arms race and terrorism.

Nevertheless, the US’s theater Missile Defense program

with Japan had caused some tension between the US and China.

Also, we should

not forget the fact that China’s competitive relationships with the US itself in some
sense can contribute to pluralistic principles especially in Asia, though the US’s
relationship with China can be recognized as hegemonic.

However, China’s

engagement with the US itself has indirectly and directly pushed China toward
democracy.
Along with the above reasons, China still has many other various reasons to be
socialized with the US, and in turns, the US also has enough reasons to be socialized
with China.

Below, I will examine this one in more details.

Via interest-based

socialization, China has gradually adapted itself to the US value and norm, such as
human rights and democracy which have been increasingly understood as norms and
values of international society, even if China has been officially reluctant to accept
democracy.

In other words, China has not directly challenged international order

and US leadership, since China does not have even actual capability and intention to
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challenge them yet (Zhu, 2006:95).

We cannot expect that in the near future, China

will be a revisionist power like Nazi Germany again that exported its own ideology or
attempted to change the characteristics of international society.

Instead, it is

continuously expected to become a status quo power, at least unless China stops
benefiting from the US dominated international political and economic society to
which China can contribute in various issues as well.
Currently, the US direct and indirect influence on China’s path toward
democracy can be easily observed.

For instance, many members of congress rarely

have anything positive to say about China, in terms of human rights and rule of law to
Taiwan and Tibet (Zhu, 2006:98).

It is worth looking at Henry Kissinger’s remark:

Republicans see China as a threat; Democrats view it as
laboratory for the spread of American values. Both view
China through th prism of their party’s experience over the
last 30 years. Unfortunately, too many Republicans have
substituted China for the collapsed Soviet Union and
seek to deal with it by the methods that accelerated the
collapse of the Soviet empire: diplomatic confrontation,
economic ostracism, and ideological warfare.
Too
many Democrats act as if the principal goal of American
policy should be to replicate our institutions and
principles in China, even at the cost of our many other
interests at stake in Asia and without regard for the
complexities of Chinese history. 475
This indicates the US intention to build up democratic norms and values in China, and
the tone itself can be seen as hegemonic tendency in some sense.

In my dissertation,

I prefer the dove’s position to advocate “peaceful evolution” via trade and
engagement, over hawk’s position to choose confrontation including military conflict,
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in terms of the promotion and consolidation of democracy in China. 476 As for me, in
the post-Cold War era, an engagement policy is more plausible than a containment
policy that had been the US’s primary foreign policy against China until before
Richard Nixon’s administration.

Nevertheless, I do not totally disregard harsh

measures, such as economic and military sanction.

For instance, in 1989, the

Chinese government’s crackdown against democratic movement led to the US
economic and diplomatic sanctions, along with former President George H. W. Bush’s
severe criticism against the Chinese government’s actions.

The Tiananmen Square

sanctions are the followings:
a continuance of the suspension of overseas private
investment corporation financing (imposed earlier by the
President); a continuance of the suspension of trade and
development agency (TDA) financing; a continuance of the
suspension of export licensing for defense articles and
helicopter parts; a continuance of the suspension of export
licenses for satellites contracted to be launched in China; a
suspension of export licenses for crime control and
detection instruments and equipment; a denial of export
licenses for any goods or technology used in nuclear
production; and the U.S. opposition to multilateral efforts to
liberalize the application of export controls that limited
goods or technology to China, such as suspension of the
export licenses for satellites to China in February 2000
(Rennack, 2003:2 and 8).
This can be direct pressure to push China to accept human rights and democracy, even
though China is still very reluctant to officially adopt democracy for its form of
government.

However, the side-effect of China’s military crackdown against

democratic development has softened its measure, whereas democratic activists have
constrained themselves as well.

Also, as a matter of fact, since the 1989 Tiananmen
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Former Secretary of State, Colin Powell can be moderate, whereas former Defense Secretary
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(2006:99).
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incident, the US has been the only state in international society to impose economic
and military sanctions against China, which include the practice of US representative
voting against or abstaining on many World Bank loans to China and the withholding
of some US export-import Bank China-related loans and credit guarantees (Zhu,
2006:100).

And, in April, 1991, former US President, George H.W. Bush initiated a

special 301, to investigate China’s piracy of American intellectual property and to bar
the sale of American components for a Chinese domestic communication satellite,
which are originated in China’s violation of human rights in Tibet (Xinghao,
1991:1163).

This can be interpreted as indirect pressure to push China toward

political freedom as well as human rights.

In fact, as Zhu pointed out, after two

decades of economic social transformations, today’s China seems far freer than before
1978, even if under a one party, Communist Party’s rule (Zhu, 2006:103).

As a

matter of fact, Chinese news paper, People’s Daily is even calling on Party
organizations to enhance Party democracy in the election of delegates to the 17 th
Communist Party of China (CPC) national congress. 477 According to People’s Daily,
“Party organizations at various levels are urged to respect and safeguard the
democratic rights of more than 70 million Party members in the election process,
which has already begun and will end by June next year” 478
Also, it is worth looking at leaders’ socialization which contributed to
democratic development.

Zhu displayed the meetings of leaders of states.

Zhu

states:
Every US President since Richard Nixon has visited China.
Major Chinese leaders have also visited the United States in
477
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1979. Despite a rocky start, President George W. Bush’s
administration has moderated its approach to China. It is
truly remarkable that President Bush and President Jiang
met three times within a year October 2001 and October
2002. And in return for then Vice President Hu Jintao’s
April 2002 US visit, Vice President Dick Cheney visited
China in April 2004. President Bush and President Hu
have also planned to exchange state visits in 2005. Clearly,
leaders from both sides are interested in maintaining and
developing this important bilateral relationship (Zhu,
2006:129).
The meetings of high-ranking officers between China and US can indirectly give
some pressure to China to learn American core values, such as human rights and
democracy, which have become gradually values and norms of international society.
Also, this can ultimately make China inevitably face even the issue of democracy and
democratization, in particular when considering the US promotion and consolidation
of democracy across international society in the 21 st century (Zhu, 2006:184).

John

Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan said that hegemonic norms and values can
influence the policy-making process through close connection among elites, which
can bring out more cooperative outcomes (Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990:290-291).479
At this juncture, we can say that socialization itself can eventually alter ruling elites’
normative orientation in the target state, even if it can also affect the hegemon elites’
understanding of the target state, at least modifying their social and political structure
to dominate it.

Nevertheless, we cannot fully expect this one from relationships

between China and the US yet, since the domestic conditions in China, like the weak
middle class and citizens’ low awareness of democracy do not yet fully prepare elites
for their reception of the newly emerging dominant norm and value, ‘democracy,’ in
479

Also, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan mentioned that socialization can happen via three
mechanisms: normative persuasion, external inducement and internal reconstruction. As causal chain,
we can see “external inducement-> policy change (cooperation via coercion) -> norm change
(cooperation via legitimate domination).” See Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990:291).
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the 21st century. 480 However, we cannot deny that China has been slowly moving
toward democracy, respecting more and more human rights via socialization, which
can help China to become a decent Great Power as well.
In terms of engagement and containment policy, scholars and leaders advocate
the engagement policy rather than the containment policy toward China.

As David

Shambaugh put it, it might be true that in dealing with China, engagement is more
plausible than containment and might be the best option available to integrate China
into the existing rule-based, institutionalized and normative international community
(Shambaugh, 1996:181). In April, 2001, former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger
warned against the containment policy for the treatment of China, saying that it would
isolate the US in Asia and the world (Christoffersen, 2002:384-386).

Also, former

Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew argued against the US containment policy
and unilateralism (Christoffersen, 2002:388).

In fact, the confrontational approach

that Bush had taken with China, and his tough geopolitical approach to Asia,
threatened U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan, and would marginalize Asian
multilateral regimes like ASEAN, ARF, and APEC (Christoffersen, 2002:384).
Japan has revealed its fear of the possible outcome of the US containment policy
against China, which could lead to the tension and confrontation between Japan and
China (Christoffersen, 2002:386).

Along with Japan, ASEAN, and the European

Union’s anti-containment policies against China, the US has opted for an engagement
policy since 1971 (Shambaugh, 1996:207).

Instead of a containment policy, in fact,

the US primary mechanism toward China must be the engagement policy, even if the
containment policy cannot be totally disregarded, as some scholars reveals the
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relationship between China and the US, saying that China and the US struggle but
cooperate, disagree but coordinate, battle but do not fall out, and disagree but do not
antagonize (Christoffersen, 2002:374).

In this sense, we can say that in the post-

Cold War era, the US-Sino relationship can be recognized as a complex mixture of
disagreement and cooperation in some sense, but the primary policy of the US has
been engagement rather than containment (Zhu, 2006:90).
There are several events for China’s engagement in international society, via
the US efforts.

For instance, we can think of the 1972 former President Richard

Nixon’s surprise visit to China (its reconstruction of the relationship with the
developed states); in the early 1980s, the US assistance of China’s modernization via
trade and investment; and China’s participation in the WTO at the end of 2001 (Zhu,
2006: 93).

All of these are in some sense behind the US effort of integration of

China into international society, in particular, the US favor to China as the most
favored nation status (MFN), while demonstrating the necessity of the US weight for
China’s continuous development and its compliance with the norm and value of
international society.

Ding Xinghao states:

Washington had certainly found the MFN to be a useful card,
and one that could make leaders in Beijing more
conciliatory. With advice from officials at working levels
of concerned departments and from research institutions in
Beijing and Shanghai, Chinese leaders became aware of the
economic cost if the United States should terminate China’s
MFN status. In these circumstances, Beijing released 200
more detainees in early May and intended to make some
additional concessions (Xinghao, 1991:1160).
This can ultimately be seen as the US effort to goad China to adopt the path toward
democracy and its peaceful surge as a Great Power in the end.

At this juncture, also,

we should not forget that the interest-based socialization can be US primary
mechanism to integrate China into international society and to get it to learn and
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internalize norms and values of international society, like human rights and
democracy, as a good cooperative member of international society.
Also, the US incorporation of China into the WTO members is very
meaningful, which ensured that China could learn the rules of games and even be a
writer of new rules in international society, not to mention its exposure to
international norms and values, such as human rights and democracy (Zhu, 2006:126).
China’s membership in the WTO can strengthen its position of pluralistic principles of
international society.

For instance, China’s chief negotiator on WTO membership

said “when our country joins an international organization, our top priority remains
our sovereignty and our national interest….we will not do anything contradictory to
our national interest” (Yongtu, 1999:2-3).

However, we cannot deny that China’s

identity and character can be altered via interest-oriented socialization, which can, at
least, minimize its potential disruptive behaviors and maximize the integration of
China into international society in which certain common norms and values are shared
among the members of international society.
Besides the WTO, the US has retained a generalized engagement with East
Asia through its membership in APEC and the ARF that reflects explicitly the linkage
between economic and military relations in the Asia-Pacific (Buzan and Waever,
2003: 166). As for the US, APEC and the ARF can be recognized as a mechanism to
transform China in both domestic and international arena. 481 In fact, as the 2006
APEC summit in Hanoi showed, it is a good mechanism for China to play a
significant role as a regional power and potential Great Power, let alone a citizen of
international society.

This will raise the possibility that China will eventually accept

481

I will touch on how ASEAN and ARF can have impact on China’s transformation again, when I
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norms and values of international society, human rights and democracy, which could
be hardly imagined in its past revisionist attitude against international society.

As

mentioned in earlier chapters, we can assume that in May 2004, China’s constitutional
change to allow private property and human rights could be in part derived from
China’s rational calculation-based engagement, primarily ‘economic development and
stability.’ This might indicate a more peaceful world in the future.

As the UK and

the US managed their power transition peacefully from the late nineteenth century
until the end of World War II due to their democratic institutions and cultures, and as
the characteristics of the Cold War itself could have been quite different from what we
experienced if the Soviet Union was a democracy rather than a totalitarian
dictatorship, we can positively expect the future constructive relationship between
China and the US.482 Further, we might possibly expect a peaceful power-transition
from US to China, if China’s overall supremacy over the US can take place in the late
21st century, beyond its potential economic supremacy over the US by 2025 and can
become the largest democratic state across international society. 483 Nevertheless,
Chinese leadership has been deeply engaged in traditional power politics.
To sum up, China reflects a pluralist international society, and the relationship
between the US and China can be understood as hegemonic on one hand but as
competitive on the other hand.

In consideration of these, as a Great Power, the US

has been more likely to adopt an engagement policy based on interest-oriented
socialization in dealing with China.

Great Power’s facilitation of integrating of

China into international society via its providing material-interest incentives can bring
482
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out cooperative relationship with its neighboring states, making China face political
pressure on itself toward democracy, which has slowly but gradually led to alteration
in China’s identity and character.

The US has made an effort to integrate China into

international society via China’s socialization with members of international society,
which has brought out its cooperative language and behavior in international society.
Also, as China has become more and more engaged in international society, China can
have more and more stakes in others’ interest and even in general interests of
international society as a whole.

In its socialization with members of international

society, also, China has slowly followed general norms and values of international
society, which can eventually alter even China’s domestic political structure, like
moving towards democracy from authoritarianism.

This is what the US has

expected from China, and this is why the US has favored China in various ways, such
as MFN status and WTO membership in order to integrate China into international
society.

This is not only the US optimal option for China’s path toward democracy,

but also its most plausible way to assist China’s participation in the club of Great
Powers.

Furthermore, this might bring out its participation even in the capitalist

democratic security community in the long run.
However, as Hongying Wang points out, the Chinese traditional view derived
from China’s centerism and nationalism might limit the role of socialization with
Great Power to alter China’s identity and characteristics (Wang, 2000:489,
Shambaugh, 1996:204-209).

In addition, we should keep in mind the assumption

that the effects of socialization might vary in relation to each state’s distinguishing
circumstances like internal and external variables (Wang, 2000:489, Shambaugh,
1996:204-209).

But, it is worth looking at how material incentives the US has

provided to China can have an impact on China’s path toward democracy under the
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US hegemonic relationship with China.

All in all, we can’t diminish the great effect

of socialization via Great power’s role on China’s peaceful evolution of identity and
characteristics, in particular when comparing China’s behaviors and language today
with its behaviors and language during Mao’s regime.

In other words, China is

slowly moving toward democracy, even if very slowly.
3. B) Great Power’s Role in Democratic Development in South Korea
In the post-Cold War and 21 st century, South Korea reflects aspects of a
solidarist international society.

In this international society, Great Power, that is, the

US is more likely to adopt value-oriented socialization via persuasion and legitimacy.
This consolidates democracy in South Korea. In turn, South Korea’s democratic
development based on economic achievement and political maturity has strengthened
its relationship with the US, and can facilitate the capitalist democratic security
community or mature anarchy in Buzan’s terms.
For several decades, South Korean people have gradually internalized
democracy as the most decent form of government.

In the post-Cold War era and

21st century, we cannot deny the fact that South Korea has entered into a capitalist
democratic security community as well as a solidarist international society.

A

majority of Koreans have been very royal to democracy, as in May 1997, 68% of the
South Korean population (more than two third) and in 2004, 58% of South Korean
population revealed loyal commitment to democracy (Park and Shin, 2006:671-2).
Also, as Park and Shin point out, for ten years (1993-2003), South Korea gained an
average rating of 2.0 on Freedom House’s seven-point scaled of political rights and
civil liberties, and in the 2005 report, South Korea got an average of 1.5 (Park and
Shin, 2006:668).

This indicates that most ordinary Koreans are highly likely to

reveal support for democracy.

Nevertheless, there has been some fluctuation, due to
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the economic crisis in South Korea, for instance, “the drop of 14 % in preference for
democracy at the beginning of the economic crisis in late 1997”(Park and Shin,
2006:672).

My point is that South Korea should be seen as different from China

because for a majority of South Korean population, democracy is an end itself rather
than a means to an end, which has made possible ‘value-oriented socialization’ based
on a learning process.
Along with the characteristics of a solidarist international society, in fact, we
should perceive that the US can be recognized as primacy and leadership over South
Korea in its relationship with South Korea.

As above, Bull mentioned that the

concept of the primacy can convey the idea that a Great Power can make a
disproportionately large contribution to the achievement of a common purpose (Bull,
1977:208-209). Such contribution provides the leadership to the Great Power, which
Small Powers and Middle Power conceded (Bull, 1977:208-209).

This can be seen

in the solid alliance relationships between the US and South Korea.

A more than

fifty-year alliance between the US and South Korea has significantly contributed to
South Korea’s relations with the US and its foundation for democratic promotion and
consolidation, because the US has guaranteed South Korea’s security in a large
manner and accelerated its economic development and political maturity (Kim,
2004c:157).
In this section, I will reveal the US’s massive material contribution to South
Korea, focusing on several aspects, such as the security aspect, economic aspect,
social aspect and political aspect.

And, I will briefly illustrate the US value-oriented

socialization with South Korea.

All of these can illustrate the relationship between

the US and South Korea as the US primacy over South Korea, and show the US
contribution to South Korea’s democratic consolidation, which can eventually help us
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comprehend how South Korea and the US can consolidate democratic norms and
values in international society.

Nevertheless, South Korea’s democracy was

primarily emerging from the inside rather than the outside.
Let us focus on the below questions to examine Great Power’s role in South
Korea’s democratic consolidation.

What impact could the US’s material

contribution and value-oriented socialization have on South Korea’s democratic
consolidation?

How could US’s material contribution and value-oriented

socialization with South Korea have an impact on South Korea’s democratic
consolidation?

To answer these questions, first of all, in economic issue, I will

examine how South Korea’s economic relationship with the US can have an impact
on South Korea’s democratic development.

South Korea’s economic relationship

with a Great Power has indirectly and directly influenced South Korea’s path toward
democracy, since the US military government (1945-1948) introduced a capitalist
market economy (Im, 2006:160). In fact, we can guess how possibly and why South
Korea has become a mature democratic regime, when considering South Korea’s solid
relation with the US beyond the military sector.
In this section, I will show that as a Great Power, the US has re-enforced
South Korea’s democratic consolidation via its economic relationship with South
Korea.

In the consideration of South Korea’s level of democracy, I will examine

how a Great Power’s economic relationship with South Korea can contribute to South
Korea’s consolidation of democracy.

In this juncture, first of all, I will briefly

examine how a Great Power can provide South Korea with economic interests in the
post-Cold War era and the 21 st century.

And I will emphasize how as Great Power,

the US economic value and norm can affect South Korea’s consolidation of
democracy on the basis of its economic wealth and stability.
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As a Great Power, the US has supported economic reforms by providing the
principal market in the international society and by providing the leadership in
promoting an open international trade, financial system and economic assistance. 484
South Korea cannot be exceptional at all.

For instance, during the period from 1946

to 1973, economic assistance from the US amounted to US $ 5.7 billion, beyond US
military assistance such as US $6.8 billion and the US 37, 000 troops, and during the
duration of the first five years plan, grants from the US counted for the largest part of
South Korea’s foreign capital (Kleiner, 2001: 257).

This could greatly contribute to

economic development on the basis of its gradual stability and order.

Further, this

could be regarded as the foundation for South Korea’s path toward democracy in the
long run. 485 In fact, we can identify it as the foundation of US primacy in its
relationship with South Korea.
In South Korea’s scale of trade with the US, we can see a close relationship.
Since the late 1980s, the US has become South Korea’s largest and most significant
trading partner and it was the second largest export market, source of imports and
supplier of foreign direct investment in 2003. 486 Primary U.S. exports to South Korea
include semi-conductors, machinery, air-craft, agricultural products, beef, etc.487 In
turn, South Korea has become the seventh-largest market for US goods, and the
second largest market for its agricultural products and beef. 488 South Korea’s trade
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relationship with the US was estimated to be worth around US $72 billion in 2005,
while in the same year, it has a $10.8 billion trade surplus from the US. 489
Also, we can observe the US favors toward South Korea in trade, as the US
favors toward China such as the MFN.

For instance, until 1998 when the US and

South Korea signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on foreign access to
Korea’s auto market, Seoul had legally protected its auto-producers from foreign
counterparts, charging 80% tariff on imported motor vehicles (Manyin, 2004:11).
Nevertheless, it is the world’s fourth-biggest producer of automobiles (Manyin,
2004:11).

In fact, even after 1998 when Korean benefits from special consideration

under the Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries were removed
(Macdonald, 1990:216) and so tariff had been reduced from 80% to 8 %, the trade
imbalance has not been shifted at all – e.g. in 2003, South Korea imported 4,460 US
cars, whereas South Korean auto manufacturers exported over 630,000 cars to the US
(Manyin, 2004:11).

Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that there has been

only one way of benefit.

In 2002, Hyundai Mortor Company (HMC) in South Korea

announced that it would build a $1 billion plant in Montgomery, Alabama, with 2000
workers and in May, 2005, the facility began the official production, with the
expectation of 300,000 vehicles per year at full capacity.490 The relationships between
South Korea and the US have been increasingly based on mutual interests. 491
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Nevertheless, as indicated above, we can see that South Korea’s economic success is
primarily derived from its economic partnership with the US, which could be the
foundation for South Korea’s democratic promotion and consolidation.
However, in economic interaction between the US and South Korea, we
should not forget several hardships in economic relationship between the US and
South Korea.

For instance, on one hand, Washington had not been satisfied with

Seoul’s regulation to discriminate against foreign firms like automobiles and
consumer electronics, its restrictions in labor market and agricultural market (the most
closed market in the OECD) (Manyin, 2004:10). On the other hand, Seoul was not
happy with an anti-dumping duty on Korean exports of steel and semi-conductors
(Manyin, 2004:16).

These issues are problematic to both states, along with South

Korea’s gradual decline of dependence on the US market.

But, once again, we

cannot deny the fact that South Korea has had massive economic interests through its
economic interaction with the US for more than fifty years, as in 1985 35% of Korean
exports were in the US market (Macdonald, 1990:213).

Also, we should keep in

mind the fact that the US has been South Korea’s principal sources of capital
investment and of technology (Macdonald, 1990:22).

This can indicate that Great

Power’s provision of material incentives should be recognized as its primary
attraction to states.
However, South Korea’s economic interaction with the US should be more
than simply the reason for material incentives.

In other words, in general, an

economic relationship conveys the idea that economic interests can be a simple means
to attract other states to adjust itself to or accept certain values and norms, which can
be seen in China’s case.

The material aspect cannot be disregarded at all in
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international society.

However, South Korea’s democratic consolidation was derived

from more than material incentives from the US.

There was authentic voluntary

acceptance of democracy, in particular, since 1987.

Furthermore, since South Korea

overcame its economic crisis in 1997-8, South Korea has escalated its process of
democratic consolidation.

As mentioned above, South Korea can be categorized into

the members of the capitalist democratic security community in Buzan’s term.

But,

South Korea’s economic structure was used to being marked as crony capitalism.
This economic structure had been used by military regimes in South Korea, which
was influenced by the methods used in Japan after WWII (Horowitz, 2002: 88).492
This can help us comprehend that power structure and economic structure (also, social
structure as Polanyi stressed) cannot be separated from each other. 493 When taking a
look at South Korea’s evolution to economic democracy from authoritarian crony
capitalism, we can perceive that the US has given pressure to South Korea’s economic
liberalization (Macdonald, 1990:215).

For instance, since the late 1970s, South

Korea has gradually favored liberalization on international trade and foreign
participation in Korean economic activity.

In the post-Cold War era and 21 st century,

the US administrations, in particular, the Clinton administration’s economic boom on
the basis of neo-liberalism, especially in 1990s can escalate economic liberalization
across international society, in particular, putting pressure upon Northeast Asian states
to adopt neoliberal model, opening their protected domestic market (Im, 2006:159).
South Korea cannot be excluded, even if neoliberal ideas could not explain South
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Korea’s rapid economic growth before its economic crisis.

South Korea has

radically reformed its economic structure since it faced the 1997-1998 economic crisis
which was primarily due to its lack of the flow of capital as well as its crony capitalist
economic structure.
Neoliberalism under the guide of the Augmented Washington Consensus via
international financial institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) has had an impact on South Korea’s economic openness and transparency,
in particular when experiencing its economic crisis. 494 Nevertheless, the Augmented
Washington Consensus differentiates itself from the original neo-liberal aspect to
constrain the activism of civil society (Beeson and Islam, 2005: 203).

The

Augmented Washington Consensus does not seem to contribute to South Korea’s
democratic development, but it has been greatly contributing to South Korea’s
democratic consolidation.

As a matter of fact, since the Asian economic crisis, such

Augmented Washington Consensus had been recognized as the solution for economic
crisis.

Beeson and Islam state:
the core policy proposals pertaining to macroeconomic
prudence, deregulation, privatization and liberalization now
had to be supplemented by a renewed commitment to
poverty reduction and wide-ranging institutional reform that
fell under the rubric of good governance (Beeson and Islam,
2005:204).

The emphasis of the Augmented Washington Consensus on economic transparency
and economic openness, along with the rule of law and the reduction of poverty,
cannot be inevitably separated from the social and economic structure, which can
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bring out economic democracy (harmonious interest as essence of democracy).

We

can say that this has contributed to democratic consolidation in South Korea.
When considering the fact that crony capitalism facilitated the corruption of
the political system in South Korea, like the arrest of former South Korean President’s
(Kim Young Sam) second son, Hyun-Chul, Kim for bribery from businessmen on
May 17, 1997, its reform of economic structure via more openness and transparency
based on rule of law has gradually reduced the corruption derived from the close
connection of money and power.

At this juncture, we can see that economic reform

is not only derived from economic interests, but also from the South Korean
population’s mature democratic attitude.

Economic reform has gradually led to

economic democracy in South Korea, and economic democracy in South Korea has
greatly contributed to democratic consolidation in South Korea.

Due to this, we can

say that neoliberalism under the guide of the Augmented Washington Consensus that
the US has spread across international society, is closely connected with consolidation
of democracy in South Korea.

This can be seen as a Great Power’s role in South

Korea’s democratic consolidation.

We cannot deny the fact that, as a Great Power,

the US contributed to South Korea’s consolidation of democracy.
In political issues, we can’t deny the US political pressure on South Korea’s
democratic development.

Since 1945, the US had been influencing South Korea to

accept democratic norms and values during the Cold War period.

In fact, the US

provided the starting conditions for Korean democratic development.

For instance,

the three-year US military government (1945-1948) in South Korea made available
universal suffrage to all adult Koreans in the fundamental election of Constitutional
Assembly of 1948, introducing liberal democratic institutions such as rule of law and
multi-party system (Im, 2006:160).

This implies that the initial stage of democracy
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was given to Koreans by the US as a Great Power.495 As for the US, South Korea’s
democracy has been very significant, and it might be more primarily for strategic
interests in an instrumental sense rather than an end itself.

In particular, during the

Cold War era, South Korea’s democracy had been recognized as a bulwark against the
communist bloc, as North Korea had been recognized as a bulwark against democratic
community.

The Reagan administration had intention to pressure Chun’s regime to

democratize South Korea, and in the highest attention of democratic movement in
South Korea in June 1987, the 40th U.S. President Ronald Reagan sent a letter to Chun
in support of the establishment of ‘democratic institutions,’ which indirectly
influenced democratic reform programs such as direct presidential elections and
restoration of banned politicians like Kim Dae-Jung (Fowler, 1999:287-288).

Also,

as Representative of the U.S. House, Stephen J. Solarz said “like the Philippines,
South Korea is an example of a country where we can more effectively protect our
strategic interests by promoting our political values” (Fowler, 1999:286).

According

to geo-political perspective, Korea has been at the nexus of regional powers’ interests,
and its capital is close to Beijing, Vladivostok and Tokyo, which means that around
700 million people live within a radius of 1,200 kilometers of Seoul (Levin, 2004:42).
Even in the post-Cold War era and 21 st century, the geopolitical significance of the
Korean Peninsula cannot be diminished, and its democracy can be still considered as
US strategic interests to cope with North Korea and China, which can facilitate to
modify China and North Korea’s identities and characteristics.

Nevertheless, after

the Cold War era, some scholars such as Hyug-Baeg Im claim that in the post-Cold
War era and 21st century, the US’s strategic interests in South Korea has been reduced,

495

This might give some hope to Iraq’s democracy which I will mention later.
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while emphasizing more economic interests, which means the transformation from
geo-political interests to geo-economic interests (Im, 2006:162).
But, currently, the US primary concerns in international society are about three
countries, Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, and about weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs), terrorism (after 9/11) and democracy.

This indicates that the US’s

strategic interests in South Korea’s democracy cannot be reduced at all, as long as
North Korea’s nuclear issue cannot be solved and its characteristics and identity (an
outlaw state) cannot be altered.

In fact, as mentioned in previous chapters, I admit

that the US can more easily promote democracy in the post-Cold War era and 21st
century than in the Cold War era, due to the end of ideological struggle on global level.
For instance, as Hyug Haeg Im puts it, the US grant of Kwangju massacre in 1980
could be one of examples of the US foreign policy’s priority of security over
democracy during the Cold War era, in its favor of authoritarian regimes against
communism (Im, 2006:172).

But, since then, the US has been very reluctant to

approve Seoul‘s use of military force against its own civilian democratic movement in
South Korea, stressing peace, prosperity and democracy (Im, 2006:172).

However,

in South Korea’s democracy, the most important thing is South Korea’s close
relationships with the US for more than fifty years, with its direct exposure to the
norms of democracy and human rights.

Also, the US has been very patient with

democratic progress in South Korea, when considering that it took more than four
decades (1945-1987) until South Korea started getting into authentic democratic
reform and that it took more than five decades until South Korea could start enjoying
a decent democratic system.
Today, we can feel more and more democratic consolidation in South Korea,
as the increasing percentage of satisfied citizens with democracy demonstrates. The
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percentage of satisfied citizens with democratic performance has increasingly risen,
for instance, from 44 % in 1998 to 47 % in 2001 and in 60 % in 2004 (Park and Shin,
2006:673).

This indicates that South Korea’s democracy has become gradually

consolidated.

In particular, we can perceive that the younger generation’ s

perception on democracy can reflect South Korea’s gradual democratic consolidation,
when taking a look at some generational gaps between the pre-Korean war generation
(old generation) and the post-Korean war generation (young generation, especially
under ages 40).

The old generation is still likely to prefer authoritarian political

structure over democratic political structure, like Park Jung-Hee’s regime, in
consideration of South Korea’s economic miracle and of its face of threat from North
Korea.

The old generation is highly likely to appreciate what the US did to South

Korea such as its help to defend South Korea from communist infiltration during
Korean War and massive economic and military aids during the post war period.

By

contrast, the young generation tends to regard political freedom and human rights as
very significant, even though a small portion of young generation seem to be radical
anti-American.

The young generation is deeply exposed to American pop culture

such as Hollywood Movies, hamburgers, Coca-Cola, Starbucks Coffee, etc. but also
they are thoroughly embedded in democratic norms and values as well.

At this

juncture, my bottom line is that this young generation is more deeply embedded in
norms and values of international society, human rights and democracy than the old
generation, even if this generation might be less likely to appreciate what the US did.
This generation does not permit second Kwang-Ju massacre that was primarily rooted
in authoritarian dictatorship.
consolidation.

This indicates South Korea’s rising level of democratic

This has contributed to the US effort to democratic promotion and

consolidation in international society.

In fact, the 2002 election demonstrated South
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Korea’s democratic consolidation.

A majority of the young generation voted for Roh

Moo Hyun who was a former labor worker lawyer/human rights lawyer, and one of
Kwang-Ju massacre prosecutors as a member of the National Assembly against
former President Chun Doo-Hwan, and who has never been given any opportunity to
study in any university.

His presidency can be marked as South Korea’s turning

point toward its mature democracy.

When considering all of these, South Korea’s

democratic consolidation process can contribute back to the US role in the promotion
and consolidation of democracy as well as human rights in international society in the
end, not to mention South Korea’s solid relationship with the US.
Regarding security issues, we can see how the US as a Great Power can have
an impact on South Korea’s promotion and consolidation of democracy.

The US and

the Republic of Korea (ROK) founded an effective alliance during the three-year
Korean War that took over 33,000 US troops and left over 100,000 wounded
soldiers.496 In 1954, it was formalized by signing the US- ROK Mutual Defense
Treaty (Kim, 2004a:191).
October 2011.

The alliance enjoyed the fifty-eighth anniversary on

Jae-Chang Kim described the Cold War and post-Cold War alliance

between South Korea and the US, by saying:
During the Cold War, the alliance used a strategy of
deterrence against North Korea even as both nations
prepared to defeat the enemy in case deterrence failed.
This strategy worked well for both partners of the alliance
because the US and the ROK wanted the status quo on the
peninsula…..After the Cold War, however, two states of
the alliance are now using their own dynamic methods in
dealing with North Korea in contrast to the more static
modes used during the Cold War (Kim, 2004a:191).
Also, we can think of Bush’s remark in January 2002 “North Korean regime is a

496

See Mark E. Manyin (2004).
356

member of axis of evil”, and of ROK’s engagement policy toward North Korea (Kim,
2004a:191).
successful.

The military alliance between the US and South Korea has been
Such alliance can consolidate South Korea’s democracy.

Victor Cha

points out mutual benefits via such military alliance:
For the United States today, a range of indicators determines
the success of a military alliance. It (1) deters aggression;
(2) facilitates US power accretion and projection; (3) shares
risks and costs among the parties; (4) enables common
tactics and doctrine through joint training; (5) promote a
division of security roles; (6) severs US security objectives
in the broader regional context; (7) facilitates cooperation in
production and development of military equipment; (8)
facilitates a reasonable quality of life and hospitable
environment for US forces stationed abroad; (9) reflects
shared political values; and (10) elicits political support
among domestic constituencies (Cha, 2004:122).
These show how the close alliance between the US and South Korea can facilitate
their relative security, which escalates South Korea’s process of democratic
consolidation and help the US effort to develop democracy in international society.
In the post-Cold War era and 21st century, the US role is still absolutely needed to
guarantee South Korea security as the fundamental element for South Korea’s
democratic consolidation.

South Korea is still given the US 28,500 troops assistance,

and the US even plans to invest $11 billion to reinforce the combat power of the US
forces in South Korea over the next three years on the program to upgrade missile
systems and military intelligence assets in order to cope with North Korea’s world
fourth largest army better (Kim, 2004a:196).

Besides, today, North Korea’s nuclear

issue is not only beyond South Korea’s capability unless South Korea nuclearizes
itself, but also it can be marked as a regional security issue or even an international
security issue.

This can be confirmed by the Japanese government’s claim that

North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons would be nightmare to Japanese
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security.

Further, North Korea has been marked as an ‘outlaw state’ in Simpson’s

term and as part of ‘the axis of evil’ in Bush’s term, and the US concern about WMDs
and terrorism has been increased since 9/11 in 2001.

At this juncture, we can

perceive that these can strengthen the solid relationship between the US and South
Korea, which can reinforce mutual interests.

In its awareness of this fact, the US

facilitates South Korea’s consolidation of democracy in the post-Cold War era and 21st
century.

Also, the above indicate that the US’s relationship with South Korea can be

seen as primacy.
However, the US relationship with South Korea can’t be seen as a rosy picture
all the time.

For instance, as Kim puts it, we can find anti-Americanism such as

ideological, policy-oriented and emotional aspects (Kim, 2004c:159).

A very small

radical group is obsessed with socialist vision of one Korea, which has been rejected
and disregarded by a majority of population, and some portion of civilians, in
particular liberal intellectuals were opposed to Bush’s administration’s hawkish
position against North Korea, which can conflict with South Korea’s Sunshine policy
(Kim, 2004c:160).

The 2002 protest for the incidence of the death of two schoolgirls

demonstrated the underlying anti-Americanism in South Korea.
like Kurt M. Campbell mentioned this anti-Americanism.

Even some scholars

Campbell states:

US alliance with Japan and South Korea, respectively,
remain the linchpins for larger American pursuits in Asia,
and it is difficult to imagine to how the United States could
manage effectively without close partnerships in Tokyo and
Seoul. Yet, just as US relations with Japan are probably
stronger than at any time in modern history, US ties
with South Korea are weaker and under greater tension.
This imbalance puts a strain on both Japan and South Korea,
but each in different ways. For Japan, the alienation
between Washington and Seoul raises the prospect that
someday soon Japan will bear the burden of hosting the
US military presence alone in Asia and serve as the lone
security entry point for the America into the regions
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(Campbell, 2004: 31).
Campbell’s argument might be right in some sense, but I do not agree to his
description of today’s relationships between South Korea and the US with three
primary reasons: first, in 2002, the massive protest for the death of two school girls
can be interpreted with anti-Americanism, but it might be nothing, when compared
with massive Japanese protest for three American soldiers’ rape of 12 years-old school
girl in Okinawa - indeed, in 2012, Washington eventually decided to withdraw 9000
US troops from Okinawa; second, South Korean government deployed around 3,300
troops along with the 500 medical and support personnel in the Kurdish-controlled
town of Irbill in northern Iraq as the third largest contributing foreign troops following
the UK troops, even after Japanese troops were withdrawn due to Iraq’s insecure and
unstable future; and third, in the 21st century, it is very hard to expect the US troops’
complete withdrawal from the Korean peninsula, as long as North Korea has posed
the great threat to international society with the world fourth largest army (1.21
million armed personnel) and with its possible nuclear weapons, and it has been
regarded as China’s bulwark against the US direct influence.

Nevertheless, the

situation might be altered after the unification of two Koreas. 497 Also, South Korea
does not need to be constrained as much as Japan has been indirectly restrained by the
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In fact, I really doubt that the US will completely withdraw its forces from the Korean Peninsula
after the unification of two Koreas, when considering that the Korean Peninsula can be recognized as
the intersection or bridge among three regional powers(Russia, China and Japan) and one Great Power/
Hyper- Power, (the US). For strategic reasons, the US might want to put its troops in the Korean
Peninsula to counter-balance Russia’s and especially China’s rising power, while assisting Japan and
South Korea in some sense. Buzan claims that global power structure can be interpreted as one superpower (the US) plus four great powers (China, the EU, Japan, Russia). See Buzan (2004b:87). This
implies that the Korean Peninsula is the very attractive zone for the US strategic reasons. However, it
might be hard to deploy the US troop continuously there after the unification of two Korea, since as for
Korea, itself, there will be very few of persuasive reasons to permit the US troop. In fact, the local
South Korean community has increasingly viewed the presence of the US bases as an obstacle to local
development due to prostitution, traffic violations, environmental containment, disturbances from
military firing exercises, etc. Woo-Soo Kim briefly mentioned this issue. See Kim (2004c:167).
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US due to Japan’s past imperialist aggression, even though Japan has been also
advocated by the US in various ways.

In short, ‘South Korea is NOT Japan.’ 498All

of these can reject Campbell’s ideas, in particular, the following ideas:
US ties with South Korea are weaker and under greater
tension......for Japan, the alienation between Washington and
Seoul raises the prospect that someday soon Japan will bear
the burden of hosting the US military presence alone in Asia
and serve as the lone security entry point for the Americans
into the regions (Campbell, 2004:31).
Furthermore, Campbell’s description of anti-Americanism should not be interpreted as
the idea that the solid relationship between the US and South Korea is fragile.

For

instance, according to the survey of Joongang Ilbo in June 2003, a large portion of
South Korean people, around 63% of respondents still advocate the presence of US
troops on Korean soil, not to mention 90% respondents’ regard of South Korea’s
relationship with the US as very significant (Kim, 2004c:175, fn. 5).
However, in the 21st century, Won-Soo Kim claims that two allies do not have
identical priorities in their perception of threats, even if the US and South Korea still
have many common grounds (Kim, 2004c: 169). He stated that South Korea has
feared any outbreak of conventional conflict on the peninsula, whereas the US has
feared WMD proliferation and its transfer to terrorists (Kim, 2004c: 169).

However,

instead of different priorities, the bottom line is that they have shared many common
grounds.

In particular, both states have reached the same point that democratic

development and security are closely related. As for the US, the promotion and
consolidation of democracy along with human rights in international society can be
498

The US troops in Japan like Okinawa and Yokosuka can be interpreted so as to constrain Japan’s
excessive military power as well, even if it has been known to counter-balance China’s military power,
in particular when considering that its neighboring states still fear its potential aggression in the future
in the absence of the US influence. Also, South Korea is not an outlaw state (not Saddam’s Iraq and
not Kim Jong-Il’s North Korea), but a decent mature democratic country, which we should keep in
mind.
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the primary solution to global terrorism that has been recognized as the greatest threat
to American national security.

Washington (& Downing Street as well) thoroughly

believes that the promotion of democracy in international society is the panacea to
global threats to international society beyond their own national interests.

Seoul has

a similar tendency, as its foreign policy such as human rights and democracy
demonstrates, in particular, in dealing with North Korea.

Thus, two states’ mutual

socialization has consolidated South Korea’s democracy further.

In this context, I do

not think that we should care too much about anti-Americanism in South Korea.

On

the whole, above, all factors could fabricate the groundwork for South Korea’s mature
level of liberal democracy.

At this point, we can perceive South Korea’s relations

with the US as a Great Power as an essential part to drive South Korea into a mature
liberal democratic country.
3. C) Great Power’s Role in Iraq’s Path toward Democracy
In this section, I will broadly scrutinize Great Powers’ role in Iraq’s path
toward democracy.

I will primarily focus on Great Powers’ invasion of and their

presence in Iraq, even if I will briefly mention their withdrawal from Iraq.

But,

unlike many other scholars, I will seek for positive points rather than negative points
for Great Powers’ use of force in Iraq, as the initial big step toward democracy.

As

E.H Carr put it in his work, “Conditions of Peace,” I will demonstrate the use of force
as necessary, as long as it is impartially used in order to uphold order and security in
any event (Carr, 1942:255). Iraq cannot be exceptional.

Ultimately, in this section,

I will reveal how Great Powers can have an impact on Iraq’s democratic development.
Let us start with the characteristics of the relationships between the US/the UK
and Iraq.

As mentioned in Chapter I, Iraq itself reflects the characteristics of a

liberal anti-pluralist international society.
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In a liberal anti-pluralist international

society, the use of force is the primary mechanism for democratic development.
When considering this, we might also think the relationship between Great Powers
and Iraq in a liberal anti-pluralist international society as dominance in Bull’s term. 499
According to Bull, the concept of dominance is short of imperial sovereign
relationships, but can be characterized by the habitual use of force against the lesser
power states, disregarding the principles of equal sovereign rights and political
independence (Bull, 1977:208-209).

Nevertheless, in my dissertation, I tend to use

the concept of dominance as a strong concept of hegemony and a weak concept of
dominance.

This could be seen in the US/UK presence in Iraq from their invasion,

which is their contribution to Iraq’s national building process toward a decent
democratic regime as a new identity and character.

In Great Powers’ dominance

over lesser power states, at this juncture, the use of force might be justified for the
promotion and consolidation of democracy in the 21 st century.

In consideration of

these, I will explore Great Powers’ role in promoting and consolidating democracy in
Iraq.
As a matter of fact, lots of democratic legacies can be easily found in Great
Powers’ former colonies.

For instance, the Westminster Parliamentary System in

Australia, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore and Malta can
be good examples of the legacy of British colonial rule. 500 This indicates Great
Powers’ historical efforts and contribution to the fusion between their social, cultural
and political structure and target state’s traditional social, cultural and political
499

The US force structure was developed during the 1960s, on the account of doctrines that the US
forces should be prepared to fight simultaneous conflicts. The US developed capabilities to fight
simultaneously a major land war in Europe, a major land war in Asia, and a brush-fire war somewhere
in the southern hemisphere. The doctrines has brought out today’s US supreme military power, which
has been called a hyper-power and makes it possible the relationship of dominance between the US and
Iraq. See Michael Glennon (2002).
500
See the website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westminster_System
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structure, via their use of force and presence of force. This could contribute to the
promotion and consolidation of democracy.

In particular, during the middle

nineteenth century, Britain could be successful in changing the normative orientation
of Indian elites, by facilitating political liberalization and secularization (Ikenberry
and Kupchan, 1990:307).

Ikenberrry and Kupchan explained well about Britain’s

impact on Indian political and social values by saying:
Before the British Presence, Indian politics was dominated
by religious affiliation and practice, the cast system, and
strong local and regional allegiance. By the end of the
1800s, Western notions of administrative efficiency and
justice had led to the gradual secularization of politics; the
importance of the caste system had declined somewhat; and
the spread of English had helped overcome the political
regionalism that had been perpetuated by linguistic diversity.
In short, British political values and practices had
intermingled with and, in some instance, replaced the
traditional norms eroding under the pressure of
colonialism……India’s political elite actually came to
believe in western values rather than simply mouthing
acquiescence because of British coercion (Ikenberry and
Kupchan, 1990:309-310).
Also, in the post-war era, the US forces had occupied Germany and Japan during long
period, bringing out successful political and social reforms to embrace the principles
of liberal democracy on the new constitutions.

Indeed, we can recall one

Japanese scholar’s remarks that as the years have passed, the influence of occupation
reforms has penetrated into the very core of society and that the reforms themselves
have been exercised as a powerful effect on character of politics and on history
(Ikenberry and Kupchan, 1990: 307).501 Also, we can make a positive assumption
that Iraq can be gradually embedded in democratic norms and values.

Below, I will

primarily examine two stages in the use of force: Great Powers’ invasion and
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See for the original context, Takemai Eiji (1983: 359-60). Also see Masataka Kosaka (1972: 65).
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occupation. Nevertheless, I will briefly mention about withdrawal.

This can

demonstrate how Great Powers can contribute to the promotion and consolidation of
democracy in Iraq.

I sincerely hope that this part can be helpful to comprehend

Great Powers’ use of force in international society and their role in democratic
development in international society.

Before assessing Great Powers’ role in the

democratic development in Iraq, I want to proclaim Carr’s remark in his work,
“Conditions of Peace”, that peace cannot be achieved by states simply avowing not to
resort to war, without their use of force and their will (Carr, 1942:241-280, Wilson,
1998:13).
a. Great Powers’ Invasion of Iraq and Democracy
In general, we can think of three stages, ‘invasion,’ ‘occupation’ and
‘withdrawal’ in the use of force when considering Iraq’s circumstance.

As one stage,

‘invasion,’ we cannot deny the US and the UK’s contribution to Iraq’s path toward
democracy in some sense.

In this section, I will investigate whether or not invasion

can alter Iraq’s identity and characteristics, and even political environment in the
Middle East.

Let us briefly scrutinize the relationships between invasion and

democratic development, which can help us comprehend how Great Powers can have
an initial great impact on democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist
international society.

Nevertheless, at this juncture, once again, I will use some

context of Chapter I in which I illustrated liberal anti-pluralism.
In 2003, Great Powers, the US and UK-led coalition forces invaded Iraq, and
they toppled Saddam’s regime.

This has been recognized as Iraq’s turning point in

kicking off its process toward democracy, which can be recognized as the good
example of Great Powers’ use of force for the promotion and consolidation of
democracy.

However, as I mentioned in Chapter II (international law), it is very
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hard to expect the use of force in contemporary international society, except for some
cases.

For instance, Article 2 (4) of Chapter I in the UN Charter clearly claims the

prohibition of the use of force against other nation states.
All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations
(Article 2, Section 4).502
This evidently shows that the principles of equal sovereignty and non-intervention
should not be violated in international society.

Nevertheless, Article 42 and Article

51 of the Chapter VII in the Charter of the United Nations have been recognized as
the basic guiding principles for the use of force in contemporary international society.
Should the Security Council consider that measures
provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea,
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade and other operations by air, sea, or
land forces of Members of the United Nations (Article
42).503
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security. Measures taken
by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain
or restore international peace and security (Article, 51).504
These two Articles obviously show that the use of force is not absolutely prohibited
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Available at the website: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
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due to the principles of non-intervention and equal sovereignty.

In contemporary

international society, the use of force can be, in some sense, justified whenever
absolutely necessary to prevent ‘the threats to peace,’ ‘the breaches to peace’ and ‘the
acts of aggression.’ The above two Articles have been most times respected by UN
member states in international society.

And also, the use of force has been

sanctioned only on the authority of the Security Council (Mayall, 2000: 319-332).
All of these reasons can justify the use of force in current international society.
However, in reality, in international society, we can observe many other
legitimate uses of force for many reasons, such as a right to intervene to put a stop to
serious human rights abuses or violation of international humanitarian law – e.g.
genocide, mass expulsion or systematic rape - and even a right to promote or restore
democracy (Byers, 2005:85).

Also, Great Powers’ use of force in international

society has been very often expected, whenever the UN failed to respond to the crisis,
such as East Timor, Rwanda, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. In particular, as the
reasons of the UN’s failure to response to the crisis, we can think of the cases that
some major powers’ interests are involved in the crisis or that there are different views
within the Security Council on the right of the UN to intervene in internal conflict –
e.g. we can still see perceive China and Russia’s opposition to UN’s humanitarian
intervention, even if the US, the UK and France support such intervention, which can
be seen as in Kosovo’s case (Hilaire, 2005:154).

Furthermore, Article 43 of the UN

Charter cannot be implemented in practice so far - Article 43 mentions:
all members make available to the Security Council, on its
call and in accordance with special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
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international peace and security. 505
Even Great Powers such as the US have not supported a standing U.N. army, and
Security Council has rarely asked the US to use armed force.

For instance, in the US,

Republican and Democratic members of Congress believe that this could weaken the
national ability to defend its own interest, if the US forces are used to serve on a
regular basis under UN command, like both conservative members of Congress’s
criticism on Clinton administration’s proposal to endorse Article 43 framework
(Glennon, 2003:340). The US is never expected to provide the US forces upon any
United Nations Security Council’s request complete freedom to use them, which
former Secretary of State, Warren Christopher revealed by saying “we do not exclude
the possibility down the road of an Article 43 kind of force, but I must say at this
point it seems quite remote”(Glennon, 2003:339-341).
Above, my point is that the use of force by Great Powers as legitimate can be
excused for maintenance and promotion of the well-being of international society.
Also, I attempted to demonstrate that the Security Council cannot be fully reliable in
international society, particularly if its resolution might influence some permanent
members’ own interest, which could be confirmed by the Kosovo crisis and the
Rwanda crisis, revealing the malfunction and limit of Security Council’s role in
dealing with international affairs.

Above, we can perceive the malfunction and limit

of the United Nations, Great Powers’ reluctance to follow the UN’s leadership due to
various reasons like Article 43, and the necessity of the role of Great Powers in
international society.506
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See Article 43 of Chapter VII in UN Charter, the website available at :
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chapter7.htm
506

Glennon reveals the relationship between the US and the UN.
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See Michael Glennon (2003).

As a matter of fact, in addition, as Tom Farer points out, on and off, states have
to adopt the choice of response to ‘urgent moral appeals’ rather than the choice of
‘rigid compliance with formal prohibition’ (Farer, 1993: 341).

At this point, the

moral appeal is aimed at Great Powers, since without the role of Great Powers, such
appeal will ultimately turn out to be in vain.

As mentioned above, the 1994

Rwanda’s genocide or the 2006 Sudan’s Darfur’s genocide undeniably demonstrate
how significant the roles of Great Powers are in international society.

All of these

obviously uncover that the use of force in international society cannot be limited to
individual state self-defense and collective self-defense of states alone (Article 51 of
Chapter VII in the UN Charter).

Great Powers should act unilaterally, whenever

necessarily, even in case that the five permanent members of Security Council cannot
reach the consensus for the use of force.

Bush revealed it in his letter accompanying

the submission of his National Security Strategy, saying “in the new world we have
entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action,” and “the greater the
threat, the greater is the risk of inaction”(Bush, 2002: v and 15, Jervis, 2003:373),
which can be, in fact, demonstrated by the US past experiences of its inaction until the
outbreak of WWI, WWII and 9/11.

The Great Powers’ action might prevent or at

least slow down the transition process of potential threat into a real major menace.
All in all, Great Powers’ use of force beyond boundaries can be legitimized /even
possibly legalized, as long as it is highly limited to outlaw states with decent price,
which can endorse the welfare of international society as a whole in the long run.
However, such use of force is not easy at all, and it cannot be expected all the
time in international society.

By December, 2006, around 3,000 Americans had lost
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their lives serving in Iraq, and 21, 000 Americans had been wounded. 507

Up to 2006,

the US had spent around US $400 billion on the Iraq War and the cost was around US
$8 billion per month.508 Approximately $2 trillion for the final cost of the U.S.
involved in Iraq was expected.509

Especially, when considering the fact that Iraqi

casualties had been over 150,000 deaths and around 2 million Iraq’s people left Iraq to
Syria since 2003, the price is high. 510 This can be one lesson for Great Powers to
choose the option of use of force.

Nonetheless, it is not wrong to alter the outlaw

state, but instead, it might not be wise to do in terms of timing and price.

However,

what if Iraq will eventually turn out to be a decent leading democratic regime in the
Middle East?
In the Cold War and the post-Cold War era, the US’s promotion of democracy
can be seen as Great Power’s role, even if we can mostly perceive some different
characteristics in the US promotion of democracy between in the Cold War period and
in the post-Cold War period, such as a simple ideological struggle.

Panama’s case

(Dec. 20, 1989) might be a good example for the US’s promotion of democracy.
might be similar to Iraq’s case.

It

Nevertheless, Grenada’s case (Oct. 25, 1983) might

be different from Iraq’s case since “the US never claimed that it was intervening in
Grenada to restore democracy”(Byers, 2005: 87). Michael Byers made a good point
by saying:
While the right of self-defense in protection of nationals
was the primary goal justification advanced by Washington,
507

See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin
Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K.
Simpson (2006:32).
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the defense of democracy claim garnered the most support
from academics. Professor Anthony D’Amato of
Nothwestern University described US actions in Panama
(and previously Grenada) as milestones along the path to a
new non-statist conception of international law. Professor
Michael Reisman of Yale University heralded a new era in
which
the
people,
not
governments,
are
sovereign…….The US government invoked democracy
to support the invasion of Panama in two ways: as the
exercise of a right to act unilaterally to promote
democracy in other countries, and as the provision of
assistance to a democratically elected head of states,
Guillernmo Endara, who had ostensibly consented to the
action (Byers, 2005:88-89).
At this juncture, I want to emphasize people rather than government as sovereign,
which reflects some parallel between Panama’s case (General Manuel Noriega’s
dictatorship) and Iraq’s case (Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship).

Maybe, Panama’s

case might open the door toward ‘Great Powers’ use of force for the promotion of
democracy’ in the post-Cold War era and 21st century.

Nevertheless, the 1999

Kosovo intervention, the 2001 Afghanistan intervention and the 2003 Iraq invasion
can be seriously taken as examples for Great Powers’ use of force as legitimate and
further legalized possibly in the late 21st century.
Along with weapons of mass destruction and Al-Qaeda’s linkage with
Saddam’s regime, the liberation of Iraqi people was one of primary excuses for the
Iraq War, which can be seen in the spectrum of the old liberal idea and a liberal antipluralist international society. 511 As Gerry Simpson puts it, via the Gulf War in 2003,
the coalition of the US and UK got the Iraqi people to sovereign right which had been
taken away from them by the dictatorship (Simpson, 2005:7).

In Simpson’s terms,

the 2003 war was for substantial sovereignty rather than formal sovereignty which is
511

The two reasons, the weapon of mass destruction and Al-Qaeda’s linkage with Saddam’s regime
seemed to turn out to be non-sense. Nevertheless, we might accept the US fear on the WMD in some
sense as one of primary causes of the US invasion of Iraq. I will touch on this in the below.
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Koskenniemi’s idea such as Kuwait’s formal sovereignty exercisable by the state of
Kuwait (Simpson, 2005:7).

Simpson claims that the US and UK invasion of Iraq

could be interpreted as even the protection of substantial sovereignty (Simpson,
2005:7).

This claim can facilitate the assumption that the use of force can be used

for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, if the target regime is absolutely
an outlaw state.

Along with this logic, it might be justifiable that in March, 2003,

the US toppled the Baathist regime, and the US has transformed the country into a
functioning liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 2004:95).

In his speech on February 26,

2003, George W. Bush stated: “we meet here during a crucial period in the history of
our nation, and of the civilized world.

Part of that history was written by others; the

rest will be written by us, ” and he laid out the agenda for democratization of Iraq and
for the transformation of the politics of much of the Middle East which includes the
progress on the Israel-Palestinian dispute and the promotion of pluralism in the Arab
World (Fukuyama, 2004:95).

At this point, I claim that Great Powers might have

full privileges to use even their physical force for the promotion and consolidation of
democracy, if it is ultimately necessary to boost up the wellbeing of international
society in the long run.

Nevertheless, as mentioned above, international law has still

officially prohibited the use of force for pro-democracy, and even in current
international society, the use of force is still hardly accepted for the promotion and
consolidation of democracy, without condemnation from some countries.

But, we

can make the use of force possible as long as it can be highly limited to the alteration
in the identity and characteristics of outlaw states alone.
We can see Iraq in this sense.

Condoleezza Rice made remarks concerning

Iraq, when she revealed some level of justification of the US and UK’s invasion of
Iraq, by saying:
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In the past two generation, it was Saddam Hussein who took
a society that was already rife with sectarian and religious
divisions and drove it to the brink of the state of nature.
He committed genocide and filled mass graves with 300,
000 souls. He slaughtered entire villages of Shia and
Kurds. And he carried out a nationwide policy of ethnic
cleansing to make Iraq’s Sunni minority dominant
throughout the country. To be certain, he repressed a good
number of Sunnis, too.512
This does not only reflect the invitation of external intervention to such wrong-doing
in Iraq, but also the necessity of democracy in Iraq.

In fact, when considering Iraq’s

circumstance, as Byers points out, what other kind of intervention can be legitimized,
in particular if we know that pro-democratic intervention can ultimately become a
panacea to governments’ atrocities against their own civilians, their invasions of
neighboring states for their own interests, and even terrorism? (Byers, 2005:91).
At this juncture, the US and the UK’s invasion of Iraq can be legitimatized in
some sense, and this can be illustrated with Great Powers’ role of ‘dominance’ in my
understanding that can be characterized with a strong concept of hegemony and a
weak concept of dominance in Bull’s terms in a liberal anti-pluralist international
society.

Great Powers’ role of dominance can be the alterative mechanism to

socialization so as to bring out Iraq’s new identity and characteristics.

As

constitutive relationships between agents and structure, in particular, mutually
constitutive relationships between Great Powers and structure (a liberal anti-pluralist
international society) imply, Great Powers can be legitimatized to promote democracy
in Iraq via their use of force, and a liberal anti-pluralist international society advocates
the role of Great Powers in promoting and consolidating democracy. 513

512

Former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice made speech at Ewood Park, Blackburn, United
Kingdom, on March 31, 2006.
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As Robert Jervis points out, we should keep in mind the fact that Small Powers’ and the Middle
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Dominance can be advocated by the US National Security Strategy of
September 2002, G.W. Bush’s remarks, and neo-conservatives such as Elliot Abrams,
Paul Wolfowitz, Irving Kristol and Charles Krauthamer.

For instance, first, we can

think of Paul Wolfowitz’s “Defense Planning Guidance” draft’s primary three points
in 1992: “The number one objective of U.S. post-Cold War political and military
strategy should be preventing the emergence of a rival super-power”; “Another major
U.S. objective should be to safeguard U.S. interests and promote American
values”(democracy, human rights as well as capitalism); and “If necessary, the United
States must be prepared to take unilateral action.”514 Second, we can assume “the
Bush Doctrine”: “A policy of preventive war, should the US or its allies be threatened
by terrorists or by rogue states that are engaged in the production of weapons of mass
destruction”;“The right of self-defense should be extended in order to authorize preemptive attacks against potential aggressors, cutting them off before they are able to
launch strikes against the U.S.”; and “The duty of the US to pursue unilateral military
action when acceptable multilateral solutions cannot be found.”515 Third, we can
observe the documents of the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, which emphasizes the idea that the US’s possession of unprecedented and
unequaled strength and influence in the world must be used to favor freedom. 516 All
of these can clearly reflect US dominance, which can help us understand the US
invasion of Saddam’s Iraq in some sense.

Powers’ values and norms (even the Great Powers’ allies) can rarely influence Great Powers’ ideas and
behaviors. See Jervis (2003:388).
514
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515

See, for more information concerning Bush Doctrine, the website available at:
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However, the above seems to focus too much on the US’s self-interest alone.
For instance, according to an April 2002 poll, the overwhelming majorities of people
in many European countries felt that the US policy toward Iraq and the Middle East in
general was based primarily on its own interests.517 Also, when considering that
George W. Bush emphasized American military supremacy beyond challenge and
when that the Bush administration walked away from the Kyoto treaty, the
International Criminal Court (ICC) and the protocol implementing the ban on
biological weapons, the US’s role itself in international society appears to focus on its
own narrow national interest alone.

Further, the US invasion of Iraq might be

misunderstood as to even build its empire, in pursuit of control of the supply of oil as
economic interests and of penetrating its influence into the region of the Middle East
as political interests.
short and biased.

However, as Jervis points out, such criticisms might be too

For instance, the desire to control a large supply of oil was not the

primary motivation for the Iraq’s war, when considering that 15 of the 19 terrorists of
9/11 were Saudi Arabian nationals and Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest net oil
exporter, containing 261.9 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. 518 ‘Why not Fahad’s
Saudia Arabia but Saddam’s Iraq?’ In fact, the National Security Strategy of the U.S.
reveals the relationship between the US dominance and the welling-being of
international society, by saying:
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty
and totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the
forces of freedom and a single sustainable model for
national successes: freedom, democracy, and free
enterprise…. Make the world not just safer but better….a

517

See Adam Clymer (2002).

518

See “Country Analysis Briefs: Saud Arabia.” The website is available at:
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/saudi.html
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path is not America’s alone.

It is open to all. 519

We can think of this in connection with the US and UK’s invasion of Iraq as well.
As mentioned in Chapter I, due to the end of the Cold War era ideological struggle,
the promotion of democracy is highly likely to be realistic.

In particular, as for the

Bush administration, it could be a time of great chance to promote democracy in the
Middle East (Jervis, 2003:381).520 Also, we can think of other reasons such as outlaw
state status and the US fear of WMD and Terrorism for its preventive war, even if the
US’s economic and political interests cannot be totally disregarded, because today’s
terrorism, WMD and tyrannical governments themselves can literally pose a great
threat to security not only to the US and but also to the general interest of
international society.

Robert Jervis made some points concerning preventive war, by

saying:
These threats cannot be contained by deterrence. Terrorists
are fanatics, and there is nothing that they value that we can
hold at risk; rogues like Iraq are risk-acceptant and
accident prone. The heightened sense of vulnerability
increases the dissatisfaction with deterrence, but it is
noteworthy that this stance taps into the longstanding
Republican critique of many American Cold War policies.
One wing of the party always sought defense rather than
deterrence. Because even defense may not be possible
against terrorists or rogues, the United States must be
ready to wage preventive wars and to act against…
emerging threats before they are fully formed, as Bush
puts it. Prevention is not a new element in world
politics, although Dale Copeland’s important treatment
exaggerates its previous centrality. Israel launched a
preventive strike against the Iraqi nuclear program in 1981;
during the Cold War, U.S. officials contemplated attacking
the USSR and the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) before
519

See “The National Security Strategy Of The United States of America.” September 2002. The
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The Bush administration called the US invasion of Iraq as preemptive attack. But we should say
that instead of preemptive attack, we have to call it preventive attack, which is the proper description
and use for the US invasion of Iraq.
375

they could develop robust nuclear capabilities (Jervis,
2003:369-370).
Above, instead of simple deterrence or defense, the idea of the preventive war might
work in a more efficient way, and it could be interpreted in a broad way; the war for
the promotion of democracy, even though it must be highly limited to the outlaw
states alone that pose the great threat to Great Powers and general interests of
international society.
Actually, the idea of preventive war itself reflects the idea of US dominance,
since the preventive war doctrine is based on strength and on associated desire to
ensure the maintenance of the US dominance with a high degree of confidence (Jervis,
2003: 370).

Thus, we can say that Great Powers’ (the US and UK’s) role in the

promotion and consolidation of democracy in Iraq can be understood in terms of
preventive war and their role of dominance in some sense.

In other words, the US

and UK’s invasion of Iraq as their contribution to Iraq’s initial stage for new national
building process toward a decent democratic regime along with a new identity and
character can be understood as the role of Great Powers and the US’s dominance
relationship with Iraq.

Outlaw states cannot be guaranteed sovereign equal rights, in

particular when they pose great threat against the whole international society and face
Great Powers whose privilege and responsibility are primarily for the maintenance
and wellbeing of international society. 521 Saddam’s Iraq was obviously put into the
category of outlaw states, and so the U.S./U.K. coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq and
their alteration in Iraq’s identity and characteristics could be understood as Great
Powers’ duty.

The Bush administration articulated, especially in the president’s June

2002 West Point speech and in the National Security Strategy of the United States
521

See, for more information, Simpson (2004).
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(2002), a doctrine of preemption or, more properly, preventive war that in effect
would put the United States in a position of governing potentially hostile populations
in countries that threaten it with terrorism (Fukuyama, 2004:95).

G.W. Bush

mentioned outlaw states at West Point on June 2002 by saying:
Today our enemies see weapons of mass destruction as
weapons of choice. For rogue states, these weapons are
tools of intimidation and military aggression against their
neighbors. These weapons may also allow these states to
attempt to blackmail the U.S. and our allies to prevent us
from deterring or repelling the aggressive behavior of rogue
states. Such states also see these weapons as their best
means of overcoming the conventional superiority of the
U.S. (Jervis, 2003:369).
When considering this, the US and UK’s promotion and consolidation of democracy
in Iraq via their use of force should be considered as the process of Great Powers’
tasks for promotion and consolidation of their values, which can alter the identity and
character of outlaw states and bring out more peaceful and better international society.
We might even think that in the absence of a strong US and UK’s international
intervention, their security and value will be threatened (Jervis, 2003:383), and the
whole picture of international society might be far worse and more darkened than now
- e.g. fascism over democracy, socialism over capitalism, depression over freedom,
and genocide over human rights.
All in all, in general, it is still very hard to expect the use of force in
contemporary international society, except for some cases like Chapter VII of the UN
Charter and Security Council Resolutions.

However, in the 21st century, we might

expect more flexible use of force for the maintenance and wellbeing of international
society, in particular to alter the identity and characteristics of outlaw state, promoting
democracy.

Iraq can be a good example.

The Bush administration believed that

liberation of Iraq would produce democracy there, and furthermore, it would
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encourage democracy in the Middle East, with its strong beliefs that the more
democracies that exist, the greater the stability, the more peaceful the relationships
among them, and the lower the threat of terrorism. 522 As Jervis puts it, if Iraq’s new
regime ultimately becomes a mature democracy and it can bring out stability to the
Middle East, not to mention discouragement of tyrants and encouragement of
reformer in whole international society, we can think of the US and UK’s invasions of
Iraq as worthwhile (Jervis, 2003:386).

Through Iraq’s case, we can see the role of

Great Powers in the democratic development across international society, even with
their use of force.

This can be made possible in the US’s dominance over Iraq in a

liberal anti-pluralist international society.
b. Great Power’s Presence in Iraq and Democracy
In this section, I will seek the positive relationships between Great Powers’
presence and democratic development in Iraq.

Nevertheless, in some sense, foreign

occupation/presence of troops might be misunderstood as the symbol of imperialism.
The second stage, ‘presence’ can be understood as a process for building the decent
democratic nation of Iraq.

This period was expected to get Iraq to adopt democratic

social and cultural structures, and adjust itself to them in order to sustain and
consolidate democratic political structure in Iraq, which could be seen in Great
Powers’ role of dominance in Japan and Germany.

Nevertheless, this did not

necessarily mean that Great Powers completely would abolish Iraq’s distinguishing
cultural and social intuitions.

Instead, they fused differences into harmony, which in

the past could be observed in Japan’s success of democracy. 523 Thus, we can say that
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the US and the UK’s rebuilding decent democratic regime has been regarded as Great
Powers’ great contribution to Iraq’s distinguishing path toward democracy in some
sense.
Since the end of the Gulf War in 2003, the US and the UK-led coalition forces
had been present in Iraq on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 1483 and
1637.524 This had facilitated building Iraq’s nation as a decent democratic regime
which should be different from Saddam Iraq’s identity and characteristics.

In the

past, the US and the UK’s troops had been relatively around 141,000 and 7,200
troops, along with approximately 16,500 military personnel from the twenty-seven
coalition partners, in Iraq.525

Also, the US had set apart a total of around $34 billion

to advocate the reconstruction of Iraq, of which around $21 billion had been set for
the ‘Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund.’526

The Bush administration requested

$1.6 billion for reconstruction in FY 2006 and received $ 1.485 billion, and it
requested $750 million for FY 2007.527

On January 11, 2007 G. W. Bush made a

statement, announcing 21,500 troops which would be sent to Baghdad, primarily
focusing on its order and security.

When looking into the US’s great aid to Iraq’s

civilians, we can think of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP)
that was installed to authorize U.S. military commanders in Iraq to respond to

524
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humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements for immediate assistance for
Iraq’s civilians and for the reconstruction of Iraq.528 For instance, we can think of
economic assistance like “trash pickup, water, sewers and electricity in conjunction
with clear, hold, and build operations.”529 This program was given a total $ 753
million in FY 2006.530
The above demonstrates well that the primary purpose of the US and UK-led
forces’ presence cannot be to colonize Iraq or install their puppet government in Iraq.
Instead, their primary goals are to assist Iraq’s government to secure order, to bring
back ordinary lives to Iraq’s civilians and to ultimately facilitate Iraq’s democracy.
These can be the fundamental steps to build up liberal democracy in Iraq.

The US

and UK forces’ presence had been quite necessary, when considering the violence by
Sunni Arab insurgency, Shiite militia and death squads and, as a small portion, by al
Qaeda and affiliated Jihadist groups.531 This might be the US and UK’s national and
moral interests in preventing Iraq from sliding into chaos as well. 532 In fact, Tony
Blair’s remarks help us understand the US general intention toward other states in
international society.

Tony Blair mentions:

One of the reasons why it is now so important to win the
conflict is to ensure that others do not make the same
528
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mistake in the future. That in itself will be a major step to
ensuring that the next decade and the next century will not
be as difficult as the past. If NATO fails in Kosovo, the
next dictator to be threatened with military force may
well not believe our resolve to carry the threat through.
…. At the end of this century, the U.S has emerged as by
far the strongest state. It has no dreams of world
conquest and is not seeking colonies.
If anything
Americans too ready to see no need to get involved in the
affairs of the rest of the world. America’s allies are always
both relieved and gratified by its continuing readiness to
shoulder burdens and responsibilities that come with its sole
superpower status (Blair, 2004:111).
This can be advocated by G.W. Bush’s remarks.

George W. Bush stated, at West

Point on June 1, 2002, “America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish.

We

wish for others only what we wish for ourselves – safety from violence, the rewards
of liberty, and the hope for a better life.”

Further, the Iraq Study Group Report

reveals how the US has made some effort to push Iraq toward democracy, via various
means including debt relief.

It states:

The US is also recently working with the United Nations
and other partners to fashion the International Compact
on Iraq.
The goal is to provide Iraqis with greater debt
relief and credits from the Gulf States, as well as to deliver
on pledged aid from international donors. In return, the
Iraqi government will agree to achieve certain economic
reform milestones, such as building anti-corruption
measures into Iraqi institution, adopting a fair legal
framework for foreign investors, and reaching economic
self-sufficiency by 2012.533
These disclose that the US has never had any intention to colonize Iraq for its own
national interests, like, purely oil purpose occupation.

These help us confirm the

idea that the US and UK’s presence of troops in Iraq was primarily for democratic
development and prosperity in Iraq and for general interests of international society.
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However, as mentioned earlier, Iraq’s steps toward democracy have so far
required high prices.

For instance, due to sectarian cleansing, in particular inside or

around Baghdad, around 1.6 million had been displaced within Iraq, and around 1.8
million Iraqis had fled Iraq. 534 The Iraq Study Group Report described Iraq’s
situation well:
Four of Iraq’s eighteen provinces are highly insecure –
Baghdad, Anbar, Diyala, and Salah ad Din.
These
provinces account from about 40 percent of Iraq’s
population of 26 million. In Baghdad, the violence is largely
between Sunni and Shia. In Anbar, the violence is
attributable to the Sunni insurgency and to al Qaeda…In
Kirkuk, the struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen.
In Basra and the south, the violence is largely an intra-Shia
power struggle. The most stable parts of the country are
the three provinces of the Kurdish north and part of the Shia
South…..However, most of Iraq’s cities have a sectarian
mix and are plagued by persistent violence.535
In consideration of this, we could hear a loud voice against the US and UK’s presence
of troops in Iraq such as about 66% of Americans’ disapproval of the Bush
administration’s handling of the war.

Further, the Iraq Study Group led by James

Baker, III and Lee H. Hamilton even recommended their troops’ rapid withdrawal
from Iraq due primarily to the high price, and suggested that at least the US should
not make an open-ended commitment to maintain large numbers of American troop
deployment in Iraq.536
However, as for me, the Iraq Study Group’s suggestion did not seem plausible
enough to be accepted, and in some sense, its suggestion itself could be recognized as
self-controversial, when considering that it was deeply concerned about the impact of
534
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instability derived from Iraq’s violence on ‘Iraq’s interest,’ ‘regional interest’ and
‘general interest’ of international society, which could not be separable from the US’s
interest, while simultaneously advising the US forces’ withdrawal from Iraq by early
2008, before Iraq could be secured and stabilized for the young democracy’s taking
root in Iraq.

The Iraq Study Group even said “if the situation in Iraq continued to

deteriorate, the consequences could be severe for Iraq, the US, the region, and the
World.”537 On January, 20, 2007, The US Defense Secretary, Robert Gate mentioned
“the failure of Iraq is not an option.”538 The Iraq Study Group emphasized Iraq’s
circumstances by saying:
Continuing violence could lead toward greater chaos, and
inflict greater suffering upon the Iraqi people. A collapse
of Iraq’s government and economy would further crippled a
country already unable to meet its people’s needs. Iraq’s
security forces could split along sectarian lines.
A
humanitarian catastrophe could follow as more refugees
are forced to relocate across the country and the region.
Ethic cleansing could escalate. The Iraqi people could
be subjected to another strongman who flexes the
political and military muscle required to impose order
amid anarchy. Freedom could be lost. Other countries
in the region fear significant violence crossing their borders.
Chaos in Iraq could lead those countries to intervene to
protect their own interests, thereby perhaps sparking a
broader regional war. Turkey could send troop into
northern Iraq to prevent Kurdistan from declaring
independence. Iran could send in troops to restore
stability in southern Iraq and perhaps gain control of oil
field. The regional influence of Iran could rise at a time
when that country is on path to producing nuclear
weapons.539
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When considering the above, we can perceive that the Iraq Study Group recognized
the instability and disorder derived from sectarian violence, rather than from the
presence of the US and UK’s troops.

However, its ultimate suggestion was Iraq’s

own political reconciliation and US rapid withdrawal of troops by early 2008.

But,

as for me, unlike the Iraq Study Groups’ judgment, nothing could be solved by itself,
and human disaster would get worse and worse. I believed the presence of the US
and UK’s troops as quite necessary, at least for basic security and order so as to build
up successful democracy in Iraq.

Furthermore, I agreed with the Bush

administration’s decision to send additional 21,500 troops to Iraq, (17,500 troops to
Baghdad and 4,000 troops to Sunni Anbar Province) on January 11, 2007, which was
totally opposite to what the Iraq Study Group suggested.
reasons for this one.

540

Below, I will reveal seven

First, the troops primarily focused on the Baghdad arenas.

The stability and security of Baghdad and its near arenas should be guaranteed as
prior, which is common sense.

With no order and no security in the capital, what

could we expect? We could not expect others such as even political reconciliation
without order and security.
Second, with additional troops, the US should literally be more engaged in
stopping civil strife.

As for me, the US military position for Iraq's civil war was

primarily its reluctance to stay in, due to two reasons: its fear of another Vietnam War
and Maliki's government's halting the US engagement in civil strife.

However,

without its more active engagement to stop civil strife, there would be no chance to
get the political reconciliation among the opposition groups.
cannot be effectively carried out (Bull, 1977).
540

Without order, justice

In other words, without order, justice

I appreciate Dr Eric Herring’s criticism on my support toward the US additional 21,500 troops on
which G.W. Bush made announcement.
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will be more likely to turn out to become a victim.
demonstrate this point.

Rwanda and Bosnia’s cases

Without active engagement in civil strife with more troops,

Iraq would hardly reach even political reconciliation - first, stop violence and then
carry out whatever - e.g. reconciliation and democracy.
Third, some scholars doubted that 21,500 troops would be enough.

They

wanted to withdraw the US troops from Iraq, saying “the US has power but it does not
have capability to stabilize Iraq and to make successful democracy in Iraq.” They
also argued that the purposes of additional troops were not new enough to alter Iraq’s
environment.541 Maybe, they might be right.

However, the US had been reluctant to

be fully engaged in stopping civil strife, as mentioned above.
could expect a better chance to stabilize Iraq.

With full swings, we

According to one of Korean proverbs,

if you stop in the middle of the process, it will be far worse than doing nothing.

If

the US dropped its task (even to guarantee security and order as the foundation for
building up democracy in Iraq) in the circumstance that around 34, 500 Iraqi
people/civilians and policemen were killed in 2006, Iraq’s situation would have gotten
worse and worse.

We could not expect Iraqi voluntary political reconciliation by

itself, not to mention Iraq’s democracy, as ethnic cleansings could be hardly stopped
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo without external intervention, especially Great
Powers’ intervention.

Further, we should not expect Iraq to become a democracy by

itself, by saying “after toppling Saddam's regime, everything is up to you.” We
should not forget that Iraq was a failed state in 2006 and 2007, and Iraqi history had a
cycle of violence, dictatorship and rebellion. 542

541

Roni Bart and Eric Herring tend to reveal negative perspective on the Bush Administration’s
decision. See the website available at:http://scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0701/S00189.htm
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See, for more information, an appendix in my dissertation.
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Fourth, democracy does not emerge very easily.

Japan had a US military

government (around 1945-1952); and Germany (around 1945-1955), and both of them
still have US military forces on their territory: Japan (around 40,000 troops) and
Germany (around 70,000 troops).543Also, the US had been continuously indirectly
engaged in building up and guiding decent democracies in both countries.

That's

why we can see today’s prosperous two democratic states which have exceedingly
contributed to the order and wellbeing of international society (especially in Asia and
Europe).

These examples cannot be exactly identical to Iraq’s case.

But for

certainty, the US and UK troops’ presence in Iraq could contribute to forming
democratic social and cultural structure to cultivate and maintain democratic political
structure.

In particular, when considering the Shia population is overwhelmingly

larger than the Sunni or Kurd, Iraq’s democracy might sprawl into a majority rule, an
empty formalism in Jack Donnelly’s term.
not a majority rule alone at all.

As mentioned in Chapter I, democracy is

One of significant elements for democracy is

‘harmonious interests’ on the basis of the guarantee of minority rights – e.g.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

In order to secure the

harmonious interests, first of all, we have to assure the rule of law in Iraq’s society,
which is one of the reasons why the US and the UK’s forces should be present in Iraq
for a while.

On January 21, 2007, Iraq’s government spokesman Ali Al-Dabbagh

said in his interview with CNN, revealing the plan aiming at crackdown on both
Shiite militias and Sunni insurgents, “Nobody will be untouchable here in Iraq now.
Everybody will be subject to the law, and whether he/she is from any party or any sect,
543

See “Japan.” GlobalSecurity.org. The website is available at:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/okinawa.htm Also, see Tim Kane, “Center for Data
Analysis Report Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2003.” The Heritage Foundation. The website
is available at:http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/cda04-11.cfm
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whether he’s Sunni or Shiite, the plan will not exclude anyone.” 544

Now that the rule

of law has been efficiently applied to Iraq's society, while Shias, Sunnis and Kurds
have been treated equally under the rule of law, today we can see that sectarian bias
has been reduced and sectarian violence has gradually disappeared as well.
Fifth, as a Great Power, the US has more responsibility and privilege to deal
with international affairs.

On average, 535,000 troops from 1950 to 2000 have been

spread across international society and more than a fifth of all U.S. servicemen were
stationed on foreign soil.

Indeed, according to the 2003 datum, 387,920 troops were

stationed on foreign soil. 545 They are in more than fifty states - e.g. Germany, Japan,
Republic of Korea, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Thailand, Spain, Turkey, Canada,
Cuba (Guantanamo-bay), Iceland, Mexico, Taiwan, Greece, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
etc.546 And by mid-2006, 150,000 US troops were in the Middle East, such as
Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait, not to mention Iraq. 547 Today, its defense budget is more
than around US $600 billion which no state can dare to challenge in international
society.

Indeed, the 2006 US defense expenditure was approximately US $535

billion.

On average, in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, the US defense

expenditure has been far more than $350 billion.

The US has had enough power

which no state can dare to challenge in international society, and furthermore, it has
had enough capability to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance and wellbeing of international society.

In terms of Iraq, the US has had enough capability to

stabilize Iraq and get Iraq to become a mature democracy in the long run, which can
544

See “25, U.S. Troops die on one of deadliest days in Iraq.” CNN. January 21, 2007.

545

See Robert Longley. “Database Tracks U.S. Troop Deployment Since 1950.” The website is
available at: http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/defenseandsecurity/a/troopdeploy.htm
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Ibid.
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See the website available at:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_United_States
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greatly contribute to the well-being of international society.

It is right that as a Great

Power, the US did not leave Iraq in a bad past circumstance - on average, 100 Iraqis
died on a daily basis – in particular at least when considering the presence of the US
and UK forces as significant to secure the law and order in Iraq’s society.

Its

responsibility was and is to assist Iraq’s path toward a decent democratic regime.
Nevertheless, the US has made some mistakes and the Iraq Study Groups wrongly
suggested that the US troops would better get out of Iraq by the early 2008, leaving all
of burdens to Iraq’s people with its hope that every conflict would be solved by itself.
Sixth, in the 21st century, Iraq should be one of prior US foreign policies, since
as Joseph Lieberman, a Democratic Senator from Connecticut in US pointed out on
December 29, 2006, the failure in Iraq would be a strategic and moral catastrophe for
the United States and its allies, and furthermore for the whole international society.548
The Iraq Study Group acknowledged this point, even saying “The Iraqi government
cannot now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of the US,” the UK
and others.549 The US withdrawal from Iraq’s past disastrous circumstance, itself
would have been not only ‘immoral’ but also ‘irresponsible.’

All of these

demonstrate that the US and UK troops’ withdrawal seemed, in reality, very hard to be
materialized.

Nonetheless, the Iraq Study Group wrongly suggested the opposite

direction, ‘the US immediate withdrawal of troops’ due to the US military burden. 550

548

See Joseph Lieberman (2006).

549

See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin
Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K.
Simpson (2006:32).
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I admit that there had been a loud voice to request the US and UK troop’s withdrawal from Iraq.
But, as for me, it does not make sense that the US should withdraw its troops due to its lack of military
capability. We can think of several options, if the US needed more troops in Iraq. For instance, the
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Seventh, many people were concerned with the idea that the Iraq War might be
another Vietnam War.

However, in fact, the US’s withdrawal of troops itself would

bring out similar outcome to what the US faced after its withdrawal of troops from
Vietnam.

We should keep in mind the fact that there are significant differences

between the Vietnam War and the Iraq War.

The US and UK troops’ presence in Iraq

was primarily to transform Iraq’s identity and characteristics from an outlaw state to a
democratic state, whereas the US troops’ presence in Vietnam was primarily for its
illusive thought of domino theory.

Also, the US troops’ presence in Iraq was neither

for its support of one side (Sunnis) nor the other side (Shias), but it was for Iraqis’
reconciliation and democracy in Iraq, whereas in Vietnam, the US troops’ presence
was deeply involved in civil war, supporting the authoritarian Saigon regime
(Republic of Vietnam) fighting against Viet-Cong (National Liberation Front) - as
Great Britain supported Sunnis alone during its occupation of Iraq (1920-32).
Further, around 4500 U.S. casualties in Iraq might be dwarfed, when compared with
Vietnam – the death of 58, 000 U.S. military personnel. 551 These are distinguishing
points between the Iraq War and the Vietnam War.

However, the US rapid

withdrawal of its troops from Iraq might have brought out a similar outcome, ‘the lost
war’ in the Middle East. In fact, as mentioned earlier, its side effect might have been
bigger than Vietnam syndrome – e.g. more severe civil strife, a haven for Al-Qaeda,
and Iran’s influence.

All in all, the US troops’ presence in Iraq was not wasting its

massive resources and time in the Middle East, but it contributed to not only Iraq’s
democratic development but also ultimately to the well-being of international society.
US could have redeployed some of its troops from other regions such as Europe and East Asia to Iraq.
The US has around 400,000 troops oversea.
551

See “Iraq War still being compared to Vietnam.” Examiner.com. The website is available at:
http://www.examiner.com/a-527732~Iraq_War_Still_Being_Compared_to_Vietnam.html
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The US troops’ presence was needed at least until peace ultimately settled in Iraq.
For me, all seven reasons can advocate the US troops’ presence in Iraq as the
necessity rather than the given option.
Along with the US, the UK as a Great Power had made its dedication of an
extraordinary amount of resources to Iraq’s democracy, not to mention its contribution
for Iraq’s stability and order; and in addition to 7,200 troops, the UK had been an
active player at every stage of Iraq’s political development in spite of its military
death toll of 119 by 2006. 552 Like US, the UK felt some level of moral and political
obligation to facilitate Iraq’s democratic development, which required its military
presence at least for helping its security and stability.

In fact, on December 12, 2006,

UK Defense Secretary, Des Browne told MPs that British forces would Not cut and
run from Iraq.553 This shows as a Great Power, the UK’s determination to play a
significant role in building up the foundation for democratic development in Iraq.
There were several evidences for the UK forces’ contribution to Iraq’s democracy.
For instance, the UK forces transferred Basra’s security to Iraq’s forces by the spring
of 2007.

This can confirm the UK intention to authentically assist Iraq’s democracy

rather than to colonize it for oil or to set its puppet government.

Also, unlike the

UK’s past biased support for the Sunni sectarian group alone during its occupation of
Iraq (1920-1932), the UK has been supporting the harmonious relationship among
Sunnis, Shias and Kurds, which can be essential for democratic development in Iraq.
On December 7, 2006, British Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that the US and the
UK (along with their coalition forces) had pursued no sectarian biased policy, in his
552

See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin
Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K.
Simpson (2006:32). Also, see “ The UK military death toll in Iraq.” BBC News. October, 24, 2006.
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See ”UK Won’t cut and run from Iraq.” BBC News. December 12, 2006.
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visit to Washington, emphasizing the significance of Iraq’s democracy to Iraq itself,
its region and international society as a whole, not to mention the US and UK’s
interests.554 At this juncture, we can say that the presence of the US and UK troops
did not simply assist Iraq’s national building process, but also Iraq’s democratic
development along with Iraq’s new identity and characteristics, which would
ultimately bring out regional interests and general interests of international society in
the long run.
As for me, the US and UK-led coalition forces should stay in Iraq until, at
least, it can accomplish its short-term goal of policy that “Iraq can govern itself,
sustain itself and defend itself” as the fundamental foundation for Iraq’s democratic
development.555 Nevertheless, if possible, I hoped that the US and the UK troops
would have continued to remain until Iraq became a mature democracy like Japan and
Germany, since this could facilitate the emergence and maturity of a democratic social
and cultural structure to maintain and consolidate a democratic political structure in
Iraq.

If we think of Foucault’s terms ‘disciplinary power,’ ‘discourse,’

‘normalization’ and ‘knowledge,’ the US and UK troops’ presence in Iraq could be
understood as helping Iraq democratize itself little by little. 556 On December 29, 2006,
the execution of the dictator Saddam Hussein on the basis of the outcome of Iraq’s
judicial process, that is, ‘the rule of law’, which is for his past cruelty and crimes
554

Iraq was occupied by Britain during the course of World War I; in 1920, it was declared a League of
Nations mandate under UK administration, and it had been governed by the UK until Iraq attained its
independence in 1932. See the website available at:
http://www.businessbookmall.com/Editorial%20Iraq%20History.htm
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See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin
Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K.
Simpson (2006:40).
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Recently, I have enjoyed reading Tanja E. Aalberts’s dissertation/book, “Politics of
Sovereignty”(2006). She tried to develop triad among sovereignty, international law and international
society, using Foucault’s logics. We can think of Iraq’s democratic development in Foucault’s terms.
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against humanity via his terrorizing his nation and Iraq’s neighboring states, such as
148 victims from the village of Dujail and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, could match the
international legal standard, and this could be recognized as Iraq’s movement toward
democracy, in terms of equality before the rule of law (rather than gun before law).
This was made possible under the US and UK troops’ presence in Iraq.557 This
reminds me of E.H Carr’s remarks in his work, “Conditions of Peace”:
power will be required both to afford the guarantee of
reciprocity and fair treatment which is a condition of any
international system, and to check the inclination of local
interests to exploit chaos for short-terms advantages (Carr,
1942:255).
Also, the presence of Great Powers, the US and the UK’s troops in Iraq in
international society which I described as a liberal anti-pluralist international society,
for democratic promotion and consolidation, might not seem liberal in some sense. 558

557

We might think of neo-trustship as a possible option to support democratic development in the
post-cold war era and 21st century. As a matter of fact, the presence of the US troops and UK troops
in Iraq might be understood as its comparison to neo-trustship in some sense, which might be a
plausible mechanism to alter the identity and characteristic of the outlaw states, quasi-state or failed
states, via its promotion and consolidation of democracy in some sense. Richard Caplan, James
Fearon and David Laitin introduce the concept of neo-trusteeship. Fearon and Laitin state: “The
terms (neo-trusteeship) refer to the complicated mixes of international and domestic governance
structures that are evolving in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and,
possibly in the long run, Iraq. Similar to classical imperialism, these efforts involve a remarkable
degree of control over domestic political authority and basic economic functions by foreign countries.
In contrast to classical imperialism, in these new form of rules subjects are governed by a
complex hodgepodge of foreign powers, international and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), and domestic institutions, rather than by a single imperial or trust power asserting
monopoly rights within its domain. In contrast to classical imperialism, but in line with concepts of
trusteeship, the parties to these complex interventions typically seek an international legal
mandate for their rule. Finally, whereas classical imperialists conceived of their empires as
indefinite in time, the agents of neo-trusteeship want to exit as quickly as possible, after
intervening to reconstruct or reconfigures states so as to reduce threats arising from either state
collapse or rogue regimes empowered by weapons of mass destruction (WMD).” See Fearon and
Laitin (2004:7). Here, when considering the aspects of neo-trusteeship, neo-trustship might be
misunderstood as imperialistic, which can be seen in China’s colonization of Tibet. However, neotrustship might not be imperialistic. Nevertheless, it is a possible coercive and anti-democratic
mechanism to rebuild a decent liberal democracy, by using Great Powers along with international
organizations and non-governmental organizations that might be recognized as for rebuilding a decent
liberal democracy.
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As mentioned in Chapter I, in terms of liberal anti-pluralism, Tanja. E. Aalberts pointed out the lack
of toleration in liberal anti-pluralism (2006:153). But as for me, the primary mechanism, the use of
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However in fact, the presence itself was quite necessary to build up the foundation for
Iraq’s liberal democracy in the long term, in particular the transformation from Iraq’s
past identity and character such as illiberal, indecent and criminal state to liberal,
decent and democratic regime.

At least, the presence of Great Powers’ troops in Iraq

for certain period could accelerate democratic progress in terms of social, cultural,
political, and even economic structures.

The presence of Great Powers does not

necessarily mean Great Powers’ elimination or devaluement of Iraq’s distinguishing
social and cultural institutions and structures, but instead it should mean the
harmonious fusion of different aspects such as Iraq’s distinguishing façades and
democratic façades, which can be seen in Japan’s successful democratic story. 559 In
terms of this point, Great Powers need to make more efforts to understand the target
states’ social, cultural, political and economic structures.

Nevertheless, there were

many problems for the US efforts to bring out fruitful outcome.

For instance, all of

US efforts in Iraq, military and civilian had been often handicapped by Americans’
lack of language skills and their lack of social, cultural, political and economical
understanding.

This could give Iraqi people a bad impression of Americans, such as

stupidity and arrogance in harsh expression.

The top US diplomat, Alberto

Fernandez admitted that American had been ‘stupid’ and ‘arrogant’ in Iraq for the
downward spiral in Iraq, even though he apologized for his comment later. 560 The
Iraq Study Group Report revealed the reality of the lack of personnel to link

force of liberal anti-pluralism might not be liberal, but we should keep the idea that the use of force in
liberal anti-pluralism should be allowed as long as the use of force is highly limited to the outlaw states
alone.
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See Buzan and Segal (1998).
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See “US’ arrogant and stupid’ in Iraq.” BBC News. October 22, 2006.
retracts Iraq remarks.” BBC News. October 23, 2006.
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Also see “US official

Americans with Iraqis.

It said:

Our embassy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of
whom are at the level of fluency……Civilian agencies
also have little experience with complex overseas
interventions to restore and maintain order – stability
operations – outside of the normal embassy setting. The
nature of the mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous,
and the United States has had great difficulty filling civilian
assignment in Iraq with sufficient numbers of properly
trained personnel at the appropriate rank. 561
Nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean that there was no process of the
alteration in Iraq’s identity and characteristics via the fusion and harmony of
differences.

In fact, the fusion of differences is possible, as South Korea, Japan,

Malaysia and Indonesia demonstrate.

And in international society, Iraq is not the

first case for Great Powers to alter the identity and characteristics of a certain state via
their presence such as Japan, Germany, Italy, and the Philippines.

If all in all Iraq

ends up becoming a decent democratic state along with assistance from Great Powers,
through its process of alteration in its identity and characteristics, Great Powers’
military presence in the conflicting state will be worthwhile as others such as Japan
and Germany’s successful democracies demonstrate.

Nonetheless, it cannot be

guaranteed to be successful all the time whenever Great Powers attempt to alter the
identity and character of target states via their presence of troops. In terms of Iraq’s
case, however, like in Japan and Germany, the US and the UK committed massive
amount of troops, time and money for building up a decent democratic Iraq.

This

indicates a highly positive outcome in Iraq in the long run. 562
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See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin
Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K.
Simpson (2006:92).
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Besides, I already mentioned the distinction between Iraq War and Vietnam War. Also, the US
and UK’s involvement is derived from the incentive of authentic assistance in a large part, rather than
from pure rational calculation such as oil and US influence in the Middle East, in particular when
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c. Great Powers’ military withdrawal from Iraq and Democracy
In this chapter, honestly, I have to say that I am not reluctant to mention about
Great Powers’ withdrawal of troops from Iraq, since the US already decided to
withdraw its troops from Iraq until December 18, 2011, though its withdrawal was a
conditional basis to guarantee Iraq’s security.

But, unlike the Iraq Study Group’s

proposal – i.e. withdrawal by the early 2008 -, this kind of withdrawal does not
disturb me very much.
withdrawal decision.

Indeed, I am okay with the Obama administration’s

However, once again, in this section, I will briefly stress the

danger of the rapid withdrawal without any condition, even if I already mentioned this
in the previous section.
The Iraq Study Group Report itself recommended that the US had better
withdraw its force by early 2008.

However, the early 2008 withdrawal itself was

controversial, irresponsible and immoral, which could bring out the similar outcome
with that of Vietnam War.

According to the UN report, more than 34, 400 civilians

and police were known to be killed in 2006 in violence across the country.563 Severe
insecurity and instability could hardly be ignored. In this circumstance, the US rapid
withdrawal itself without any condition might bring out further human disaster, as
well as the rule by fear, which would further the extremist cowards in their attempts to
take power, by manipulating the fears of the people. 564 Also, another Saddam’s
dictatorship was expected to take place, which put Iraq back into its historical cycle of
considering more than 60% of the US public which supported its withdrawal of troops (CNN News,
January 2007). The US and UK involvement is for more than simply oil and Iran’s challenge against
the US dominant power.
563

Also, see “New figures
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See “Bombers rock Baghdad University.” BBC News. January 17, 2007.
show 23,000 Iraqis killed in 2006:paper.” Reuters. January 8, 2007.

See “IRAQ: It is too late for U.S. to pull out.” The Florida Times Union. January 8, 2007.
see “Bombers rock Baghdad university.” BBC News. January 16, 2007.
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violence, dictatorship, and rebellion.

Besides, we can think of other reasons for

opposition to the US and UK’s rapid withdrawals without any condition in the Middle
East: three civil wars in the Middle East – i.e. Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine which have
been deeply involved in Iran and Syria; fragile regimes in Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and Iraq; and Terrorism (Al-Qaeda’s violence).565 Thus,
the failure of Iraq itself might lead to chaos in the Middle East and in international
society as a whole, because it could have had a great impact on its neighboring states
such as Iran (Shias), Turkey (Kurds), Jordan, Syria, Israel and Palestine, in particular
geo-political and economic sense.

When considering a broad picture concerning

Iraq, it was very hard to expect that the US would rapidly withdraw its troops from
Iraq by early 2008.

In fact, importantly, Iraq has become the hub of the US interests

in the Middle East and the priority of the US foreign policy.

As mentioned earlier, as

for the US, economic and political interests could not be ignored as well, when Iraq
has the second largest proven oil reserves in the world and when Iran appears to be a
rising regional power with its potential nuclear weapons. 566 This reflects the reality
that the US could not simply walk out of the Middle East region, standing by and
watching the possible outcomes such as Iran’s growing influence as well as Iraq’s
becoming a possible haven for Islamist terrorists and a battle zone for civil strife.
However, I did not expect the US and UK’s troops to stay for decades until Iraq’s
democracy becomes mature and successful enough.

I preferred a flexible time table

to withdraw the US and UK’s troops from Iraq on the accordance with Iraq’s progress
level of stability and security, which is ultimately related to Iraq’s democratic
development.
565

See David Rothkopf (2006).
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Ibid.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I started with the concept and role of Great Powers, and
showed Great Powers’ different impact on democratic development, such as interestoriented socialization, value-oriented socialization and the use of force.

Also, I used

three preponderant types of Great Powers, ‘hegemony,’ ‘primacy’ and ‘dominance.’
These relatively different preponderant types of Great Powers reflect the different
degrees of the use of force, such as ‘reluctance of the use of force,’ ‘legitimacy,’ and
‘the habitual use of force.’ In consideration of these, I tried to primarily emphasize
the role of Great Powers in promoting and consolidating democracy, while
simultaneously revealing the inevitable relationship between Great Powers and
predominant norms of international society.

This can facilitate democracy as the

emerging new standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and 21st century.
And we can see the historical limited progress in international society, such as the end
of the slave trade (the early 19th century), compliance with international law beyond
Western states (the late 19th century), self-determination (1960s), human rights
(1980s) and democracy (possibly post-Cold War era and 21st century).

When

considering Great Powers’ rights and duty for the maintenance of international order
and promotion of well-being of international society, we cannot deny Great Powers’
contribution to historical limited progress in international society.

In the post-Cold

War era and 21st century, Great Powers have put a great impact on the promotion and
consolidation of democracy in international society.

In this chapter, we could see the

triad relationship between democracy, the nature of international society and Great
Powers as an outcome of the limited progress, and especially how Great Powers can
adopt different mechanisms to push states toward democracy.

Like other chapters,

China, South Korea and Iraq help us understand how Great Powers’ relatively
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different preponderant types can influence democratic developments, while in the
awareness of different structures of international society: pluralist, solidarist and
liberal anti-pluralist, and in the awareness of different relationships between Great
Powers and lesser powers: hegemony, primacy and dominance.

Great Powers do not

use a single method to promote and consolidate democracy, and they have to adopt
their various methods for democratic developments, in accordance with each state’s
characteristic and identity and each international society’s characteristic, let alone
different relationships between Great Powers and lesser powers.
Great Powers cannot explain every international affair in international society,
but their norms, interests, behaviors, and relationships with others elucidate
international affairs well enough, since their perception and interests have been
widely shared with many other powers.567 In the post-Cold War era and 21st century,
the US and UK, as Great Powers, have promoted and consolidated democracy across
international society.

As we have observed that in Europe, Asia, America, Africa,

and the Middle East, the increasing numbers of states have become democratic, Great
Powers’ norm, democracy and more states’ adoption of democracy cannot be regarded
as simply co-incident.

Taken together, Great Powers have greatly influenced

democratic development in international society in the post-Cold War era and 21st
century.

We cannot separate democratic success from the role of Great Power that is

very critical for the well-being of international society.

567

As Bull points out, we cannot disregard the close co-relationships between Great Powers’ interests,
and general interests of international society. Hedley Bull states “in the 1940 and in the 1950s, the
United States became heir to the tendency to identify its own interests with those of the world at large,
which Carr had found in Britain in the 1930s.” See Hedley Bull (1969).
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Chapter V. International Organization and Democracy
Introduction
In Chapter IV, I pointed out the UN’s failing role in the management of
international affairs.

However, it does not necessarily mean that it is completely

useless and ineffective.

Instead, I have to say that its function is still recognized as

significant, even if there are many weaknesses and malfunctions in a UN system.

In

other words, generally, international organizations might be misunderstood as a
simple tool for Great Powers or as an impotent mechanism in international society,
but, we should keep in mind the fact that they can be still recognized as one of the
significant institutions maintaining the order and promoting the well-being of
international society, let alone even their contribution to the expansion of international
society.

Indeed, many international relations scholars recognize the important role

of international organizations in international society.

For instance, unlike neo-

realists such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer, 568 liberals and neo-liberal
institutionalists like Robert O Keohane are well aware of the significant role of
international organizations in international society.

Also, English School scholars,

like Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Barry Buzan and Peter Wilson are aware of the
significant role of international organizations as the secondary institutions of
international society in Barry Buzan’s term, along with their obsession with the
primary institutions of international society (Evan and Wilson, 1992: 341, Barry
568

As for neo-realists, international institutions are simply “epiphenomenal.” See, for more
information, Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), Chap.6. Also see Stephen D. Krasner (1983:5).
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Buzan, 2002).

When considering the above, we can say that international

organizations cannot be disregarded in order to properly comprehend international
relations in a broad sense.

Nevertheless, many international organizations need their

reforms to get them to function in a more effective way in the evolutionary nature of
international society.
As indicated in other chapters, as democracy starts becoming the new
emerging standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society
in the post-Cold War era and 21 st century, the significant role of international
organizations in democratic development cannot be undermined, in particular when
considering that as indicated above, international organizations have become an
increasingly ever-present part of international relations and so their presence in an
international arena cannot be disregarded (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke,
2005:9).

In this chapter, I will focus on how international organizations can have an

impact on democratic development in international society.

Also, in the process, like

previous chapters, with regard to different structures of international society – i.e.
pluralist, solidarist, and liberal anti-pluralist - I will reveal that each different
international society partly determines how international organizations can have an
impact on democratic development, including election monitoring to encouragement
of transparency.

For instance, we might think that more election monitoring, more

encouragement of transparency and more sanction or enforcement mechanisms as
primary examples can be seen relatively in pluralist, solidarist and liberal antipluralist structures of international society, albeit I admit that there is not a
distinguishing clear-cut line, but a blurred line.

Indeed, three case studies, China,

South Korea, and Iraq can help us understand how international organizations can
bring about different paths toward democracy due to their relative different
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international societies.

All in all, we cannot disregard the significant role of

international organizations in democratic promotion and consolidation across
international society.

Also, in Chapter V., I will be given a chance to explain how

the international organizations are one of the important institutions to maintain
international order and security and to promote the well-being of international society,
importantly, albeit I will put more emphasis on international organizations’
contribution to democratic promotion and consolidation – i.e. the expansion of
international society - in the long run.

Indeed, I will reveal that as the secondary

institution of international society, international organizations have implemented
numerous missions for the management of international society, the well-being of
international society, and even the expansion of international society.

Below, first of

all, I will start with the origin and definition of international organizations as the
secondary institutions of international society, and I will touch on the roles of
international organizations in international society before examining their impact on
democratic development.
1> International Organization
I will start with examining the origin of international organization.

When we

look into the historical development of international organizations, we can notice that
there are many precursors of contemporary international organizations (Armstrong,
Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:1).

First of all, we can think of a treaty or contact

between two rulers as one of the origins of international organization, as Gerard J.
Mangone mentioned “the treaty or contract between two rulers for an enduring record
of interstate practice” of the past can be regarded as the first step toward international
organization (Mangone, 1954:14).

For instance, we can find various treaties among

ancient Greek city-states toward international organization.
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Gerard J. Mangone

pointed out this, by saying:
Although the Greek people were politically divided into
city-states, the homogeneity of their religion and culture
encouraged a multiplication of interstate agreements beyond
all other ancient experience. Well over 200 inter-Aegean
treaties have been reckoned prior to 338 B.C. Frequent
warfare among the Greek cities called for numerous articles
of peace, but these terms often went further than the
settlement of current claims by providing for arbitrary
tribunals composed of both the litigants and a neutral to
smooth out any new frictions arising between signatory
states. In both the One Year Armistice (423 B.C.) and the
Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.), the Athenians and Spartans
agreed in the event of future disputes to have recourse to
law…..as many be agreed upon between the parties. Not
only were treaties of alliance abundant in Greece, but
several pacts included an exchange of citizenship and
reciprocal trading privileges for the contracting parties
(Mangone, 1954:14).
In addition, we can think of various leagues as a significant step toward the
international organization.

From the perspective of early international organizations,

we can think of the several amphictyonic councils and political confederations as the
unique pattern of Greek history, which contributed to the emergence of international
organizations (Mangone, 1954:18).

Gerard J. Mangone made a good point on this,

by saying:
The amphictyonic councils, of which the Delphic council
was the most illustrious, were composed of representatives
of those tribes devoted to the same temple. Bound by the
same religion, some city-states would agree upon the joint
maintenance and security of holy places and provide for a
council to discuss or manage such matters. The council
members swore to observe the inviolability of shrines and
the safety of pilgrims, and they pledged themselves to
moderate rules of warfare: for example, the interruption of
water supplies and the razing of cities were forbidden. The
Delphic Amphictynoy, however, touched political regulation
only as an incident to its function as a religious cooperative
(Mangone, 1954:18).
The Amphictyonic Council of ancient Greece was not a means to manage the
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consequences of the sovereign independence of the city states, but a celebration of
cultural unity among the Greeks, such as common religious observance and the
protection of the shrine at Delphi (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:1).
However, importantly, its members were required to swear an oath designed to limit
the harm they could do to each other in the event of war, and so this might be
regarded as the basis for the argument that the Amphictyonic Council was an
International Governmental Organization (IGO), albeit unfortunately this argument
was, by and large, disregarded (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:1).
Moreover, we can say that, as a legacy of ancient Rome, Christianity had
greatly contributed to the emergence of international organizations.

For instance, the

Roman Catholic Church was the most international institution emerging into a role
which would put its emissaries in every Christian capital, call great international
councils, and actually transcend political sovereignties (Mangone, 1954:15-16).
This can be regarded as a step toward the modern international organization.

In

particular, in Renaissance Italy, living in the memory of the continuous international
relations of Rome and united by a common Christian faith hardened international
customs and multiplied international agreements (Mangone, 1954:17).

However, the

hypothetical unity of Western Christendom led to questions about the validity of
perceiving it as a true association of independent political communities (Armstrong,
Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:2).
Importantly, also, the practices of a regular meeting of heads of government or
their representatives in modern international organizations, as periodic gatherings,
originally grew out of the 1815 Congress of Vienna (Congress System) (Feld, Jordan
and Hurwitz, 1983:2).

Quite importantly, at this juncture, “the congress system” was

inaugurated with the Congress of Vienna as the first international organization in
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September 1814 (Russett and Oneal, 2001:159). And, the Congress of Vienna can
be seen as a starting point of the modern international organization, when the
Napoleonic War can be a historically distinguishing line between the past (above) and
the modern international organization (Mangone, 1954:28).

From this point onwards,

indeed, we can notice that there are three big differences between the past and the
modern international organization (Mangone, 1954:28).

With respect to the modern

international organization, we can notice the followings:
first, the stress is on a multilateral agreement rather than a
bilateral accord; second, treaties under modern international
organization attempt to harmonize continuity and selfperpetuation of the basic document with modification of the
terms; and third, most characteristically, modern international
organization is institutionalized by periodic councils and
permanent secretariats (Mangone, 1954:28).
These three aspects can be seen in the Congress of Vienna as the first modern
international organization.

Also, we can notice that the Congress opened the new era

of international organization into the stream of international politics, in particular
when considering that the Congress of Vienna gathered to clear up the unsettled
political problems which the years of warfare had raised in Europe, and that it opened
the age of consultation in international organization as the big step toward the
development of the modern international organization (Mangone, 1954:35, 40).569
In the nineteenth century, importantly, the fact that the industrial revolution
struck Europe greatly contributed to the emergence of many international
organizations (Mangone, 1954:67).

As a result of industrialization, various

international problems emerged (Mangone, 1954:67).

In fact, David Armstrong,

Lorna Lloyd, and John Redmond made four points on this, by saying:

569

Multilateral conferences cultivated the habit of consultation. See Mangone (1954:51-53).
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First, the greater number of international transactions
increased the risk of conflict arising out of some trivial
dispute….Secondly agreed regulations and common
standards had to be determined for such purposes as
patenting inventions, classifying goods for customs duties
and deciding exchange rates between currencies….. Thirdly,
the traditional insistence by states upon a rigid interpretation
of their sovereign rights was emerging as a significant
barrier to the efficient conduct of international
business….Fourthly, the economies of the major powers
were becoming increasingly interdependent, which provided
them with certain mutual interests to set against their many
rivalries (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:2-3).
Thanks to these kinds of complexity, by the nineteenth and early twentieth century,
governments sought new forms of interstate cooperation, which has been known
gradually as international organizations (Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz, 1983:1).

This

ultimately brought about a favorable environment for the emergence and proliferation
of international organizations (Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:2).

Indeed,

many different kinds of international organizations were created; for example,
Telegraph (An International Bureau of Telegraphic Administrations), Postal Union
(the Universal Postal Union), Health (Alexandria Health Council), Science (the
International Geodetic Association and the Metric Union), and Commerce (a sugar
union) (Mangone, 1954:73-89).570 These kinds of organizations became specialized
agencies of the United Nations system after WWII (Claude, 1968:33).

This clearly

demonstrates that the 19th century international organizations greatly contributed to
the development of modern international organizations.
The Hague system also greatly contributed to the development of modern
international organizations.

Most importantly, a leading feature of the Hague System

was its approach toward universality, which is different from a club of European

570

At this juncture, we can see some functionalist tendency.
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Great Powers, that is, the Concert of Europe whose primary concerns were about
European community’s interests alone (Claude, 1964: 6-7).

In the Hague conference

in 1907, for instance, the representatives of all constituted states had met together to
talk about interests which they had in common and which contemplate the good of all
mankind (Claude, 1964: 25). Importantly, with regard to universality, the Hague
system included non-European states and small states on equal terms with the great
powers (Claude, 1964: 25).

In short, at the Hague, even non-European and small

states enjoyed independence and equality as much as Great Powers did (Claude, 1964:
25).

Hence, the Hague Conferences ushered in the signal of global international

organizations – i.e. the League of Nations and the United Nations – beyond mere
European organizations (Claude, 1964: 28).
However, the events of 1914, such as the outbreak of WWI, proved that
sporadic consultation could not suit the rapidly mounting international pressures of
the twentieth century, and so in 1919, world leaders created the real modern
international organization – i.e. the League of Nations (Mangone, 1954:61-62).

In

other words, the League of Nations was created to prevent the accidental war in the
future (Claude, 1964: 41).

In fact, the League tried to assure each member to submit

its own disagreement with another member to either judicial remedies or the Council
of the League before waging the war (Mangone, 1954:133).

With regard to the

development of international organizations, the League of Nations was very
meaningful.

There were differences between the nineteenth century international

organizations like the Congress of Vienna, and the twentieth century international
organizations such as the League of Nations.

For instance, if we say that the

nineteenth century was an age of international consultation on political affairs, we can
say that the twentieth century began a period of collaboration (Mangone, 1954:128).
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In other words, the League of Nation was the mechanism for states to collaborate on
the serious problems which influence the peace of the world.
development of modern international organizations.

This contributed to the

Also, the creation of the League

of Nations can be conceived as the first attempt to combine into one general
organization the different elements of organizational improvement which had
appeared during the previous century (Claude, 1968:33).

Indeed, Inis L Claude

emphasizes that the League was the first general international organization in several
senses (Claude, 1968:33).

Inis L. Claude states about it:

(a) it pulled together the threads of the great-power council,
the general conference of statesmen, and the technically
oriented international bureau; (b) it was a multipurpose
organization, although its primary focus was on the political
and security problems of war and peace; and (c) it was, in
principle, a world-wide institution, even though it retained
much of the nineteenth-century emphasis upon the centrality
of Europe in international affairs (Claude, 1968:33-34).
All in all, we can possibly say that the League of Nations itself clearly indicates the
development of modern international organizations.
However, now that the League of Nations could not stop WWII, world leaders
created the new system to prevent war, which was the United Nations (UN) for
international collaboration (Mangone, 1954:154).

But, like the creation of the

League of Nations, the creation of the United Nations was primarily for the
prevention of accidental war in the future.

Indeed, after WWII, the League of

Nations was eventually replaced by the UN, and the UN got its major features from
the nineteenth-century heritage and the lessons of experience, both positive and
negative, given by the League (Claude, 1968:34). Thanks to this, we can say that the
UN should be recognized as the total collection of the past international organizations
including the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations (Claude, 1964: 54-55).
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Today, the UN comes to be understood as the central component of a various and
decentralized system of international institutions including autonomous specialized
agencies and regional organizations (Claude, 1968:34).

Importantly, unlike the

drafters of the League of Nations, the creators of the UN were aware of the difference
between the objective requirements and the subjective possibilities of an effective
world order, and so, unlike the League of Nations, the UN has been continuously
playing an important role in managing international society and it is continuously
expected to play a crucial role in managing international society and even in
expanding international society (Claude, 1964: 65).
Along with the birth of the UN, many international organizations including the
European Economic Community (EEC), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) have greatly thrived since the end of WWII (Russett and Oneal,
2001:160).

For instance, there were 37 international organizations in 1909, 132

international organizations in 1956, and 293 international organizations in 1990
(Russett and Oneal, 2001:160).

Indeed, the expansion of international organizations

are still lasting today (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:4).

Their numbers have

not only increased visibly, but also their political significance, their financial
resources and their personnel have increased (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:4).
In the 21st century, thus, we can expect many international organizations to continue
to thrive.
Let us turn to the examination of the definition of the international
organization.

First of all, the term ‘international organization’ came into both

scientific and everyday vocabulary astonishingly lately (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch,
2006:5).

During the last third of the 19th century, expressions like international
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public union, international office or commission were commonly used for
international organization (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5).

The term

‘international organization’ was presumably introduced in scientific discourse around
1867 by the Scottish legal scholar James Lorimer in some of his later publications
(Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5).
Frantz

was

campaigning

By 1880, the German publicist Constantin

“federalism

as

a

principle

organizations”(Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5).

for

international

And, importantly, Georg

Jellinek considered international organization under the study of association between
states (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5).

More importantly, the term

‘international organization’ was indirectly acknowledged in Article 23 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations, which indicates the creation of specialized
international organizations for the endorsement of international cooperation, although
Article 24 of the Covenant used the older expressions like international office and
commission (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:5-6). Eventually, only after WWII,
most importantly, a comprehensive concept of international organization was accepted
and the organizations themselves adopted this name (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch,
2006:6).
However, it is not easy to clearly grasp the definition of international
organization, even if it is defined as the secondary institution of international society
in Barry Buzan’s term, since regime is also the secondary institution of international
society. 571 Indeed, as Robert O. Keohane put it, the term, ‘institution,’ itself is a fuzzy
concept (Keohane, 1989:162).

Let us compare the regime with international

organizations, in order to grasp the definition of international organization better.

571

See Barry Buzan (2002).
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First of all, let us start with Stephen D. Krasner’s definition of regime.

Stephen D.

Krasner defines regimes as principles (beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude), norms
(standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations), rules (specific
prescriptions or proscriptions for action), and decision-making procedures (prevailing
practices for making and implementing collective choice) around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue area (Krasner, 1983:1-2). This definition has
been widely accepted in the arena of international relations (IR), but, as Buzan points
out, there are still some problems in Krasner’s definition of regime – e.g. no clear,
mutually exclusive concepts (Buzan, 2004a:163-167).
Robert O. Keohane attempts to define international regime with the following:
Regimes are institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by
governments that pertain to particular sets of issues in
international relations. In Oran Young’s terminology, they
constitute ‘negotiated order’ (Young, 1983:99). Examples
include the international monetary regime established at
Bretton Woods in 1944, the Law of the Sea regime set up
through United Nation-sponsored negotiations during the
1970s, and the limited arms control regime that exists
between the United States and the Soviet Union (Keohane,
1989:4).
And, also, Robert O. Keohane defines international organization with the following:
Formal
intergovernmental
or
cross-national
nongovernmental organizations. Such organizations are
purposive entities. They are capable of monitoring activity
and of reacting to it, and are deliberately set up and
designed by states. They are bureaucratic organizations,
with explicit rules and specific assignments of rules to
individuals and groups. Hundreds of intergovernmental
organizations exist, both within and outside the United
Nations system.
Cross-national nongovernmental
organizations are also quite numerous (Keohane, 1989:3-4).
At this juncture, the definitions of international regime and organization can help us
grasp the distinction between international regime and international organization.
Unlike the primary institutions of international society, international organizations as
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the secondary institutions of international society are physical entities possessing
offices, personnel, equipment and budgets, along with bureaucratic creations designed
to achieve specific ends and satisfy well articulated goals and needs (Evans and
Wilson, 1992:340).

Thus, international organizations have contributed to the

efficiency of a wider, and more fundamental, set of the primary institutions (Evans
and Wilson, 1992).

In Wight’s and Bull’s writings, for example, organizations like

NATO and GATT are significant to the extent that they strengthen and make more
efficient the more basic institutions - primary institutions of international society, such
as diplomacy, international law, and the balance of power (Evans and Wilson, 1992).
International organization is usually understood as international governmental
organization, since its membership is sovereign state (Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz,
1983:2).

However, in my dissertation, international organization should be

interpreted with inclusive terms rather than exclusive terms, in particular when
considering that None Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can often be instigated
by governmental organizations or funded by governments, and some NGOs
implement some tasks for the government, albeit NGOs are not governmental bodies
(Vedder, 2007:3). Thus, international organizations can be recognized as three main
types, international governmental organizations (IGOs), regional organizations and
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs).572 They have been primarily
for promoting cooperation on various issues including resolution of conflict situations
(Feld, Jordan and Hurwitz, 1983:2).

572

In general, an NGO is defined as “an essentially non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is
organized at a local, national, or international level, and is locally, nationally, or internationally active.”
Also, it depends at least in part on donations from private citizens. According to the World Bank,
NGOs can be defined as private organizations in pursuit of activities to alleviate suffering, elevate the
interests of the poor, look after the environment, offer basic social services, or carry out community
development. See, for information, Anton Vedder (2007: 2 -3).
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From now on, I will touch on the nature of international organizations.

I

will attempt to demonstrate that realists or liberals alone cannot explain the nature of
international organizations.
international organizations.

There are different kinds of perspectives on
Those different kinds of perspectives on international

organizations are necessary to understand them better.
realist perspective on international organizations.

First of all, I will start with a
Realists are highly likely to

classify states in terms of a hierarchy on the basis of material capability (Pease,
2003:47).

And so, realists account for the creation and nature of international

organizations via a power hierarchical relationship (Pease, 2003:47).

In other words,

there are certain hierarchical relationships among states in international organization –
e.g. the UN Security Council. 573 For realists, international organizations are simply
adopted by powerful states to carry out their power politics more effectively and to
strive for their self-interest (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:15). Indeed, for
realists, international organizations should be understood as the social arrangements
among states by which the interests of the powerful are institutionalized (Pease,
2003:47).

Thanks to this, the existence of a hegemon possessing tremendous power

resources determines the establishment and the success of international organizations
(Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:15).

Also, international organizations can only

contribute to international cooperation if a hegemonic state is willing to endure an
over-proportionate percentage of the cooperation costs – hegemonic condition -and it
ties other states into the organizations via the judicious use of carrots and sticks
(Keohane, 1980, Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:16).

For many realists, thus,

the rise and fall of international organizations, let alone their maintenance, are

573

See Barry O’Neill (1997).
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determined by hegemony (Keohane, 1984:31).

To put it differently, we can

ultimately say that for many realists, as leading states decline and other states rise, the
international organizations comprising that world order are either portrayed as
obsolete or are reshaped to reflect the new power distribution (Pease, 2003:48).
There are many examples to support the above realist arguments.

The

Concert of Europe was “an exclusive club for great powers," whose self-appointed
members guarded the European community and directed its affairs, and so we can call
the Concert of Europe a concert of great powers (Claude, 1964: 6-7).

And, in the

nineteenth century when the modern international organizations such as the Congress
of Vienna started emerging, the opinion of the small disinterested states was not
recognized as relevant to the solution of international political conflicts (Mangone,
1954:58).

Also, many people assumed that the League of Nations was doomed to

fail because of the abstention of the US – i.e. Great Power (Claude, 1964: 249).
Indeed, E. H. Carr contended that the League of Nations needed the overwhelming
predominance of power of its supporters in order to make it work properly in an
international arena that reflected discrimination, unfairness, and power politics
(Archer, 2001:117).

And, the UN Security Council’s five permanent members are

composed of major powers.

Indeed, founding fathers of the UN proposed and

proceeded to build the UN upon the belief of major powers unity (Claude, 1964: 20).
Hence, an effective UN system cannot be possible without genuine collaboration
among major powers or in the opposition to major powers, let alone the absence of
their various supports including military and finance (Claude, 1964: 69).

During the

Cold War era, the UN could not efficiently work due to two superpowers’
competitions – i.e. the US and the USSR -, particularly in the case that the UN actions
could hurt superpowers’ interests.

This indicates that the effectiveness of
413

international organizations is closely correlated to the powerful states (Pease,
2003:47).

And, as another example, during the Cold War era, NATO was basically

an American instrument to manage power in the face of the Soviet threat
(Mearsheimer, 1994-5:13-14). All of these are good examples to indicate that power
matters seriously in international organizations.

At this juncture, as John J.

Mearsheimer put it, international organizations seem to be fundamentally “a reflection
of the distribution of power” in the world (Mearsheimer, 1994-5:7).
Above, I had examined a realist perspective on international organization. 574
The realist perspective does not seem to be wrong when considering numerous cases
to support realist assumption on international organizations.

However, we should be

aware of the fact that power is not panacea, though it is a necessary element to grasp
the nature of international organizations, and that international organizations cannot
be negligible in international society.

For instance, as for many realists, international

organizations simply bear the imprint of powerful states.
capabilities or interests of powerful states.

In short, they reflect the

However, as for weak states,

international organizations can be a mechanism to ameliorate powerful states’
domination.

For instance, the weaker states like Belgium, Portugal or even France in

the EU attempted to bind the stronger such as Germany into a form of relationship
that avoids domination (Archer, 2001:125).

In other words, international

organizations can play a significant role in containing the dominant powers, which is
quite different from a realist account that international organizations primarily serve
the interests of dominant powers.

Also, realists have failed to address global issues

574

Above, I did not mention many reasons why realists tend to undervalue the role of international
organization, in order to emphasize the role of power in international organization, but reasons are
significant to understand the realist perspective on international organization. The reasons are the
central logic of anarchy, security competition, dominance, struggle for power, relative-gain
consideration, self-help system, concern about cheating and so on.
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like welfare questions and pollution, which dominate the world of the late twentieth
and early twenty-first centuries, let alone their failure to predict the end of the Cold
War (Archer, 2001:126).

We know well that even the most powerful state cannot

solve global problems by itself, even though, as realists repeatedly emphasize, some
global issues are closely related with national security, in particular when considering
that no state alone can cope with global terrorism.

This clearly demonstrates the

necessity of international cooperation among states via international organizations,
regardless of Great Powers, Middle Powers and Small Powers.

As another critique, I

cannot completely deny the fact that mostly international organizations reflect the
interests of powerful states, but we can also notice some level of independence of
international organizations from powerful states. For instance, when considering the
following international organizations - the International Committee of the Red Cross,
Amnesty International, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the
World Confederation of Labor, the International Organization of Standardization, the
International Chamber of Commerce, the International Co-operative Alliance and the
World Federation of United Nation Associations, - we cannot say that international
organizations are simply instruments for powerful states.

In particular, the

International Committee of the Red Cross has provided relief assistance in warfare
and disaster zones, and has, by and large, looked after many suffering people whom
governments have been unable or unwilling to help (Archer, 2001:80).

Also,

Amnesty International has well coordinated massive pressure to help prisoners of
whatever political hue (Archer, 2001:80). Thus, at this juncture, we can see some
level of independence of international organizations.

Also, we can see that

international organizations cannot be a tool for major states alone, but also for the
common good of international society.

All in all, when considering the above
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critiques of a realist perspective on international organization, we need another
perspective, such as a liberal perspective, on international organizations to grasp the
nature of international organizations better, at least to know that there are other
important elements existing in international organizations.

Let us turn to the liberal

perspective on international organizations.
In general, we can even say that international organization is the typical
expression of liberalism, as international organizations like the League of Nations and
the United Nations found their philosophical origins in liberalism (Claude, 1964:13,
71).

In particular when considering that former US President Woodrow Wilson

supported the formation of the League of Nations to embody the conscience of the
community of nations and contribute to the creation of a worldwide public opinion
displaying the common norms and values of different societies, which might make
possible the prevention of war, we can clearly grasp the picture that international
organizations themselves reflect a liberal idea (Rittberger, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:21).
Unlike realism, liberalism is pretty optimistic about the contribution and
interdependence of international organizations in international relations (Pease,
2003:64).

For instance, though Mearsheimer claims “institutions are not an

important cause of peace, and institutions matter only on the margins”(Mearsheimer,
1994-5:7), liberals point out the significant roles of international organizations in
various issues: collective security, welfare of international society, promotion of
common values and norms – i.e. liberal norms and values – and assistance of victims
of international politics (Pease, 2003:64-67). 575 In other words, as for liberals,
international organizations are able to prevent war, mobilize human and material
575

In a later section, I will touch on the contribution of international organizations to international
society.
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resources, and spread norms and values in a great effort to cultivate good international
society, in particular when considering that today’s international organizations are
agents of socialization for a political and economic order via which everyone can
profit (Claude, 1964: 393, Pease, 2003:67).

In short, to liberals, international

organizations are not peripheral and negligible, but significant and influential in
international society.

Indeed, the fact that most international organizations have

proven to be quite stable and long-lived, in particular when considering that of the 34
international organizations that were present in 1914, 18 were still operating in 1989,
indicates the necessity of international organizations in international society (Russett
and Oneal, 2001:160).

Also, the fact that even two-thirds of Canadians surveyed in

January 2003 said that they would trust the UN rather than the Bush administration, in
case of the disagreement over the state of Iraqi weapons, confirms the necessity of
international organizations in international society. 576 All in all, as we can see,
liberalism can provide an alternative perspective to the realist perspective on
international organizations, in particular when considering that liberalism cherishes
the important role of international organization in the increase of international
cooperation and international interdependence, let alone its emphasis on the role of
non-state actors in international relations.

Indeed, at this juncture, as Keohane and

Nye put it, we can see that “in battle, the sword is mightier than the pen, but over the
long run, pen guide swords,” albeit this does not necessarily mean that either of them
can be disregarded (Keohane and Nye, 1977:242).
Let us take a look at a neoliberal institutionalist perspective on international
organizations in order to understand the liberal perspective on international
576

Ipsos-Reid/CTV/Globe and Mail poll was released on January 17, 2003. See Alexander Thompson
(2006:12, fn. 37).
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organizations better, which can ultimately help us comprehend the nature of
international organizations.

From now on, I will examine international organizations

via the spectrum of neoliberal institutionalism.

Unlike John J. Mearsheimer’s claim

that international organizations have minimal influence on state behavior, and so hold
little promise for promoting stability in international society,

neoliberal

institutionalists believe that, as an independent variable rather than a dependent
variable, international institutions can play a leading role in managing international
society, let alone their contribution to peace and stability (Mearsheimer, 1994-5:7).
Precisely speaking, for neoliberal institutionalists, international organizations are
collective goods to promote the mutual interests and development of common values,
and so they are valuable to states and will continuously remain even in the absence of
a hegemon (Keohane, 1984:244-6, Pease, 2003:63).

Indeed, though, as for

institutionalists, international organizations do not displace states, they enable states
to reach mutually beneficial, cooperative outcomes in international relations,
cultivating common values (Schweller and Priess, 1997:3, Pease, 2003:63).

Most

importantly, also, institutionalists tend to believe that international organizations can
temper the ill effects of anarchy and the suboptimal outcomes, while emphasizing the
principle of absolute gain rather than that of relative gain, and various mechanisms to
cope with the free ride problems (Pease, 2003:62-64).

Neoliberal institutionalists

argue the following positive and important roles of international organizations: to
lower transaction and information costs to member states; to regulate state behavior
and promote transparency; under condition of complex interdependence, to become
valuable assets to states; and to provide tangible benefits to members, who then come
to be willing to share the cost of preserving international organizations even after
hegemony, since non-hegemonic powers would find it rational and in their self418

interest to uphold existing international organizations (Koehane and Nye 1977:24-25,
35, Keohane, 1984, Keohane, 1989, Pease, 2003:62).577 All of these explain why
even rational egoists are willing to cooperate via international organizations and why
states continue to join international organizations in the decline or absence of
hegemonic power.
panacea.

Also, importantly, they demonstrate that power cannot be

Indeed, we should keep it in mind that what the UN most requires for the

purpose of helping to create a meaningful world community is not new instruments of
coercion, but precisely the various tools for doing useful work in the world which it
has been busily forming (Claude, 1964: 401).

However, at this juncture, as indicated

earlier, neo-liberal institutionalism itself does not necessarily mean the complete
failure of realism, in particular the neo-realist perspective on international
organizations.

As Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye claimed “complex

interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism”(Koehane and
Nye 1977:23), at this juncture, the neoliberal institutional perspective on an
international organization seems to be closer to reality than the realist perspective, but
not always at every circumstance, which can confirm that we need various
perspectives on international organizations in order to grasp the nature of the
international organization better.

This also explains why we need three traditions.

Let us turn to the contribution of international organizations to international
society.

International organizations have contributed to the governance and welfare

of international society.

And so, I will examine how international organizations can
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Complex interdependence has three main characteristics: first, multiple channels; second, an
absence of hierarchy among issues; and third, no military force by governments toward other
governments within the region, or on the issues, when complex interdependence prevails. Keohane and
Nye claim that under complex interdependence, international organizations help set the international
agendas, and act as catalysts for coalition-formation and as arenas for political initiatives and linkage
by weak states. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977).
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manage international society, contributing to the welfare and the expansion of
international society, which can help us understand the inevitable co-relationship
between international organizations and international society.

First of all, we have to

acknowledge that international organizations are necessary for international society.
When looking into the relationship between international organizations and
international society, international organizations should be recognized as more than
simple gadgets to cope with current problems in international society (Claude, 1964:
5).

Indeed we can possibly assume that international organizations reflect a

characteristic phenomenon of the international society, and also, international
organizations influence international society (Claude, 1964: 6-7). In other words, we
can say that international organizations reflect the fabric of international society, and
that the fabric of international organizations is not fixed and given but evolved on the
basis of the fabric of international society - e.g. today North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) is not the same as NATO during the Cold War era.

We can

also see that international organizations influence the fabric of international society –
e.g. the Congress of Vienna contributed to the end of the slave trade in international
society.

When considering this, we can hardly imagine the separation of

international organizations and international society.

In short, we should pay

attention to international organizations as a significant means to understand
international society, let alone the management of international society, the welfare of
international society and even the expansion of international society.
Let us examine how international organizations can govern international
society, investigating various functions of international organizations in international
society.

First, we can think that international organizations have contributed to the

deterrence of the destruction of international society.
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In terms of security, in

particular collective security, we cannot deny the significant role of international
organizations for international society.

Collective security has been the primary

concern of the builders of international agencies (Claude, 1964: 223).

For instance,

the balance of power system started being subject to significant revision, and the
principle of collective security emerged, when the League of Nations was formed
(Claude, 1968:37).

Indeed, we can see a great step toward the formal establishment

of the elements of a collective security system, when considering Article 10, Article
11, and Article 16 in the League Covenant (Mangone, 1954:160-162, Claude, 1964:
239).578 Gerard J. Mangone made a point on the collective security in the League of
Nations, by saying:
In the eyes of the League, a state committed an act of war
upon the community, and every member promised to sever
all commercial and financial relations with the aggressor
immediately. If the Council should decide upon further
coercion to protect the covenants of the League, it could
invite member states to supply contingents of military or
naval forces. Such troops would be permitted to cross the
territory of all member states in order to approach the
outlaw (Mangone, 1954:133).
Nonetheless, members of the League were unwilling to accept the obligations and
risks which an operative system of collective security connoted for them, and the
578

Article 10:“The member of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external
aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.
In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall
advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled”; Article 11: “Any war or threat of
war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a
matter of concern to the whole league, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise
and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations……”; Article 16: “Should any Member of the League
resort to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12, 13, or 15, it shall ipso facto be deemed to
have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake
immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all
intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention
of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking
State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. It shall be the duty
of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective
military, naval or air forces the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to
be used to protect the covenants of the League ……..” See The Covenant of the League of Nations.
The website is available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp
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League of Nations ultimately failed to translate the concept of collective security into
a working system – e.g. German and Japanese aggressions in the 1930s (Claude,
1968:37-38, Mearsheimer, 1994-5:33).

Also, indeed, as Inis L. Claude put it

(Claude, 1968:37), the principle of collective security can be clearly seen in the UN
Charter, in particular, Article 1, “to maintain international peace and security, and to
that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace.”579 Also, we can easily find some good examples concerning UN
collective security, such as the Korean War (1950-53) and the Gulf War (1991).

This

demonstrates that international organizations have facilitated collective security,
which has contributed to the maintenance of international society and the
management of international society.
With regard to security, we can think of various international organizations
like the UN, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and so on.

These international

organizations have greatly contributed to the governance of international society, in
particular the security of international society.

For instance, importantly, we can

think of the OSCE which has contributed to peace and security in international society.
Emanuel Adler explains the OSCE as an explicit and distinct security communitybuilding institution (Adler, 1998:119).

According to Adler, the OSCE has played a

critical role in achieving a common security space (Adler, 1998:153, fn. 4).

Adler

describes how the OSCE had contributed to the emergence of a security community.
Adler states:
579

See Charter of the United Nations. The Website is available at:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
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Through political dialogue, the establishment of a liberal
normative structure for the entire OSCE region, and
constant pressure to implement normative commitments, the
OSCE first imprinted the development of political
community during the Cold War, when it contributed to the
emergence of civil societies in the East, and then to the
peaceful end of the Cold War. Since the end of the OSCE
region and, in spite of the ethnic conflicts now ranging in
the OSCE region and the fact that two steps forward have
sometimes been followed by one step backward, OSCE
practices have been helping to increase the interdependence
and transactions between East and West and to lay the
foundation for a liberal transnational collective
understanding in the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok.
By means of seminar diplomacy – a relatively new tool for
pursuing state interests, which integrates academic expertise
and diplomatic discourse and practice – and other
innovative means of cooperation, the OSCE and other postCold War European security institutions have been making
significant political efforts to change the inter-subjective
knowledge through which identities are defined. Also, by
stimulating cooperative behavior through a plethora of faceto-face interactions on a large variety of technical, practical,
and normative subjects, these security community-building
institutions are gradually strengthening civil society in
former Communist countries and changing people’s beliefs
about who they are. By teaching others and themselves to
cooperate….actors are simultaneously learning to identity
with each other – to see themselves as a ‘we’ bound by
certain norms (Adler, 1998:121).
The OSCE has clearly contributed to the management of international society, along
with the common good of international society and even the expansion of
international society, in particular when considering that a normative framework for
its member states is derived from adherence to multi-party democracy, the rule of law,
human rights, and liberal economic systems (Adler, 1998:128).

580

All in all, we can

say that international organizations have greatly contributed to the security of
international society.

580

In a later section, I will touch on how international organizations have contributed to
democratization across an international arena.
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Second, international organizations have urged states to seek peaceful
solutions.

One of the primary tasks of international organizations is to make

available a variety of peaceful substitutes for the technique of violence, and to
encourage their utilization by the parties in disputes, which can be seen in the Hague
system, the League of Nation and the United Nations (Claude, 1964: 200-201).

For

example, although many people say that the League failed to settle several disputes
that paved the way for WWII, during the first ten years of its life, the Council
successfully tackled seventeen cases likely to lead to a rupture, and put to an
immediate end hostilities which had broken out on seven or eight occasions between
members of the League (Claude, 1964: 209).

As one of the outstanding examples,

we can think of the termination of a violent controversy between Greece and Bulgaria
in 1925.581 Also, the UN Charter commits member states to search for peaceful
solutions, and in any case to renounce coercive solutions of disputes, and authorizes
outsiders, ranging from uninvolved states to the Secretary-General, to instigate
collective action for encouraging peaceful settlement, in particular when considering
Article 14 (Claude, 1964: 205). 582 As examples, we can think of the pacific

581

“On 22 October 1925, the Bulgarian foreign minister wired the Secretary-General of the League
that a border incident had led to a flagrant invasion of Bulgarian territory by Greek forces. The
Bulgarian government, therefore, requested a meeting of the Council of the League without delay to
repair the breach of Covenant obligations. Within twenty-four hours Aristide Briand, Acting
President of the Council, exhorted the two governments that until the Council heard both sides of the
case, no further military movements should be undertaken and that all troops should retire at once
behind their respective frontiers. Three days later the representatives of Bulgaria and Greece were
confronted by a stern Council which requested that, before anything else was done, hostilities cease and
each state withdraw its troops immediately from the affected area. To this unequivocal proposition
the two belligerents acceded. Military attaches of Great Britain, France, and Italy hastened to the
scene of the encounter to verify the actions of Greece and Bulgaria. On 31 October 1925, just nine
days after the charge of aggression, the military attaches wired the Council of the League:
‘Reoccupation of the Bulgarian posts by the Bulgarian troops took place without any incident. There
is complete calm on both sides. The Bulgarian population which had evacuated the invaded territory
has nearly all returned and life is again taking up its normal course.’” See Gerard J. Mangone
(1954:144).
582

Article 14: Subject to the provisions of Article 12, the General Assembly may recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to
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settlement in 1956 with the formation of the United Nations Emergency Force
(UNEF) and in 1960 with the establishment of the United Nations Operation in the
Congo (ONUC) (Claude, 1968:38).
Third, international organizations have contributed to trusteeship which can
help cultivate states (non-members) to become full members of international society
(Claude, 1964: 318).

For instance, we can think of the UN trusteeship 583 – e.g. the

UN Trusteeship Council.

Today, we can often see the UN mandate for trusteeship,

such as Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo (Claude, 1964: 328).
This trusteeship does not only civilize barbarian states to become decent members of
international society – i.e. the expansion of international society - but also improve
the welfare of international society, let alone the management of international society
(Claude, 1964: 342).

Thus, we can say that international organizations can help

civilize barbarian states to be decent members of international society, let alone
contribute to the management of international society. 584
Fourth, international organizations have promoted the welfare of international
society.

Many international organizations have implemented numerous programs in

reaction to the demand for international aid to underdeveloped countries (Claude,
1968:39).

For instance, the UN has greatly contributed to the welfare of

international society.

Article 55 of the UN Charter is one of these examples.

impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations, including situations resulting from a
violation of the provisions of the present Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United
Nations. See, for more information, “Charter of United Nations.” The website is available at:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter4.shtml
583

The UN trusteeship was developed from the League’s trusteeship.
L Claude Jr (1964: 322-323, 328).
584

See, for more information, Inis

Today, international organizations goad states to comply with certain norms and values of
international society – e.g. human rights and democracy - which is one way to civilize states to become
the decent member of international society. I will touch on this later.
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With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and wellbeing which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations
shall promote: a. higher standards of living, full employment,
and conditions of economic and social progress and
development; b. solutions of international economic, social,
health, and related problems; and international cultural and
educational cooperation; and c. universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion
(Article 55).585
Indeed, as parts of the UN system, we can think of various organizations, such as the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health
Organization (WHO), and the World Food Programme (WFP), which have
contributed to the welfare of international society.

Also, outside the UN system, we

can think of some international organizations that have contributed to the welfare of
international society.

For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross

(ICRC) is to assist the victim of war, primarily civilians and prisoners of war (Pease,
2003:242).

And, we can think of Oxfam’s contribution to the governance and

welfare of international society, by its addressing of the structural causes of poverty
and injustice beyond famine, especially the relationship between poverty, human
rights, development and trade (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2006:999, 1008). 586 All in
all, we can clearly see that international organizations have greatly promoted the
welfare of international society.
Fifth, international organizations have historically promoted and consolidated
various norms and values across international society.

Some of the earlier

585

See “Charter of the United Nations.” The website is available at:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml
586

Indeed, in 2000, the Oxfam member organizations reached agreement to move beyond providing
famine relief and assistance to the poor. I will touch on this later.
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international organizations, particularly international non-governmental organizations
(INGOs) even in the nineteenth century had contributed to the promotion and
consolidation of certain values and norms – e.g. Anti-Slavery Society (the rejection of
slavery), the International Committee of the Red Cross (control of the effects of war),
and Aborigines’ Protection Society (protection of native people) (Archer, 2001:96).
With regard to human rights, international multilateral human rights monitoring
bodies have increasingly appeared since the end of the WWII, albeit the International
Labor Organization (ILO) was created in 1919 (Donnelly, 1994: 204-205).

For

instance, we can easily find many international organizations, such as the ILO, the
United Nations Commission on Human Rights (the UN Human Rights Council),
Office of High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC), the Council of Europe, the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights, Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and the International Committee of Jurists
(Rittberer, Zangl and Staisch, 2006:45-48, 193-208, Donnelly, 1994:205-217,
Armstrong, Lloyd and Redmond, 2004:243-245). In the late 20th century and the
21st century, we can often see that the UN helps to promote and consolidate
democracy across international society. 587 All in all, international organizations have
promoted and consolidated numerous norms and values across an international arena.
This greatly contributes to the management of international society, and the common
good of international society, let alone the expansion of international society.
Sixth, with regard to the environment, we can also think of several
international organizations, such as the United Nations Environment Programme
587

I will touch on the contribution of international organizations to the promotion and consolidation of
democracy in a later section.
427

(UNEP), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), Greenpeace, Friends of the
Earth International (FoEI), and the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).
These international organizations have played a critical role in international
cooperation for the protection of the world’s climate and environment (Rittberger,
Zangl and Staisch, 2006:192).

For instance, the IPCC was set up under UN auspices

in 1988 and is the most highly publicized global environmental assessment project
(Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik, 2009:19). The IPCC includes governments that
endorse the summary reports for policy-makers and provide legitimacy for its work,
but its main activities are run by networks of scientists (Keohane, Macedo and
Moravcsik, 2009:19).

Importantly, over the past twenty years, the IPCC has

provided the most authoritative information on climate change available to
policymakers in a highly salient way – e.g. its receipt of the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize
(Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik, 2009:19).

All in all, we can see that numerous

international organizations have attempted to tackle environmental problems.
All things considered, we can say that international organizations have played
significant roles in numerous arenas like security, peaceful settlement, welfare,
trusteeship, promotion and consolidation of norms and values, and environment.
Also, we can firmly say that international organizations have greatly contributed to
the governance of international society, the well-being of international society, and
even the expansion of international society.

In short, international organizations are

one of essential institutions for international society.

In the next section, I will

mention the contribution of international organizations to democratization across
international society.

This can confirm the significant roles of international

organizations in the governance of international society, the well-being of
international society, and the expansion of international society.
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2> International organizations and democracy
In this section, I will attempt to demonstrate how international organizations
have promoted and consolidated democracy across international society.

First of all,

we have to be aware of the fact that, as democracy has gradually become a new
standard of civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the
post-Cold War era and the 21st century, many international organizations in
international society tend to promote and consolidate democracy, in particular when
considering that international organizations reflect the fabric of international society.
Also, we have to know why states join international organizations that goad them to
become mature democratic states, and why states maintain their memberships in
international organizations, even though they have been under the pressure of political
liberalization.

And so, I will try to reveal that there are some reasons why states are

highly likely to join international organizations and maintain their memberships in
international organizations, albeit international organizations put massive pressure on
member-states for their political liberalizations.

In the process, also, we can see that

how international organizations can goad member-states to become more democratic.
For example, states can have many benefits from their joining international
organizations and maintaining memberships in international organizations, even
though I do not think that I need to explain such benefits, in particular when
considering that Turkey has desperately pursued the membership in the EU, and, in
the past, China had desperately pursued the membership in the World Trade
Organization (WTO).

Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse made several

sharp points about why countries, in particular democratizing countries are highly
likely to join international organizations, by saying:
Because doing so sends a credible signal to domestic and
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international audiences that political reform efforts are
sincere. Entering an IO can help leaders in transitional
states credibly commit to carry out reforms since these
institutions convey information, help ameliorate timeinconsistency problems, and improve the reputation of
new member states. Membership can also discourage
regime opponents from threatening emerging regimes by
imposing potentially high costs on countries that renege
on IO commitments. Each of these mechanisms can
assist in the process of deepening democracy giving
leaders in nascent democracies strong incentives to join
IOs (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:162-163).
As Edward D. Mansfield and Jon C. Pevehouse put it, we can easily find that to enter
IOs can help leaders in transitional states credibly commit to complete democratic
reforms and can diminish the prospect of reversing to authoritarianism, in particular if
the organizations consist primarily of democratic members – e.g. EU (Mansfield and
Pevehouse, 2006:138).

In particular, leaders who want to carry on political

liberalization can benefit from a mechanism of international organizations that ties
their hands, presents information about their policy goals, and differentiates them
from leaders who wish to use the rhetoric of reform to accumulate power in the
absence of genuine liberalization (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:141).

Indeed,

membership in international organizations can help the leaders of democratizing
countries credibly commit to reform efforts, since international organizations can raise
the cost of deviating from these efforts and backsliding, more specifically when
considering that international organizations can provide information about members’
actions and have the reputational impact of violating an IO’s rules, not to mention
imposing conditions for new members (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:141). There
are some examples.

In 1991, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic created the

Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) in order to prove to the EU that they
were firmly committed to both political and economic liberalization (Mansfield and
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Pevehouse, 2006:143).

Also, the EU sternly enforced the conditions of its

Association Agreement with Slovakia when President Vladimir Meciar’s behavior
toward Slovakia’s Hungarian minority and his political opponents did not satisfy EU
standards (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143).

And so, indeed, the EU even

officially eliminated Slovakia from its first list of applicant countries (Mansfield and
Pevehouse, 2006:143).

More importantly, Alina Mungiu Pippidi indicated the close

relationship between international organizations – i.e. the EU - and democratization in
Central and Eastern Europe, by saying:
I do not, in all fairness, know whether Romania’s joining
Europe is the only formula for a good future for the
Romanians or, indeed, if it is possible. It is difficult to
anticipate what ‘Europe’ will mean and imply by the time
Romania is already to join. But it is my strongest belief
that ‘Europe’ is the only strong incentive, for the
political class and the people, to further the
democratization of the country (Pippidi, 1999:149).
Let us take a closer look at how international organizations can goad member-states to
become more democratic.
be a good example.

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) can

Its members have been firmly committed to democracy, while

“locking in the domestic political status quo against their non-democratic opponents”
(Moravcsik, 2000:243-244).

And as another example, we can think of the Council

of Europe that has promoted democracy as well as human rights throughout
Europe.588 In fact, many observers of the Council of Europe have claimed that
Council membership can be seen as a way of certainly locking a country into an intergovernmental democratic network, with its binding international conventions and
treaties, in an attempt to protect it more efficiently from its own antidemocratic

588

See, for more information, “Who are We?” Council Of Europe. The website is available at:
http://www.coe.int/aboutcoe/index.asp?page=quisommesnous&l=en
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enemies within (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:142).

Importantly, also, as

indicated above, we can often see that violating the terms of membership tends to
bring about a suspension of specific benefits and even risks eviction from the
organization (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143).

This is one of the ways to put

pressure on member-states to keep their political liberalization.

For instance, the

European Community (EC) suspended Greece’s associate membership in 1967 when
the military came to power (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143).589 Indeed, former
Greek Foreign Minister Constantine Mitsotakis’s remarks concerning the role of EC
confirms the fact that international organizations have greatly contributed to the
promotion and consolidation of democracy.

Mitsotakis stated:

Naturally, we do not expect our nine partners in the
Community to become the guardians of Greek democracy.
By joining a broader group of like-minded Western
democracies, however, our own democratic institutions
will be reinforced, through constant contract and
interchange, but mainly because from now on Greece will
share the destiny of its Community partners….They
(prospective dictators) are bound to know that the
abolition of democracy entails immediate ostracism from
the Community. This could have grave internal and
external consequences. So in this respect, the EC is a safe
haven (Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2006:143).
Also, we can recall that the Council of Europe suspended Turkey’s membership in
that organization after the September 1980s coup (Pevehouse, 2002: 530).590
Moreover, most importantly, international organizations tend to exert external
pressures on authoritarian regimes to undertake democratization.

Indeed, as Jon C.

Pevehouse put it, we can often see that international organizations can employ
pressure in various ways ranging from explicit de-legitimization of the authoritarian
589

I will touch on this later.

590

I will mention this later.
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regime by IO members through diplomatic pressure to direct economic sanctions
against the regime (Pevehouse, 2002:522).

For instance, Burma had to give up the

2006 chairmanship of a key Asian regional forum, since Burma had been under
pressure to institute democratic reforms before taking the helm of the Association of
South East Asian Nation (ASEAN). 591 Also, as another example, we can think of the
Organization of American States (OAS)’s pressure on Guatemala after the self-coup
of Jorge Serrano in May 1993 (Pevehouse, 2002:523-524). The OAS lodged highprofile protests and moved to impose sanctions against Serrano’s regime, which was
regarded as a significant part of Serrano’s calculations to step down (Farer, 1996,
Pevehouse, 2002:518).592
Equally as important, international organizations, particularly securityoriented organizations, are able to help persuade the military elites to acquiesce to
democratization by not only generating externally advocated guarantees, but by
helping to make military officers stay away from their interest in domestic policies
(Pevehouse, 2002: 527).

There are several cases.

In Hungary the military received

direct assistance from its alliance partners, such as NATO during Hungary’s
democratic transition (Pevehouse, 2002: 527). Also, after Franco’s death, Spain’s
entry into NATO has kept its army away from the domestic political process as its
army underwent important modernization and re-orientation (Pevehouse, 2002: 528529).

At this juncture, when we think of ‘the separation of military and domestic

political process’ and ‘civilian supremacy over military missions and institutions’

591

See “Burma will not take Asean chair.” BBC News. July 26, 2005.

592

I will touch later on the OAS’s contribution to the promotion and consolidation of democracy in
detail.
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(Huntington, 1991b:251, Pevehouse, 2002:528),593we can firmly say that international
organizations have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of
democracy (Pevehouse, 2002: 528).
All in all, we can say that many international organizations have contributed to
the promotion and consolidation of democracy across international society.
However, not every international organization does so.

Some international

organizations like the Warsaw Pack and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization may
undermine domestic democracy (Pevehouse, 2002: 529; Keohane, Macedo and
Moravcsik, 2009:23-25).

However, we cannot completely deny the fact that many

international organizations have greatly contributed to the promotion and
consolidation of democracy across an international arena.

Below, I will investigate

several international organizations in more detail, which have promoted and
consolidated democracy across international society.

This can help us understand

how international organizations can have a great impact on the promotion and
consolidation of democracy across international society.
In the consideration of the above, let us investigate further on how
international organizations can promote and consolidate democracy and how
international organizations have had an effect on paths toward democracy.

When

considering the role of international organizations in democratic development in
international society, we have to think of two ways to promote democracy: IGO and
INGO’s paths toward democracy.

The international governmental organizational

path toward democracy can be recognized as the top-down democracy promotion,
whereas the international non-governmental organizational path toward democracy
593

Huntington puts emphasis on curbing military power and promoting military professionalism as
essential elements for democracy. See Samuel P. Huntington (1991b).
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can be understood as the bottom-up democracy promotion.

The top-down

democracy promotion is carried out via governments, formal institutions and
processes, whereas the bottom-up democracy promotion is to focus on strengthening
civil society and public awareness and on developing local capacity (Newman, 2004:
190).

In short, we can say that in terms of the promotion and consolidation of

democracy, international governmental organizations tend to focus on the
governmental level, while non-governmental organizations incline to emphasize
ordinary citizens, by linking citizens with their governments in pursuit for global
democratic movement.594
Let us turn to the role of international governmental organizations and that of
regional governmental organizations for democratic development.

As primary

international organizations for democratic promotion and consolidation, we can think
of the United Nations (UN), the European Unions (EU), the Council of Europe, the
African Union, the Commonwealth, Organization of American States (OAS),
Organization for Economic-Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Trade Organization
(WTO), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and World Bank.

These

international organizations have indirectly or directly contributed to the promotion
and consolidation of democracy.
Let us explore several international organizations which have greatly
contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

First of all, as one of

the international governmental organizations, I want to touch on the significant role of
the UN in democratic development in international society, such as United Nations
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See, for more information, Edward Newman (2004).
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General Assembly Resolution 55/96 (entitled “Promoting and Consolidating
Democracy”).595 When considering the UN’s contribution to democratic development,
we can recollect the 1991 UN General Assembly’s pressure on Haiti’s democratic
process.

In 1991, following the 1987 Organization of American States’ action to

resume Haiti democratic process, the UN General Assembly strongly condemned the
illegal replacement of the constitutional President of Haiti and confirmed as
deplorable any entity resulting from that illegal situation (Teson, 1996:46). This
indicates the UN’s support of democratization in international society.

However, I

should admit that the primary goals of the UN have not been directly related with
democratic development.

Democracy is not the precondition for UN membership,

which is different from the prerequisite for EU membership.

Instead, its

membership only requires peace-loving states to accept obligations in the present
Charter and perform them (Rich and Newman, 2004: 5).

In fact, we should recall

that many members of the UN are still not multi-party democracies in their domestic
political structures, not to mention liberal democracies (Rich and Newman, 2004:5).
However, as Rich and Newman point out, the UN has indirectly tended to
advocate electoral democracy as the basic ideal governance model, for every state in
international society (Rich and Newman, 2004:5).

In other words, we cannot

completely deny the fact that the UN has greatly contributed to the promotion and
consolidation of democracy across international society.

For instance, the United

Nations Development Fund’s criteria, published in 1995, illustrated the UN’s support
of democracy, by saying:
. Political Legitimacy
595

See, for more information, A/RES/55/96. The website is available at:
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/565/15/PDF/N0056515.pdf?OpenElemen
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. Cooperation with institutions of civil society
. Freedom of association and participation
. Bureaucratic and financial accountability
. Efficient public-sector management
. Freedom of information and expression
. A fair and reliable judicial system (Niblock, 1998: 231-232).
As mentioned above, we are able to see the UN’s tendency to indirectly promote
democracy, although some members of the UN do not yet adopt democracy as a
decent form of government.

Around two-thirds of UN members can be recognized

as democratic and there is no aggressive opposition to democracy from the members
of the UN (Farer, 2004b: 38).

Actually, as the members of the UN have become

more and more increasingly democratic, we cannot deny the fact that the UN reflects
increasingly democratic norms and values.

For decades, the UN has been playing a

significant role in conveying certain values and norms across international society
such as decolonization and self-determination during the Cold War era, and in the late
20th century and the 21st century, the UN has indirectly propagated democracy and
even facilitated democracy across international society like the UN’s monitoring
referenda, let alone human rights (Rich and Newman, 2004:29, Ludwig, 2004:169).
For instance, in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Nicaragua, the UN
was requested to assist the process of election (Ludwig, 2004:170).

Within the UN

system, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and as one of UNDP
subdivisions, United Nations Volunteers (UNV) have been directly or indirectly
engaged in the electoral assistance (Ludwig, 2004:177).596
The electoral assistance is part of the peace-making processes as the
aggressive role of the UN, which can be different from the roles of the UN during the
596

Also, see other institutes outside the UN system, International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance (IDEA), Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA), International
Foundation for Election System (IFES), and Administration and Cost of Elections (ACE).
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Cold War era.

One of the transformations in the role of the United Nations in the

post-Cold War era is that the UN is not merely satisfied with peace-keeping alone, but
also it has been in pursuit of peace-making since the end of the Cold War.

We can

say that in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, the UN electoral assistance is
the sign of the evolution of the character of the UN, such as even peace-making rather
than only peace-keeping, which has greatly contributed to democratic development in
international society (Ludwig, 2004:170).

In short, we can clearly say the great

contribution of the UN to democratic development across international society.
As a matter of fact, the UN has done more than just electoral assistance, not to
mention civic education.

As one of the significant historical milestones in the UN,

first in 1991 (as mentioned earlier) and later in 1994 and 1995, the General Assembly
decided to encourage not only the provision of electoral assistance, but also
democratization itself (Ludwig, 2004:186).

In particular, in 1994, United Nations

Security Council Resolution 940 for the restoration of Haiti’s democracy via its
authorization of the deployment of the multi-national coalition can obviously convey
the message that the UN can provide the defense of democracy. 597 Further, as former
UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali put it in his 1996 Agenda for
Democratization, the General Assembly has averred the foundation for a United
Nations role in democratization by clearly confirming the relevant principles,
purposes and rights articulated in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
597

See, for more information, Strobe Talbott (1994). However, Prof. Ved P. Nanda argues that
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international security. My point is that we should be aware of the importance of democracy in
international society. However, I thoroughly appreciate Prof. Ved P. Nanda’s enormous generosity
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Rights.598 And, we can recall that the General Assembly decided to:
include in the provisional agenda of its fifty-first session the
item entitled ‘support by the United Nations system of the
efforts of governments to promote and consolidate new or
restored democracies.’599
All in all, we can notice that the role of the UN has gradually included an agenda for
the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

Nevertheless, officially, the UN has

been quite reluctant to intervene in countries in the name of promotion of democracy.
The above indicates that the UN in some sense can be recognized as the
international agent for democratization, in particular when considering that the
purposes of the UN are the promotion of the principle of equal rights, selfdetermination of peoples, human rights and fundamental freedom for all, without any
discrimination as to race, sex, language or religion (Newman, 2004: 193).

As a

matter of fact, the UN Charter is primarily based on the sovereign state, but the UN
Charter can be interpreted in a more flexible way to strengthen democratic
development across international society.

For instance, in the UN Charter, ‘we the

peoples’ can be understood in the way that the people’s will should lie behind that
sovereignty, that all persons are born free and equal in dignity and rights and that all
persons have a right to participate in the government of his/her state, directly or
through freely chosen representatives (Newman, 2004:193). Indeed, in 1998, the
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) formed
an International Panel on Democracy and Development with the purpose to analyze
the relation between democracy and development and to offer recommendations for
future UNESCO projects concerning democracy (Neto, 2008:8).

This indicates that
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we can connect the UN with the norms and values of democracy, and we can assume
that the UN can be a strong candidate to promote democracy in international society.
Once again, as in the era of the post-Cold War and the 21st century, the nature of the
UN has been evolved to become gradually more peace-making rather than peacekeeping, the UN has been progressively more expected to promote and consolidate
democracy across international society.
Although the primary goals of the UN are security and peace, we cannot avoid
the great contribution of democratization to security and peace in international society
in the long run. 600

For instance, as Newman put it, since the September 11 terrorist

attacks on the US, we have been more and more aware of the close connection
between good governance and security (Newman, 2004:190).

Especially, when

considering that Afghanistan could be a good example for corrupt, unstable,
ineffective, and repressive governance, ‘an outlaw state’ which could not only bring
out the misery for millions in that country, but also the terrorist havoc, we can
perceive the correlative relationship between democracy and the primary goals of the
UN (Newman, 2004:190).

If good governance is one of the pillars for democracy

and can guarantee security and peace in international society, democracy and the UN
cannot be inseparable from each other.

In other words, as democracy can ultimately

contribute to world peace and security, we can say that there is a shared ground
between democracy and goals of the United Nations. 601 When considering the close
connection between democracy and the goals of the UN, we can understand the
reason for the recent creations of the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and
600

We can think of democratic peace theory.

601

If we also accept democratic peace theory as plausible, we can perceive the close relationship
between democracy and the UN.
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of the United Nations Democracy Caucus.

The UNDEF is a pure democracy fund

rather than a development fund or a human rights fund, in order to strengthen the
voice of civil society in the various democratic processes. 602 Indeed, on September
2005, during the Millennium Summit review conference, representatives of more than
150 member states confirmed their support to the formation of a UN fund to promote
democracy, and the meeting’s final statement recognized that democracy is a universal
value on the basis of the free will of the people in deciding their political, economic,
social and cultural system (Neto, 2008:8).

The UN Democracy Caucus is to provide

some networks of like-mined democratic nations to work together in order to enhance
the work of the UN in various arenas, in particular human rights, good governance
and the rule of law, while contributing to the creation of an international environment
in which democracy can flourish. 603 In short, the UN Democracy Caucus can help
secure human rights, expand economic development and preserve peace for a sound
environment to promote and consolidate democracy across international society. 604
All in all, we can say that the UN has had an impact on democratic development, and
it should be more deeply involved in the promotion and consolidation of democracy.
Let us turn to regional organization in order to demonstrate how regional
organizations can contribute to democratic development in international society.

At

this juncture, I will scrutinize North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
Organization of American States (OAS) and European Union (EU).
will start with the role of NATO.

First of all, I

NATO which was found in 1949, was initially
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designed to provide for the common defense of the United States, Canada, and their
Western European allies under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and it explicates the
geographical boundaries of alliances territory with its emphasis on the key
responsibility of the UN Security Council to maintain international peace and security
(Butler, 2000:273).

During the Cold War era, the role of the NATO alliance was

primarily to respond against a growing Soviet threat and a resurgent Germany.

Such

primary and original reasons for the creation of NATO can be described well by
George Kennan.

Kennan mentioned:

In the long run, there can be only three possibilities for the
future of western and central Europe. One is German
domination. Another is Russian domination. The third is
a federated Europe, into which the parts of Germany are
absorbed but in which the influence of the other countries is
sufficient to hold Germany in her place. If there is no real
European federation and if Germany is restored as a strong
and independent country, we must expect another attempt at
Germany domination (Kennan, 1948:515).
With these reasons, the creation of NATO gave the Western European nations some
security guarantee against resurgent Germany as well as Russia. 605 Also, during the
Cold War era, NATO could strengthen the capitalist democratic community via close
socialization among members, in particular transforming and rehabilitating West
Germany. 606 As John Ikenberry put it, NATO is primarily a security alliance
institution, but the role of NATO has been to lock in political and even economic
relations within the Atlantic area (Ikenberry, 2003:64).

Thus, NATO can be

recognized as one of the institutions to facilitate and consolidate capitalist democratic
community, tying Europe to the US, as West Germany’s transformation of identity and
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See John Ikenberry (2003: 61).
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characteristics demonstrates, which resulted in the reorientation of Europe. 607 In
particular, in the post-Cold War era, NATO has become less a military alliance and
more a grouping of like-minded democratic states in pursuit of the preservation and
extension of democratic community in Europe and beyond Europe (Ikenberry,
2000b:95).

The North Atlantic Military Committee’s MC 327 can help us

comprehend the expansion of the role of NATO.

It defines “peace support

operations as ranging from conflict prevention activities, peace- making, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid missions and peace-building, to peace-enforcement”(Butler,
2000:275).

This implies that the role of NATO is more than just a collective self-

defense regional organization, especially when considering its roles of peaceenforcement and peace-building.

Peace-enforcement, peace-making and peace-

building can be understood as to promote democracy.

For instance, although

Kosovo case can be seen to be humanitarian intervention, NATO’s Kosovo
intervention case demonstrates the close relationship between democracy and NATO,
since the primary goal of the US-led NATO’s strike against Yugoslavia was to “end
Europe’s last dictatorship” and to “bring democracy to Serbia”(Yunling, 2000:117).
We should keep in mind the fact that the Kosovo case can be seen as peace-building
and democratization.

This can be confirmed by former British Prime Minister Tony

Blair’s claim that NATO’s campaign in Kosovo was quite necessary for the long-term
regional peace via removing a dictator (Yunling, 2000: 120).
can see the close relationship between democracy and NATO.

At this juncture, we
Further, when we

consider the above evolutionary characteristics of NATO, we can even say that the
expansion of NATO can be marked as to help expand and consolidate the capitalist
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democratic community.

In July 1997, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic

were officially invited to become the members of NATO, which followed a decision
made at the January 1994 NATO summit in Brussels to enlarge NATO to accept the
members from Eastern and Central Europe (Ikenberry, 2003:66).

Such NATO

enlargement has facilitated the promotion and consolidation of democracy, as it can
consolidate democratic and market gains in Eastern and Central Europe, building an
expanded Western democratic community along with its assistance for domestic
transitions under way in Eastern and Central Europe (Ikenberry, 2003:66).

In

particular, when considering one of NATO officials’ remarks “We are enmeshing them
in the NATO culture, both politically and militarily so they begin to think like us and
– over time – act like us,” as Ikenberry points out, we can perceive that NATO
membership indirectly requests democracy and a capitalist market economy (Towell,
1998:275, Ikenberry, 2003:66).
However, I have to admit that in some sense, NATO cannot be a full institution
for promotion and consolidation of democracy, when considering the past legacy of
NATO as an alliance mechanism to fight against communism during the Cold War era.
For instance, in the past, as Russett put it, NATO did not reject Greece and Turkey
when they turned against democracy (Russett, 2005:403).

Since 1952, Greece has

enjoyed NATO membership, but in 1967, Greece’s military dictatorship suspended
many political liberties. 608 Nevertheless we should recognize that in 1974, Greece
held democratic elections and created a parliamentary republic, with abolishment of
the

system

of

the

monarchy.

Further,

Greece

joined

the

European

Community/European Union, and became the 12th member of the euro zone in 2001.
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Like Greece, also in the past, Turkey had military dictatorship in 1950, and the
Turkish Army had carried out three coups in 1960,1971 and 1980, not to mention its
intervention to force Turkey’s first Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan from
power in 1997, even if Turkey has become a multi-parties democratic political
system.609
However, the transformation of states from military dictatorship to liberal
democracy can be made more possible within NATO.

As mentioned above, Spain’s

case can confirm the role of NATO in the promotion and consolidation of democracy,
since Spain’s entry into NATO shows its indirect role to secure democracy.

Its

NATO membership could modernize, improve and reorient Spain’s army in military
technology via its joint maneuvers with NATO (Pevehouse, 2005:25).

As a result,

the Spanish military could be reoriented away from domestic politics and become
more professional (Pevehouse, 2005:25).

In this sense, we can say that NATO can

play a significant role in reshaping the preferences of actors, while contributing to the
promotion and consolidation of democracy (Pevehouse 2005: 25).

Due to this,

NATO expansion can be understood as to facilitate the promotion and consolidation
of democracy, and NATO has been gradually recognized as one of the significant
institutions for democratic development in international society.
As one of the regional organizations, the Organization of American States
(OAS) has had politically and economically a great impact on shaping and shoving
the behavior of states. The OAS has had impressive declarations and committees
dealing with human rights and democracy (Vogelgesang, 1979:221-222).

The OAS

Charter, drawn up in 1948 and revised in 1967, declares that American states proclaim
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445

the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality,
creed, or sex, and it designates the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) (Vogelgesang, 1979:222).

Also, Article 1 of the OAS Inter-American

Democratic Charter, 40 ILM (2001) 1289 declares that the people of the Americas
should have a right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to
promote and defend it.

And, when considering the members of the OAS, we find

that most members of the OAS are democratic.

The organization directly or

indirectly request democracy as a membership condition.

Indeed, the OAS has been

more closely connected to the promotion and defense of democracy, since it was
founded in 1948.

Its first sign of a crucial commitment to pro-democracy principles

came in 1979 with the passage of a resolution that condemned the human rights
record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua (Cooper and Legler, 2001a:105).

In the

post-Cold War era, there has been a growing consensus among OAS members to
pursue collective action to promote and defend democracy, and this can be seen in
inter-American legal documents such as the Santiago Commitment and Resolution
1080 (1991), the Washington Protocol (1992), the Managua Declaration (1993), and
the Declaration and Plans of Action of the Miami and Santiago Summits of the
Americas (1994,1998) (Cooper, and Legler, 2001a: 103).

Especially, the Declaration

of Santiago can be recognized as a symbolic milestone in the creation of regimes to
protect democracy in the hemisphere. 610 Resolution 1080 declares that the OAS
Permanent Council should be convened if the democratic process is interrupted in any
of the OAS member states, and a meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or a special
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session of the General Assembly can be assembled within a 10 day period.611 Also,
with the Protocol of Washington, on December 14, 1992, the OAS added ‘the treat of
suspension’ to Article 9 of the OAS.

The amendment to Article 9 of the OAS

Charter states:
A member of the Organization whose democratically
constituted government has been overthrown by force may
be suspended from the exercise of the right to participate in
the session of the General Assembly, the Meeting of
consultation, the Councils of the Organization and the
Specialized Conferences as well as in the commissions,
working groups and any other bodies established (OAS
1992, Cooper and Legler, 2001a: 107).
This displays the OAS’s support for democratic development.

The OAS has used

two methods, ‘pressure’ and ‘acquiescence’ to affect the development of democracy
(Pevehouse, 2005: 136).

Nicaragua (1979), Panama (1989), Haiti (1991), Peru

(1992), and Guatemala (1993), can be good examples to advocate this idea, while
denouncing anti-democratic governments.

At this juncture, I will briefly mention

about Peru and Guatemala. The impact of the OAS on Peru’s democracy confirms the
OAS’s significant role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy.

In 1992,

Peru’s President, Fujimori declared the implementation of a Government Emergency
and National Reconstruction, dissolving parliament and suspending the judiciary on
April 5, 1992, when he had tension with judiciary and legislature (Pevehouse,
2005:129).

The following OAS reaction called upon him to restore democracy,

declaring “Fujimori’s move was a blow to democracy”(Pevehouse, 2005:130).
Besides, the OAS threatened to impose sanctions against Peru, while organizing the
international community against Peru, including the suspension of assistance from the
international financial community (Pevehouse, 2005: 131).
611
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This reaction of the

OAS indirectly or directly brought Peru back on track to democratization.

Peru even

accepted an OAS mission to Peru under the adoption of Resolution 1753 which
authorized a high-level team of ministers to travel to Peru to strengthen democracy
(Cooper and Legler, 2001b:128).

As we can see, the OAS’s contribution to Peru’s

democratic development cannot be discounted.612 As mentioned briefly before, the
OAS for Guatemala can demonstrate as well that the OAS has advocated young
democracies, such as the OAS’s pressure on Guatemala after the self-coup of Jorge
Serrano.

Jon C. Pevehouse states this point, by saying:
One example of this scenario would be the Organization
of American States’ pressure on Guatemala after the
self-coup of Jorge Serrano. In May 1993, Serrano
dissolved Guatemala’s legislature and courts, and
announced that he would rule by decree. Led by several
of the smaller democratic members of the organization, the
OAS lodged high profile protests and moved to levy
sanctions against the regime. After five days, Serrano
was forced from office by military, which reinstalled a
civilian president. Many observers credit the OAS
response as an important part of Serrano’s calculations
to step down (Pevehouse, 2005:19).

The role of the OAS in Guatemala demonstrates how the OAS as a regional
organization has pushed non-democracies to liberalize, while de-legitimizing
autocratic regimes via various means, including public condemnation, political or
economic sanction, and even exclusion from the organization (Pevehouse, 2005: 20).
All of these cases demonstrate that as a regional organization, the OAS has had a
great impact on democratic development.
612

Nevertheless, I admit that the OAS

Here, I do not want to reveal the US great contribution to Peru’s democratization, even though we
cannot ignore it, in particular when the US suspended aid to Peru and put heavy pressure on several aid
organizations such as IMF to withhold over $2 billion in financial assistance, which ultimately could
drove Fujimori to make concession toward democracy (Pevehouse, 2005:132). The primary reason is
that the promotion of democracy is not only the key value and norm of Great Power, the US, but also
international organization usually cannot be severed from the will and interests of Great Powers. At
this juncture, my point is that as a regional organization, OAS’s contribution to democratic
development cannot be discounted in international society.
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members’ commitment to collective initiatives to safeguard democracy underscores
the conflicting foreign policy principles in that region: the perennial tension between
the prodemocracy collective interventions and the respect for non-intervention and
state sovereignty (Cooper and Legler, 2001a). And, we can see some states which
still reject the norms of democracy such as Chavez’s Venezuela – e.g. semiauthoritarian regime, lack of freedom of speech, and Chavez’s trenchant critique of
party politics - even if once it was considered as South America’s most stable
democracy and it was a promoter of Resolution 1080.

However, for certainty, we

cannot deny the OAS’s great contribution to democratic promotion and consolidation
in international society.
As another regional organization, the European Union is a good example to
demonstrate how international organization can facilitate democratic development.
The EU has been well known as the most powerful community for democratic
development, in particular when considering that within the area of the EU, bilateral
diplomatic missions already are being eclipsed by the inner communicative activity of
the EU.613 Most importantly, the EU has always had a commitment to democracy and
has never had a non-democratic member, and every member of the EU should adopt a
democratic form of government (Russett, 2005:404).
Originally, the EU democratic commitment can be found in the Treaty of
Rome.

Democracy was a condition for membership in article 237 of the Treaty of

Rome that began the integration process in 1950 and the commitment was strongly
advocated by the European Parliament in 1962, proclaiming that a joining state has to
ensure truly democratic practices and respect for fundamental rights and freedom
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(Russett, 2005:404).

Also, successive reform of the European treaties such as Single

European Act (SEA) in 1987, Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and Treaty of Amsterdam
in 1999 brought out an extension of the arena of EU policy (Witte, 2002:236).

In the

process, the EU has specified that accession would rely not only on “the political and
economic performance of the candidate states, but also on the EU’s state of
preparation, more of its institutional structure” (Witte, 2002:237).
interpreted in two ways.

This can be

One is that new member states should become fit for the

European Union to ensure that their joining the EU cannot hurt the actual
competitiveness and stability of actual members (Giorgi and Pohoryles, 2005:408).
On the other hand, the structure of the EU itself should have enough capability so as
to include new member states, in the awareness of the impact of the new member
states on the structure of the EU.614 Under this assumption, the EU has a common
foreign and security policy to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law,
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Solonenko, 2005:59).
Iryna Solonenko states:
Throughout the 90s this approach began to more strongly
emphasize democracy in the EU’s external policy. The
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam proclaimed human rights to be a
cornerstone of EU external policy, an the Nice Summit in
December 2000 launched the EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights and called for more coherence between the EU’s
external and internal policies.
According to ‘The
European Union’s role in Promoting Human rights and
Democratization in the third Countries’ (as of 8 May
2002), promoting human rights and democratization
became a main concern of EU external relations
(Solonenko, 2005:59).
As we can see, at this juncture, democratic commitment of the EU can be strongly felt.
Many European Union countries and its candidates demonstrate this point.
614
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For

instance, in 1981, Greece became a full member of the European Community/EC
(Pevehouse, 2005:172).
to join the EC/EU.

Nonetheless, until that point, Greece had several difficulties

For example, after the 1967 Greek military coup, the European

Commission suspended the Greek Association Treaty with Greece, and threatened to
cancel the agreement entirely.

Greece has not ignored such pressure from the EU, in

particular when considering that nearly half of Greece’s total trade was with the EU
(Russett, 2005:404).

Also, Bulgaria and Romania became the new EU members

(26th and 27th) on January 1, 2007.

However, both of them had experienced massive

difficulty in order to become EU members.

They even missed the first round of EU

expansion into Eastern Europe due to their failure to implement democratic and
market reform. 615

Bulgaria had faced criticism for its failure to adopt a new anti-

corruption penal code and for insufficient efforts in combating organized crime, and
Romania had a lack of press freedom and problems with corruption.

616

As a

candidate of EU membership, Turkey has been pursuing EU membership, but its
membership has been slow due to its questionable record of democracy such as
human rights violations in Northern Cyprus, not to mention EU’s concern about
Turkey’s commitment to political reform (Pevehouse, 2005:38). 617 After the
September 1980 coup, also, Turkey even experienced suspension from the Council of
Europe (Pevehouse, 2005: 48). Thus, Turkey’s membership in EU will be very
meaningful, if it becomes a new EU member.

At least, Turkey’s entry to the EU will

reflect Turkey’s status as a democratic regime, even if Turkey’s entry to it will be
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And, see “Turkish

more than just recognition of Turkey’s democratic regime by others.

As Turkey

joins the EU, it can break down the general prejudice against the EU as a Christian
club, and also, it can help Turkey’s consolidation process of democracy.
Furthermore, via Turkey’s membership in the EU, we might confirm that democracy
does not recognize cultural differences.

All in all, all of these examples can strongly

advocate the idea that the EU promotes and consolidates democracy in international
society.

So far, I have briefly touched on international governmental organizations

and regional organizations to reveal close relationships between international
organizations and democratic development in international society.
Let us turn to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) for
democratic development.

In regard to INGOs for the promotion of democracy, we

can consider Freedom House, the Council for a Community of Democracies (CCD),
the Ford Foundation, the Carter Center, Oxfam, Amnesty International (AI), Human
Rights Watch, etc.618 As mentioned above, their primary role is to assist the bottomup democracy across international society.

It is worthwhile to take a brief look at the

function of the INGOs for democratic development.

The above INGOs have clearly

strengthened democracy via the followings:
funding pro-democratic civil society actors in transitional
societies, organizing exchanges of democratic leaders;
providing expertise for institution-building; encouraging
accountability and transparency by conducting informal
oversight and scrutiny, and funding local projects aimed at
strengthening democratic processes (Newman, 2004: 192).
Also, large-scale INGOs have played a significant role in democracy assistance via
even observing and validating elections, advertising governments, and assisting in

618

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are recognized as primary non-governmental
organization for human rights. But we cannot deny their contribution to democratic development.
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building democratic institutions (Newman, 2004:193).

Carothers makes a good brief

summary on the role of the NGO in the promotion and consolidation of democracy.
Carothers mentioned that the NGOs have fostered civil society development
especially in issues like human rights, women’s issues and election monitoring;
assistance to build independent media; support for independent labor unions; and
programmers that seek to promote a better understanding of democracy for citizens
via civic education projects, conferences and seminars on democracy, and educational
exchange programmes (Carothers, 2000:188).

The significant role of NGOs in the

promotion and consolidation of democracy cannot be diminished and disregarded at
all.
Let us take a look at several NGOs that promote and consolidate democracy.
I will start with Freedom House.

As an INGO, Freedom House is a non-profit, non-

partisan organization for economic and political freedom in international society.

In

particular, Freedom House has been very active in supporting the infrastructure of
civic life and democratic values across international society. 619 It has been in
opposition to tyranny in Latin America, apartheid in South Africa, Soviet
Communism, domination of Eastern and Central Europe, and religiously based
authoritarian dictatorial regimes including Sudan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. 620 Its
primary function is to play a role in a catalyst for freedom, democracy and the rule of
law via its analysis, advocacy and action.621 It can be recognized as one of the leading
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See “Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy.” Hearing Before the Committee on International
Relations House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Series No. 109-82, May 5, 2005.
The website is available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/21022.pdf
620

See “Welcome to Freedom House.” The website is available at :
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=2
621

Ibid
453

advocates of the world’s young democracies, in debilitating legacies of tyranny,
dictatorship and political repression, and in supporting human rights, democracy, freemarket economics, the rule of law and independent media. 622 For instance, in Jordan,
Freedom House worked to prevent violence against women; in Algeria, to seek justice
for victims of torture; in Uzbekistan, to stem a brutal dictatorship; and in Venezuela,
to protect and promote human rights. 623 Overall, Freedom House has advocated
democracy across international society, not to mention its measurement of the
democratic level of each country.
As another example, we can think of the Council for a Community of
Democracies (CCD).

First of all, we’d better know more about the Community of

Democracies (CD).624 The Community of Democracies was launched in Warsaw,
Poland, in June of 2000, which was drawn from a diverse mix of regions, cultures,
and religions, dedicating itself to a key set of democratic principles and has advocated
cooperation among democracies in international society. 625 The Council for a
Community of Democracies, which is a NGO incorporated in Washington D.C. was
formed to support a global democratic movement. 626

As an INGO, CCD has

exclusively focused on the community of democracies. 627

For instance, CCD

contributed in various ways to the success of the 2005 Santiago Ministerial
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Conference of the Community of Democracies. 628 Its mission can be summarized
with the followings:
. To strengthen collaborating among governments and
democracy advocates in building an effective worldwide
community of democratic nations based on the initiative of
the June 2000 Warsaw Community of Democracies
Conference.
. To help implement resolutions promulgated at the 2002
Community of Democracies meeting in Seoul, Korea; to
assist national and international non-governmental
organizations formulate a strategic vision for the future of
the Community of Democracies and to support that vision
by their participation in the 2005 meeting to be held in
Santiago, Chile.
. To share among governments and non-governmental
organizations their pro-democracy programs and resources.
. To promote collaboration among democratically elected
parliaments and among delegations to be the United Nations
–including the organization of a UN democracy caucus --and collaboration among other international organizations in
support of democratic practices.629
However, we should keep in mind the fact that this INGO is different from other
INGOs for democratic development, since it advocates the community of democracies,
that is, groups of democratic states rather than each individual state.
As the third example, we can think of the Ford Foundation as well.

The Ford

Foundation is transnational, albeit its international staff remains mostly American
(Nye and Keohane, 1973: XVI). The Ford Foundation has made grants in all 50 U.S.
States and in many countries across international society, while strengthening
democratic values, reducing poverty and injustice, promoting international
cooperation and advancing human achievement as its goals. 630 It has 12 offices in
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See “CCD’s Mission.” Council for a Community of Democracies. The website is available at:
http://www.ccd21.org/visionmission.htm
630
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Africa, Asia, Latin America and Russia. 631 It has programs for democratic
development, including ‘asset building and a community development program,’ ‘a
peace and social justice program’ and ‘a knowledge, creativity and freedom
program.’632 Also, in the peace and social justice program, in particular, the civil
society unit is primarily there to strengthen democratic civil society, seeking to
increase participation in public affairs beyond the act of voting and to strengthen civil
society organizations. 633 In short, the Ford Foundation has had an impact on
democratic development.
Also, we can think of Oxfam that has been known as the world’s most
influential international development organization (Aaronson and Zimmerman,
2006:999).

Oxfam was created in 1942 as a relief organization (Aaronson and

Zimmerman, 2006:1008).

Oxfam International is a confederation of 14 like-minded

organizations working together and with partners and allies around the world to lead
to lasting change. 634

And, Oxfam International works with more than 3,000 local

partner organizations, helping “people living in poverty to exercise their human rights,
assert their dignity as full citizens and take control of their lives.” 635 Also, Oxfam
emphasizes equity about making the rules fair for poor people and guaranteeing that
justice prevails (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2006:1010).

Indeed, we can say that
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See “Global Offices.” Ford Foundation. The website is available at:
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Oxfam’s work on human rights and democracy focuses on the ‘voice of poverty,’ in
particular as social and political citizenship, albeit its traditional task was famine
relief (Aaronson and Zimmerman, 2006:1010).636 In short, we can assume that when
poor people are denied the right to affect the decisions that influence their lives,
Oxfam International helps the voices of the poor to reach policy-makers. 637 For
instance, in Uganda, Oxfam worked to influence policy makers to triple government
spending on water and sanitation. 638

Most importantly, in 2006, Oxfam Haiti

launched a national campaign against armed violence, while helping set up a
committee of national and international organizations to lead the campaign and
working with a thousand young people in areas most affected by armed violence,
when fear of armed violence discouraged Haitians from voting in the presidential
elections on February 7, 2006.639
Moreover, we can think of Amnesty International (AI) as a democracy
enhancing international organization.

AI is the best known non-governmental

organization (NGO) in the field of human rights (Thakur, 1994:144).

AI has more

than 2.2 million members and subscribers in more than 150 countries and regions 640
AI has been investigating and judging human right abuses around the world without
any discrimination on grounds of race, region, or ideological belief (Thakur,
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1994:148).

Also, despite being prevented by AI rules from investigating or taking

action in respect of abuses in their own countries, members of AI have an internal role
in contributing to the development and promotion of a human rights culture in their
own country (Thakur, 1994:149).

All in all, AI has contributed to human rights and

democratic development across international society.
Finally, we can think of Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch is an

independent and non-governmental organization that was advocated by contributions
via private individuals and foundations across international society, and it has never
accepted governmental funds directly or indirectly. 641 In general, it has been well
known to protect the human rights of people in international society, and it has been
actively engaged in prevention of discrimination and political freedom. 642 So far, I
have revealed a few of examples of INGOs that support democratic promotion and
consolidation in international society. 643
To sum up, I have to mention that every international organization in
international society does not necessarily contribute to the process of the promotion
and consolidation of democracy, but as I pointed out above, many international
organizations have directly and indirectly contributed to the promotion and
consolidation of democracy, especially via various ways, like enhancing states’
legitimacy, and the process of socialization.

In other words, the external pressure

from international organizations can push authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes
641
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to undertake liberalization and further liberalization, as a force for democratization. 644
As an excessive way, international organizations can create economic difficulties and
diplomatic isolation for any authoritarian regime, which can help de-legitimize it at
home, and which can help mark it as a pariah state or an outlaw state abroad. 645 Also,
importantly, international organizations provide the opportunity for socialization
among states, which can lead to transparency, similar patterns of behavior among
states, and further even change in the domestic structure of states toward democracy.
On the whole, these international organizations can be recognized as facilitators to
promote and consolidate democracy as the emerging new standard of civilization and
a new wave expansion of international society.

Below, I will start examining how

international organizations can have an impact on democratic development in three
countries, China, South Korea and Iraq.
3> Case Studies for International Organizations and Democratic Development.
In this section, I will examine three cases, China, South Korea, and Iraq.
These three cases, China, South Korea and Iraq can help us understand how
international organizations can have an impact on the promotion and consolidation of
democracy across international society and lead to each different path toward
democracy in international society. 646 Like other chapters, each case belongs to each
different international society, pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist.

With

regard to this point, I will reveal that international organizations have adopted
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different paths to push each state toward democracy.

In this section, I will examine

how IGOs and INGOs can have an impact on China (interests), South Korea
(legitimacy) and Iraq’s (force) democracies.
3. a, International Organization and China’s Democratic Development
1) International governmental organization’s role in democratic development in
China
Let us start with China’s entry into the United Nations.

China’s entry into the

most far-reaching IGO, ‘the United Nations’ was realized on October 25, 1971, and it
has been the only Asian and developing state that has enjoyed permanent membership
in the Security Council (Kim, 1977:713, 720). This has been understood as China’s
official re-integration into the international community (Kent, 2002:344).

Beside the

UN, in fact, China has joined increasingly many other international organizations in
international society.

For instance, by 1966, China had been a member of only one

international governmental organization (IGO), but by 2002 it had become a member
of around fifty IGOs, including the International Labor Organization (ILO), Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), etc. (Kent, 2002:345).

Under this specific circumstance, we

can say that China is actively engaged in IGOs, and importantly that the more IGOs
China has joined, the more China’s domestic and foreign policies have been
constrained by the norms and values of international society.

Nevertheless, most

importantly, its participation in many IGOs has been authentically originated in its
incentives of narrow self-interests.647
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Hempson-Jones (2005).
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However, we should not forget that China had been very reluctant to use
international organizations.

Mao’s China had been reluctant to rely on IGOs, even

the United Nations, albeit China has cherished the UN charter system, which can be
recognized as a pluralistic principle (Kim, 1977:742).
reasons.

There are primary three

First, as for Mao’s China, IGOs had been regarded as instruments of

Western imperialism and hegemonism (Hempson-Jones, 2005:707).648 For example,
in the 1960s, Beijing disdained “the U.N. as a dirty international political stock
exchange in the grip of a few big powers.”649And the Chinese newspaper, People’s
Daily (Renmin Ribao) advocated this view, revealing the following language and
attitude: “what kind of thing is the UN? It is a tool of US imperialism, number one
overload, and the Soviet Unionist ruling clique, number two overlord, to press ahead
with neo-colonialism and big nation power politics.”650Second, Chinese pride had
been embedded in the principle of self-reliance.

In other words, China’s pride had

been too strong to become a recipient of any UN assistance program, which is deeply
derived from the Maoist version of dependencia theory (Kim, 1977:742, Kim,
1992b:142).

Mao’s China had been the only Third World country that gave but

never accepted any bilateral and multilateral aid (Kim, 1977:742).

Third, there had

been no Chinese direct economic interests in its joining of the UN and other IGOs
(Kim, 1977:742).
However, as Samuel S. Kim points out, the turning point emerged in 19781979 when China made a dramatic reversal from giving aid to seeking aid, which

648
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stemmed primarily from Deng’s three key objectives: anti-hegemony, modernization
and unification (Kim, 1992b:142). This new direction emerged, thanks to the part of
failure of the Cultural Revolution that led to a total economic destruction.

Due to the

failure of the Cultural Revolution, China’s per capita income at the end of the Cultural
Revolution, was one of the lowest in the world, around on par with that of Somalia. 651
Deng’s reform was necessary to remedy China’s deep wound.

China’s

modernization in science and technology pushed China closer to international society
via its more aggressive participation in international organizations, which has brought
out alteration in China’s identity and characteristics.

As a result, China started

playing a significant role in the United Nations by the 1980s and it joined all IGOs in
the UN system.

Until late 1981, China had revealed a negative attitude toward U.N.

peace-keeping operations, but after then along with its identification with the third
world and putative strategic de-alignment from the US, China has gradually shown its
positive language and attitude toward the peacekeeping operation.

On December 14,

1981, China, for the first time, voted for the extension of the U.N. peacekeeping force
in Cyprus (Kim, 1992b:148).

By late 1982, Beijing even claimed itself as a

champion of U.N. peacekeeping, by saying:
The more tumultuous the international relations, and the
more seriously threatened are world peace and international
security, the more important and pressing becomes the task
of strengthening the United Nations (Kim, 1992b:148).
Also, China voted for all non-peacekeeping resolutions, with its approval of 52
resolutions from 1981-1990 on Middle East Issues (Hempson-Jones, 2005:714).

In

1992, China even sent 47 military observers and 400 military engineers to the
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operation of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). 652 Furthermore,
China has increased financial contributions to the UN, whereas some states have
reduced their financial contributions to the UN.

653

This denotes the close

relationships between China and the UN, and China is a part of international society,
and this means that China started being aware of the norms and values of international
society as its potential own ones.654
Along with the transformation in China’s attitude toward international
organizations, indeed, we can perceive China’s altering concept of international
organizations – e.g. a system-transforming approach during the exclusion period of
1949-1970, to a system reforming approach in the 1970s, to the system maintaining
and system exploiting approach of the 1980s and 1990s (Kent, 1997/98: 520-21).655
At this juncture, we can perceive that although China was used to rejecting the norms
and values of international society because, according to China’s perspective, they
seemed biased toward the Western Great Powers, once participating in international
organizations, China has been acting as a system-maintainer rather than as a system
reformer, revisionist or system-transforming revolutionary (Kim, 2004b:51).
Nonetheless, China only remains as a system-maintainer, as long as it can bring about
China’s national interests first.

China’s participation in international organizations

652
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can be recognized as a socializing mechanism via which China has gradually become
like other members of international society.

When considering this, we can expect

China to eventually become democratic, as democracy itself starts being recognized
as the new emerging standard of civilization in the 21st century.
As for China, international organizations are not seen as supranational, but as
political entities like sovereign states (Kent, 1997/98:520). This is meaningful to
understand China’s perception on international society and its motivation of
engagement in international organizations: a pluralistic international society and selfinterest.

China’s concept of international organization is based on China’s concept

of international society, that is, a pluralist international society.

Section 5 of China's

Independent Foreign Policy of Peace reveals this point, by saying:
China would like to establish and develop relations of
friendship and cooperation with all the countries on the
basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-Existence
namely, mutual respect for territorial integrity and
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in
each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and
peaceful coexistence.656
Along with the above, China has been seriously critical of ‘the use of force’ in the
name of the United Nations Charter on the ground that the United Nations is an
international organization with its responsibility for international peace and security,
thanks to its historical painful experience of interventions from other nations, such as
the Opium War (Kim, 1992b:150).

Also, China’s motivation of engagement in IGOs

is authentically oriented in self-interest.

For instance, during the Persian Gulf War

crisis, Beijing’s initial response was ‘silence’ for its own interests (Kim, 1992b:149).
China abstained over Resolution 678 to authorize the forcible ejection of Iraqi forces
656

See “China's Independent Foreign Policy of Peace.” Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of
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unless they had withdrawn from Kuwait by the agreed deadline (Hempson-Jones
2005:714).

This implies that the UN’s effectiveness in dealing with China will be

more likely determined by how much the UN can bring about China’s national
interests.

Thanks to this, we can assure that China is belonging to a pluralist

international society, and that interest(material)-based socialization is the most
plausible option to alter China’s identity and characteristics.

As a matter of fact,

China’s international organizational behavior can be characterized by a max-mini
approach, which is a strategy of maximizing the benefits of organizational
participation through state-enhancing rather than state-diminishing, and minimizing
normative costs like dependency and loss of sovereignty (Kent, 1997/98:521).

As

for China, international organizations can confer on China international prestige,
status and domestic legitimacy, albeit China has tended to stress bilateral relations in
the resolution of conflict (Kent, 1997/1998:520).

To China, international

organization can be a good mechanism for projecting and enhancing international
status – i.e. a potential Great Power-, maintaining its strategic independence,
preserving an environment conducive to its own development goals and promoting
internal developmental aims via foreign investment, expanded trade, technology
transfer, and development assistance (Kent, 2002:348).
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In short, China’s

participation in international organizations has enhanced China’s power and assisted
China’s participation in globalization, not to mention its modernization and its status
of a potential Great Power (Kent, 2002:345).

We can say that China’s concept of an

international organization can be understood as instrumental in its pursuit of its own
interests.
657
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More importantly, as briefly mentioned earlier, for China, international
organizations provide the arenas for socializations in its pursuit of its own interests.
For instance, Beijing has regarded the UN’s mechanism and IGOs as an amiable
platform to project its own perspective toward international society and to receive a
response or an impact from international society.

In other words, we can assume that

the UN mechanism and IGOs act as a socializing mechanism to connect China to
international society.

Samuel S. Kim illustrates this point by saying:

The annual general debate in the General Assembly’s
plenary session affords Beijing free global prime time to
pronounce its own definition of the international situation in
the form of its annual state-of-the world report. In the
unique domain of this quasi-global parliamentary meeting,
many normative proposals are adopted in the form of
recommendatory resolutions with few implementing actions.
This may be the primary reason why the General Assembly
is so important to the Chinese style of dramatizing its moral
righteousness. The General Assembly is the surest and
cheapest way to China’s international forum shopping…
(Kim, 1992b:141).
This helps us understand how China comes to think and act like other members of
international society.

In truth, we cannot deny the fact that China has been

increasingly patient enough to be regulated by IGOs.

China does not completely

disregard the influence and restraint of international organizations on its domestic and
foreign policy (Kent, 2002:349).

At the initial stage, indeed, China rejected each

norm and value of international society, but it has tried to keep its harmonious balance
between its adaptation to international society and its self-interests – e.g. domestic
stability, economic interests, international reputation, etc.

China has gradually

adjusted itself to international society and adopted norms and values of international
society, such as democracy as well as human rights.

China’s participation and

ratification of human rights treaties, such as the UN Convention against Torture
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(CAT), the UN Human Rights Commission and the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities advocate the fact that
China has gradually accepted the norms and values of international society (Kent,
2002:353).
The UN’s reaction to the massacre incident of June 1989 and the International
Labor Organization’s reaction to Chinese’s mistreatment of workers advocate China’s
gradual acceptance of the norms and values of international society.

Due to the June

1989 massacre, Beijing acquired a pariah anti-people regime as a new national
identity (Kim, 1992b:144).

This incident is very significant to the UN.

The UN

could condemn the permanent member of the Security Council for its human rights
abuse at home.

Samuel S. Kim illustrated the importance of the incident to the UN

very well:
In August 1989, the U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a subsidiary
expert body of the Commission on human rights, passed by
a secret vote of 15-9 the first resolution in U.N. history
criticizing one of the Big Five of the Security Council for
human rights abuses at home (Kim, 1992b:144).
In February 1990, the International Labor Organization intensified international
delegitimization for China’s mistreatment of workers who had endorsed the prodemocracy movement.

Those kinds of severe criticisms for China’s reluctance to

comply with international norms eventually got China to recognize human rights as an
integral part of global normative politics by 1982, and China eventually ratified or
acceded to seven U.N. sponsored multi-lateral human rights treaties on women, racial
discrimination, refugees, apartheid, genocide, and torture (Kim, 1992b:145).

Also,

in the UN human right treaty committee and in the ILO Governing Body Committee
on Freedom of Association, China has even accepted a harsh process of monitoring
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from 1990 to the present, even exposing itself to public shaming, but it has not
withdrawn from its participation in those bodies and gradually complied with austere
reporting requirements (Kent, 2002:355).

At this juncture, we can perceive China’s

transformation of itself within international organizations.

We can see that China

has altered its language and attitude toward international society within international
organizations, which has led to an alteration in China’s identity and character.

Under

this circumstance, more tellingly, in China, even many Chinese scholars and students
are increasingly engaged in human rights and democracy (Kim, 1992b:146).
However, once again, we should keep in mind the fact that China’s incentive
of such transformation has been pretty much derived from its own self-interest,
including its great desire to become a Great Power.

This indicates how China can be

altered in its process of pursuit of its own interests.

Samuel S. Kim illustrates well

about the impact of international organizations on an alteration in China’s identity and
characteristics.

Kim said:

Through generous and aid and friendly policy advice,
always with special sensitivity to the pretenses and claims
of the self-styled moral regime, IGOs managed to enter the
castle of Chinese state sovereignty, thereby influencing the
processes by which Chinese state sovereignty, thereby
influencing the processes by which Chinese national
interests are redefined and Chinese modernization
requirements
and
priorities
are
reformulated.
International Organizations have certainly helped postMao China to bridge information, knowledge, capital,
and technology gaps with a minimum of political
control……………….The price that China has to pay to
maintain membership in good standing and to maximize
its benefits is compliance, at least rhetorical, with the
norms and policies of IGO. This may explain Chinese
refusal to exercise its veto power in the Security Council
and its generally positive voting behavior in the General
Assembly. Such compliance can also reflect and effect
some readjustment or restructuring of certain principles
of Chinese foreign policy, such as world peace and
development or global interdependence (Kim, 1992b:155).
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This can be seen as the interest-based socialization.

The interest-based socialization

in IGOs has altered China’s language and attitude toward international society, which
seems to bring out more positive signs to China’s democratic development.

As an

example, let us take a look at an impact of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
as one of United Nations specialized agencies on China’s democratic development.
As mentioned above, in 1971, the People’s Republic of China was accepted as a
member of the United Nations.
in the ILO.
the ILO.

This made it possible for China to gain membership

However, the ILO stresses the freedom of association as the standard of
In particular, Convention No.87 ascertains the rights of workers and

employers to join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization
(Kent, 1997/98:522).

From the perspective of the ILO, China should become a full

member of the ILO, subject to the ILO constitution, due to its status such as a large
and powerful state and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council (Kent,
1997/98:524).

However, China has not fully advocated the ILO, and it did not yet

ratify No. 87 and 98 which are concerning freedom of association (Kent,
1997/98:525). The Chinese government claimed itself as responsible for its own
domestic affairs, with its firm belief of sovereign rights on the basis of Article 2,
para.7 of the UN Charter (Kent, 1997/98:525). However, China could not avoid the
pressure of ILO standards from international society.

China’s failure to meet the

ILO standards like the freedom of association weakened their support for its
candidacy for chairmanship of the ILO governing body (Kent, 2002:351).

This kind

of case can be easily found in international society, such as Burma and Sudan: as
mentioned before, in 2005 Burma was forced to renounce the 2006 chairmanship of
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) due to its lack of democracy and
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Sudan was also forced to give up the 2007 chairmanship of Organization of African
States for the same reason.658 This can be indirect pressure on China to comply with
the norms and values of international society, and this can indirectly push China
toward democracy.

As a matter of fact, in 1994, Article 7 of the new Labor Law of

China eventually declared “a trade union shall represent and protect the lawful rights
and interests of workers and organize its activities autonomously and independently”,
and Article 8 also declares “each worker should participate in democratic
management or consult on equal level with his/her employing unit about the
protection of lawful rights and interests of workers through staff meetings.” 659 These
indicate that China is slowly adapting itself to the norms of international society,
albeit it does not satisfy No. 87 on the freedom of association enough.

This can be a

positive sign that China is slowly moving toward democracy.
As another example, we can think of the contribution of the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) to China’s democratic development.

The aims of

the UNDP are the protection and promotion of the universal values of the rule of law,
human rights and democracy. 660 The UNDP started its operations in China in
September 1979, and it has fostered human development to empower women and men
to build better lives in China. 661 Also, today, 84% of UNDP projects in China are
nationally implemented in collaboration with more than a dozen government
658

See “Burma Will not take Asean Chair.” BBC News, July 26, 2005. Also, see “Waging Peace:
Building a safe and democratic world: letter to member states of the African Union,” The website is
available at: http://www.wagingpeace.info/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=261:8january-2007-letter-to-member-states-of-the-african-union&catid=22:sudan-letters&Itemid=43
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I quoted these from Ann Kent’s article (1997-98: 530).
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See UNDP Democratic Governance. The website is available at :http://www.undp.org/governance/
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See UNDP: China. The website is available at:
http://www.undp.org.cn/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2&topic=12&cati
d=10
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ministries and with even NGOs and private sectors.662 During the 21 years from 1979
to 2001, the UNDP had provided China with a total assistance of some US$ 500
million. 663 Also, since 1980s, the UNDP has provided a total of $50 million
assistance, with 30 reform/governance projects having been carried out, including:
restructuring administrative organs, economic system,
financial system, planning management system, economic
laws, custom administration, capital market operation,
foreign investment introduction and reforming social
security system. 664
With these benefits, China has been more and more engaged in international
organizations, and it has adjusted itself to the norms and values of international
society.

And, as the nature of international society reflects more democratic norms

and values, and the nature of international organizations has gradually included more
democratic values and norms, it is very hard for China to totally reject human rights
and democracy in the long run, in particular when considering that the respect of
human rights and fundamental freedom was already expressed in the Dumbarton Oaks
proposal more than a half century ago. 665 Indeed, it seems to be almost impossible for
China to avoid human rights and democracy, in its pursuit for its national interests
from its deep engagement in international organizations.
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See China International Center For Economic And Technical Exchanges. The website is available
at: http://www.cicete.org/english/achievement.htm
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See Dumbarton Oaks: Chapter IX. Arrangements for International Economic and Social
Cooperation -“Section A. Purpose and Relationships. 1. With a view to the creation of conditions of
stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations, the
Organization should facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian
problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Responsibility for the
discharge of this function should be vested in the General Assembly and, under the authority of the
General Assembly, in an Economic and Social Council.” The website is available at:
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1944/441007a.html
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2)

International

non-governmental

organizations’

role

in

democratic

development in China.
The concept of NGOs for Chinese people in Salamon’s definition can be
understood as formal, private, non-profit distributing, self-governing and voluntary
(Ma, 2002:309).

Nonetheless, even Chinese NGOs cannot make their own decision

in political and ideological matters (Ma, 2002:310). In fact, China is one of the few
countries in which the NGO has some difficulty with promotion of human rights and
democracy, because it still has constrained the deep involvement of the NGO in
Chinese politics.

However, the NGO has provided various interests to China, and

this has been one of the mechanisms to urge China to move toward democracy.
When considering the relationships between China and the NGO, we can
notice that between 1949 and 1978, China harshly suppressed most independent
organizations including religious groups and rejected any freedom of association (Ma,
2002:308). However, as mentioned previously, due to the failure of the Cultural
Revolution (1966-76) which could pose great threat to the Party’s legitimacy via total
destruction of economy, China had to change its direction (Ma, 2002:308).

It was

Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform that led to economic and political alteration in
China.

Deng’s reformation of China did not only bring out economic openness, but

also lessened political control (Ma, 2002:308-309).

Even the unprecedented

flourishing of student association emerged in the 1980s (Ma, 2002:309).

Under this

specific circumstance, China’s participation in NGOs had been increased tenfold in
the years 1977-89 (Kim, 1992b:141).

According to the Ministry of Civil Affairs, in

China, by the end of 2003, there were 142,000 registered NGOs (Morton, 2005:521).
In China, in 2004, there were 285,000 registered NGOs, and a little larger number,
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290,000, which were unregistered. 666 These numbers are highly expected to be
continuously increased.

Also, importantly, we cannot completely disregard some

level of influence of NGOs to China.
China has massively benefited from INGOs.

For instance, between 1993 and

2000, the China foundation for Poverty Alleviation (CFPA) received US$ 3.6 billion
in total funds from INGOs, and China’s umbrella organization for NGOs, the China
Association for NGO Cooperation (CANGO) was given roughly US$ 1.3 million in
2003 alone (Morton, 2005:521).

INGOs in China act like substitutes for the state by

providing basic social welfare services such as health care, education, AIDS
prevention, environmental reform, economic justice, and low cost energy supply to
advocate the disabled and the disadvantaged groups (Morton, 2005:522).

Due to

these benefits and China’s inability in economic and social services, the Chinese
government has increasingly allowed INGOs to operate, even claiming “small
government and a big society” as a big slogan since the Mid-1990s (Ma, 2002:306).
However, as mentioned above, the Chinese government put some regulation on the
INGOs, such as the impossibility of conducting survey research in China in a proper
way (as in the US and other western countries) and a strict regulation governing
registration (Ma, 2002:307, 310). Nonetheless, the Chinese government has been
generous to the INGOs as long as the INGOs do not overtly challenge official rules
and they simply provide relief or other basic services (Dalpino, 2000:62).
However, we cannot deny the fact that the INGOs themselves indirectly goad
China toward democracy, advocating freedom of association and strengthening
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See “China Environment Forum.” The website is available at:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1421&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=
182907
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emerging civil society as essential parts for democratic development in China.

For

instance, when thinking that the INGOs have greatly contributed to the above CFPA
and CANGO, we can perceive their contribution to the freedom of association as
China’s movement toward democracy.

Also, with regard to the relationships

between the INGOs and civil society, as implied above, we cannot deny that the
INGOs in China are making substantial contribution to China's social and economic
development by engaging in public benefit activities, like the followings:
the environment, health, education, scientific research,
cultural services, poverty relief, legal aid, social welfare,
and services to disadvantaged groups such as orphans, the
elderly, and the disabled. 667
All of these have facilitated an emerging civil society in China.

We can certainly say

that the INGOs have played a significant role in boosting civil society.

In China, we

can observe both the expansion of civil society and the growth of NGOs (Morton,
2005:519).

Along with this, we might expect more positive signs of democratic

development in China via the active engagement of INGOs in China’s society. 668
When considering close triad relationships among democracy, civil liberty and INGOs,
we can expect China’s movement toward democracy.

As the bottom-up democratic

development, independent INGOs pay their attention to the interests of people rather
than that of government, and even make the voice of people heard to the Chinese
government.

As Morton put it, in fact, INGOs can be seen as an agency to connect

the local with international partners as well as to connect the local with the
667

See “the World Bank and NGOs in China.” The website is available at:
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/CHINAEX
TN/0,,contentMDK:20600359~menuPK:1460599~pagePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:318950,0
0.html
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We cannot deny the fact that civil society is closely related with democratization, even if someone
might argue that civil society does not always equates with greater democracy. Katherine Morton
mentioned this point. See, Morton (2005: 520).
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government, so as to exchange idea and share experience (Morton, 2005:522). This
exchanged and shared idea can have an impact on China’s democratic development,
and the INGOs can be recognized as democratic infiltrating agencies that can deeply
penetrate into China’s society in a pluralist international society.
As for the INGO for democratic development in China, we can think of the
Ford Foundation and the Carter Center.

The Ford Foundation has facilitated

universal suffrage, the system of “one vote one value” in China (Shelley, 2000:231).
Also, the Ford Foundation is so far the largest grant-giving institution in China, and it
has played a significant role in promoting grassroots organizations that can strengthen
civil society in China (Ma, 2006:181).669 The Beijing Office adopts the following
themes, indirectly influencing democratic development in China: a commitment to
gender equality, a focus on poor and disadvantaged groups, an emphasis on
participation as a core value that promotes community-based empowerment, support
for civil society, respect for diversity, and promotion of philanthropy. 670
As another INGO, the Carter Center has indirectly facilitated China’s path
toward democracy.

The Carter Center has assisted elections in China.

In March

1998, the Center initiated a joint project with China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs to
standardize village election procedures, with its focus on four main arenas:
developing a computer system for collecting data on village
elections; providing advice and assistance to the Ministry of
Civil Affairs on developing uniform election procedures;
sponsoring Chinese officials to observe elections in the United
States and other countries; and assisting in the development of
669

For instance, in 2000, the Ford Foundation gave over five million USD to programs and
conferences for the promotion of communication and cooperation between China and the rest of world.
Also, from the opening of its Beijing office to 2001, it spent around US $ 128 million on Chinese
institutions and China-related programs. See Ma (2006:183-189).
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See “Ford Foundation.” Century Online China Art Networks. The website is available at:
http://www.chinaartnetworks.com/feature/wen29-5.shtml
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civic education program and publicizing information on
village elections in China. 671
In September 2005, the China village elections project became the China program. 672
Also, the Carter Center has gradually expanded its activities:
monitoring and reporting on political and electoral innovative;
conducting better-governance seminars for local governmental
officials; providing assistance in amending elections laws and
conducting election pilots; translating English democratization
and political transition theories into Chinese; establishing
learning centers for ordinary Chinese citizens; and publishing
a book series on China’s political developments. 673
Most importantly, the Carter Center has benefited from the high level access to
political and media channel due to Jimmy Carter’s involvement, and it can put
pressure on the Chinese government toward democracy (Shelly, 2000:228).

Due to

all of these activities, China has increasingly opted for openness, fairness, and
competitiveness on the basis of the rule of law.

This indicates the Carter Center’s

contribution to democratic development in China.
All in all, we can say that the INGOs in China assist the establishment of basic
democratic systemic elements such as a secret ballot, a choice among candidates, a
public count, regular elections and transparency at village level.

All of these

activities of the INGOs have been beneficial to China, and the INGOs can push China
closer to democracy.

Nevertheless, for China, in some sense, such INGOs’ effort to

promote democracy in China has been used for instrumental purposes.

For instance,

as Shelley put it, the election itself can be used as instrumental propaganda so as to
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show a positive image about China in international society. 674 However, we cannot
totally deny the fact that the INGOs have had an impact on democratic development
in China, since China’s effort for such a positive image itself can play an indirect
significant role in the democratic development in China.

We have already seen

China’s similar attitude in its dealing with human rights, which the Chinese
government has gradually accepted, such as the 2004 Constitutional reform.

All in

all, as many INGOs have provided China with various benefits such as social welfare,
economic assistance and assistance with election procedures with which it feels an
inability to deal with by itself, China has been slowly goaded to keep its step on its
long journey toward democracy in a pluralist international society.

All in all, we can

say that INGOs have had an impact on democratic development in China in a pluralist
international society.
3. b International Organization and South Korea’s Democratic Development
1) international governmental organizations’ role in democratic development in
South Korea
South Korea belongs to a solidarist international society and so external
pressure plays a different role in South Korea (value-oriented) from in China (interestoriented) or in Iraq (enforcement-oriented).

In this section, I will reveal how

international organizations have assisted South Korea’s democratic development,
along with their impact on its path toward democracy in a solidarist international
society.

Let us start with South Korea’s engagement in IGOs.

When considering

South Korea’s membership and engagement in IGOs, they have been very essential
under South Korea’s notable circumstance, in particular, the divided Korean peninsula
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which is the most militarized zone per square mile and the last Cold War zone.

In

the Cold War era, South Korea had primarily sought for recognition as a sovereign
state from international organizations, which brought about more legitimacy for South
Korea than North Korea in international society. 675 For South Korea, international
organizations had been regarded as one of the mechanisms to primarily gain and
guarantee the legitimate external sovereignty.

Since the late Cold War era, however,

South Korea’s participation in IGOs have made it modify its domestic repression on
democratic movement, including freedom of association, freedom of speech and
freedom of arbitrary arrest.

Further, they have gradually goaded it to comply more

with the norms and values of international society like human rights and democracy.
Nevertheless, South Korea’s democratic movement is primarily derived from an
internal rather than an external impact.

However, when considering that currently

South Korea can be recognized as a mature democracy in international society, we
should be aware of IGOs’ contribution to South Korea’s democratic development.

In

particular, we should acknowledge the shared values and norms between South Korea
and IGOs, which are the promotion of human-welling, democracy, peace and
prosperity. 676 This can help us understand how IGOs consolidate South Korea’s
democracy.
South Korea got its admission to the world organization, the United Nations in
1991 (Koh, 2000:199).

Nonetheless, before 1991, South Korea had already joined

activities of the UN specialized agencies, such as a UN observer mission in New York
675

There had competitive and confrontational relationships between the two Koreas in international
organizations, which South Korea had been used to dominating, since North Korea began to join
various international organizations in 1973. See Pak (2000:152).
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Chi Young Pak points out Seoul’s belief that “South Korea’s active participation in the UN’s effort
for international peace and human well-being will be the only way to promote its national interest in
the age of complex interdependence of the world.” See Pak (2000: 152).
478

since 1951 (Pak, 2000:150).

And South Korea has steadily increased its

participation in the activities of the United Nations as well (Koh, 2000:199).

For

instance, South Korea has joined U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, including the U.N.
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), Operations in Somalia II (UNOSOM
II), the U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the U.N.
Angola Verification Mission III(UNAVEM III) (Koh, 2000:209).

Also, from 1996 to

1997, South Korea served the UN as a non-permanent member of the Security
Council. 677 And, South Korea has even committed an eight-hundred person military
unit to the U.N. Standby Arrangement System (Koh, 2000:203).
In addition to UN agencies, South Korea has increasingly participated in other
IGOs, such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

In 1960, South Korea joined

only nineteen IGOs, but in 1998, it participated in fifty two IGOs (Koh, 2000:200). 678
In particular, outstandingly from 1985 (thirty six) to 1998 (fifty-two), we can see the
clearly increased numbers of IGOs (Koh, 2000:200).

This indicates that South

Korea has been deeply engaged in international society, not to mention its close
relationships with IGOs.
Unlike others, China and Iraq, as mentioned above, South Korea belongs to a
solidarist international society.

On September 29, 1993, South Korea’s Foreign

Minister Han Sung-Joo in the United Nations revealed South Korea’s official position,
by saying “South Korea has firm support for the international movements to promote
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human rights” (Koh, 2000:202).

This is not only the same direction as the United

Nations, but also, it indicates that South Korea does respect solidarist principles of
international society, and indeed, currently, South Korea can be seen to be in the
mature stage of democracy.

In South Korea’s process of democratic consolidation,

we should not disregard IGOs’ contribution as well.

For instance, the OECD can be

a good example for South Korea’s democratic consolidation.
First of all, let us examine a few of the IGOs for democratic consolidation in
South Korea.

Let us explore the OECD.

The OECD has thirty four member

countries, and they have a shared commitment to democratic governments and market
economies.679 As Carl B. Hamilton put it, a member country of the OECD ought to
be a pluralistic democracy, with its respect for human rights and its market economy
in exposition to international competition. 680 On December 12 1996, South Korea
was accepted as a member of the OECD.681 This indicates that South Korea was
recognized as a decent democratic regime, given a significant opportunity to
consolidate democracy in the OECD.

Also, when South Korea applied for

membership in the OECD in 1995, the OECD’s Trade Union Advisory Committee
made South Korea’s admission conditional on its compliance with ILO requirement,
not to mention South Korea’s openness of economy (Kim and Moon, 2000:58, Kim,
2000c:259). 682 As mentioned in the earlier chapter, the requirement was the
following:
679

See “About OECD.” Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The website is
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ILO called for abolition of the ban on third-party
intervention in labor disputes and on multiple labor
unionism, restoration of the basic labor rights of the public
officials and school teachers, and termination of government
interference in labor union activities (Kim and Moon,
2000:58).
This indicates that the OECD put some pressure on South Korea’s consolidation of
democracy via its request for South Korea to comply with the rules of other
international organizations, which can facilitate democratic development in South
Korea.

Also, in consideration with the OECD’s emphasis on openness, we can

assume its contribution to democratic development, in particular if openness would
enhance democracy through its impact, such as more transparency and less corruption
in South Korea.

Carl B. Hamilton reveals the close relationship between openness

and democracy, by saying: “a democracy cannot be a closed country or
economy…..democracy in general and democratization have contributed to the
lowering of trade barriers in a number of developing countries since 1970s”
(Hamilton: 2002:13).

Along with this fact, we should keep in mind the close

relationships among openness (political, social and economic openness), liberalization
and democratization.683 Recently, South Korea’s transparency is ranked as the 24th
place among 30 member countries of the organization. 684
As another example, we can think of the United Nation Development Program
(UNDP). The UNDP’s partnership with South Korea can be traced back to 1965,
and from 1965 to 2000, the UNDP provided around $100 million to South Korea.685
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Catharin E. Dalpino reveals the close relationships between liberalization, openness and
democracy, claiming that “democratization is usually preceded by liberalization, though democracy
cannot be taken as the assured outcome of a liberal experiment. See Dalpino (2000:4).
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See “Korean Society: Korea jumps to 40th in the world in transparency.” The website is available at:
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In turn, nevertheless, South Korea has contributed $15 million to the program (Pak,
2000:152).

Also, the UNDP has contributed to South Korea’s democratic

development in various ways, like promotion of sustainable human development,
reduction of poverty, gender equality and development of a social security system. 686
In particular, the UNDP has put emphasis on gender equality as a priority.

It has

indirectly reduced gender inequality in South Korea, which can facilitate South
Korea’s consolidation of democracy.
as essential for democracy.

In fact, gender equality should be recognized

As Ronald Inglehard, Pippa Norris and Christian Welzel

put it, gender equality implies toleration, self-expression and individual freedom.687
In regard to this point, we can say that increasing the emphasis on gender equality as
the process of democratization can increase the chances for a mature democracy, as
more democratic states attempt to guarantee more gender equality. 688 South Korea
cannot be the exception to this.

In South Korea, women have suffered from gender

inequality, which has had a negative impact on South Korea’s mature stage of
democracy.

Bang-Soon Yoon describes the situation of women in South Korea well,

by saying:
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) ranked
South Korea 61 among the 64 countries for which gender
empowerment measures data are available, and Korea
ranked 45 out of 49 countries in equal opportunity. In
terms of women’s legislative representation, Korea ranks
102 among the 123 countries surveyed (as of the end of
2002), far lower than the average for women’s
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representation (in a single-house government or in a lower
house) at the global level (15.2 percent) or in the Asian
region (15.4 percent)” (Yoon, 2003:4)…”Women’s political
space in formal government institutions has been extremely
limited in the National Assembly, executive offices, and
judiciary” (Yoon, 2003:12). “In Korea, Women’s political
marginality needs to be understood within a larger political
framework of South Korea politics, which include the
structure of power; a boss-centered, patronage political
system; political culture; and the women’s movement”
(Yoon, 2003:6)…..…”South Korea’s unique geopolitical
situation as a divided nation has supported a militarism that
also has had ramifications for women. Confucianism,
which determines social hierarchy based on class, gender,
seniority, and official status, still dictates the male-oriented
political culture (Yoon, 2003: 16-17).
However, we can perceive that such gender inequality has been altered toward an
egalitarian model in South Korea.

For instance, in July 2005, the Supreme Court

granted married women in South Korea equal property rights with men concerning the
inheritance of property owned by family clans, which can be the landmark for gender
equality since previously, married women were only considered to be part of their
husband’s family and were not eligible to inherit family property. 689
The reduction of inequality in South Korea can be primarily seen as a result
of South Korea’s economic growth, but we should pay attention to the UNDP’s role in
South Korea. 690 The UNDP has been working with South Korea’s government,
research institutions and other NGOs in order to promote gender equality, along with
its emphasis on monitoring the Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) indicator,
gender responsive budgeting and gender mainstreaming in national policy. 691 UNDP
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female equality index rates South Korea 37th in the world, and the UNDP ranked
South Korea 61 among the 64 countries for which gender empowerment measures
data are available. 692

Also, as noted above, South Korea ranked 45 out of 49

countries in the equal opportunity country rankings (Yoon, 2003:4). As mentioned
above, with regard to women’s legislative representation, South Korea ranks 102nd
among the 123 countries surveyed, pretty lower than the average for women’s
representation (in a single or in a lower house) at the global level (15.2 percent) or in
the Asian region (15.4 percent)(Yoon, 2003:4).693 These figures get attention from
government and civilians on gender gaps in education, earned income, representation
in parliament, which has led to indirect and direct pressure to alter gender inequality
in South Korea.

Also, South Korea has made significant progress in promoting

gender equality in the past decades through introducing various legal and institutional
frameworks, like enactment of the Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief act in
1999, Women’s Development Act in 1995, and Equal Employment Act in 1987; and
establishment of the national governing body, the Ministry of Gender Equality and
Family in 2005. 694 All in all, as the UNDP has indirectly influenced the reduction of
gender inequality in South Korea, we can say that it can facilitate South Korea’s

the basis of data on political participation and decision making, economic participation and decision
making, and power over economic resources. There are three dimensions to measure: female
representation in national parliaments as an indicator of political representation; senior positions in the
economy (proxied by female representation as legislators, senior officials, and mangers and
representation as professional and technical workers; and earned incomes of males and females. See
“Human Development Report 2001.” The website is available at:
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/completenew1.pdf. pp. 239. Also, see Stephan Klasen (2006).
692

See “Women, gender issues in Korea.” The website is available at:
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consolidation of democracy.

Nonetheless, someone might argue that gender equality

has nothing to do with the promotion and consolidation of democracy, which is
completely wrong, in particular when considering that women rights and gender
equality have been more guaranteed in mature democratic countries than authoritarian
countries.
So far, I have briefly touched on an impact the IGOs have had on South
Korea’s democratic development. The IGOs have had an impact on South Korea in
various ways.

In particular, their impact on South Korea’s democratic consolidation

cannot be ignored.695 Also as South Korea has become a decent and stable democracy,
South Korea has contributed back to the roles of IGOs, such as its engagement with
the UNDP to help the reduction of poverty and human development in third world
countries, which is closely related to the promotion of democracy in international
society.

South Korea spends around $12 million annually on its activity in IGOs as a

provider of international aid, which can be spent for development assistance in
foreign countries (Cha, 2000b:226).

For instance, in cooperation with the UN High

Commissioner for Refugees, South Korea has indirectly helped North Korea and Iraq
in terms of developments and humanitarian reliefs. 696 In addition, the South Korean
government has greatly contributed to the United Nation Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in particular for Mongolia, Uzbekistan, North
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In this chapter, I did not mention how international labor organization (ILO) could have an impact
on South Korea’s democratic development, since I did touch on it in international law chapter, but we
should keep it mind that ILO is one of good examples to demonstrate how IGOs have had an effect on
the promotion and consolidation of democracy in South Korea.
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See Shin-wha Lee (2003). Also see UNHCR, The UN Refugee Agency: Government of The
Republic of Korea – UNHCR donor profile and donor history. The website is available at:
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.htm
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Korea and African countries. 697 All in all, the relationships between South Korea and
IGOs have been close and effective, and IGOs have certainly aided South Korea’s
consolidation of democracy in a solidarist international society.
2)

international

non-governmental

organizations’

role

in

democratic

development in South Korea
Along with IGOs, INGOs have had an impact on South Korea’s democratic
development.

As for South Korea, INGO is significant.

The fact that South Korea

has increasingly joined INGOs demonstrates their importance.

For instance, in 1960,

South Korea joined only one hundred and two INGOs, but in 1998, it participated in
one thousand two hundred fifty INGOs (Koh, 2000:200).698 Like many IGOs, many
INGOs have greatly contributed to democratic development in South Korea.

As

examples, we can think of Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch
(HRW) as INGOs for democratic development in South Korea.

In this section, I will

primarily touch on AI and HRW that have an impact on South Korea’s democratic
consolidation, even if South Korea is put into the category of a solidarist international
society as well as a capitalist democratic security community – i.e. in South Korea,
human rights and democracy have been authentically accepted since they are
understood as legitimate-oriented norms and values rather than interest-oriented.

In

other words, external pressure plays a role in South Korea’s democratic consolidation
in a different way from China’s democratic development.
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South Korea triples its contribution to UNESCO’s education project. It will triple its contribution
to UNESCO education projects and the fund is expected to be more than $300,000 annually for three
years. See the website available at:
http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.phpURL_ID=51572&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
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This data came from Table 9.1. ROK Participation in International Organizations Compared to That
of Eight Other Countries, 1990-98. See Koh (2000).
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Let us start with AI.

AI has done many various things in South Korea.

Most importantly, what it has done so far for consolidation of democracy in South
Korea is to reduce the impact of the National Security Law (NSL).

AI has attempted

to guarantee the freedom of speech, that is, the rights to express dissident views. 699
AI has directly and indirectly reduced the possibility of abuse of the NSL in South
Korea, which contributes to democratic consolidation in South Korea.

In South

Korea, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, the NSL has been used arbitrarily to curtail
the right to freedom of expression and association, providing long sentences or even
the death penalty for loosely defined anti-state activities. 700 For instance, article 7 is
against freedom of consciousness and freedom of expression.

Article 7 states the

following:
Praising or Sympathizing – up to 7 years in prison for those
who praise, encourage, disseminate or cooperate with antistate groups members or those under their control, being
aware that such acts will endanger the national security and
the democratic freedom.701
Between February 1998 and August 1998, over 180 people such as students, activists,
publishers and trade unionists were arrested under the NSL. 702 Also, the released
political prisoners are still required to report regularly to the police under the Security
Surveillance Law. 703 The Security Surveillance Law that was enacted in 1989, tracks

699

See “Transnational Civil Society and the National Identity Question in East Asia.” The website is
available at: http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-21663758_ITM
700

See “South Korea: Human Rights Concern.” Amnesty International USA .The website is available
at: http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/south_korea/index.do
701

See “South Korea’s National Security Law.”
hwp.com/archives/55a/205.html

The website is available at: http://www.hartford-
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See “Amnesty International, Republic of Korea” (September 1, 1998). The website is available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA250271998?open&of=ENG-394
703

See Chung-in Moon, Youngjae Jin and Wook Kim, “Democracy Report for South Korea.” The
website is available at http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South_Korea.pdf pp. 10.
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the activities of certain political prisoners after their release in order to prevent any
danger of their recommitting crimes, like espionage and anti-state activities; to
promote their return to a normal sound social life; and to maintain national security
and social peace.704 AI has criticized it for its application in an arbitrary and secretive
way to threaten and harass former prisoners of conscience and long-terms political
prisoners who do not post any security threat.705 AI has brought out indirect and
direct pressure to the government to lessen the weight of the NSL, which consolidates
democracy in South Korea.
government.

For instance, AI made recommendations to the

There are several recommendations that are worth looking at.

are the followings:
. The National Security Law should be amended in
accordance with international standards so that the rights to
freedom of expression and association are protected, in
accordance with international standards.
. Pending legislative amendment, use of the National
Security Law should be minimized, in particular, there
should be a halt to the current high numbers of arrests for
non-violent activities under Article 7 of the National
Security Law. The law should not be used to crack down
on peaceful political and industrial protest in the context of
the current economic crisis…………………
. The arbitrary use of the Security Surveillance law to
harass and restrict the activities of former prisoners of
conscience and long-term political prisoners who were
convicted unfairly is a violation of their basic rights and
should be halted.
. South Korea should ratify ILO conventions 87 and take
steps to ensure that trade unionists are able to exercise
their rights to freedom of association, in accordance with
international labor standards.
Trade Unionists and workers should be permitted to
organized and take part in legitimate and non-violent
strike action without harassment of arrest, in
704

See “Amnesty International, Republic of Korea.” The website is available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGASA250271998?open&of=ENG-394
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Ibid.
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They

accordance with their rights under international human
rights and labor standards………………………….
. The Government should take steps to implement the
recommendations of international bodies.706
In fact, the NSL has been modified since May 1991 when the Roh Taewoo
government was forced to amend the NSL; for example, to allow contact with
communist organizations, except for those who are engaged in ideological support to
Kim Jong Il’s regime and linked with North Korea and those who visit North Korea
without South Korea’s government’s permission.707 This would have been harder
without AI’s role and South Korean civilians’ voluntary will against the NSL.

This

demonstrates that AI has been significant in consolidating democracy in South Korea,
along with South Korean civilians’ high level of awareness of democracy.

Especially,

it should be noticed that the INGO’s mobilizing ability broke down the government’s
monopoly. 708 As a matter of fact, on October 16, 1997, AI’s Secretary General Pierre
Sane even wrote a letter to all candidates of the presidential election in South Korea to
prevent the abuse of the NSL.709 Along with these aspects of AI, we can acknowledge
AI’s role in democratic development in South Korea, especially when considering
AI’s contribution to the freedom of consciousness and freedom of speech as well as its
role in checking and balancing of the South Korean government’s abusing power.

In

other words, AI has contributed to more liberalization in South Korea, which is an
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Ibid.
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Ibid
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See “Republic of Korea (South Korea): A human rights agenda for the Presidential election: open
letter to all candidates.” The webstie is available at:
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ASA250321997ENGLISH/$File/ASA2503297.pdf
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essential condition for consolidation of democracy. 710 At this juncture, we cannot
deny the contribution of AI to South Korea’s democracy, let alone human rights.
Also, AI is even concerned with the rights of migrant workers in South Korea,
criticizing the labor conditions including delayed payments and exploitation.
Nevertheless, South Korea is the first country in Asia to protect the rights of migrant
workers in law, such as the Act concerning Employment Permit for Migrant Workers
(EPS act), and it has led the region in legislation for the protection of migrant workers,
which confirms that South Korea belongs to a solidarist international society. 711 But
we should not forget that there are some remnants of discrimination, exploitation,
unpaid wages and appalling working conditions.

Thanks to this, AI urges

governments to pay attention to these problems and tackle them.

As the South

Korean society treats minorities and foreign workers in a more fair way, we can
expect a more consolidated democracy in South Korea, since the South Korean
society has been gradually expected to tolerate differences, which is one of the
essential elements for democracy.712 All in all, at this juncture, we can see that AI,
along with civilian voluntary action, plays a significant role in pushing more
liberalization and more democracy, which consolidates democracy in South Korea.
As another INGO we can think of, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has
consolidated democracy in South Korea in some sense.

Like AI, HRW is very
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As many democratic scholars mention, we should keep in mind the fact that liberalization does not
necessarily lead to democratization, but it is one of essential conditions for democratization.
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Approximately 360,000 migrant workers are working in South Korea, and they came form China,
Vietnam, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Philippines, Indonesia, etc. See “South Korea.” Amnesty international
USA. The website is available at:
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/south_korea/document.do?id=ENGASA250092006
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Korean non-profit organizations such as the Seoul Ethnic Koreans’ Church and the Sungnam
Migrant Workers’ House, the Seoul Bar Association and the Korea Legal Aid Corporation
(KLAC).have helped minorities and foreign workers. See Chung-in Moon, Youngjae Jin and Wook
Kim, “Democracy Report for South Korea.” The website is available at:
http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/South_Korea.pdf
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sensitive to human rights concerns, including the National Security Law (NSL),
imprisonment of conscious objectors to military service, the death penalty, etc. 713
HRW even challenges governments and those who hold power to end abusive
practices.714 Indeed, in South Korea, HRW has played various roles in consolidating
South Korea’s democracy.

For instance, like AI, it has complained about the wide-

spread mistreatment of migrant workers, and about South Korea’s reluctance to
recognize non-Korean refugees and asylum seekers. 715 As mentioned earlier,
although this might not be seen as directly related with democratic consolidation,
there is some connection between ‘fair treatment of non-Korean refugee and asylum
seeker’ and ‘democratic consolidation.’ We should not forget that toleration and fair
treatment toward foreign workers as social liberalization can indirectly contribute to
the consolidation of liberal democracy in South Korea.
Like AI, HRW has criticized the NSL for its criminal charges against people
who praised North Korea.

For instance, a criminal trial against Professor Kang

Jeong-Koo of Seoul’s Dongguk University can be a good example.

He was charged

with violating the NSL for writing pro-North Korea columns and making pro-North
Korea remarks – violation of Article 7.

In this case, Brad Adams, the Asia director

of HRW claims that the trial itself was the violation of the international law and an
embarrassing relic of South Korea’s military regimes, because what Kang did should
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See “South Korea, Events of 2006.” Human Rights Watch. The website is available at:
http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/skorea14758.htm
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See “About HRW.”

The Website is available at: http://www.hrw.org/about/
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In South Korea, there are about 360,000 migrant workers, and about two-thirds are believed to be
undocumented. Migrant workers are not allowed to form trade unions and suffer from human rights
violations, such as physical and verbal abuses by their employers, and limited chances of redress when
their rights are violated. See the Website available at:
http://hrw.org/englishwr2k7/docs/2007/01/11/skorea14758.htm
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be seen as simply, a peaceful expression of political views. 716 Also, as another
example, a monitoring group associated with HRW even sent a letter to former
Korean President Kim Dae-Jung, in order to call for all charges against former
political prisoner and long-time human rights worker, Mr. Suh Joon-Sik to be
dropped. 717 These examples can show how HRW has contributed to democratic
consolidation in South Korea.
Further, HRW has been indirectly influencing North Korea, which cannot only
spread a norm of human rights, but also a norm of democracy, via South Korea that
can be put into the category of mature democracy.

In other words, HRW has even

influenced South Korea’s foreign policy, in particular in dealing with North Korea’s
human rights violation.

For instance, HRW urged South Korea to press North Korea

to start meaningful dialogues with UN Human Rights experts.718 HRW had requested
Seoul to alter its policy of silence (silence diplomacy) on North Korea’s human Rights
record and to adopt a more aggressive attitude against the anti-liberal democratic
regime, since South Korea has been often quiet on North Korea’s denial of the
freedoms of information, association, movement and religion, and its lack of
organized political opposition, labor activism, or independent civil society, not to
mention arbitrary arrests, torture, lack of due process and fair trial, executions and
other issues of grave concern.719 As a result of these efforts, the Ministry of Foreign
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See Brad Adams (2006).
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See “Asia: South Korea.” The website is available at:
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See “South Korea: Policy Shift may help rights in North Korea.” Human Rights Watch News. The
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Affair and Trade announced on November 16, 2006 that South Korea would vote in
favor of the resolution to call on North Korea to fully respect human rights and
fundamental freedom. 720 Due to the impact of HRW and other external organizations
on South Korea, South Korea started speaking up, giving pressure on North Korea’s
regime to take a step toward human rights and liberal democracy in the long run.
This indicates that HRW has consolidated democracy in South Korea, via its influence
on South Korea’s foreign policy, which makes South Korea facilitate democratic
development as well as human rights in international society.

All in all, INGOs have

an impact on democratic consolidation in South Korea.
3.c International Organization and Iraq’s Democratic Development
1) International governmental organizations’ role in the democratic development
in Iraq
In this section, I will focus on how IGOs have had an impact on Iraq’s
democratic development in a liberal anti-pluralist international society in the postCold War era and 21st century.

In the process, I will emphasize the assumption that

the UN had legitimized the US-led multinational forces’ presence in Iraq, which has
been helpful to Iraq’s young democracy, in particular when considering that
democracy can hardly have roots in society where security is not guaranteed. In this
section, unlike the cases of China and South Korea, I will primarily focus on the role
of the UN, even though Iraq is a member of many international organizations,
including the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the Arab
League -Iraq is a founding member.
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However, South Korea had been absent or had abstained from voting on similar resolutions, due to
its consideration of peace and security as prior. See “South Korea: Policy Shift may help rights in
North Korea.” Human Rights Watch News. The website is available at:
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In 1945, Iraq joined the United Nations. 721 Today, the UN performs in all of
the 18 governorates of Iraq and operates at community, governorate and national
levels. 722 Also, now, there are around 170 international staff and over 420 national
staff, all based in Iraq.

723

However, overall, in the past, Iraq and the UN had negative

relationships rather than positive relationships.

We can observe the negative

relationships between the UN and Iraq during Saddam’s regime, such as the Security
Council Resolutions 661 and 678, not to mention monitoring missions against Iraq
like the U.N. Monitoring, Inspection, and Verification Commission (UNMOVIC)
(Fukuyama, 2006:200).

Also, we can recall the United Nations Special Commission

(UNSCOM) as teeth of the United Nations against Iraq.

UNSCOM was primarily

established for overseeing the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and
ballistic missiles in Iraq on the basis of Resolutions 687, 707 and 715. 724 It was set up
to ensure Iraq’s compliance with Resolution 687 for the disarmament of Iraq in regard
to its non-conventional weapons programs. 725

It had two primary purposes: to

inspect and oversee the destruction or elimination of Iraq’s CBW and ballistic missile
capabilities and their production and storage facilities; and to monitor Iraq over the
longer term to ensure continuous compliance. 726 All of these Resolutions indicate that
the UN had used a stick more often than a carrot against Iraq.
721

See “Background Note: Iraq.” U.S. Department of State. The website is available at:
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm
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As mentioned earlier, Iraq belongs to a liberal anti-pluralist international
society.

In this context, the UN can have highly possible, alternative methods to

interest-oriented or value-oriented mechanisms to promote democracy, which is an
aggressive mechanism.

In particular, when considering that the UN has been known

as one of the few international organizations to deal with international security with
its teeth, the UN’s impact on Iraq cannot be degraded.

Nevertheless, as mentioned in

the earlier chapter, the UN has been known to be weak and incompetent, especially in
use of force, and also its teeth are more likely to come from collaboration and
cooperation among major powers. Indeed, I admit that the UN alone is not strong
enough to properly manage international affairs.

For instance, the UN had no further

option to deal with Saddam’s Iraq after the seventeen Security Council Resolutions.
Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made this point, even saying “If the
UN did not take action against Iraq the UN would be irrelevant and fall into the
dustbin of history,” in a comparison of the UN’s inability to act against Iraq to the
League’s incompetence after Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and Germany’s
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938.727 Also, as Charles Krauthammer put it, the
Security Council was formed six decades ago, and it seems to need a remodel,
primarily thanks to its malfunction derived from the current out-dated model to
manage international affairs (Grigorescu, 2005:27).728 Furthermore, in a similar line,
we can find the malfunction of the UN due to the lack of consensus among major
powers.

In other words, the US and UK had perceived Iraq as a greater threat than

other permanent members, and this prevented collective action in the Security Council
727

I quote this from Alexandru Grigorescu’s article (2005:27). We know that one of reasons for the
League of Nations’ failure, including Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia and Germany’s invasion of
Czechoslovakia, is no privilege for Great Power.
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See Charles Krauthammer (2003: A-37).
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and any UN authorization for the US and UK’s military action (Grigorescu, 2005:31).
The Security Council has very often not reached a consensus on how to deal with
outlaw states, as the Iraq’s case demonstrated.

And via a different spectrum,

someone might argue that in dealing with Iraq, as a matter of fact, the US and UK’s
coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq itself might appear to demonstrate the UN’s inability
to control Great Powers, especially when considering their use of force without the
UN authority. 729 In short, all of these indicate that the UN does not have enough
capability to fully manage international affairs, especially, the outlaw states Saddam’s regime demonstrates this point - especially in the absence of major powers’
cooperation and collaboration.
However, it does not necessarily mean that the UN is always completely
ineffective in international society in dealing with outlaw states and transforming
them toward democracy. 730 For instance, as Grigorescu put it, the UN’s full economic
sanctions and weapon inspections against Saddam’s regime significantly reduced
Saddam’s military and economic power and even the US costs for going to war in
2003(Grigorescu, 2005:31, 37).

In fact, some scholars even argue that the UN

sanctions and the weapon inspections against Saddam’s regime were successful, when
considering that the US-led coalition forces could not find any WMD in Iraq.
Nonetheless, they could not alter Saddam’s major policy.

In other words, in the

cooperation and collaboration among major powers, the UN has teeth such as
economic sanctions and even other collective military actions, to give some pressure
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In fact, the UN and Great Power should re-enforce each other to manage international affairs
properly.
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Also, the UN has been able to set up around sixty peacekeeping operations that have contributed to
international security. This also demonstrates that the UN is not dead enough to be disregarded. See
Grigorescu (2005: 38).
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on the outlaw states in some level.

At this juncture, the UN’s sanctions and

inspections, in some sense, can be understood as what the UN has done in its own best,
to deal with Saddam’s Iraq. These could be interpreted as the UN’s efforts to alter
Iraq’s identity and character in some sense as well. 731
When considering the relationships between Great Powers and the UN, as
mentioned above, also, the US-led invasion of Iraq might be seen as the UN’s
inability to control Great Powers in some sense.

However, despite this, we should

regard it as the UN’s flexibility to give Great Powers some opportunity unilaterally to
deal with international affairs, in particular outlaw states, whenever the five
permanent members of Security Council cannot reach the consensus, and whenever
there is an endless lack of disarmament from target states. 732 This could be
interpreted as privileges for the Great Powers.

What if Great Powers such as the UK

and the US had invaded Italy and Germany and changed their identities and characters,
just after Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and Germany’s invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1938? Can we expect the same outcome as the WWII, if Great
Powers alter the identity and character of those regimes in advance in cooperation
with the League of Nations? At this juncture, I have to make two points, throughout
Iraq’s case.

One is that Great Powers have the privilege to deal with outlaw states

unilaterally, and the other is that the UN should be more flexible and cooperative in
the Great Powers’ role in managing international affairs, in particular when
731

I admit that more than one million people were killed due to sanction, with the intact Iraqi regime.
However, due to inspection and sanction, Iraq had been gradually weaker and weaker militarily and
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strategy, since there had been no trust between Washington and Baghdad.
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Grigorescu compared the UN with the League of Nation, in order to reveal the UN’s effectiveness
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considering that one reason for the failures of the League of Nations was its
inflexibility and its reluctance in giving some privilege to Great Powers.733 In reality,
due to the UN inability in various ways – e.g. Article 43 of the UN Charter - the rights
of the Great Powers should be guaranteed and in turn their duties should be properly
carried out.

In Iraq, the US-led coalition forces toppled Saddam’s regime – indeed,

we know that the world is far safer in the absence of Saddam’s regime - and this has
facilitated democracy.

This can be the Great Powers’ duty to maintain and promote

the well-being of international society in the long run in some sense.

At this point, I

am not saying that the UN must be always subject to Great Powers, but their
relationships must be cooperative in the management of international affairs, since,
practically, the UN is incapable of dealing with international affairs by itself, and
since democracy is good enough for all in international society.

On September 16,

2004, nonetheless, Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the UN, speaking on the
US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq, even said, "I have indicated it was not in
conformity with the UN Charter.

From our point of view, from the Charter point of

view, it was illegal.”734
However, we can perceive that the UN was flexible in supporting the
unilateral role of Great Powers in dealing with outlaw states in some sense, when
considering that the UN tended to legitimize and legalize the presence of US-led
multinational forces in Iraq via UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637.
The UN plays a significant role in facilitating Iraq’s democratic, political, social and
733
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economic structure via its indirect cooperation with Great Powers.
Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637 demonstrate this point.

UN Security

On May 22 2003,

Security Council Resolution 1483 reveals this point, saying:
1. Appeals to Member State and concerned organizations to
assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their
institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to
conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance
with this resolution. 2. Call upon all member states in a
position…..for Iraq and to help meet the humanitarian and
other needs of the Iraqi people by providing food,
medical supplies, and resources necessary for
reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s economic
infrastructure………4. Calls upon the authority, consistent
with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant
international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi
people through the effective administration of the
territory, including in particular working towards the
restoration of conditions of security and stability and the
creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can
freely determine their own political future.735
Resolutions 1483 and 1637 made the US-led multinational forces’ presence in Iraq
legally accountable, as the US-led MNF acceded Resolutions 1483 and 1637, not to
mention that the UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637 encouraged
international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force. 736
Resolutions 1483 and 1637 not only guarantees the legal participation of international
organizations, and that of the US-led MNF, 737 but also guarantees the UN as a middle
man which can link the international community with Iraq, thus helping Iraq’s young
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See S/RES/1483 (2003). The website is available at: http://www.iamb.info/pdf/unsc1483.pdf
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Resolutions 1483 and 1637 demonstrate how important the UN has been in international society,
when considering that the UN was the only international organization that could give legitimacy to the
US-led MNF’s presence in Iraq.
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democracy. 738 In particular, when considering the fact that Iraq had formally notified
the U.N. Security Council that it wanted the U.S.-led multinational forces to remain in
place due to the Iraqi troops and police’s inability, we can see the U.N. role in
connecting Iraq with the international community, not to mention the legalized
presence of the US-led forces in Iraq.

In all of these contexts, former President

George W. Bush said in his State of Union speech: “in Iraq, multinational forces are
operating under a mandate from the United Nations.”739The UN could ultimately help
Iraq internalize itself with the norms and values of international society in a flexible,
legitimate and legal way, while legitimizing and legalizing the US-led MNF’s
presence to facilitate Iraq’s young democracy.

At this juncture, we can say that the

UN and Great Powers have been cooperatively reinforcing each other in managing
international society, which eventually facilitates the promotion and consolidation of
democracy in international society in the 21 st century. 740 This is one of the differences
between the League of Nations and the United Nations - the former was far less
cooperative with Great Powers than the latter, which is one of the reasons for the
failures of the League of Nations in international society.
Great Powers are not always cooperative.

However, the UN and

Instead, on and off, the UN can be

assumed to play a role in checking and balancing the role of Great Powers indirectly,
even if its negative reputation can be described as a tool for the interests of Great
Powers.

For instance, the Security Council set up a special account, and created an

international monitoring board to watch over Great Powers, in May 2003 to ensure
738

See Laurence Boisson De Chazournes (2003).
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I quote this from Kaveh Afrasiabi (2007).
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I won’t mention again here that in the post-cold war and 21st century, Great Powers have promoted
and consolidated democracy as an emerging new standard civilization across international society,
since I did it in the previous chapter.
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that the US-led MNF did not misuse Iraqi resources, which can be seen as to check
and balance the overly misused power of the US-led MNF. 741 This indicates that we
cannot disregard the tendency that the UN might be only an official mechanism to
reduce the abusive tendency of Great Powers.

Nonetheless, no one should have the

illusion that the UN can replace the Great Powers’ roles in particular, the military role
in Iraq.742
Besides the UN’s legitimization and legalization of the US-led MNF’s
presence in Iraq and its cooperation with Great Powers for Iraq’s young democracy,
the UN has directly contributed to Iraq’s national reconstruction, shaping Iraq’s young
democracy in various ways.

For instance, most importantly, U.N. election experts

trained more than 8,000 Iraqi electoral workers, in order to assist the Independent
Electoral Commission of Iraq (IECI) for a fair and free election, while assisting the
recruitment and training of 148,000 poll workers for the estimated 5,578 polling
centers around Iraq (Fukuyama, 2006:210).

And 23 different agencies and

organizations from the greater U.N. family are helping to coordinate aid and
reconstruction in Iraq, and 46 different projects have been approved, receiving a total
funding of more than $ 490 million (Fukuyama, 2006: 210).

Also, UN agencies, for

instance, the World Food Program (WFP), the U.N. Development Program (UNDP),
the U.N. Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations Educational
Scientific Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the United
Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) have been actively engaged in
humanitarian efforts, reconstruction and democracy in Iraq (Fukuyama, 2006:201).
741

See Irwin Arieff (2006).

742

See Carlos Pascual and Brian Cullin (2007).
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As a lead agency of the Food Security cluster, WFP is vigorously involved in a
range of activities including:
collaboration with the World Bank to address the issue of
food security and protection of the most vulnerable groups
in the context of a Public Distribution System (PDS) reform;
‘safety net’ activities, including school feeding and
supplementary feeding; and continuation of poverty and
food security assessment and analysis. 743
For example, a total of 19,196 mt of commodities – e.g. High Energy Biscuits, wheat
flour, vegetable oil and pea/wheat blend – have been sent into Iraq under WFP
operations. 744
The UNDP for Iraq’s reconstruction can be summarized with three pillars:
‘democratic

governance,’

‘economy

and

employment’

and

‘infrastructure

rehabilitation and the environment.’745 In particular, in terms of Iraq’s democracy, the
UNDP has supported the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC), along with
its provision of technical assistance for the election, which can implement the
aspirations of the people of Iraq to live in a democratic society. 746 Also, the UNDP
has assisted the early stages of independent media development including the creation
of the first independent news agency in Iraq and the training of Iraqi journalists,
which has encouraged freedom of expression. 747 Moreover, the UNDP is vigorously

743

See “WFP Activities in Iraq,” Available at the website:
http://one.wfp.org/country_brief/middle_east/iraq/monthly_update/0404_iraq.pdf
744

See “WFP Iraq Operation Update.” Vol. 14. May 2005. The website is available at:
https://www2582.ssldomain.com/uniraq/documents/Monthly%20Update%20WFP%20Iraq%20Ops%2
014.pdf
745

See “UNDP in Iraq.” Available at the website: http://www.iq.undp.org

746

See “UNDP supports Iraqis in electing their future government.” UNDP: Newsroom. Available at
the Website: http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/march/undp-supports-iraqis-in-electing-theirfuture-government.en
747

See “Short History of UNDP Iraq.” United Nations Development Program: Republic of Iraq.
Available at the website:
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advocating the development of the rule of law and justice, working with the Ministry
of Justice and the Higher Judicial Council in putting up the capacity of legal and
judicial institutions in Iraq.748 And the UNDP is advocating human rights, working
with the Ministry of Human Rights and the Ministry of Justice.

749

Currently, UNOPS supports Iraq’s democratic transition.

Since 1999,

UNOPS has assisted elections in 15 countries spanning over four continents. 750 One
of them is Iraq.

For instance, throughout 2008, UNOPS had supported the IHEC. 751

In other words, UNOPS assisted the institutional development of the IHEC.752 Also,
UNOPS assisted the mobilization and training of 45,000 domestic electoral observers
for election day. 753
UNESCO contributes to Iraq’s democratization.

For example, UNESCO has

a mandate to defend freedom of expression, and so it strongly advocates the Iraqi
government and the Iraqi media in the improvement of a national media and
communication policy that endorses freedom of expression, respect for the free and
sustainable media and free access to information corresponding to internationally

http://www.iq.undp.org/Default.aspx?data=C2vBlscNsCFjo_2bhGKDD0JErL1Yvd00qcvdolftl_2fHC
VedLA0kgXGkHdDOkIIqSisEKw_2fNCkl8CF6wJXwiwSdiRu6PJT7W7o3wYF7C2QxPCCWhbRd9
vCEofEApBYkWGMq
748

Ibid

749

Ibid

750

See “Elections.” UNOPS. Available at the Website: http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/focusareas/census-elections/Pages/elections.aspx
751

Ibid

752

Ibid

753

Ibid
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recognized standards.754 This clearly indicates that UNESCO contributes to the Iraqi
transition to democracy, particularly via strengthening and building a media sector
committed to freedom of expression. 755
As the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR protects and assist refugees and
displaced people.

For example, UNHCR is working to satisfy the needs of internally

displaced persons (IDP) via “the construction of schools, clinics and community
centers” and via “providing counseling and special care for the most vulnerable.”756
Indeed, a UNHCR initiative has been aimed at augmenting the capacity of Iraq’s
national, regional and local authorities to help IDP. 757 But, UNHCR has remotely
controlled its Iraq operation from Amman and Kuwait city via national staff based in
Iraq, international staff on short tasks, liaison with government counterparts and an
extended network of 24 NGO partners across Iraq.758
As the lead United Nations agency, UNICEF has given vulnerable Iraqi
children and families vital assistances including emergency health care, safe drinking
water, sanitation, education and critical protective services throughout Iraq. 759 For
instance, UNICEF has responded to the urgent needs of more than 12,000 families
754

See “Towards Democracy in Iraq.” UNESCO and Iraq. Available at the website:
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.phpURL_ID=18230&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
755

See “UNESCO and Iraq.” Available at the website:
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=24958&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.ht
ml
756

See “Iraq.” UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency. Available at the website: www.unhcr.org.uk/howyou-can-help/emergenies/Iraq.html
757

See “Supporting UNHCR: Iraq.” UNOPS. Available at the website:
http://www.unops.org/english/whatwedo/partners/Pages/UNHCR.aspx#3
758

See “UNHCR Iraq Operation 2006, Supplementary Appeal.” April 2006. The website is available
at: http://www.unhcr.org/4565b4422.html pp.2
759

See “UNICEF appeals for $37 million to save vulnerable Iraqi children.” UNICEF.
the website: http://www.unicef.org/emerg/iraq_42810.html
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Available at

and 3,000 individuals by providing “safe water, hygiene materials and emergency
health supplies in Sadr city.” 760

Also, UNICEF is at present investing over US$8

million in humanitarian interventions in 59 communities across Iraq, and this action is
in places where families are suffering severe vulnerability as a direct consequence of
conflict, epidemic and natural disaster. 761 All in all, UNICEF has been deeply
engaged in humanitarian efforts to help many Iraqi people in desperate situation.
The UNAMI was heralded in Security Council Resolution 1500 adopted on 14
August 2003.762 The UNAMI advocated the development of innovative operational
options for continued UN involvement in Iraq.

763

Also, importantly, the UNAMI has

provided the IHEC with advice and assistance on a wide range of electoral issues,
including a nationwide overhauling of the voter registry to increase accuracy and
reduce the potential for multiple voting. 764 For instance, in July 2009, the IHEC, with
assistance from UNAMI, had a successful and violence-free election in the Kurdistan
region of Iraq.765
The United Nations even set up the International Reconstruction Fund Facility
for Iraq to fund activities in Basra, Fallujah, and elsewhere, and this fund has received
24 donors to come forward with more than $ 1 billion in assistance for these activities

760

See “Unicef Humanitarian Action Update: Iraq.” June 11, 2008. Available at the website:
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Iraq_HAU_June_2008.pdf
761

See “UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update: Iraq” February 17, 2009.
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Iraq_HAU_17_February_2009.pdf
762

See “About UNAMI.”

763

Ibid

Available at the website:

The website is available at: http://www.uniraq.org/aboutus/aboutus.asp

764

See “Ban congratulates Iraqis on violence-free provincial elections.” UN News Center. Available at
the website: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=29746&Cr=iraq&Cr1
765

See “The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.” Available at the website:
http://www.betterworldcampaign.org/un-peacekeeping/missions/iraq.html
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as well (Fukuyama, 2006:210).

All of these engagements in Iraq demonstrate how

important the UN system has been, especially with its support for the US-led MNF as
well as democratic promotion in Iraq.
When considering the above UN direct, various, significant activities in Iraq’s
rebuilding and democratization, we might even think that the UN should have more
responsibility in Iraq.

For instance, the UN might need to take more responsibility

for Iraq’s basic education and training from the registration of claims to the
preparation of ballots.766 As a matter of fact, the UN has been told that it might do a
better job than the US-led MNF in various aspects since someone might argue that the
UN might have more credibility than the US-led coalition forces, in particular when
considering popular Iraqi figures’ perception of the US-led coalition forces:
Shiite leader Ayatollah Sistani (who can be said to indirectly
represent sixty percent of the population), will not deal with
the coalition on long-term political matters because that they
are viewed as occupying forces (Uruqhart, 2004:228).
In fact, the legitimacy of the coalition was simply not accepted by most Iraqis. 767 A
2005 poll for the British Ministry of Defense found that eight out of 10 Iraqis strongly
opposed the presence of coalition forces, and between 70% -90% want to see a
timeline for the withdrawal of coalition troops.768 This indicates that the United
Nations seems to have more political legitimacy in the Middle East than the US.769
Also, the UN chief, Ban Ki-moon has pledged:
a more active UN role in assisting in building an inclusive
political process, helping to cultivate a regional environment
766

See Kaveh Afrasiabi (2007).

767

See Menzies Campbell (2006).

768

Ibid.

769

See Juan Cole (2006).
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supportive of a transition to stability, and pursuing
reconstruction through International Compact.770
In fact, despite the destruction of UN offices in Iraq on August 19, 2003 which killed
22 UN workers, the UN has been continuously supportive to Iraq’s reconstruction in
the post-war era.771 All of these imply that the United Nations seem to have more
chances than the US-led MNF in Iraq.
However, I do believe that both the roles of the UN and the US-led MNF were
absolutely necessary for successful democracy in Iraq, in particular when considering
the past situations: according to UNAMI, 6,376 civilians were violently killed in
November and December 2006, and during 2006, a total of 34,452 civilians were
violently killed and 36,685 wounded 772; even 12,000 police officers have been killed
since 2003, which means that on an average, 10 police officers were killed every
single day773;and the rule of law was challenged by the existence of militias and other
groups who continuously acted with impunity, confirming an urgent need for the state
to assert control over its security forces and all armed groups in the country.774 With
regard to Iraq’s specific circumstance, Great Powers and the UN cannot successfully
carry out their mission without the other, especially when considering that as
mentioned above, the US-led MNF was necessary and it had been legitimized by UN
770

I quote this from Kaveh Afrasiabi (2007).

771

Due to the destruction, the UN had chosen a low profile, but it has never given up its mission. See
Kaveh Afrasiabi (2007).
772

See “UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report, 1 November -31 December
2006.” pp. 2. The website is available at:
http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Nov%20Dec%202006%20EN.pdf
773

Ibid, pp 3.

774

See “UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report, 1 November – 31
December 2005.” The website is available at:
http://unami.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=mVYbM4FJFEc%3D&tabid=3174&language=
en-US. pp. 1
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Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637.

Also, we should keep in mind the idea

that democracy cannot be successful without the guarantee of security and order, as
justice cannot last without order.
All in all, the UN can be seen as an institution to goad the outlaw state to
conform to the values and norms of international society in the long run.

We cannot

deny the UN’s direct and indirect role in transforming the outlaw state into a member
of the international society, via its process of modifying the language and behavior of
the outlaw state so as to make it become a decent democratic state.

Saddam’s Iraq

had been marked as the outlaw state and had posed a threat to its neighboring states,
such as Kuwait and to a whole international society, but, since 2003, Iraq has been
altered.

The UN has greatly contributed to such change.

All in all, the UN has

facilitated Iraq’s path toward democracy, via indirectly backing Great Powers’ role,
such as the US-led MNF, and being directly engaged in rebuilding Iraq, although Iraq
still has so many difficulties on its road toward a mature democracy.
So far, I have touched on the United Nations for democratic development in
Iraq.

In the process, I have attempted to reveal how international organizations can

have an impact on democratic development in Iraq in a liberal anti-pluralist
international society.

At this point, unlike China and South Korea, I tended to stress

an ‘enforcement mechanism’ rather than ‘interest’ or ‘legitimacy,’ while revealing the
importance of cooperative relationships between the UN and Greats Powers like
through sanctions and Resolutions 1483 and 1637.

Nonetheless, I briefly mentioned

non-enforcement mechanisms of the UN agencies such as the UNDP, UNOPS and
UNESCO, for Iraqi transition to democracy.

All in all, I have to say that IGOs have

had an impact on democratic development in Iraq, along with Great Powers, in
particular when considering Resolution 1483 and Resolution 1637.
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2) International non-governmental organizations’ role in the democratic
development in Iraq
Like China and South Korea, in Iraq, some non-governmental organizations
are indirectly engaged in the promotion and consolidation of democracy as well.
Some INGOs play a significant role in reacting across sectarian lines to reinforce
dialogue and understanding, and several U.S.-based organizations have employed
substantial resources to help Iraqis develop their democracy. 775 Nevertheless, as the
Iraq Study Group points out, we are well aware of the fact that the participation and
activity of INGOs had been constrained by the lack of security. 776 But we can’t deny
the fact that INGOs have had an impact on Iraq’s democratic development in various
ways.
There are various INGOs for democratic development, like the Iraq
Foundation, to help rebuild and democratize Iraq.

These INGOs can influence the

promotion and consolidation of democracy in Iraq, by emphasizing ‘freedom,’ ‘the
rule of law,’ ‘transparency,’ the check and balance system,’ ‘order’ and ‘justice,’ not to
mention ‘protection of human rights.’ 777 This shows one of the aspects of INGOs,
which is to promote and consolidate democracy in the Middle East.
Let us take a look at the Iraq Foundation as a non-profit, non-partisan, nongovernmental organization, which was established in 1991 by Iraq’s expatriates.778

775

See James A. Baker, III, Lee H. Hamilton, Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Edwin
Meese III, Sandra Day O’Connor, Leon E. Panetta, William J. Perry, Charles S. Robb, and Alan K.
Simpson (2006:31).
776

Ibid.

777

See, for example, “Iraq: Activists call on army, police to respect women’s rights.” Irin News.
February 8, 2006.
778

See “The Iraq Foundation.” Available at the website:
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/foundation.html
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According to the group’s 2002 IRS Form 990, the Iraq Foundation received $ 1.66
million in support for 2001, 99.97 percent of that figure derived from public funding
sources.779 It promotes and consolidates democracy as well as human rights in Iraq,
while working for a better international understanding of Iraq’s potential as a
contributor to political stability and economic progress in the Middle East. 780
primary philosophy is the following:
Iraq commands considerable human and natural resources
and enjoys a tradition of intellectual and economic
prominence in the Middle East. A peaceful Iraq can serve
as a stabilizing force and as a catalyst for security and
economic prosperity in the region. However, Iraq will
only live in peace within its borders and with its neighbors
once democracy and accountable government are
established. The Iraqi people will only flourish when their
civil and human rights are respected.781
Its major objectives are the followings:
. To expand the constituency for democracy among Iraqis.
The Foundation works extensively with Expatriate Iraqis,
who today constitute over 10 % of the Iraqi Foundation.
Whenever possible, the Foundation maintains direct or
indirect contacts within Iraq as well
. To highlight human rights abuses in Iraq. Human Rights
abuses by the Iraqi state, dismal for the past thirty years,
have escalated and multiplied. In a 1995 report, the UN
Special Rapporteur for Human Rights called Iraq’s human
rights situation the worst of any country since World War II.
Without sufficient recognition and exposure of the problem,
it will be impossible to embark on a healthy future for Iraq.
. To educate non-Iraqis about Iraq and strengthen support
for a democratic new beginning.
The Foundation
endeavors to give a clear understanding of the consequences
of totalitarianism in Iraq and the cost in personal suffering,
economic collapse, and social disintegration.
779

See “Iraq Foundation.” Available at the website:
http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Iraq_Foundation
780

See “The Iraq Foundation.” Available at the website:
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/foundation.html
781

See “Iraq Foundation: Philosophy.” Available at the website:
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/aboutus/mission.htm
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Its

. To educate non-Iraqis about the potential for Iraq to
become a major contributor to democratic reform and socioeconomic development in the region in a climate of
democracy and an open society. 782
At this juncture, we can see liberal thought and democratic norms, which can be
understood as a contributing factor of the Iraq Foundation to democratic development
in Iraq.
It has several projects, such as the Iraq Constitution Assistance Project (ICAP),
raising democratic awareness and citizen participation in a democratic process;
Human Rights Education (HRE), the apprehending of human rights; the Iraqi
American National Network (IANN), capacity-building of developing Iraqi
communities around the United States; and the Iraq Civil Society Program (ICSP),
encouragement of women’s participation in all facets of public life in Iraq.783
particular, along with Freedom House,

784

In

ICAP has been promoting Iraqi

democratization via a shared knowledge on constitutional development and notable
democratic awareness and civic participation in the constitutional process and
democratic change.785 Also, as part of the ICAP Project, Iraq Democracy Watch is
trying to make democracy a reality in Iraq, and to monitor the democratic
development in Iraq, especially the implementation of articles in the constitution
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See “Free Iraq Foundation: About Objectives.” Available at the website:
http://wwww.wiser.org/organization/view/64cd2a1fba9e76d42d94af1157dbf5f4
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See the website available at: www.iraqfoundation.org/projects_new
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As a non-profit and non-government organization, Freedom House has monitored Iraq’s progress of
democracy. For instance, it rated Iraq’s political rights improvement from 7 to 6, thanks to the
holding of the series of modest elections to a transnational national assembly in January 2005 and the
subsequent formation of a transitional government. See “Welcome to Freedom House, Country
Report, Iraq.” Available at the website:
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6983&year=2006
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See “Iraq Constitution Assistance Project.” Available at the website:
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects/consititution%20assistance/constassistindex.htm
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concerning Iraqi citizens’ rights and freedoms. 786 When considering the above
projects, we can clearly notice that the Iraq Foundation greatly contributes to Iraqi
transition to democracy.
In addition, importantly, the Iraq Foundation has been working with the
American Bar Association and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, which
carries out and advocates the legislative agenda of Iraq’s pledge campaign, and which
institutionalizes the objectives of Iraq’s pledge across the social and political
spectrum. 787

It is worthwhile looking at the five laws of the Iraq’s Pledge platform.

A law to secure freedom of expression, freedom of the press,
and freedom of assembly
A law to preserve the existence of civil courts for matters of
personal status (such as marriage and divorce) as an
alternative to religious court.
A law to ensure the independence of Iraq’s Supreme Court
by requiring that all judges have a high degree in law and
experience as practicing judges.
A law to strengthen the High Commission for Human
Rights by enabling it refer cases to the Supreme Court for
review
A law to enable the High Commission for Human Rights to
enforce the right of equal opportunity for all Iraqis. 788
Moreover, the Iraq Foundation has organized a watchdog group to supervise
parliamentary legislation related to the above five laws, to examine the debates in
parliament influencing the five laws, and to oversee voting and trace the statements
and positions which parliamentarians make. 789 All of these show that the Iraq
Foundation has indirectly and directly strengthened Iraq’s young liberal democracy.
786

See “Iraq Democracy Watch.” Available at the website:.
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects/consititution%20assistance/iraq_democracy_watch.htm
787

See “Pledge for Iraq (PFI) Campaign.” Iraq Foundation. The webstie is available at:
http://www.iraqfoundation.org/projects_new/ahd_al-iraq/ipindex.htm
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Conclusion
In general, although international organizations have been very often
recognized as an incompetent tool for the interests of Great Powers, we should not
forget the fact that international organizations can be seen as an institution to maintain
order and security and to promote common good in international society.

And, most

importantly,

democratic

many

international

development in international society.

organizations

have

influenced

They have indirectly and directly contributed

to democratization as the new emerging standard of civilization and the new wave
expansion of international society in the post-Cold War era and 21 st century.
International organizations can be divided into IGOs and INGOs.

IGOs and

INGOs have slightly different approaches to promote and consolidate democracy:
IGOs are more likely to opt for the top-down approach, whereas INGOs are more
likely to opt for the bottom-up approach.

They can be relatively seen as the top-

down democratic promotion and the bottom-up democratic promotion.

Nonetheless,

sometimes it is hard to distinguish one approach from the other.
Like other chapters, in this chapter, I adopted three countries to demonstrate
how international organizations can have relatively different methods to promote and
consolidate democracy on the basis of each different international society.

As China,

South Korea and Iraq reflect relatively different international societies, pluralist,
solidarist and liberal-anti-pluralist, international organizations have opted for
relatively different mechanisms to promote and consolidate democracy: China
(interest: desire to be Great Power), South Korea (legitimacy: voluntary acceptance)
and Iraq (enforcement: UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1637).

All in all,

international organizations have cultivated and consolidated democratic elements in
each state.

They obviously have an impact on democratic development, while
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contributing to the fact that democracy becomes an emerging new standard of
civilization and the new wave expansion of international society in the post-Cold War
era and the 21st century.
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Conclusion
In the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, democracy has been gradually
recognized as the predominant norm of international society.

Indeed, we can even

think that democracy has become the newly emerging standard of civilization and the
new wave expansion of international society, in particular when considering even
Libya, Tunisia and Egypt’s moves toward democratization in 2011.
reflects this global phenomenon.

My dissertation

In other words, my dissertation is about

democratization across international society.
In my dissertation, I adopted the English School as one of predominant IR
theories for democratization.

I underline the English School as the IR theoretical

background for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, while showing that the
English School is the widest and the deepest IR theory.

The English School is fit for

the explanation of democratization across international society, in particular when
considering its unique assets including pluralistic methodology, interdisciplinary
character, international society (pluralist, solidarist and liberal anti-pluralist
international societies), Great Powers, the standard of civilization, and outlaw states.
In my dissertation, I also used the concepts of inner circle and outer circle relative to
democratic countries and non-democratic countries, as democracy becomes the newly
emerging standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century.
Furthermore, I underscored the phenomenon that the inner circle has been greatly
enlarged and the outer circle has been diminished in the post-Cold War era and the
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21st century, as an increasing number of countries have become democratic across
international society.

This phenominon indicates that more and more states have

become civilized, when considering that democracy has become the newly emerging
standard of civilization in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century.
Moreover, in my dissertation, I attempted to show external variables and
internal variables which have an impact on paths toward democracy as well. 790 As
external variables, I mentioned three different international societies: a pluralist
international society, a solidarist international society, and a liberal anti-pluralist
international society.

Each different international society has brought about

relatively different paths toward democracy.

For instance, we can see more often

interest-oriented socialization in a pluralist international society, value-oriented
socialization in a solidarist international society, and the use of force in a liberal antipluralist international society.

And, in my dissertation, importantly, I attempted to

show that institutions within three different international societies have greatly
promoted and consolidated democracy across international society.

In particular,

Hedley Bull’s three institutions – i.e. international law, diplomacy, and Great Powers and international organization as the secondary institution of international society
have greatly contributed to the promotion and consolidation of democracy across
international society.

Precisely speaking, international law, diplomacy, Great powers

and international organizations have been significant institutions of international
society, as they have contributed to maintaining international order and even
promoting the well-being of international society.

And, importantly, those

institutions have played a significant role in promoting and consolidating the norms
790

Please read an appendix in order to understand how internal variables can have an impact on paths
toward democracy.
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and values of international society.

As in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century,

democracy has become the predominant norm and value of international society,
institutions facilitate the promotion and consolidation of democracy across
international society.
In terms of institutions’ promotion and consolidation of democracy across
international society, we can notice that institutions tend to choose various
mechanisms rather than one, on the basis of each circumstance; for example, a target
state’s identity and character and a type of international society – i.e. pluralist,
solidarist, or liberal anti-pluralist international society.

As noted above, I tend to

emphasize three mechanisms – i.e. interest-oriented socialization, value-oriented
socialization and the use of force – in order to promote and consolidate democracy
across international society.
In my dissertation, I adopted China, South Korea, and Iraq in order to
demonstrate that each country has its own unique path toward democracy.

However,

in general, we can see three general types – i.e. interest (interest-based socialization),
legitimacy (value-based socialization) and force (use of force) – for democratization,
since China, South Korea and Iraq belong to relatively a pluralist international society,
a solidarist international society, and a liberal anti-pluralist international society.

In

other words, China has cherished pluralistic principles such as equal sovereignty and
non-intervention, and is recognized as an authoritarian regime rather than an outlaw
state.

Also, China has been in pursuit of economic development and Great Power

status.

Under these circumstances, interest-oriented socialization should be adopted

for China’s democratization.

Indeed, China has gradually but slowly moved to

democracy due to its pursuit of national interests.

South Korea has cherished

solidaristic principles, voluntarily adopting human rights and democracy as significant
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norms and values.

In other words, in South Korea, a majority of people have

authentically accepted democracy as well as human rights.

And so, South Korea

becomes a full member of a solidarist international society.

Thus, at this juncture,

we can think of the value-oriented socialization for South Korea’s consolidation of
democracy.

Saddam’s Iraq had been recognized as an outlaw state that posed an

existential threat to its neighboring states and further to international society, let alone
Saddam’s cruel dictatorship.

These aspects of Iraq made the use of force necessary

to bring about its democratization.

This indicates that Iraq became a member of a

liberal anti-pluralist international society in which the use of force can be justified,
even if the target state must be an outlaw state.
All in all, what is important is that external factors and institutions – i.e.
international law, diplomacy, Great Powers, and international organizations - have
greatly contributed to these three countries’ democratization, even though they have
relatively different paths toward democracy.

However, at this juncture, though I tend

to emphasize the external factors and institutions for the promotion and consolidation
of democracy, this does not necessarily mean that internal variables can be completely
disregarded.

In an appendix, I stressed internal variables which influence paths

toward democracy.

As internal variables, I mentioned history, culture, politics,

economics, military, and foreign policy.
on paths toward democracy.

Those internal variables can have an impact

To sum up, democracy has become the newly emerging

standard of civilization and new wave expansion of international society in the postCold War era and the 21st century.
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Appendix: Internal Variables and Democracy
Introduction
In my dissertation, I attempt to show that the relatively different path toward
democracy can be, in a large part, determined by the characteristics of each
international society, internal variables and external variables as independent variables.
But, in this appendix, I will examine internal variables, which can have an impact on a
path toward democracy.

Also, I will demonstrate that internal variables cannot be

disregarded for the promotion and consolidation of democracy, although in my
dissertation, I pay more attention to characters of international society and external
variables on which I touched in the earlier chapters, than to internal variables.

All in

all, in this appendix, I will ultimately reveal how internal variables including history,
culture, politics, economy, military power and foreign policy can affect the
democratic path, which can ascertain that democracy has become steadily a standard
of civilization across international society.

Each case study, China, South Korea and

Iraq can help comprehend how each country’s internal variables can have an impact
on each country’s democratic path.
First of all, I will take a look at China’s internal variables for its democratic
path.

In China’s history, I will attempt to investigate how its humiliating past and its

brief democratic experience can have an effect on its path toward democracy.

With

regard to Chinese culture, I will demonstrate the compatibility between Confucianism
and democracy, with emphasizing some aspects of Confucianism, which can be seen
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as democratic norms and values, such as a pluralistic life, moral equality and human
dignity.

With respect to Chinese politics, I will reveal that China’s democratization

must be slowly evolutionary rather than radically revolutionary, due to Chinese
leadership’s fear of instability and disunity drawing from any radical change toward
democracy.

In terms of China’s economy, I will explain how its economic growth

based on the adoption of a market economy can bring out its gradual political freedom.
Regarding military power, I will explain why Great Powers cannot embrace the use of
force for China’s democratization, suggesting alternative options such as interests
anchored in the rational calculation and interest-oriented socialization.

On the

subject of China’s foreign policy, I will explore how pragmatism as its primary aspect
of foreign policy, can contribute to China’s path toward democracy.
Secondly, I will take a look at South Korea’s internal variables which can have
an impact on its path toward democracy.

In terms of South Korea’s history, I will

emphasize South Korea’s strategic location, and its traditional legacy of Saddae Chuui
(reliance on a big power), along with the continuous influence of regional hegemonic
powers on the Korean Peninsula.

Regarding South Korea’s culture, I will examine

how Christianity has greatly contributed to South Korea’s democratic development,
and I will stress that South Korea’s democratic success in the co-existing society of
four religions, Christianity, Buddhism, Shamanism, and Confucianism verifies the
idea that democracy does not recognize different cultures.

In South Korea’s politics,

I will underline civilian roles in its democratic development, which was mass protestdriven rather than elite protest-driven.

With regard to South Korea’s economy, I will

underscore a positive correlation between economic development and democratic
development, and also I will investigate the close relationship between outcomes of
economic development, like growth of living standard and high education, and
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democratic development, although I will briefly refer to South Korea’s economic
reform from crony capitalism to economic democracy, which has reinforced South
Korea’s democratic consolidation.

On the subject of South Korea’s military power,

I will disclose the fact that South Korea’s military superiority over North Korea’s
military power has steadily generated a positive environment for South Korea’s
democratic development, underlining the idea that justice can hardly last in the
absence of order or security.

In terms of South Korea’s foreign policy, I will explore

how South Korea’s foreign policy can bring about a more open and more democratic
environment.
Finally, I will look at Iraq’s internal variables which can influence its path
toward democracy.

In Iraq’s history, I will emphasize the old cycle of violence,

dictatorship, ill-liberal foreign occupation and rebellion as barriers to Iraq’s path
toward democracy, which could help justify the use of force by the US-led coalition
forces in 2003 so as to overthrow Saddam’s regime and to introduce a new cycle of
cooperation, democracy, peace and prosperity in Iraq.791

Regarding Iraq’s culture, I

will reveal that Islamic culture can be compatible with democracy.

With respect to

Iraq’s politics, I will point out Sunni’s dominance, Saddam’s dictatorship, Baath
Party’s role, and close relationship between military and politics as obstacles to Iraq’s
democratic development.

In Iraq’s economy, I will demonstrate that Iraq’s economic

failure could be an obstacle to its democratic development.

In terms of Iraq’s

military, I will show that Saddam’s military power could not help Iraq’s democratic
development as long as Saddam’s Iraq was an outlaw state which posed an existential
threat to its region and international society, let alone brutal dictatorship.
791

On the

As for me, the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be recognized as a stimulant
for a change in paradigm in Thomas Kuhn’s terms. See Kuhn (1996).
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subject of Iraq’s foreign policy, I will demonstrate that Iraq’s foreign policy based on
anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and regional hegemony could not be compatible with
Iraq’s democratic development.

All in all, via three cases, I will emphasize the fact

that internal variables have impacts on paths toward democracy.
A.

China’s internal variables and its path toward democracy

1.

China’s history and its path toward democracy.
China’s historical background is a significant independent variable to shape or

shove its path toward democracy.

Let us take a look at China’s historical

background, while keeping in mind the question on how China’s past experience can
have an impact on its path toward democracy.

In general, China had been well

known as the Middle Kingdom, the center of civilization, the center of the world or a
superior position to any other society until the late 19th century, especially in a cultural
and political sense. 792

However, China’s defeat in the 1839-1842 Opium War

marked China’s turning point toward its deterioration and weakness in the
international arena.

Also, as a result of the defeat of the Opium War, China was

forced to become a member of international society, via its reluctant compliance with
Western norms and values. 793 In the process, there had been unequal treatment – e.g.
even during the Cold War era, Great Powers’ failure to recognize the communist
government of China, and China’s inability to take a seat at the United Nations, much
less a permanent membership in the Security Council, until 1971 (Armstrong, 1993:
269).
792

China has been recognized as the Middle Kingdom until the late 19th century. As the US has
been embedded in its exceptionalism, therefore, China had been embedded in its own unique kind of
exceptionalism. See Buzan (2004b) and Zhang (2001).
793

The disappearance of the kowtow of foreign diplomats toward the Chinese emperor can be
recognized as China’s reluctant acceptance of sovereign equality as a western norm in international
society. See, for more detail, Zhang (2001:60).
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The above can be a brief historical background about why China regarded
international society as an unfair Western hegemonic order, and about why China
appeared as a revolutionary state against international society for around the last 150
years. 794 China's defeat in the Opium War and its following period of humiliation
from 1839 to 1949 led to China's hostile attitude and reaction against international
society, like the Boxer Rebellion in 1900.

Due to China’s historical background,

importantly we can hardly expect China to adopt norms and values of democracy
which has slowly become predominant in an international society, but instead, we can
easily comprehend why China became a revisionist state, rejecting international order
as well as international norms.
However, it will be problematic, if we entirely reject the possibility of China’s
democratization simply due to its humiliating past.

In fact, China’s humiliating

experience can be one incentive for its democratic movement.

There can be close

relationships between China’s adoption of democracy and its ambition for Great
Power status in international society, drawing from its strong nationalism. 795

In the

twentieth century, all Chinese leaders from Sun Yat-Sen, Chang Kai shek, Mao
Zedong, Deng Xiaping to Jiang Zemin, and in the twenty-first century, Hu Jintao have

794

See, for more details, Foot (2000) and Zhang (1998).

795

American strong nationalism has been well known and been easily observed in particular since
terrorist attacks on the US homeland on September 11, 2001. However, when comparing the US
nationalism with Chinese nationalism, we can perceive that Chinese nationalism is no less strong than
American nationalism, though personally I feel that Chinese nationalism might be even far stronger
than American nationalism. As a matter of fact, Chinese strong nationalism had been prominent via
the whole process of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. In particular, in the aftermath of the March
unrest in Tibet and chaos surrounding the Olympic torch relay in London and Paris, many Chinese
were outraged, and their strong nationalism was confirmed. In China, some internet users called for a
boycott of French goods, and large demonstrations were held at several Carrefour supermarkets. Even
at the Carrefour next to Friendship Shopping in Xinzhuang, teenagers milled outside with T-shirts
saying “Tibet Was, IS and Always will be part of China.” See, for more information, Geoff Dyer
(2008).
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shared a deep bitterness derived from China’s humiliating history, and have
determined to blot out humiliation and restore China to its rightful place as a Great
power (Zhao, 2004: 70).

According to this strong nationalism, China’s possible

pursuit of democracy can be materialized with functional or instrumental reason.

In

other words, as Suisheng Zhao puts it, Chinese quite often regard democracy as a tool
to elevate China and to help put it into the category of Great Powers (Zhao 2000:4647).

In fact, a majority of Chinese intellectuals and ordinary Chinese citizens have

increasingly believed that democracy itself can make China a strong nation and get it
to be recognized as a Great Power in international society.

Thus, it is not impossible

to expect China to become democratic, in particular when considering China’s
alteration after Deng’s open door policy.
Indeed, China has gradually changed to become voluntarily engaged in
international society.

In particular, if democracy gradually becomes the big wave of

international society and slowly becomes the standard of civilization in the 21 st
century, China is highly expected to move closer and closer to democracy, especially
as it has been more and more aware of the fact that democracy can be a decent form
of government for Great Powers.

For instance, along with Deng Xiaoping’s four

modernizations of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense,
‘democracy’ has been marked as the ‘fifth modernization’ (Zhao, 2000: 46).

Also,

Wei Jingsheng claimed three reasons for China’s democracy demand.

First,

democracy is in opposition to the autocracy of the Chinese system.
democracy could bring out prosperity.

Second,

Third, democracy could provide freedom

(Zhao, 2000:46-47). The above indicates how China’s nationalism derived from its
past humiliating experience as well as its discontent with an authoritarian political
system can request China’s democratization.
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All in all, we can say that China’s

humiliating past can indirectly bolster China’s likelihood to adopt democracy.

In

other words, China’s humiliating past is not a fundamental obstacle to its democratic
development, but can be one of incentives to goad China to adopt democracy in the
long run.
Actually, when scrutinizing China’s past political systems, we can uncover
that democratic systems are not totally new to China.

As Suisheng Zhao puts it,

China already had every different kind of democratic institution, such as a presidential
system, parliamentary system and federalism like Sun Sat-Sen’s republican
government in 1911 and a presidential system in 1912 (Zhao, 2000: 33).
China had experienced a multi-party system in the past.

In addition,

Before the time of the late

Qing dynasty, China had never had any political party, since it had been prohibited by
Chinese emperors.

However, since the 1911 revolution, China’s political parties

started emerging (Zhao, 2000:38).

From 1911 to 1913, China had 682 parties or

associations and around thirty of them could be literally recognized as political parties
with complete political platforms, although China’s multi-party politics eventually
ended up one party authoritarian system (Yufa, 1985:32, and Zhao, 2000:38).

When

considering that China had briefly experienced democratic institutions and a multiparty system, not to mention Taipei’s multi-party democracy, it does not seem to be
overly optimistically to expect China’s democracy to allow a two-party or multi-party
system in the future.

As a matter of fact, we should not forget the fact that in the

past, many Chinese had great desire for democracy, such as the May Forth Movement
1919, Wilsonian idealism after WWI (i.e. the principle of democracy, selfdetermination and the protection of the weak)(Hsu, 2000:503), and the democratic
movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

Overall, we can say that on one hand,

China was used to rejecting international society due to its shameful past, but on the
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other hand, it has slowly moved itself toward democracy due to its shameful history
and its brief democratic experience on the strength of Chinese desire for democracy.
2.

China’s culture and its path toward democracy
In general, Chinese culture has been acknowledged as quite different from

Western culture.

This is one of the reasons why many scholars rarely expect the

blossoming of democracy in China.

However, we should not jump to the conclusion

that Chinese cultural factors are the fundamental obstacles to China’s promotion of
democracy.

In this section, I will focus on Confucianism as a primary aspect of

Chinese culture, while displaying the compatibility between Confucianism and
democracy and disclosing how Confucianism can have an impact on China’s path
toward democracy.
Confucianism has been known as the most powerful and durable Chinese
political philosophy inherited from Confucius (K’ung-fu-tzu) (551-479 B.C.) whose
view was that nature was on the basis of moral order and that political affairs have to
reflect that order, and whose ideas were humanistic and practical, emphasizing
personal satisfaction and public well-being as well as on social responsibility
(Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996:206).

However, Confucianism has been frequently

used for authoritarian rule, since Confucianism can be regarded as an ideal ideology
for a hierarchical officialdom with an omnipotent emperor on top (Ferguson and
Mansbach, 1996:214).

Indeed, as ‘Asian Values’ developed in Confucianism shows,

Confucian ethics can be understood as to stress the importance of filial piety and
submission to state authority.796 At this juncture, Confucianism can be acknowledged
as incompatible with norms of democracy, since the former lays emphasis on
796

We should not forget the fact that Asian Values have been on and off used to justify authoritarian
rules. See Ibrahim (2006:6).
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hierarchical relationships, whereas the latter underscores horizontal relationships.
Also, we can perceive that traditional Confucianism puts emphasis on the
responsibility to society, and the obligations to family and community, as the very
basis of the harmony and order of Chinese society, without considering individual
rights as an independent right as an independent entity (Zhang, 1998:184).

In fact,

in terms of ‘individual rights,’ the concept of ‘rights’ ‘Quanli’ in Chinese, had been
rarely used in Chinese history, and it just started being used in the nineteenth century
(Zhang, 1998:184).

Thus, individual rights themselves are rarely understood among

Chinese people.
When considering the above reason, Confucianism can be misunderstood as
incompatible with the essences of democracy, such as individual rights, liberty and
equality.

However, actually, we can notice the compatible relationships between

Confucianism and democracy.

For instance, Confucius himself did not advocate

tyrannical dictatorships (Bell, 2003:64).

As one of Confucianism influences, the

emperor’s authority in Confucianism-imbedded China could be undermined if his
own immorality led to his loss of the mandate of heaven (Fukuyama, 1995:27). That
is, Confucianism itself does not advocate tyranny, but condemns it, although
Confucianism itself puts stress on a hierarchical relationship.

Such Confucianism’s

anti-tyrannical tendency can be a contributor to a founding philosophy for modern
democracy, not to mention compatibility between Confucianism and norms of
democracy.

In fact, the essences of Confucianism, like its emphasis on the primacy

of the self and the importance of self-cultivation in realizing human potential and
guarding against exploitation by the powers, should not be disregarded at all (Ibrahim,
2006: 6).

Due to this, we can say that Confucianism does not support any kind of

exploitative hierarchical relationship,

in particular
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when considering ‘ren’

(humaneness) as the key value in Confucianism (Ackerly, 2005:552-561).

Also, as

Chan Sin Yee argues, Confucian criticizes social and political barriers to women’s
political participation and workplace opportunity, since those barriers can harm selfdevelopment or self-cultivation (Ackerly, 2005:567).

These can clearly indicate that

Confucianism is not incompatible with democracy.

More, importantly, we should

not forget the fact that Confucianism advocates pluralistic ways of life, not to mention
tolerance, while providing fair mechanisms for dealing with conflicts and minimal
government, and underscoring moral equality and human dignity.

At this point, the

parallel between Confucianism and democracy can be observed, and we can perceive
that Confucianism is not a fundamental obstacle to the promotion of democracy but
instead, Confucianism can indirectly or directly shape China’s distinguishing path
toward democracy.
As a matter of fact, the character of neo-Confucianism is even closer to norms
of democracy than Confucianism.

Neo-Confucianism strongly endorses the values

that are consistent with the norms of liberal democracy (Bell, 2003:63).

Neo-

Confucianism began with Mencius’s ideas (390-305 BC) (Bell, 2003:57-58).
Mencius greatly stresses moral potential/equality and human dignity (Bloom,
1998:111).

Mencius states: “all human beings have a mind that cannot bear to see

the sufferings of others….all human beings have within themselves what is
honorable” (Bloom, 1998:101, 106-107). This visibly displays that Confucianism is
obviously embedded in human dignity and human equality, which can be
comprehended as the foundation for democratic thought.
Also, importantly, Mencius’ thought is closely linked with the concept of
‘minben’ (Wang and Titunik, 2000:74-77).

‘Min’ means people and ‘Ben’ means

root, and the word ‘minben’ reflects the idea that “the people are the original source of
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the political authority of a state.” (Wang and Titunik, 2000:74).

That is, Mencius’

idea about government and people is deeply imbedded in the concept of minben, and
this apparently demonstrates that Confucianism is not incompatible with the notion of
democracy.

However, I admit that the concept of minben and Mencius’ thought does

not necessarily mean people’s participation in decision-making processes.

Instead,

they convey the ways to guarantee political legitimacy to govern people, especially
when considering, for example, that Hitler’s government could not be legitimized
even if it was elected via a decent democratic process (Wang and Titunik, 2000:83).
All in all, Confucianism is not incompatible with the notion of democracy and it can
have an effect on China’s path toward democracy.

At this point, we can see that the

success or the failure of democracy in China cannot be determined by Confucianism,
but Confucianism can simply have an impact on China’s path toward democracy.
3.

China’s political system and its path toward democracy
There are many political issues as obstacles to China’s democratic

development.

First of all, the most fundamental obstacle to China’s democratization

is China’s one party system which has made it difficult for China to become
democratic.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921 (Hsu,

2000:12).797 Since then, CCP itself alone in China has been given legitimacy, and
China has adhered to a one-party authoritarian system until now, while strongly
rebuffing pluralistic liberal democracy. 798 A one-party authoritarian system’s purpose

797

The May Forth Movement in 1919 is hailed as the first genuine mass movement in modern Chinese
history. On May 4, 1919, around 5,000 students in Peking held protest against the verdict of the
Versailles Peace Conference on Shantung. It was an explosion of public anger, an outburst of
nationalism, a deep disappointment in the West and a violent indictment of the deceitful warlord
government in Peking. See, for more detail, Hsu (2000: 501-505).
798

See “Communist Party of China.” Wikipedia. Available at the website:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_China#Role_within_the_People.27s_Republic_of_
China
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has been primarily for political and social stability.

However, the CCP has many

problems, which cannot be seen in democratic government.

First of all, under a one

party system, we cannot expect modified government policy which can be seen in a
two-party system or multi-party system (Schultz, 2001: 96).

As Schultz put it, the

momentous roles of a two-party system or multi-party system are to reduce the
possibility of wars and to provide efficient information, as a check and balance
mechanism against a potential danger of governmental dictatorship, which can be
recognized as one of the fundamental values for democracy (Schultz, 2001:96).

Due

to China’s one party system, however, we can hardly anticipate effective and
organized democratic institutions to challenge the dominance of the CCP in China.
In China, the direct opposition to the CCP has been hardly expected.

For instance,

though the authoritarian tendency of the CCP has facilitated the tendency of
corruption and dictatorship, as a member of the CCP, Mr Zhou Wei’s opposition to the
CCP for its corruption and high-handedness ended up putting himself into a forced
labor camp for re-education (Saich, 2001:188).

This shows that how CCP

domination can be a fundamental obstacle to China’s democratic development.
However, it is not true to say that there is no possibility for China to become
democratic.

First of all, with regard to the CCP system, we can expect some change,

in particular when considering that according to a survey of 80,000 people conducted
by the Organization Department of the CCP in 2008, one-third of the Chinese
populace was neither satisfied with the way CCP officials were selected, nor was onethird satisfied with the performance of the CCP’s leadership (Li, 2010:12).

When

considering this, we cannot thoroughly discard the possibility that China’s democracy
based on a multi-party or two party system may be formed in the future.
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As a matter

of fact, it is not accurate to say that at present, China has adopted a one party system,
since China has had eight other informal political parties which can be put into the
category of democratic parties. 799 According to Chen Dongxiao, eight political
parties in China are composed of intellectuals and well-off Chinese, and they are
recognized as policy consultants rather than politicians, since they do not have any
desire to challenge and overthrow the CCP, but instead have been simply happy to just
be policy-making advisors to the CCP.800 However, we cannot repudiate the existence
of eight political parties besides the CCP, in China’s political arena, which can
indirectly prevent the CCP from abusing its unilateral policy-making process, in
particular when considering that as an opposition party, the China Democratic Party
(CDP) focuses on grassroots election practices, encourages associations for peasants,
workers, intellectuals, and private entrepreneurs, and CDP candidates to participate in
elections, and work to carry out fair elections from the grass roots to higher political
levels. 801
In addition, when considering interior factions within the CCP, we can see
many factions as an ‘inner-party democracy,’ which can bring about a check and
balance system. 802 As a matter of fact, in China, the term ‘inner-party democracy’ is
to describe the idea that the party must institutionalize checks and balances within

799

I had a chance to talk with Chen Dongxiao who is the director of Shanghai Institute for
International Studies, at the Center for China-US Cooperation’s Fourth Annual International
Symposium from April, 28 to April 29, 2006. He has had a positive view on gradual political
freedom in China.
800

Ibid
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See “Fifteen Years After Tiananmen: Is Democracy in China’s Future?” Hearing before the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China. One Hundred Eighth Congress, June 3, 2004. The
website
is
available
at:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg94258/html/CHRG108hhrg94258.htm
802

Ibid
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party leadership (Li, 2008:77).

In China, this dynamic factional politics contributes

to the growing transparency of diverse outlooks and stances in the decision-making
process, which indicates the toleration of diversity as one of the significant elements
for democracy (Li, 2008:89).

Indeed, in September 2009, the Fourth Plenary

Session of the 17th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party called for
promoting democracy within the Party and intensifying the anti-corruption drive
within the leadership (Li, 2010:2).

Importantly, at this juncture, the intra-party

democracy can be regarded as a means for general democracy in the end (Li, 2010:7).
Thus, in some sense, this can be recognized as China’s possible path toward
democracy (Li, 2008:92).
As an obstacle to China’s democratic development, we can think of Chinese
leadership.

Chinese leaders fear instability, and such fear is one of the obstacles to

China’s democratic development.

In other words, we should recognize that China’s

difficulty with democratization can draw from Chinese leadership and the CCP’s
pursuit of stability and national unity as the highest priority.

Indeed, for Chinese

leadership and the CCP, political legitimacy has been primarily derived from three
major sources: economic development, stability and national unity (Zheng, 2004:51).
Due to this, Chinese leadership has ruthlessly cracked down on any social movements,
especially the organized ones that might seriously challenge the regime, initiating
instability and division of unity, as exemplified by the crackdown on the prodemocracy movement in 1989 and the Falungong (FLG/ the wheel of life) movement
(Zheng, 2004: 140).

However, most Chinese intellectuals assume that the great

threat to China’s social stability is corruption rather than bourgeois liberal values
(Chan, 2000: 216).

Also, a long-term true social stability requires fundamental

conditions, such as the protection of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law,
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since order or stability without these conditions is simply social repression or
control.803 And so, it is not completely wrong to say that in the absence of those
fundamental conditions, China may continuously suffer from enormous instability at
the micro level, such as 300 riots every day, around 20 mining deaths each day, 300
traffic deaths every day, a major water-pollution incident every three days, unsafe
food, ethnic conflicts in Tibet and Xinjiang, and failure to invest in social security –
e.g. $90 per worker of lifetime social security benefits -, private pensions, medical
care – e.g. medical insurance: only $30 a person for three years -, and unemployment
insurance.804

When considering all of these, Chinese leadership should adopt human

rights and democracy as a long-term solution for stability and unity, let alone
continuous economic development.
Indeed, some Chinese leaders have approved democratic development.

For

instance, today, Premier Wen Jiabao has been a consistent supporter of the universal
value of democracy (Li, 2010:4).

In 2006, when meeting a delegation from the

Brookings Institution in Beijing, Premier Wen Jiabao argued that “institutional checks
and balances, constitutionalism, freedom of the media, civil liberties, and political
choice expressed through elections” are not proprietary elements of Western
democracies, but are the vital and universal components of any democracy (Li,
2010:5).

803

Also, importantly, the emerging fifth generation of Chinese leaders

Ibid
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Minxin Pei is a director of Keck Center For International and Strategic Studies, Claremont
Mckenna College. He joined China 2025 Panel I: Challenges from Within: Emerging Domestic
Challenges, at Council on Foreign Relations, on October 19, 2009. See Pei’s remarks, available at
the
website:
http://www.cfr.org/china/china-2025-panel-challenges-within-emerging-domesticchallenges/p20663. Stephen S. Roach is chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia. On October 19, 2009,
he made a speech concerning “China 2025: Keynote II: China’s Economic Future”at Council on
Foreign Relations. See his remarks, available at the website: http://www.cfr.org/china/china-2025keynote-ii-chinas-economic-future/p20472
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brightens China’s future of democratic development.805 In terms of education, unlike
the fourth generation leaders (any previous generation leader) most of whom almost
completed only an undergraduate degree due to the Cultural Revolution, the fifth
generation leaders received higher levels of education: 73% received postgraduate
degrees; and 21% received PhD degrees (Li, 2008:70).

Moreover, a majority of fifth

generation leaders attended schools in Western democratic countries (Li, 2008:75).
It means that the fifth generation has been exposed far more to Western ideas and
values like human rights and democracy than any previous generation, and tends to
have better understanding of Western values (Li, 2008:89). Though this does not
necessarily mean that the fifth generation’s outlook is thoroughly pro-West or proAmerica, we can expect that this generation is more likely to be open and to be
engaged in international society.

More importantly, they are more pragmatic and

less dogmatic than their predecessors because of their experience of ideological
disillusionment during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) (Li, 2008:88).

This means

that the ideological conflicts between the US and China is less important today than in
the past.

In other words, China does not have any hostile ideology against Western

values, in particular American values such as human rights and democracy (Li,
2008:88).

At this juncture, we can expect a positive picture of democratic

development in China, when considering that the fifth generation will eventually
govern China in the end.
As Larry Diamond puts it, importantly, Chinese citizens have gradually
become more and more aware of their political rights beyond economic rights, and
805

The first and second generations are communist revolutionary veterans with backgrounds as
peasants and soldiers. The third and fourth generations are engineers-turned-technocrats. As the
fourth generation leaders, we can think of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. See, for more detail, Cheng Li
(2008).
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they have become more assertive in defending their political rights (Diamond,
2000:xiii).

Currently, Chinese citizens can criticize officials’ misbehavior and

inefficient government policies, which can be comprehended as an initial stage of
Madison’s check and balance system under one party’s predominant rule.
Furthermore, they have enjoyed the practice of fair election for officials at village
levels.

The election at a village level is very meaningful for China’s democratic

movement, in particular when considering that over 80 per cent of villages had elected
their own chiefs and village committees and that there were around 900,000 villages
in China housing approximately three-quarters of the country’s 1.3 billion population
(Youngs, 2000: 202, 242 fn. 52).806 This is not only a political transformation at the
local level, but also the spread of village democracy can be highly expected to bring
about some level of political change in central China from the bottom up (Youngs,
2000:192). 807 Thus, we can say that this evidently replicates a sign of China’s
transformation toward ‘democracy.’ Indeed, China is slowly moving toward
democracy.
To sum up, we can say that China has slowly become democratic and that
democratic movement in China will be continuous, albeit it will take a long period for
China to become a mature democracy, along with some fluctuation.

As Xu Jian put

it, in fact, Chinese leaders have been unmistakably aware of the fact that China will
inevitably move toward democracy, although China has slowly adopted an
806

Also see “China’s Grassroots Democracy.” The Economist.. November 2, 1996, pp. 27-28.
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This can be a similar way to Japanese democratic development. Japan’s economic development
produced strong citizen pressures on local authorities as powerful institutional actors to guarantee
different societal interests and basic rights. These local authorities convey the pressures on the central
authority, which brought out Japanese style of democracy. When considering this point, we should
not disregard the fact that local village-level democratic development in China can have an impact on
China’s central government’s policy-making process, which can contribute to democratic development.
See Terry E. Macdougall (1989).
535

evolutionary process toward democracy rather than a radical revolutionary process
toward democracy, because Chinese leaders fear instability and disorder in China,
which might draw from the radical change toward political freedom, 808 and
furthermore, tell the truth, because Chinese leaders are yet to figure out how to
effectively implement democracy in the most populous state in the world, in the same
way that they still have some difficulty in implementing human rights in China. 809 In
short, Chinese leaders do not authentically reject the democratic movement in China,
but instead, they have been very cautiously and slowly moving toward democracy on
the precondition of China’s stability and unity, along with economic development.
Also, they realize that so many courageous Chinese – e.g. the Tiananmen Mothers,
journalists, intellectuals, peasants, workers, students, internet activists, religious
practitioners, lawyers, professors, artists and poets - continue to write, speak and
organize mass demonstrations, to petition the government, and to appeal to
international fora to promote human rights and democracy in China – e.g. China’s
Charter 08.810 As for Chinese, all in all, as Cheng Li put it, political reform is not a
choice but a necessity (Li, 2010:12).

Nevertheless, Chinese leaders fear possible

instability and disorder in China which can be derived from political reform, and so
China is very cautiously and slowly moving toward democracy.
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I had a good chance to talk with Xu Jian who is the deputy vice president at China Institute of
International Studies(CIIS), at the Center for China-US Cooperation’s Forth Annual International
Symposium in Denver, from April, 28 to April, 29, 2006. He clearly mentions that it will take time to
see China’s mature democracy, even if China can hardly avoid the current big wave of democratic
movement across international society. Chinese leaders are still struggling with how to implement
democracy in China and with what the side-effect of political freedom is, which can be recognized as
the fundamental obstacle against China’s democratic development.
809

Ibid

810

See “Fifteen Years After Tiananmen: Is Democracy in China’s Future?” Hearing before the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, One Hundred Eighth Congress, June 3, 2004. The
website
is
available
at:
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108hhrg94258/html/CHRG108hhrg94258.htm
536

4.

China’s economy and its path toward democracy
China had been known as an agricultural society until 1978 when China

started adopting a socialist market economic system.

The Chinese economy had

been literally isolated from the world economy, especially from the 1940s to 1970s,
because the country had been able to feed itself without any massive external
assistance.

Nonetheless, China was still the most populous state in the world at that

time.
However, at the Third Plenary Session of the 11 th Central Committee of the
CCP in December 1978, Deng Xiaoping emerged as a pre-eminent leader, persuading
fellow leaders to adopt a fundamental change in direction for China’s development –
e.g. to radically transform the agricultural sector; to initiate market influences through
the personal responsibility system; to open China’s economy to the world; and to
increase exports and foreign exchange earnings (Bottelier, 2007:239, Jacobson and
Oksenberg, 1990:68).

In other words, when he took power in China, Deng Xiaoping

rejected Mao’s insistence on class struggle and adopted a socialist market economy, in
order to revive the ailing economy (Woodman, 1997: 253).

Nonetheless, we can

observe the fact that China’s economic character has been steadily transformed into a
capitalist market economy.

To be precise, at the moment, a liberal market economy

can be comprehended as a typical aspect of China’s economic structure.

Indeed,

today, as for many scholars, CCP does not stand for the Communist Party of China,
but for the ‘Chinese Capitalist Party,’ let alone that it does not have any ideas, or
ideology.811

811

Minxin Pei is a director of Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, Claremont Mckenna
College. He joined China 2025 Panel I: Challenges from Within: Emerging Domestic Challenges, at
Council on Foreign Relations, on October 19, 2009. See Pei’s remarks, available at the website:
http://www.cfr.org/china/china-2025-panel-challenges-within-emerging-domestic-challenges/p20663
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When considering China’s liberal market economy, we can anticipate China’s
democratization as well.

One of the essences of a market economic system is

freedom of choice in the marketplace, which can be interpreted as ‘individual
freedom’ in some sense (Nolan, 2004: 49).

The economic freedom based on

economic growth can lead to more political freedom in the end.

In fact, we can say

that economic freedom and political freedom are closely related to each other.

Nolan

points out the close relationship between economic freedom and political freedom.
Nolan states:
Successful capitalist development has generally, after a
certain point, witnessed mass demands, for democracy.
Successful capitalist development brings an increased sense
of individual self-worth, reinforced by a growing sense of
membership of an interdependent national community, and
by increasing levels of education and, eventually, leisure
time in which the mass of the population is able to
participate in democratic activities extending beyond the
important right to choose periodically local or national
rulers. Moreover, there is an international demonstration
effect of political concepts spilling over from the advanced
to the less developed economies (Nolan, 2004:49).
Also, Zheng states the close relationship between capitalism and democracy as well:
It is widely considered that capitalism and democracy are
inseparable twins; that capitalism and economic wealth are
conducive to the formation of a democratic government, and
that democracy as a form of government is likely only in
market or capitalist economies (Zheng, 1998:178).
The above conveys the clear message of the possibility that Chinese economic growth
in a market economic system can bring out political freedom in the long run.

When

considering that economic growth in a market economic system initiates civil rights,
political democracy, income growth, falls in infant mortality, and a rise in life
expectancy (Nolan, 2004:109), we should not discount the possibility that democracy
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can emerge in China as well.

In China, to advocate capitalist economic activity

requires ‘social transformation’ and ‘sound political institutions,’ that is, democratic
institutions (Zheng, 2004: 57).

In fact, China’s case can demonstrate some

connection between economic freedom and political freedom, since China’s economic
prosperity and widening process of marketization have continuously brought out the
inexorable democratization of daily life, although China is still under the umbrella of
one-party rule.

Indeed, since Deng’s adoption of a market economic system, China’s

excessive collectivism has been modified to take into account individual, local and
immediate interests (He, 2000: 93).

In particular, we can noticeably perceive the

transformation of Chinese society, when recalling that in the past, Chinese society had
been recognized as a mass society with an absence of individuality (He, 2000:93).
As an economic development policy, China initially chose four economic
zones, like Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen as Special Economic Zones
(SEZs) in 1979 to attract foreign investment and create windows on the outside world,
and this program was expanded up to coastal zone developments by the late 1980s
(Saich, 2001: 16, Bottelier, 2007:239).

Such an economic development program has

transformed China’s economic appearance.

For instance, as the first major zone,

Shenzhen had transformed itself from a small sleepy village to Asia’s newest
metropolis with an urban centre full of towering skyscrapers rising from the former
paddies, along with massive foreign investment of $ 2.7 billion in 1999 (Saich,
2001:17).

As a matter of fact, since Deng’s economic reform, China had been

recognized as the fastest growing economy in the world, in particular in the 1980s,
and had attained one of the fastest growth rates of exports, with a real growth rate of
around 12 percent per annum in the 1980s (Nolan, 2004:119).

In 2005, China’s

economy grew an estimated 9.8 %, which is higher than the 9.5% growth seen in 2003
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and 2004, while its GDP had reached 2.3 trillion US dollars. 812 Also, China’s trade
surplus with the United States is larger than Japan’s (Nolan, 2004:152).
China’s trade surplus from the US exceeded 200 billion dollars.

In 2005,

Actually, in 2010,

China started surpassing Japan to become the second-largest economy in the world.
China’s rapid rise is clearly challenging the predominant economic position of the
OECD and the world hegemony of the United States (Nolan, 2004:144).
highly expected to become more and more influential in the global economy.

China is
At this

point, what is important is not simply the positive indicator for China’s economic
growth, but China’s gradual change in its attitude in international society, along with
China’s possible, gradual transformation toward democracy.

We can say that

economic growth has ultimately modified China’s hostility against norms of
international society.

In other words, as David Copeland points out, China’s ‘rapid

economic growth’ and its ‘continuous economic stable and positive future,’ can hardly
bring about a revisionist position against international society, but instead they can
make possible a status quo position in existing international society. 813 Due to this
positive economic aspect, China has modified its language and behavior in
international society, and furthermore China is highly anticipated to steadily adjust its
behavior to the norms and values of international society, even such as human rights
and democracy.
Also, as one result of China’s dramatic economic growth on the basis of
China’s market economy, we can see China’s integration into the international
economy, which can encourage China’s democratization.
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For instance, because of

See, for more detail, “China’s economy soars 9.9 % in 2005, on track of balanced growth.”
People’s Daily. January 26, 2006.
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See, for more information, Dale C. Copeland (1996).
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the result of China’s economic growth on the basis of China’s market economy, China
has been increasingly dependent on the foreign sources of raw materials and energy
(Harvey, 2005:139).

In 2003 China took 30 % of the world’s coal production, 36 %

of the world’s steel and 55 % of the world’s cement (Harvey, 2005:139).

Also, it

went from relative self-sufficiency in 1990 to being the second largest importer of oil
after the US in 2003 (Harvey, 2005:139).

This kind of gradual integration with the

international economy on the basis of its adoption of a market economy should be
recognized as significant.

Such integration could lead to a growth of China’s

massive economic interests and an alteration of its manner in international society as
well, which can help it become a full member of international society in the long run.
In fact, China has been well aware of how significant its integration with the
international economy is on the basis of its economic open door policy,
encouragement of external investment and internal capitalism.

Due to this, in 2001,

China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which has been
known as one of the international organizations for the promotion and consolidation
of democracy in international society.

At this point, China’s socialization on the

basis of international economic integration in international society can gradually make
China comply with common rules and norms of international society.

On the whole,

as Larry Diamond suggests, China’s active economic engagement with the members
of international society along with its rapid economic growth based on its market
economy has greatly contributed to China’s path toward democracy.
Another result of economic growth based on China’s market economy is that
Chinese citizens have been given more chances to be directly exposed to the world,
enjoying economic freedom in various ways such as studying abroad and tourism.
Nonetheless, only after 1978 when Deng Xiaoping began the educational open-door
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policy, did a large number of Chinese students and scholars started travelling abroad
to pursue academic studies (Li, 2008:74).

For instance, more than 25,000 Chinese

students leave the country annually to study abroad, and the total number of students
has so far reached about 380,000 across around 103 countries, but especially in the
US, the UK, Australia, Canada and Japan, and in point of fact, Chinese students have
become the largest group of foreign students in the US and Japan. 814 In 2010, 56
million Chinese traveled abroad, around six times larger than 8.5 million in 1998. 815
This exposure to the world, particularly Western democratic countries, can help
Chinese citizens, especially fifth generation leaders, understand political freedom,
democracy, which indicates a positive sign for China’s future democracy.

Also,

along with economic growth, an increasing number of Chinese have become internet
users.

As Ole Schell put it, “the more money Chinese got, the more things they

would want to get and the more traveling they would want to do, the more they would
turn to the internet.”816 In fact, in 2011, China has around 505 million internet
users.817 Importantly, as a new trend, thank to this, public sentiment can be spread
and heightened through the internet that is less effectively subject to surveillance by
the state (Feng, 2006:89).

At times of crisis, thus, public opinion can even shape the

political environment constraining the leadership’s capacity to maneuver (Feng,
2006:89).

Indeed, internet activists contend that “Beijing cannot win the fight

814

See “Culture & Science: China has Most Students Studying Abroad.” February 5, 2002. The
website available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/26487.htm
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See “China Travel Trends.com: 57 million Chinese tourists set to visit abroad in 2011.” The
website available at
http://www.chinatraveltrends.com/2011/01/57-million-chinese-tourists-set-to-visit-abroad-in-2011/
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Ole Schell joined China 2025: Panel I: Challenges from Within: Emerging Domestic Challenges, at
Council on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2009. See Ole Schell’s remark, available at the website:
http://www.cfr.org/china/china-2025-panel-challenges-within-emerging-domestic-challenges/p20663
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See “China’s internet users breach half billion mark.” Reuters. January 11, 2012.
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between online activism and censorship.” 818 Moreover, some Chinese intellectuals
even said “the internet has great potential to advance basic human rights and freedom
for Chinese people.”819All of these imply Chinese direct exposure to each other and
international society, and indicate the Chinese authoritarian government’s inability to
control information flow as well as citizen’s lives.

When considering the above, we

can see that China cannot elude engagement in international society, which has
increasingly stimulated China to accept norms and values of international society –
e.g. human rights and democracy.

All in all, China’s economic growth based on its

market economy has ultimately pushed China toward democracy, though the process
has been sluggish.
5.

China’s military power and its path toward democracy
Realists, neo-conservativists, and some English School scholars such as

Hedley Bull, intensely emphasize the role of material capability in international
society.

We can easily well perceive how significant the role of material capability is

in international society.

China cannot be exceptional in terms of the importance of

material capability, which can determine the way that China complies with the norms
and values of international society.
When considering China’s military power, it is apparently strong enough to
defend itself from any Great Power’s use of force.

Unlike Iraq, China is not weak

enough for Great Powers to use their military forces in order to impose democracy on
China’s soil. 820 Thus, the alternative way to the use of military force, that is, interests

818

See Kathrin Hile (2009).

819

Ibid.
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Also, China is not an outlaw state, and it has a veto power in Security Council, which makes it hard
for Great Powers to use their force in order to impose democracy on China.
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on the basis of rational calculation and interest-oriented socialization should be
adopted as the best option to promote democracy in China.
military power.

Let us examine China’s

China is the third largest nuclear power. Indeed, China is the only

state in the world, whose nuclear missiles are aimed at the US, and further as military
purpose, even its aerospace program is aimed against the US (Segal, 2004:15).

It

also has a 2.3 million-strong military, which is the world’s largest standing force.821
In January, 2007, China’s successful test of anti-satellite weapons was a pretty
disturbing development in China’s military modernization, let alone its lack of
transparency on the pace, scope and direction of China’s military modernization.822
China’s military budget is currently the highest in Asia and its military expenditure is
the world’s second largest. 823 For instance, According to the US Secretary of
Defense’s 2008 report to Congress on PRC military power, “China’s total defense
related expenditure for 2007 could be $97-137 billion.”824 On the whole, the above
evidently shows that unlike Iraq, we cannot expect Great Powers’ use of force to
change China, like China’s democratic development.
However, China’s military power does not pose a global threat.

China is not

a concern as a global military power, although it can clearly be a major player at the
regional level.

China accounts for only 4.5 % of global defense spending and does

not have any military projection capacity on the global level, even if China has one
aircraft carrier, whereas the US makes up 33.9 % of global spending and has eleven
821

See David Lague (2008).
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See Thomas J. Christensen (2007).

823

See Richard A. Bitzinger (2012).
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See Thomas Lum, Christopher M. Blanchard, Nicolas Cook, Kerry Dumbaugh, Susan B. Epstein,
Shirley A. Kan, Michael F. Martin, Wayne M. Morrison, Dick K. Nanto, Jim Nichol, Jeremy M. Sharp,
Mark P. Sullivan, Bruce Vaughn and Thomas Coipuram (2008:36).
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aircraft carriers (Segal, 2004:14).

And, China’s weapons system still remains

obsolete and limited, along with its poor power projection capability, although China
has modernized its military capability (Li, 2004:35).

When considering these, we

can conclude that China is strong enough to defend itself from any external invasion
of Great Powers, but is not strong enough to challenge or alter the existing
international order which Great Powers have kept for their self-interest and for
common interests of international society.

Nonetheless, today, there are only few

reasons for China to radically alter the characteristics of international society, and
China has even been very sensitive to regional and international stability, which are
vital to its enormous interests, in particular economic interests.

Overall, China’s

democratization cannot be materialized by the use of force by Great Powers, but it can
be materialized in an alternative way such as interests based on rational calculation
and interest-oriented socialization.
6.

China’s foreign policy and its path toward democracy
China’s foreign policy has been influenced by China’s 150 year history of

shame and humiliation at the hand of foreigners after China’s defeat in the Opium
Wars.

Because of this, anti-imperialism and anti-hegemony have been often found

in China’s foreign policy – e.g. the 1999 Sino-Russian summit in a joint communiqué
for criticizing the US hegemony (Zhao, 2004: 264).

Indeed, Chinese claim that

China has advocated a world free of aggression and exploitation of capitalism,
imperialism and colonialism, due to its post-Opium War humiliating experiences
(Xinbo, 2004:61).
When looking into China’s foreign policy, we can also notice that there are
historic evolutionary steps in China’s foreign policy.

For instance, as Zhao put it,

China had adopted a revisionist attitude until the early 1970s – e.g. Mao’s China
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fought against the United Nations forces during the Korean War, - but since the late
1970s, China’s primary goal has been to sustain a peaceful and stable international
environment for its economic interests, and its foreign policy has been practical rather
than ideological – e.g. the 1979 diplomatic recognition between China and the US
(Zhao, 2004: 258).

In particular, in the post-Cold War era and the 21st century, China

has gradually adopted the partnership as primary, with its emphasis on equality,
friendly cooperation and lack of confrontation (Cheng and Wankun, 2004:180).
Thus, when looking into the direction of evolution in China’s foreign policy, it has
been gradually cooperative, peaceful and constructive rather than revisionist, violent
and destructive to international society.

Such evolution of China’s foreign policy

toward the cooperative, peaceful and constructive direction can be interpreted as
China’s gradual tendency of pragmatism.

Wu Xinbo claims that Chinese foreign

policy is fundamentally based on the combination of principle and pragmatism.

At

this point, pragmatism can be understood as flexibility to maximize China’s national
interests.

As an example of pragmatic foreign policy, we can think of China’s open-

door policy in 1979 and the cooperative tendency of foreign policy in the post-Cold
War era.

Also, when considering China’s pragmatic foreign policy, as Avery

Goldstein put it, we can even say that at present, China can be paralleled with
Germany in the era of Otto Von Bismarck, which was a geopolitically crucial rising
power, with a foreign policy of strategic flexibility (Goldstein, 2003:61).
Actually, in the current international society, China can get more benefits via
the bandwagon than via the balance of power against the US global hyper-power.
Thus, currently, in its building constructive partnership with the US, China repeatedly
claims that it is not a potential adversary of the US, but instead, it wants to become a
trustworthy partner for cooperation (Cheng and Wankun, 2004:180).
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Also, China

has cultivated its close economic and diplomatic relationship with Japan and South
Korea, which seems to be in continuous blossom.

In fact, today, China focuses more

on its relationship with East Asian and OECD states than on its relationship with the
third world, which can be China’s big distinguishing posture from its attitude during
the Cold War period (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 167).

In addition, China has been

actively engaged in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the basis
of mutual trust as well as partnership of cooperation.

In July 2000, then Chinese

Vice President Hu Jintao repeatedly assured ASEAN countries that the PRC
government would adhere to its policy to sustain good neighborly and friendly
relations with countries in the region, while affirming that China’s development can’t
be achieved in isolation of Asia, and that Asia’s prosperity cannot be achieved without
China (Leong, 2004:298).

Furthermore, as a member of the ASEAN Regional

Forum (ARF), in some sense, China has attempted to promote an inclusive type of
cooperative security arrangement in the region with other member states (Leong,
2004:299).

These examples imply that China has a great desire to establish and

maintain friendly and cooperative relations with its neighboring countries and further
all Asian countries.

Nevertheless, besides the Taiwan issue, there are several major

territorial issues, especially in the South China Sea, like the Paracel and Sprately
island groups, which could be recognized as a big obstacle to China’s friendly
neighboring foreign policy.

For instance, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia and the

Philippines have claimed the oil and gas rich areas like the Paracel and Spratly island
groups (Leong, 2004:300).

However, we should not forget the fact that China’s

foreign policy has gradually evolved in a more cooperative and peaceful direction.
This character of foreign policy indicates that China will gradually become a full
member of international society, and will become one of the Great Powers that feel a
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strong responsibility for the welfare of international society as well as the
maintenance of international society.

China is no longer a revisionist state which

could be seen in the Mao’s era, but it is a potential Great Power. Thus, we can
ultimately say that that China can be highly expected to accept the norms and values
of international society such as human rights and democracy in the end.
B.

South Korea’s internal variables and its path toward democracy

1.

South Korea’s history and its path toward democracy.
In this section, I will demonstrate how historical factors have had an impact on

South Korea’s democratic promotion and consolidation.

Looking into the history of

Korea, in particular, its traditional strategic position, such as a focal point for the
conflicting interests of major powers, we can notice that the fate of Korea has been in
a large part, determined by major powers, and also that, in turn, Korea has had the
traditional policy of sadae chuui or reliance on big powers.

For instance, from the

late second century B.C. to the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), Korea had been in one
way or another, a satellite of China (Fisher, 1954:284, Kim, 1992a:53).

And

following the period of Chinese dominance, Japan started dominating Korea after
Japan’s victory in both the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the Russo-Japanese War
(1904-05).

Japan eventually annexed Korea as a subject territory in 1910 (Kim,

1992a:53).

However, the victory of the Allied Powers in 1945 ended Japanese

colonial rule, and the Japanese were expelled from Korea at the end of World War II
(Kim, 1992a:53).

The Soviet Union was responsible for receiving the Japanese

surrender in the north of Korea, while the US undertook the corresponding task in the
south (Fisher, 1954:291).

Thus, South Korea came to belong to the US bloc that was

capitalist and democratic, whereas North Korea came to belong to the Soviet bloc that
was socialist and communist.
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As we can see above, now that Korea has been historically subjected to strong
external pressures, its freedom to make decisions concerning her own fate had been
drastically limited (Chung, 1958:189).

But, in fact, because South Korea had

historically been heavily influenced by large regional hegemons, it has developed the
ability to adjust itself to a world that such hegemonic powers created and maintained,
such as its traditional policy of sadae chuui.825 This might have helped South Korea
gradually adopt human rights and democracy.

At this juncture, we cannot say that

all of the external pressures from major powers are bad, in particular when
considering that external pressures from the U.S. have contributed to South Korea’s
promotion and consolidation of democracy.
Let us take a look at the role of the US in South Korea, which is almost
parallel with the role of China before the Sino-Japanese war (1894-95), although
unlike China, the US has never sought its domination over South Korea nor has the
US ever requested any type of tributary relationship from South Korea.

When

considering the role of the US in South Korea, most importantly, we can think that the
US contribution to South Korea’s democracy is obviously undeniable.

Indeed, since

1945, the US has had a great impact on South Korea in various issues, in particular
urging South Korea to adopt a market economy, human rights and democracy, since
the basic objective of the US policy with respect to South Korea was to create
conditions under which political and economic democracy could flourish (Oh,
1969:164).

For instance, the US Army Military Government in South Korea made

an effort to teach Koreans the principles of democratic government (Fisher, 1946:268).
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See “Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy.”
Wilson Center. December 4, 2007. The website is available at:
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/nation-building-south-korea-koreans-americans-and-the-makingdemocracy
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Also, the US greatly contributed to ending President Syngman Rhee’s dictatorship in
1960 – e.g. the US tactical control of the Korean army in order to hinder the Korean
army from using live ammunition against civilian demonstrations (Kim, 1992a:45, Oh,
1969:168-169).

And, when Park Jung Hee and his military junta controlled South

Korea after toppling the civilian government in a coup, the US flatly turned down the
military junta’s request for $25 million in economic aid, in order to underscore its
determination to bring a constitutional government to South Korea (Oh, 1969:175).
These examples indicate how the US led South Korea toward democracy in various
ways.

Nonetheless, it is important to mention that the US did not interfere

frequently or tyrannically in the domestic affairs of South Korea, and also that South
Koreans have not always slavishly followed the advice or bent to the pressures of the
US (Oh, 1969:177).

However, it must be admitted that South Korea’s domestic and

foreign policy have been influenced by US foreign policy.
In the ROK-US relationships, as implied above, I cannot say enough how vital
the US has been to South Korea.

For instance, in his early political career, former

South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun had been widely acknowledged as antiAmerican, in particular when considering his opposition to US military presence in
South Korea and his demand of revisions to the SOFA agreement (Lee, 2007a:485).
Later, however, even Roh officially objected to a precipitous transformation or
reduction of the US troops in South Korea (Lee, 2007a:485).

In addition, during the

May 2003 summit meeting with US President Bush, Roh expressed his friendly
feelings toward the US and accepted Bush’s critical viewpoints on North Korea, while
sharing the common values such as human rights and democracy in international
society (Lee, 2007a:485).

Moreover, Roh appointed moderate experts and seasoned

bureaucrats to key government positions that had regular interactions with
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Washington (Lee, 2007a:485).

All in all, this change in attitude indicates Roh’s

gradual realization of the importance of the US as a strong and vital ally to South
Korea, though this might be, in some sense, derived from the legacy of Korea’s sadae
chuui, especially when considering that South Korea would be undeniably vulnerable
to North Korean nuclear blackmail, unless the ROK-US alliance remains strong (Lee,
2007a:486).

This also explains the reason why 69 percent of the public in South

Korea has hoped to strengthen the ROK-US alliance, and a majority of South Koreans
have advocated a US military presence and opposed any abrupt withdrawal of US
troops (Lee, 2007a:487). In fact, South Korea’s intention to maintain its strong
alliance with the US can be well noticed in South Korean government statements
which urge its continuous strong alliance with the U.S. even after Korean Unification
and the end of the North Korean threat (Cha, 2000a: 273).

Currently, South Korean

President Lee Myung Bak attempts to make the ROK-US alliance stronger than ever,
on the basis of common values like human rights and democracy.

This ultimately

indicates that under the strong alliance between the ROK and the US, we can expect
more easily a solidarist international society in which the US and South Korea have
the shared common values of human rights and democracy. 826
2.

South Korea’s culture and its path toward democracy
In the past, South Korea’s culture could be branded primarily as Confucianism,

Buddhism, and Shamanism.

However, recently, Christianity has been increasingly

adopted and has become steadily one of South Korea’s dominant religions – i.e. 26%
of South Korea’s whole population, over 160 Protestant denominations, around

826

I explained more on the relationship between the ROK and the US, when I touched on Chapter IV
(Great Powers).
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60,000 churches, and 1,100 Catholic churches. 827

Indeed, South Korea started to be

recognized as an emerging Christian state, even though in 1950, Christianity covered
only one to three percent of the whole population (Huntington, 1996: 98).

This has

altered South Korea’s cultural identity, which has greatly contributed to South Korea’s
democratic development.
However, we should keep in mind the fact that Christianity in South Korea has
not overtaken the whole society, when considering Buddhist population (around 24
percent) and the unaffiliated population (around 48 percent).

Indeed, in terms of

Shamanism, there are around three million Koreans consulting modern-day shamans,
and more than 600,000 fortune-tellers.828

Regarding Confucianism, around 200,000

South Koreans identify Confucianism as their religion, along with some 200
Confucian shrines.829

In terms of Buddhism in South Korea, there are more than

11,000 temples and over 26,000 monks, along with Buddhist-run media outlets like
cable television, radio networks, and newspapers. 830

These diverse religions in

South Korea reflect the co-existence of Christianity with other religions.
When considering the above religions and their relationship with democratic
development in South Korea, we can manifestly observe that Christianity has been
more compatible with democracy than Shamanism, Confucianism, or Buddhism.

As

a matter of fact, the close co-relationship between Western Christianity and
democracy is very noticeable.

In his work, “Democracy in America,” Alexis De

827

See Kim Eungi, “Religion in Contemporary Korea: Change and Continuity.” Korea Focus. The
website is available at: http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design1/layout/content_print.asp?group_id=412
828
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Tocqueville was well aware of the significance of Catholicism for democratic
development in America.

Tocqueville states:

I think that the Catholic religion has erroneously been
regarded as the natural enemy of democracy. Among the
various sects of Christians, Catholicism seems to me, on the
contrary, to be one of the most favorable to equality of
condition among men.
In the Catholic Church the
religious community is composed of only two elements: the
priest and the people. The priest alone rises above the rank
of his flock, and all below him are equal (Tocqueville, 1945:
311).
Also, Huntington argues as well that we can’t deny the fact that modern democracy
has emerged and vigorously been developed in Christian states (Huntington 1991b).
And, Huntington states “the expansion of Christianity encourages democratic
development,”(1991b:73).

Indeed, when looking into the relationship between

Christianity and democracy in South Korea, we can easily notice that in South Korea,
Christianity has greatly contributed to South Korea’s democratic development.

As

civic institutions, both Catholic and Protestant Churches in South Korea have a
history of criticizing authoritarian regimes, organizing anti-government societies,
holding demonstrations and publishing critical statements (Kuo, 2006:7).

In

particular, Catholic leaders established themselves as fearless human rights advocates,
standing up to the military regimes and distinguishing themselves not only as
churchmen, but in the fields of politics (Clark, 2006:38).

For instance, in early

March 1986 Cardinal Su Hwan, Kim declared that “democratization is the best way to
make peace with God” (Kim, 2007:56).

Also, the National Catholic Priest’s Corps

for the Realization of Justice (NCPCRJ) contributed to the democratization of South
Korea, in particular, with its demand for an investigation of the tragic death of a Seoul
National University student, Pak Chong-chol when his torture during police
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interrogation was revealed.831 There are many other examples to demonstrate that
Christianity has greatly contributed to South Korea’s democratic development.
Taking a look at the relationship between other religions and democracy in
South Korea, we can discern that Confucianism, Shamanism or Buddhism is less
likely to advocate democracy than Christianity.

Nonetheless, this does not

necessarily mean that Confucianism, Shamanism or Buddhism is incompatible with
democracy. 832 For instance, Korean Buddhists tend to be more conservative than
Christians on all political issues ranging from the support for the ruling party to the
evaluation of governmental reports and student movements for democracy. 833
However, this does not necessarily mean that Buddhism itself is a fundamental
obstacle to democratic development in South Korea.

For instance, a Buddhist

kingdom, Bhutan had its first parliamentary election on March 24, 2008, which made
Bhutan the world’s newest democracy. 834 Also, in Myanmar/Burma, Buddhist monks
fought against authoritarian dictatorship for democracy.

More importantly, when

considering the existence of Buddhist human rights activists, such as Jin-kwan who is
a leader of the Chogye Buddhist order, Co-Chairman of the Buddhist Human Rights
Committee and a regional Chairman of the National Alliance for Democracy and

831
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Unification of Korea (NADUK),835 we cannot say that Buddhism is a fundamental
obstacle to South Korea’s democratic development, and we cannot completely deny
some level of contribution of Buddhism to South Korea’s democracy.
As for many people, Confucianism does not seem to support South Korea’s
democratic development.

Instead, in terms of the relationship between

Confucianism and South Korea’s past authoritarian governments, someone might
argue that Confucianism and authoritarianism are compatible, particularly when
thinking of former President Park Jung Hee as Confucian.

However, as mentioned

earlier about the shared ground between Confucianism and democracy, in particular,
liberal aspects of Confucianism, we cannot confirm that in South Korea,
Confucianism itself has been a fundamental obstacle to South Korea’s democratic
development.

Besides, we can notice that there is common ground between

Confucianism and Christianity – e.g. objection against dishonesty, political corruption,
moral depravity, the abuse of power by the elite and so on (Kim, 2000b:127).

And,

more interestingly, we should not forget the fusion of different religions, such as
Confucian Christians’ (Kim, 2000b:129).

For instance, in South Korea, we can see

that many people behave on the basis of Confucianism, like respect for elderly people,
even though they are evangelical Christians, which can be marked as Confucian
Christians, that is, fusion of different cultures.

All of these can strengthen the

comparability between Confucianism and democracy.
In general, when looking into the characteristic of Shamanism, we can see
that Shamanism is less compatible with democracy than Christianity.

835

But, this does

See “Arrest of Buddhist Human Rights Activist, Republic of Korea,” Amnesty International,
November 5, 1996.
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not necessarily indicate that Shamanism poses an anti-democratic trend, especially
when considering that Shamanism advocates political participation, with its rebuff to
dictatorship (Kuo, 2006:12).

Also, there are some shared grounds between

Christianity and Shamanism in South Korea, like their emphasis on material blessings
as well as physical health (Kim, 2000b:119-120).

In particular, Shamanism’s

singular emphasis on material successes as the supreme goal of its belief can converge
with certain aspects of capitalism such as the Protestant ethic or individualism. 836
When considering this, we cannot say at all that there is no compatibility between
Shamanism and democracy.

It also cannot be said that Shamanism is a fundamental

obstacle to South Korea’s democratic development.

In summary, when considering

that in South Korea, Christianity, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Shamanism co-exist,
and that South Korea enjoys a mature democracy as a full member of international
society, we can say that democracy does not recognize cultural boundaries, and also
that the relatively different religions have their own different impacts on South
Korea’s path toward democracy.
3. South Korea’s politics and its path toward democracy
In this section, I will lay an emphasis on how civilians’ suffering and fighting
for democracy could ultimately formulate South Korea’s full blossoming of liberal
democracy.

In other words, I will reveal that in South Korea, current political

freedom, a mature liberal democracy could not be achieved without any civilian
sacrifice and struggle.
In South Korea, under Park Jung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan’s regimes, many
young innocent lives were sacrificed for its democratic development – e.g. the

836

See Andrew Eungi Kim (2000a).
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Kwangju massacre in 1980.

Such sacrifice for democratic development in South

Korea shows that South Korea’s ultimate democratic achievement was more likely
ignited by internal forces rather than external forces, and that it came from the
bottom-up rather than the top-down.

Nevertheless, except for a civilian uprising

against Rhee’s dictatorship in 1960, a democratic uprising had been rarely successful
until the late 1980s.
However, civilian political protests against military regimes did not stop.
And, each political protest against authoritarian regimes in South Korea has little by
little pushed South Korea toward democratization.

Specially, Chun’s unilateral

decision to refuse liberal reforms, such as a constitutional change that could make
direct presidential election possible, brought out a series of massive demonstrations
throughout May and June of 1987 (Kim, 1998:231).

More precisely, in South Korea,

then, diverse groups such as students, trade unions, opposition political parties and
religious organizations were continuously mobilized into a militant pro-democracy
alliance in their intense struggles against the authoritarian regime (Kim, 1997:1136),
in pursuit of political goals which were primarily to investigate the Kwangju massacre,
reform the authoritarian constitution, and bring down Chun Doo Hwan (Lee,
2000:188).
Eventually, the sky-rocketing numbers of political protests could have an
impact on Chun Doo Hwan’s perception and even the perception of the US
government – unlike in 1980 when the US backed his military action, in 1987, the US
became increasingly supportive of South Korea’s democratization 837 -, which led to
Chun Doo Hwan’s surrender to the demands for democratization (Lee, 2000:194).
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On June 29, 1987, President Chun Doo Hwan, the leader of the ruling Democratic
Justice Party (DJP), issued an eight-point statement on democratic reform, accepting
the opposition demands, which was the surrender of the ruling regime (Kim,
1997:1136).

Students, intellectuals, religious leaders, and the middle class thought

that the June 29th democratization package which included human rights, political
freedom, and the electoral system, had substantially satisfied their major demands
(Kim, 1997:1138).

This was a turning point for South Korea to become a

democratic country.

Indeed, since the 1987 democratic transition in South Korea,

protection of the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, other civil
liberties and political freedom have considerably improved (Damron, 2004:8).

In

light of this democratic success, we can confirm that South Korea’s democratization
was not an elite protest-driven success, but a mass protest-driven success (Lee,
2000:195).

Many civic organizations demonstrate this as well.

In South Korea,

there are many civic organizations that have steadily contributed to South Korea’s
mature democracy.

For instance, we can think of the United People’s Movement for

Democracy and Unification (UMDU), the National Coalition for a Democratic
Constitution (NCDC), the Coalition of the People’s Movements for Democracy and
Reunification (CPMDR), the Citizen’s Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ or
Kyongsillyon), the People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPDor
Ch’amyoyondae); Minbyun-Lawyers for a Democratic Society (Minbyun), the
Association of Families of Political Prisoners (AFPP or Min’gahyop), Sarangbang
Human Rights Group (Sarangbang) (Damron, 2004:9), the Korea Council of
Professors for Democratization, the National Association for Democracy, Unification
of Korea, and the Korea Confederation of Trade Unions.

These kinds of civic

groups have facilitated South Korea’s promotion and consolidation of democracy.
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At this juncture, we can confirm that South Korea’s mature democracy cannot be
materialized without its civilian contribution to democratic development.

Also, this

indicates how deeply South Koreans have been embedded in norms of human rights
and democracy, and explains why and how South Korea came to belong to a solidarist
international society rather than any other type of international society.

It is another

indication that South Korea’s path toward democracy is different from Iraq’s (the use
of force) or China’s (interest-oriented socialization).
4. South Korea’s economy and its path toward democracy
South Korea’s economy has, to a great extent, influenced its path toward
democracy.

In this section, I will examine how South Korea’s economic growth can

have an impact on its democratic development.

South Korea had been an agrarian

county and an underdeveloped state until the early 1960s.

However, as South

Korea’s economic turning point, Park Chung-Hee’s regime embarked on a series of
five-year plans for economic development: the first five-year economic development
plan (1962-66), the subsequent second (1967-71), third (1972-76), and fourth (197781). 838 These plans brought about successful outcomes, while providing the
foundation for South Korea’s rapid economic growth and industrialization – e.g.
industrial production was steadily increased, for instance, from a mere 9 percent of
the gross national product (GNP) in 1962, to 31 percent in 1985, whereas the share of
agricultural production decreased from 43 percent to 15 percent (Koo, 1991:487).
When considering South Korea’s economic development, we can say that
South Korea’s economic growth is dazzling.

For instance, in 1950 Haiti was 36

percent richer than South Korea, but by 1998 South Korea was 16 times richer than
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See “Economic Development.” Available at the website:http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/15.htm
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Haiti.839 Indeed, currently, South Korea’s economy is the 4th largest in Asia and the
12th largest in the world.840 More importantly, the nation’s GDP per capita has grown
from only $100 in 1963 to a record-breaking $10,000 in 1995 in less than 40 years to
a fully developed $25,000 in 2007, which is called the ‘Miracle on the Han River.’ 841
According to the recent analysis report by Goldman Sachs in 2007, South Korea could
become the world’s 3rd richest country by 2025 with a GDP per capita of $52,000, and
25 years later, may surpass all countries in the world except the U.S. to become the
world’s 2nd richest country, with a GDP per capita of $81,000.842 In fact, South Korea
has been called one of the Four Asian Tigers and a newly industrialized country
during its exponential growth periods in the late 20th century. 843 Furthermore, it has
developed status since the 21st century and is currently defined as a High Income
Nation according to the World Bank.844
From now on, let us take a look at how economic growth has had an impact on
South Korea’s promotion and consolidation of democracy.

As mentioned earlier, we

can see the positive relationship between economic growth and democracy.

Looking

into the impact of South Korea’s economic growth, we should keep it in mind that
South Korea’s economic growth under its authoritarian rule had led to the formation
of a self-conscious middle class whose demands became more political than socio-
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economic, which greatly contributed to South Korea’s democratic development. 845
For instance, due to economic growth, between 1955 and 1985, the proportion of
white-collar workers soared from 4.8 per cent to 17.1 percent (Koo, 1991:488-489).
Also, in South Korea, the proportion of professional, managerial, and clerical workers
(not including sales employees) increased from 6.7 percent to 16.6 percent during the
two-decade period from 1963 to 1983 (Koo, 1991:485).

And, industrial growth in

South Korea also galvanized the small-business sector, bringing about a new breed of
independent producers and small capitalists who could strengthen the middle class
(Koo, 1991:490).

This increasing portion of the middle class has tended to be

engaged in political democratization, since the middle class could not be satisfied
with economic prosperity alone anymore, and wanted political freedom (Kim,
1998:232).

For instance, a Seoul National University survey in May 1987 revealed

that 52.1% of the middle class preferred political freedom to economic development
and that 85.7% of them wanted to protect human rights even at the cost of economic
growth (Kim, 1998:232).

All in all, we can see that the middle class derived from

South Korea’s economic growth has contributed to South Korea’s democratic
development.
As another outcome of economic development, we can notice that the standard
of living and the education level in South Korea rose, which can contribute to South
Korea’s democratic development.

Indeed, we can find the close positive relationship

between economic growth, education, and democracy.

Karen Pennar points this out,

with Geri Smith, Rose Brady, Dave Lindorff and John Rossant, by saying:
As a small slice of the population in enriched, the rest of the
845
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citizens agitate for their fair shot at doing better, and such
privilege is granted only in democracies. Then too, rising
incomes at first go toward needed goods and investment,
then later toward higher education. A more educated
population tents to demand political and civil rights, and
so democratization begins (Pennar, Smith, Brady, Lindorff,
and Rossant, 1993:84).
South Korea shows the close positive relationship among economic growth, education
and democracy.

South Korea’s Human Development Index (HDI) was rated at

‘High’ with 0.912 by the HDI in 2006, owning a 99% adult literacy rate.846 This has
contributed to South Korea’s democratic development, and can explain how and why
South Korea become a mature democratic regime, in particular when considering that
mass illiteracy causes political docility. 847 At this point, we can confirm that the
increased education based on the high level of wealth can be one of the essential
factors for a basic requirement of democracy. 848
As shown above, South Korea’s economic growth has greatly contributed to
South Korea’s promotion and consolidation of democracy.

However, we cannot say

that there have been no problems with South Korea’s economic structure.

In other

words, South Korea’s economic structure was not a democratic economy until at least
1998 when it adjusted itself to an international standard just after experiencing a
major financial crisis.

South Korea’s economic structure had been known as ‘crony

capitalism’ and a clan-based economic system.

‘Crony capitalism’ can be defined as

a certain type of capitalist economy in which business greatly relies on an extremely
close relationships between businessman and the state institutions of politics and
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government, which can be somewhat distant from the free market, open competition,
and economic liberalism, since it exhibits favoritism in the distribution of legal
permits, government grants, special tax breaks and so forth.849 For example, in crony
capitalism, former President Park Chung Hee offered Chaebols state-sponsored loans
and low interests rates, and in turn the Chaebols returned the favor with political
funding, which can be called ‘a mutual hostage relationship’(Kang, 2002:9,121).
However, though crony capitalism in South Korea was the primary source for South
Korea’s rapid economic development that had pushed South Korea toward democracy,
in 1997-1998, the economic structure of South Korea eventually revealed its
vulnerability in international finance, while escalating the corruption and immorality
– e.g. on January, 1997, Hanbo Steel company’s collapse of over $1 billion, and
government officials’ involvement in a $6 billion bribe-for-loans scandal (Emery,
2001:6).

Thus, since 1998, the South Korean economic structure has been gradually

transformed into a decentralized democratic economic structure.

Such an economic

democracy eventually facilitates the full blossom of a mature democracy in South
Korea, while reinforcing its consolidation of democracy.
5. South Korea’s military power and its path toward democracy
South Korea’s military power has been very significant to its security in order
to maintain its sovereignty.

However, we should recognize that military power is

also important to its promotion and consolidation of democracy.

The reason is the

following: justice cannot be sustained long enough in the absence of order or security.
In other words, the only guarantee of security in South Korea through its superiority
in its military strength over the North’s military strength can make possible its
849
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democratic promotion and consolidation.

For example, the security guarantee for

South Korea can even help ease the rigidity of the National Security Law which is
often regarded as an obstacle to its democratic development.
During the Cold War era, North Korea’s military strength posed a great threat
to South Korea’s security.

In the early 1970s, North Korea was described as the

most highly militarized society in the world (Eberstadt and Banister, 1991:1095).

At

the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970, Kim Il-Sung boasted that North Korea
had finally completed war preparations (Choi, 1985:345).

Moreover, two or three

times, South Korea faced the uncertainty of security from the US – e.g. US President
Richard Nixon’s Guam doctrine on July 25, 1969,

850

the US withdrawal of 20,000

troops (the 7th Infantry Division) from South Korea in July of 1970, and the
possibility of the withdrawal of the U.S. ground combat forces from South Korea by
1981 or 1982 as the Carter administration’s initial plan in 1977 (Lee, 1981:859, Han,
1980:1078).

In the above context concerning insecurity, South Korea had to put

emphasis on stability over political freedom.
However, it was a matter of time for South Korea to catch up with the North’s
military strength, due to a South Korean population twice as large as the North’s, its
fast growing economy which allowed it to invest much in its weapon systems
(Lee,1981:859) and North Korea’s economic difficulties since the 1990s, which
constrained the North from continuously building up its military strength. 851 Indeed,
the South’s military expenditure began to surpass the North’s in 1972, and the gap has
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widened ever since, resulting in a cumulative difference of $38.7 billion by 1990 (Suh,
2004:67).

In 1991 Seoul spent $7.8 billion on its military, more than three times

Pyongyang’s $2 billion (Suh, 2004:67). Ten years later, Seoul’s defense budget had
grown to $10 billion, almost eight times as much as Pyongyang’s which shrank to
$1.3 billion (Suh, 2004:67). Eventually, in the last two decades, the military balance
between the South and the North has gradually been reversed. 852 When considering,
in particular the quality of the North’s forces, the North’s military strength has trailed
behind the South’s military might, which means that the North’s military does not
appear as menacing as it was in the past (Suh,2004:63).

Even without U.S. military

support, the South can stop and defeat a possible blitzkrieg attempt from the North
(Suh, 2004:63-65).
Besides the fact that the South alone has enough military strength to deter the
North’s attack, if we add in the U.S. military capabilities in the Korean Peninsula
(around 28,500 personnel) and the vicinity (48,000 personnel) including the Seven
Fleet, we realize why “there has been no war since 1953: deterrence has been clear
and unambiguous” (Suh, 2004:66).853 The military superiority of the combined South
Korean and US forces over the North Korean forces can make stability possible in the
Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asia, and further international society as a whole, which
can provide the foundation for democratic development in the Korean Peninsula,
Northeast Asia, and further international society.

All in all, when considering South

Korea’s military strength, we can be sure of the fact that South Korea’s consolidation
of democracy has been steadily guaranteed
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6. South Korea’s foreign policy and its path toward democracy
In a broad sense, South Korea’s foreign policy has been based on several
goals: security, economic development, legitimacy, stability, human rights and
democracy, even though human rights and democracy emerge as South Korea’s goals
of foreign policy in the post-Cold War era.

However, in general, national security

has been a primary goal of South Korea’s foreign policy.

In the Cold War era, for

national security, South Korea’s foreign policy had a strong anti-communist posture –
e.g. in the 1950s and the 1960s, the relations between South Korea and any
communist country were rare (Koo, 1980:1154). There had been several reasons for
South Korea’s anti-communist sentiment: the bitter experience from the Korean War,
a continuous hostile and confrontational relationship between the South and the North,
the US global strategy of containing communism - the US influence on South Korea’s
foreign policy - and South Korea’s deployment of 320,000 troops to South Vietnam
during the Vietnam War -South Korea could be a target for communist attacks (Ahn
1980: 1099-1100).
However, under its foreign policy soaked in anti-communism, South Korea
could hardly push itself toward human rights and political freedom.

Indeed, anti-

communism was often used as a tool to justify authoritarian rule at the expense of
democratic values, such as the suppression of political opposition and the curtailment
of civil liberties in South Korea under Rhee Syngman, Park Jung Hee – Yushin
Constitution - and Chun Doo Hwan’s regimes – the Kwangju massacre. 854 Also,
during the Cold War era, democracy activists or people calling for better relations
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with the North had been easily labeled as pro-communist. 855 Under these
circumstances, it was very hard to promote and consolidate democracy in South
Korea.
For legitimacy as a goal of foreign policy, during the Cold War era, the South
had competed with the North, claiming its exclusive legitimacy to represent the
Korean nation and making its efforts to obtain exclusive recognition from the
international community (Choo, 2006:4).

Indeed, during the Cold War era, like

North Korea, the South made normalization pacts that recognized the South as the
only legitimate government, which is a Korean version of the Hallstein doctrine.
Under this kind of struggle for exclusive legitimacy, South Korea could not at the
time be expected to have any space to promote or consolidate democracy within its
borders or beyond them.
However, even during the Cold War era, we occasionally could observe some
change in international society such as the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and
the advent of détente – Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing in February 1972.

As a result,

South Korea slowly reduced direct hostility and tension with communist countries.
For instance, even Park Jung Hee briefly launched his campaign for peaceful
coexistence between the South and the North with his speech on “A Foreign Policy
for Peace and Unification” on June 23, 1973 (Kamiya, 1980:753) whose aims were to
open diplomatic relations with any country regardless of political or social
orientations, and to join international organizations with North Korea (Hong, 2005:2).
This indicated that South Korea dropped its version of the Hallstein doctrine.
Nonetheless, this was not enough to lessen the Cold War mentality in South Korea.
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However, on July 7, 1988 President Roh Tae Woo made an announcement of a
Nordpolitik, or Northern Policy toward communist countries, which was a Korean
version Ostpolitik that could weaken a strong Cold War ideology in South Koreans’
mind (Hong, 2005:3).

It was to approve external ties between South Korea’s allies

and North Korea; to abandon South-North diplomatic competition; and to support
cross-recognition (Hong, 2005:4).

Under the Nordpolitik policy, thus, South Korea

established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with China in
1992 (Hong, 2005:4).

Indeed, owing to Nordpolitik/ Northern policy, by the

beginning of 1990, South Korea had ultimately established diplomatic relations with
133 countries and had 138 diplomatic missions, including representative offices and a
consulate department in Moscow - today, South Korea maintains diplomatic relations
with more than 170 countries, which has fortified South Korea’s international
legitimacy. 856

Meanwhile, North Korea only had diplomatic relations with 102

countries and 85 overseas missions. 857 All in all, we can see that South Korea became
more engaged and more secure in international society, enjoying international
legitimacy.
At this point, I have to say that South Korea’s foreign policy, Nordpolitik
strengthened the democratic environment in South Korea, at least, via the gradual
dissipating of the Cold War mentality – Nordpolitik even made it possible for civilians
to visit North Korea, such as a visit by the late South Korean business tycoon Chung
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Ju-yung. 858 In other words, under the above foreign policy, like Nordpolitik, anticommunist authoritarianism gradually faded away, which overtime moved South
Korea toward the values of human rights and democracy.
In the Post-Cold War era, we can rarely find anti-communist sentiment in
South Korea’s foreign policy.

We can confirm this in Kim Dae Jung’s ‘Sunshine’

policy and Roh Moo Hyun’s ‘Peace and Prosperity’ policy, which greatly reduced the
Cold War mentality in many South Koreans’ minds, which led to more democratic
environment in South Korea.

The ‘Sunshine’ policy greatly deconstructed South

Koreans’ image of North Korea as a monstrous enemy through North Korea’s
engagement in dialogue and exchange, and through South Korea’s patience and its
accommodating stance toward North Korea.859 In terms of inter-Korean relations, the
‘Sunshine’ policy resulted in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, tourism to Mt.
Geumgang, and a 2000 summit meeting between the two leaders, Kim Dae Jung and
Kim Jong Il.

Like the ‘Sunshine’ policy, the ‘Peace and Prosperity’ policy attempted

to help alter the image of North Korea as an enemy into a partner on the basis of
reconciliation and cooperation through various projects like a South-North crossborder railway connection, emphasizing peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula.
Thus, the “Sunshine” policy and “Peace and Prosperity” policy ultimately reduced the
tension and antagonism between the South and the North, while making a Cold War
ideology dissipate in many South Koreans’ minds.

This ultimately facilitated a more

open and more democratic environment within South Korean society so as to help
South Korea’s consolidation of democracy – e.g. lessening a rigid application of the
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National Security Law.

Nonetheless, the tension between the South and the North

did not completely disappear, in particular when considering the North’s nuclear
program.

The ‘Sunshine’ policy and the ‘Peace and Prosperity’ policy were not

enough to rapidly alter North Korea’s revisionist attitude against international society
not to mention South Korea, in particular when considering the principle under the
‘Sunshine’ and under the ‘Peace and Prosperity’ policies that South Korea would not
intervene in North Korea’s domestic issues, in particular North Korea’s severe
violation of human rights.
Since 1987, South Korea has gradually emerged as a mature democratic state,
not to mention its respect of human rights, and also since 1987, South Korea has
gradually become an ardent supporter of human rights and democracy across
international society.

In other words, South Korea’s foreign policy has been

increasingly embedded in human rights and democracy as norms of international
society.

As its significant goal of foreign policy, in the post-Cold War era, South

Korea has advocated human rights and democracy across international society.

For

instance, South Korea has advocated for positive change in developing countries, like
its participation in bringing democracy to East Timor. 860 In fact, the Presidents of
South Korea have greatly emphasized the promotion of human right and democracy in
international society as foreign policy.

For instance, Kim Dae Jung showed his

interest in Myanmar, and his forum of democratic leaders made statements calling for
the Myanmar authorities to stop the oppression of democratic forces, make a
constructive dialogue with the National League for Democracy (NLD) and release all
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political prisoners, requesting the Myanmar authorities to respect the right to freedom
of assembly, speech and political participation. 861 In addition, Kim Dae Jung founded
the Kim Dae Jung Peace Foundation in 1994 to promote democratic change in Asia
and world peace, not to mention Korean reunification. 862 Under the Roh Moo Hyun
regime, South Korea’s about 3,000 combat and non-combat troop deployment (Zaytun
unit) in Northern Iraq might be for a strong ROK-US alliance, and also for some
benefits from Iraqi reconstruction project and oil production.

However, we should

not forget the fact that more importantly, it has ultimately contributed to stability and
democratization in Iraq and in the Middle East.863

As a matter of fact, the promotion

of human rights and democracy in international society as a goal of South Korea’s
foreign policy was confirmed by former President Roh Moo-hyun’s meeting of the
former US President George W. Bush on November 17, 2005.864

In the meeting, the

two leaders agreed that the alliance between the South and the U.S. should not only
stand against threats, but also for the promotion of common values, such as human
rights, democracy, and a market economy across international society. 865 Also,
current President, Lee Myung Bak, emphasizes human rights and democracy as
foreign policy.

For instance, the Myung Bak (MB) doctrine -a guideline of foreign

policy - puts weight on the values of democracy as foreign policy.

At the meeting
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with the former US President George W. Bush in Camp David, Maryland on April 20,
2008, President Lee Myung Bak mentioned that under the strong alliance between the
ROK and the US, South Korea would contribute more to US-led efforts to spread the
market economy and democracy across international society. 866
All in all, South Korea’s foreign policy, in particular in the late Cold War era
and in the Post-Cold War era, has had an impact on South Korea’s promotion and
consolidation of democracy, while facilitating a more open and democratic
environment in South Korea.

Moreover, in a broad sense, when considering that the

ROK, the US and Japan’s foreign policies share human rights, democracy and market
economy as common values, we can not only expect a more solid democratic
community, but also a more consolidated democracy in each country.
C.
1.

Iraq’s internal variables and its path toward democracy
Iraq’s history and its path toward democracy
Looking into Iraq’s history, we can notice that Iraq endured a cycle of illiberal

foreign occupation, rebellion, dictatorship, and violence, which was a primary barrier
against Iraq’s democratic development.

However, we can also find some positive

ingredients for its democracy, and so we cannot flatly say that in Iraq’s history, there
had been no single positive element for Iraqi democracy.
ingredients were not enough to realize Iraq’s democracy.

Nonetheless, those

In this section, I will detail

Iraq’s historical cycle of illiberal foreign occupation, rebellion, and dictatorship as a
holdup to Iraqi democratic development, and I will demonstrate why the US-led
coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq and their presence in Iraq were necessary to alter
Iraq’s historical entrenched cycle of illiberal foreign occupation, rebellion/coups,
violence and dictatorship into its new cycle of peace, prosperity and democracy.
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When looking into Iraq’s history, we can easily find several foreign invasions
and occupations, in particular, illiberal foreign invasions and occuptations.

For

instance, the Arabs conquered Iraq in AD 637, and for a century, the Orthodox and the
Umayyad caliph controlled Iraq as a province of the Islamic Empire. 867 But the
Mongols invaded in the early 13th century, and in 1258, Genghis Khan’s grandson
Hulagu ransacked Baghdad. 868 Nonetheless, the Mongol’s occupation of Iraq was
replaced by Timur’s conquest of Iraq in 1393. 869

In 1534, the Ottoman Turks

conquered Baghdad, and, barring a short period of Persian control in the 17 th century,
Iraq was a province of the Ottoman Empire, as Iraq (Mesopotamia) falling to the
Ottoman Turks made Iraq pass under direct Ottoman administration in the 19 th
century.870 However, in October 1918, Britain was ultimately in de facto occupation
of the whole of Iraq, and after the Turkish administrators’ and the Turkish armies’
retreat from Iraq, it began to construct a civil administration for Iraq (Farouk-Sluglett
and Sluglett, 1983:496). In the late 1920, the Treaty of Sevre established Iraq as a
mandate of the League of Nations under British administration.

Under Britain’s

tutelage on the basis of the mandate, in 1921, Iraq became a new state headed by
Faisal I as an imported monarchy (Hashim, 2003:30-31),871 and the British renamed
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the arena of Mesopotamia Iraq and recognized it as a kingdom in 1922.872 All in all,
Iraq got through various invasions and occupations in its history, which brought out
Iraqis’ xenophobia in some sense.
Indeed, such illiberal foreign occupations were not welcomed by Iraqis.

For

instance, many Iraqis wanted a free and independent Iraq that should be ruled by
Iraqis, when Britain’s occupation replaced the Ottoman Empire’s occupation (Simon,
1974:314).

Thus, Iraqis concentrated their efforts on anti-British propaganda,

disruption of British communications, and provocation of the tribes of the Euphrates
(Simon, 1974:314-315). In fact, in Iraq, the Sunnis (urban population) the Shias
(peasants), and the Kurds demanded Iraqi independence, launching the revolt against
British presence and rule, and the revolt ultimately came to take place across Iraq
(Galvani, 1972:5).
Eventually, amid the fading of Britain’s influence, on July 14, 1958, the Iraqi
army led by Gen. Abdul Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd-al-Salam Arif, launched a
successful military coup d’etat, and decreed a republic on the basis of nationalist
principles, abolishing the Iraqi monarchy with the killing of King Faisal, most of the
royal family like Crown Prince of Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri al-Said who dominated Iraqi
politics. 873 Qasim remained in power for four and a half years. 874 However, during
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Qasim’s rule from 1958 to 1963, the republican regime of Qasim purged some 2000
competent, but politically suspect officers from the 8,000 members in the armed
forces (Hashim, 2003:34).

As this kind of purge implies, the republican regime was

not even close to a decent liberal democratic regime, but rather an authoritarian
dictatorship.
However, we cannot deny the fact that during Qasim’s rule, there were some
ingredients for political liberalization in Iraq.

For instance, in 1958, Qasim’s regime

permitted the relicensing of formerly prohibited political parties, and he even
announced that free and fair elections would be held within a year, even if they never
really happened (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004: 34).

Also, according to the new

1958 constitution, Islam was declared the religion of the state, but religious freedom
for non-Muslim was guaranteed under article 12 (Khadduri, 1969: 65).

And article 9

provided for equality before the law, and it prohibited any discrimination due to race,
nationality, language, religion, or belief (Khadduri, 1969: 65).

Nevertheless, the

1958 constitution could not have a permanent constitutional framework (Khadduri,
1969:66).

As another important example for Iraqis’ attempt for democracy, in Iraq

there were some moderate politicians like ‘Chadirchi,’ ‘Hadid,’ ‘Abd al-Fattah
Ibrahim’ and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz,’ and some political parties like ‘the National
Democratic Party’ and ‘the National Progressive Party’ that were in pursuit of
democracy.

Chardirchi’s great desire for Iraq’s democracy is worth reading.

The

leader of the National Democratic Party, Chardirchi said:
Now the question is no longer whether the National
Democratic Party is represented or is not represented in the
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Cabinet. The question is rather whether the party can act
independently or not, and this is part of the struggle for
democratic freedoms.
This in turn requires that all
members of the party should possess certain qualities the
most important of which is the democratic spirit combined
with the necessary moral courage to oppose any kind of
violence from whatever source it ensures. They should be
able to tolerate the opinion of others and feel free to discuss
it.
They should oppose tyranny and coercion, and
recognize no other than the rule of law and accept no
judgment save that based on justice….Thus, democratic
freedoms would be enjoyed equally by all, regardless of
their differing political views and methods (Khadduri,
1969:134).
Chardirchi also recognized well the significance of the role of political parties to
sustain democratic form of government.

He claimed that “political parties were

absolutely essential in building up a democratic system, and that the trend toward a
one party system was inconsistent with parliamentary democracy”(Khadduri, 1969:
228).

All in all, we can see that during Qasim’s rule, some Iraqi people had great

desire for liberal democracy as an ideal form of government, which indicates that
democracy itself is not totally new to all Iraqis. 875
However, in Iraq, the ingredients for democracy were not enough to bring out
a fruitful outcome.

For instance, though at the early stage, Qasim’s regime and

moderate politicians were authentically interested in establishing a truly democratic
system, Qasim himself gradually became a tyrant, while using his influence to
constrain any political activity unfriendly to himself and his personal interests, and
making several transfers of personnel whenever in conflict, in order to establish his
firm control over the military hierarchy (Khadduri, 1969:72, 147).
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In 2003, many scholars vigorously claimed that Iraq’s democracy would not work due to various
reasons. One of reasons was that Iraqis did not have any single experience of democracy.
Nonetheless, looking into its history, we can often find some ingredients for Iraq’s democracy.
Fortunately, now, more scholars become optimistic in Iraqi success of democracy.
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parties were increasingly crippled and even banned by authorities (Khadduri,
1969:147).

Therefore, overall, during Qasim’s rule, all attempts at democracy faded

away.
On February 9, 1963, Qasim’s dictatorship was put to its end, as Qasim was
expelled via a nationalist coup by the Iraqi Arab Baath Party (Hashim, 2003:32).

As

a coup leader, Colonel. Abd al-Salam Aref executed Qasim, and all of Qasim’s top
aides.876 Abd al-Salam Aref became the new president, and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr
became prime minister.877 Like Qasim’s regime, a pan-Arabist, Abd al-Salam Aref’s
regime transformed into a dictatorship.878 But on April 13, 1966, President Abd alSalam Aref was killed in a helicopter crash, and so Aref’s brother, Gen. Abd alRahman Aref took office. 879
During Aref’s rule, there were also some ingredients for Iraq’s democracy.
For instance, there were many protests in the city streets, demanding free elections.880
Also, Deputy Premier al-Bazzaz, under Aref’s regime made a great effort to establish
and cultivate norms of democracy in Iraqi soil a half century ago.

For example, he

strongly emphasized the rule of law and an end to the erratic behavior of military
officers dominating Iraq’s politics.881 He made an effort to increasingly civilianize
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Iraqi government and open Iraq’s political system. 882 In 1966, the Iraqi people
protested against Deputy Premier, Bazzaz’s resignation, in Baghdad, since for many
Iraqis he had been seen as a symbol of democracy (Khadduri, 1969:252-283).

When

considering all of these, we can be sure of the fact that, as noted previously, in Iraq’s
history, democracy is not completely new to Iraqi people.

Nevertheless, Iraq’s

history demonstrates as well that Iraq did not have enough ingredients to achieve a
decent, stable, and prosperous democracy, and had to constantly face the fatal failure
of democracy to take root.883
On July 17, 1968, Abd al-Rahman Aref’s regime was overthrown by a
bloodless coup that was led by Maj. Gen. Ahmad Hussan al-Bakr as the head of the
Ba’ath party, along with Arif’s own assistants and members of the Ba’ath Party. 884
Ahmad Hussan al-Bakr became president, and appointed Saddam Hussein, his Tikriti
cousin, as his vice president.885 Just after he took the power, al-Bakr started a purge
of opponents, and in 1969 more than 50 persons were executed after an espionage
trial. 886 Also, the Ba’ath Party government ruthlessly suppressed any opposition. 887
Also, in July 1978, al-Bakr’s regime passed a decree which made all non-Ba’thist
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political activity illegal and membership in any other political party punishable by
death.888 All in all, Al-Bakr’s regime was no less than dictatorship itself, and it was
also a prologue to the worst monstrous monolithic dictatorship in Iraq’s history, ‘the
regime of Saddam Hussein.’
In 1976, Saddam took the title of general in the Ba’ath party’s Popular Army,
and he gradually became the de-facto leader of Iraq.889 On July 16, 1979, the 65-yearold President al-Bakr resigned, and Saddam Hussein eventually became Iraq’s
President.890 This means that the most dreadful dictatorship in Iraq’s history started.
Shortly after he became president, Saddam started executing top members of the
Ba’ath party and others under various claims like espionage.

Until it was toppled in

2003, Saddam’s regime itself was nothing more than a monolithic monster which
greatly threatened not only Iraqi people, but also the region (further even international
society as a whole).

Saddam’s ruthless dictatorship does not need any further

explanation now, even though I will touch on Saddam’s brutal dictatorship in detail,
when I deal with Iraq’s politics.
All in all, when looking into Iraq’s history, we can depict Iraq’s history as a
cycle of illiberal foreign occupation, dictatorships, revolts/coups and so on.

Under

this historical circumstance, we cannot expect Iraq to become a democratic country by
itself.

In fact, thanks to this historical trend, it has been widely accepted that ‘Iraq

has never experienced democracy’ and it had been often said that ‘Iraqi people do not
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know democracy at all.’ Nevertheless, while Iraq had had some ingredients for
democracy, they had never been enough to reach a mature and prosperous democracy.
Thus, when considering such a historical cycle, Iraq needed a shot in the arm in order
to break its historical implacable circle and to kick off a new cycle heading toward a
mature prosperous democracy.

The US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003

could be in part seen as a strong stimulus to mold a new cycle that could initiate Iraq’s
distinguishing path toward a mature and prosperous democracy as a full member of
international society.

As a matter of fact, since Saddam’s regime was toppled, with

its new constitution, a new Iraq has gradually grasped a new identity and character
quite different from Saddam’s Iraq, while taking large strides on a new cycle based on
cooperation, basic rights (civic and political rights), a multi-party system, rule of law,
transparency and fair elections, which will eventually induce a mature, stable and
prosperous democracy in Iraq.

Thus, the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in

2003 can be seen as the catalyst for Iraq to adopt democracy.

Also, unlike its past,

today’s Iraq seems to have enough ingredients for a stable, prosperous and mature
democracy.

This might be almost impossible, if the US-led coalition forces did not

invade Saddam’s Iraq and did not topple Saddam’s regime.
2.

Iraq’s culture and its path toward democracy
Iraq is located in the Middle East, which has been well known as a bulwark

against democracy and human rights. 891 Most governments in the Middle East such
as Syria, let alone Saddam’s Iraq, have been recognized as authoritarian or
dictatorships, along with their chronic violation of civil and human rights, the
resistance of political liberalization and mere lip service to their respective
891
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constitutions (Kubba, 2003:28).

Due to this, some scholars tend to identify Islamic

culture as one of primary reasons for ‘the severe violation of human rights’ and ‘the
lack of democracy’ in the Middle East, while also identifying it as the background
cause of the turmoil in the Middle East (Fukuyama, 2004:94).

However, in this

section, I will investigate Islamic culture, and attempt to reveal the compatible
relationship between Islamic culture and democracy, in order to demonstrate that
Islamic culture is not a fundamental and determinant factor against Iraq’s democratic
development.
In general, Islamic culture has been widely recognized as anti-western, antihuman rights or anti-democratic, while Western culture has been known for
individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of
law, democracy, free markets, and the separation of church and state (Huntington,
1993b: 40).

This recognition might be derived from some Islamic characteristics.

For instance, in Islamic culture, community has been given priority over the
individual.

Also, in Islamic culture, there is no separation between private life and

public life, and between religion and society since the Islamic religion itself can be
understood as the constitutional law of society in some sense.
Islamic culture can be interpreted as even a totalitarian tendency.
rules of Muslim law are controversial.

Because of this,
Furthermore, some

For instance, the law of sharia has been

known to discriminate against women, though Islamic fundamentalists strongly deny
such allegations (Charfi, 2005:39).

And, according to sharia, a man has the right to

be married to four women at once, which went unchallenged for thirteen centuries,
and during the first thirteen centuries of the Hegira, sharia law gave a man the right to
buy as many slaves as his means permitted and to have sexual relations with all his
female slaves (Charfi, 2005:41).

In addition, Islamic culture might be compatible
581

with authoritarian dictatorship rather than democracy, when considering that unlike
the Christian Church in the 1980s and 1990s in South Korea, Islamic mosques have
never been vigorously in opposition to authoritarian regimes, let alone the success of
Saddam Hussein’s brutal dictatorship during over two decades.

All in all, in

considering all of the above points, Islamic culture might be perceived as
incompatible with democracy, and so we might easily conclude that the promotion of
democracy in the Middle East, particularly Iraq, would not be easy, especially if
democracy is assumed to be a Western norm which cannot be harmoniously fused into
Islamic culture.

In short, Islamic culture might be a fundamental obstacle to the

promotion and consolidation of democracy in the Middle East, in particular Iraq’s
democratic development.
However, we should recognize that the above explanation on the conflicting
natures of different cultures, Western culture vs. Islamic culture, is too much
exaggerated, and that democracy in Islamic culture can be materialized, especially
when considering the Arab Spring in 2010 and 2011.

Let us take a look at several

sentences in the Holy Quran in order to find the close connection between Islamic
culture and liberal democracy.
1.Freedom of choice. People are free to choose and
without prejudice. We have shown him the right path,
whether he be grateful or ungrateful. (Verse 3, Sura 76,
Holy Quran). For man is a free being, accountable to
Allah and society for his preferences. 2. Equality. All
people are the creation of Allah and are equal, regardless of
their inclinations, origins or the language they speak. Men,
we have created you from a male and a female, and made
you into nations and tribes that you may get to know one
another. The noblest of you in Allah’s sight is the most
righteous…(Verse 14, Sura 49, Holy Quaran).
3. Justice.
A basic principle put forward in Islam to counter oppression.
Do not allow your hatred for other men to turn you away for
justice. Deal justly; justice is nearer to true piety (Verse 8.
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Sura, Holy Quran).892
1. The sovereignty of the umma. Islam considers the
umma to be the rightful authority to determine its own
methods of legislation and policy implementation. This
“right” stem from: First, the principle of vicegerency
granted to man by the Lord. Allah has made man
responsible for the leadership and progress of the world in
which he lives. On this basis is centered the theory of the
“people rule.” When your lord said to the angels: I am
placing on the earth one that shall be my deputy…(Verse 31,
Sura, 2, Holy Quran).
Second, the mutual consent
principle (shura). Every individual enjoys the ability to
join in political activities and contribute to the formation of
a society on the basis of mutual consent (Verse 38, Sura 42,
Holy Quran). Take counsel with them in the conduct of
your affairs..(Verse 159, Sura 3, Holy Quran). And third,
the right to differ. The right to differ in ideas, positions
and method is acknowledged so that one does not deprive
others of their convictions. Had your lord pleased, he
would have made mankind a single nation. (Verse 118, Sura
11, Holy Quran). There was a time when men were one
nation. They disagreed among themselves….(Verse 19,
Sura 10, Holy Quran).893
The above values in Quran are obviously opposed to dictatorship and tyranny on the
basis of a single party or a single family such as Saddam’s regime, while advocating
pluralism, justice and individual rights (Uloom, 1994:28).

Also, these values in the

Quran demonstrate that Islamic culture cannot be a fundamental obstacle to the
promotion and consolidation of liberal democracy in Iraq.
As a matter of fact, when focusing on Islamic common values such as ‘adl’
(Justice), ’Shura,’ (Consultation), and ‘al maslaha’ (public interests) as the pillars of
Islamic liberalism, we can notice that Islam is not incompatible with norms of
democracy (Masmoudi, 2003:258-262, Barber, 1996:209).

Indeed, we can recognize

that Islamic values like Shura/Consultation and adl/Justice can be regarded as even
892
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core elements of liberal democracy.

Also, according to some decent Islamic liberals,

Islam, properly interpreted, gives equal rights to men and women, while attributing
the limitation on gender equality to local culture rather than Muslim religion (Tessler,
Moaddel, and Inglehart, 2006:44).

Moreover, when considering that in Quran, there

is no single verse that non-Muslims such as Christian and Jews should be fought
against or be killed, and that in Iraqi society, Christians have even been able to adopt
Western norms and customs, we can grasp some level of toleration and pluralism in
Islamic culture, not to mention the fusion of different cultures (Sick 1994:32, Piscatori
2003:284).894 In fact, Sultan Qabus of Oman claimed, in his interview with a Dutch
paper, the following, which demonstrated close relationship between democracy and
Islamic culture:
Islam, in essence, is democratic. We believe in equal
chances. We believe that our leaders, spiritual as well as
secular, have to prove themselves to God and to the people.
We believe that civilians must be able to express their
opinions freely. This is the spirit of Islam, in its purest
form (Sick, 1994: 32).
Also, Anwar Ibrahim claims that crucial elements of constitutional democracy, such
as freedom of consciousness, freedom of expression, and the sanctity of life and
property are moral imperatives in Islam (Ibrahim, 2006:7).

And, Muhammad Baqir

as-Sadr emphasized the Islamic premise that “the human being is free and that no
other human being or class or human group has dominion over him” which
conspicuously reflects some level of democratic norm (Batatu, 1982:8).

When

considering the above, we cannot say that Islam itself is completely against the values
and norms of democracy.

Instead, Islam has many features that are compatible with
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At this juncture, the concept of “fighting” does not include the concept of “killing.” “fight” can be
understood as persuasion rather than be literally interpreted as physical fighting. We have to
recognize that the meaning of “fight” can be interpreted as various ways. See Piscatori (2003:284).
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modern democratic values, like unitarianism, toleration, individualism, egalitarianism,
republicanism, and rule-based governance (Kuo, 2006:15-16).

Also, many liberal

Muslim intellectuals have attempted to ground democracy in the text of the Quran and
the context of the practice of the Prophet and his Caliphs, or political progeny, and
they have claimed that Islam might even be no less democratic than either Christianity
or Judaism (Sadri, 1994: 122).

And, surprisingly enough, a growing number of Arab

scholars and intellectuals are speaking up very eloquently not only for human rights in
general but also for the need for democracy as a basic condition of good
governance. 895 All in all, we can see that Islamic culture is not incompatible with
democracy, and we can certainly say that Islamic culture cannot be a fundamental
obstacle to Iraq’s democratic development.896
3.

Iraq’s politics and its path toward democracy
In this section, I will attempt to reveal the fact that Sunni dominance,

Saddam’s dictatorship, Baath Party’s role, and close relationship between military and
politics had been primary political obstacles to Iraq’s democratic development.

In

the process, I will emphasize the necessity of the external factor, the US led-coalition
forces’ invasion of Iraq to remove the primary obstacles, which can facilitate Iraq’s
democratic development.

First of all, let us examine the Sunni dominance as Iraq’s

distinguishing political feature.

Iraq is a diverse state rather than a homogeneous

state, since Iraq has a population of 25 million people who are ethnically and
religiously diverse – e.g. the Turkomans, the Assyrians, Armentians, Christians,
895

See Larry Diamond’s remark on “Universal Democracy? Prospects for a World Transformed” at
Carnegie Council on February 26, 2004. Available at the website:
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/transcripts/4398.html
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See Iraq’s Charter – Iraq’s new constitutional draft- (Article 2). Available at the website:
http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/files/20704/11332732681iraqi_constitution_en.pdf/iraqi_constitution_en.
pdf
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Yazidis, the Sunni Arabs, the Shia Arabs and the Kurds (Luizard and Stork, 1995:18).
However, at this juncture, the problem is not diverse religious and ethnical population,
but various hierarchical relationships ethnically and religiously, which can be
recognized as an obstacle to Iraq’s democratic development.

For instance, we can

think of a hierarchy of sectarian groups, that is Sunnis above Shia, even though about
17% of the Arab Iraqis are Sunni, and around 60% of the Arab Iraqis are Shia.

897

Such hierarchy was derived from Sunni continuous dominance and Shia’s systemic
exclusion under Ottoman rule, British rule, the monarchy’s rule, and Saddam’s rule.
As the hierarchical relationship between Shia and Sunni, the division between a ruling
Sunni minority and a deprived Shia majority can be seen as the key to understanding
the political dynamics of Iraqi society (Stork, 1981:6).

Nonetheless, this

distinguishing aspect of Iraqi politics was one of the hindrances for Iraq’s democratic
development.
The Sunni Arabs made up the majority of the urban population (FaroukSluglett and Sluglett, 1991:1413).

And, schools and opportunities for non-religious

education were located almost exclusively in large towns like Baghdad (Stork,
1981:6).

Due to these factors, Sunnis got many opportunities to be educated, and

they could be tracked into teaching, administrative and military careers as well as
politically dominant positions (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991:1413, Stork,
1981:6).

By contrast, the Shia Arabs were poorly educated and they were mainly

engaged in commerce or theology (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991:1413, Stork,
1981:6). For instance, during the Ottomans’ rule, Sunnis were predominantly chosen
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See “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” The Assessment of the British Government, available at
the website:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf
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for positions of administration and governance. 898 Indeed, the Ottoman empire could
be recognized even as a Sunni institution (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett, 1991:1413).
During British occupation, Sunnis dominated various significant administrative
positions beyond social and intellectual positions, whereas, in contrast to Sunnis, Iraqi
Shias were principally excluded from governmental positions, from the military to
even government-sponsored education institutions.

And, Iraqi King Faisal had to

choose the experienced administrators, Sunnis, and in 1933, Faisal even openly
admitted that “Iraq is a kingdom ruled by an Arab Sunni government”(Mallat,
1988:723).899 Indeed, between 1921 and 1947, not one single Iraqi prime minister
was a Shia (Chalabi, 1991:25).

And, out of the total of the fifty-three members of

the top command leading the Baath party from November 1963 to 1970, 84.9 percent
were Sunni Arabs, 5.7 percent Shia Arabs, and 7.5 percent Kurds (Mallat, 1988:724).
Moreover, in 1968, all the members of the highest political bodies, the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) and the Regional Leadership (RL) came from the Sunni
Arab triangle between Baghdad, Mosul, and the Syrian border (Baram, 1989:447).
This trend did not radically change, and lasted until Saddam’s regime was toppled in
2003, when considering that Saddam himself was from a Sunni tribe and his
government institutions were largely staffed by Sunnis (Anderson and Stansfield,
2004:147).

The Iraqi exclusive hierarchical political structure needed a shot in the

arm so as to ultimately achieve democracy.

The US-led coalition forces’ invasion of

Iraq in 2003 might be regarded as the catalyst to overhaul Iraq’s systemic repressive
and aggressive regime on the basis of Sunni domination and systemic exclusion of the
898

See “Arabic & Islamic Studies essay – Social and Political History of Iraq,” Sound Affects,
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Shia.

In fact, the systemic hierarchical exclusion has been steadily repaired under a

new Iraqi government and under a new Iraqi constitution, since in 2003 the US-led
coalition forces toppled Saddam’s regime.
As for Iraq’s second political distinguishing aspect, we can point out Saddam’s
dictatorship. Saddam Hussein could be characterized into a class of war criminals,
violating most of the Nuremberg Principles with ‘his crimes against peace’(the
invasion of Iran and Kuwait), ‘war crimes’(the ill-treatment of the civilian population
in occupied territories, let alone the plunder and destruction of private property as
well as the taking of hostages) and ‘crimes against humanity’(murder, deportation and
inhuman acts or prosecution) (Finkelstein, 1991:43-48).

Indeed, Amnesty

International 1990 report made a good summary on massive crimes against humanity
in Iraq under Saddam’s rule, with the following:
Thousands of political prisoners, among them prisoners of
conscience, continued to be detained without charge or trial
or imprisoned after trials which reportedly did not satisfy
international fair trial standards. Torture of political
prisoners remained widespread.
Disappearances were
reported and the government did not clarify the fate and
whereabouts of thousands who disappeared in previous
years. Many of ‘the disappeared’ were believed to have
been killed. Executions were also reported. Some of
those executed apparently had sought from the authorities
benefits announced under official amnesties. In most case
it was unclear whether they had received any form of trial
(Finkelstein, 1991:48).
Besides, as a horrible atrocity, during Saddam’s rule, anyone found guilty of
slandering President Saddam Hussein had his/her tongue removed. 900 And, any
opposition to Saddam’s rule could be cruelly executed, no matter who he/ she was.
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See “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction.” The Assessment of the British Government, available at
the website:
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For instance, former Minister of Health, Riyadh Ibrahim Hussein was executed for his
suggestion that Saddam Hussein should step down in favor of former President
Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork, 1984:25).

Moreover,

there was nothing in Hussein’s past behavior to insinuate that he was concerned about
the suffering inflicted on his people or that he was motivated to settle disputes via
non-violent means (Goertzel, 1991:780). That is why it was possible that on Friday,
March 17th 1988, Iraqi forces cracked down on a Kurdish rebellion in Halabja, with
conventional and even chemical weapons, killing around 100,000 people of whom the
immense majority were civilians (including women and children) as very shocking,
which was called the Anfal campaign as Saddam’s long-term program of persecution
of the Iraqi Kurds (Bellamy, 2004:138).

This cruelty flatly demonstrates how

Saddam could manage to maintain the Iraqi civilian population under his tight control.
All in all, Saddam’s dictatorship, in particular the dire violation of human
rights should warrant the external military intervention, which was seen in Kosovo
and East Timor.

As Tony Blair, George W. Bush and John Howard argued, Saddam

Hussein’s record of awful human rights abuse alone was enough to warrant the use of
force so as to rectify Iraq’s repressive and despotic regime into a decent democratic
regime as a full member of international society (Bellamy, 2004:137).

In Iraq’s case,

a liberal anti-pluralist international society can be strongly felt, and Gerry Simpson’s
remark “when Great Powers meet outlaw states, the rules of the equal sovereignty
regime are suspended” is echoed (Simpson, 2004:348).901 Overall, as Great Power’s
responsibility, the UK and the US’s invasion of Saddam’s Iraq and their imposition of
democracy on Iraq was a right and necessary thing to do, in particular when
901

The role of Great Powers was dealt with in Chapter IV in which I demonstrated the role of Great
Powers such as the US and UK, to promote and consolidate democracy across international society.
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considering that sovereignty should belong to Iraqi people rather than Saddam
Hussein who had tortured and killed many Iraqi people under his dictatorial rule for
more than twenty years.902
As Iraq’s third distinguishing political aspect, it is worth examining the role of
the Baath Party.

The Arab Socialist Baath Party originally stood for pan-Arabism

such as the establishment of a single Arab state; freedom from foreign rule; and
socialism as social justice for the poor and underprivileged (Devlin, 1991:1396-1397).
And, when it came to power in Iraq in July 1968, the Baath Party announced that it
was against religious sectarianism, racism and tribalism, defining all of three as the
remnants of colonialism (Baram, 1997:1).
Baath Party were altered.

However, the above characteristics of the

The Baath Party could increasingly function as Saddam’s

vehicle to carry out his personal ambition (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:32).

As a

matter of fact, during the 1968–1988 period, Baathist ideology and vision became
whatever Saddam said, and it was very hard to think of any discernable content
independent of Saddam (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:78).

Indeed, the Baath Party

became simply the veneer which covered Hussein’s terror (Chalabi, 1991:20) and
Iraqi Ba’thism’ had been transformed into a simple tool to consolidate Saddam’s rule,
even fostering a huge personality cult around the person of Saddam Hussein himself,
whereas its traditional rhetoric such as Arab unity and Arab socialism were gradually
jettisoned (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork, 1984:24).

Also, the Baath Party had

served as an instrument of social monitoring and control rather than a decent political
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Here, I put the US into the category of Great Powers. However, the US should be regarded as
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Hedley Bull’s categorization of Great Power in some sense. See, for more detail, Bull (1977) and
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party. 903 In other words, the Baath party was used for a modern totalitarian
mechanism in which all aspects of society came under the scrutiny of the party.
Indeed, the cellular structure of the Baath could make the party infiltrate and control
all aspects of Iraqi life (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:8).

Therefore, through its

infiltration and control of Iraq’s people, the Baath Party could become one mechanism
to discipline the population to dictator’s orders.904 All in all, the Baath Party in oneparty dominant system became a pivotal part of an Iraqi despotic monolith.

Because

of the above roles of the Baath Party, any challenge against Saddam’s dictatorship
could not be possible.

Due to this, the de-Ba’athification has been carried out since

the US-led coalition forces removed Saddam’s despotic regime, which facilitates
Iraq’s democratic development.
As Iraq’s fourth distinguishing political aspect, Iraq did not have any strong
mechanism to separate the military from politics, which can be usually witnessed in
non-democratic states.

The Iraqi state’s key supporters were not located in a client

merchant and industrial class, but in the army and the bureaucracy, which revealed the
close connection between politics and the military (Chaudhry, 1991:21).

Indeed,

there was the dependence of the Baath Party on the military for the attainment of
power and the Baath Party’s great impacts on the military (Galvani, 1972:16).

And,

importantly, we should not forget the fact that the Iraqi military was a primary tool for
Saddam’s despotic rule.

At this juncture, the problem is that due to this close

relationship between the military and politics, Iraqi political life provided the military
officers with ample opportunity to intervene in the political process as several coups
903
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in Iraq’s history demonstrated (Hashim, 2003:31). Indeed, the Iraqi army had been a
destabilizing political force throughout most of Iraq’s history (Foote, Block, Crane
and Gray, 2004:55).

Therefore, Iraq demonstrates that it was very difficult to build

up a democratic state, without clear separation between the military and politics.

In

the new Iraq, its military becomes a de-politicized military force under civilian
control, which defends its territorial integrity and secures Iraqi civilians rather than
represses them, and no longer threatens Iraq’s neighbors. 905 Now, the Iraqi military is
not expected to intervene in the political process, which is one significant step toward
democracy (Hashim, 2003:43).

This indicates that the US-led coalition forces’

invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a right and necessary decision for Iraq’s democratic
development.
To sum up, when looking into Iraq’s past political aspects, we can see Iraq’s
distinguishing political facades, such as Sunni dominance, Saddam’s cruel
dictatorship based on torture and execution, the roles of the Baath Party, and the close
relationship between military and politics.

As a result, it was not strange that until

the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, there had emerged not even a single serious Iraqi
opposition leader ready to challenge Saddam’s dictatorship.

Also, Iraq’s political

facades can help understand why Iraq could not be democratic by itself.

However,

this could help justify the necessity of the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in
2003 as liberation of the Iraqi people from Saddam’s systemic repressive and
aggressive dictatorship, which will bring more benefits than losses, to Iraqis, the
region and international society as a whole in the long run.

In particular when

considering that today Iraq is on the right track toward democracy and it slowly
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See Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas
Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell (2008:36).
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becomes a stable, prosperous and democratic state, the US-led coalition forces’
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a right and necessary decision.

Furthermore, we can

even say that the regime change might be a strategic victory in the long run, as Iraq
becomes a showcase for democracy in the Middle East.

Recently all data concerning

the new Iraq, like fair elections, transparency, the rule of law, guarantee of minority
rights, gradually improved security, and steadily increased revenue, verify this, let
alone Iraq’s new direction toward democracy. 906
4.

Iraq’s economy and its path toward democracy
In the Middle East, in general, many states have been known to suffer from a

weak economy, along with other problems such as burgeoning populations, a
dysfunctional education system, illiteracy, political disaffection from the regimes,
aggression and so on (Buzan and Waever, 2003:203).907 In the past, Iraq could not be
exceptional when looking into an overall Iraqi economy, even if it enjoyed an
economic prosperity for a short period just before its war with Iran (1980-1988).
Such economic condition could not positively contribute to Iraq’s democratic
development.
In this section, I will examine how Iraq’s economy based mostly on oil could
have a negative impact on Iraq’s democracy, pointing out aggression, poverty,
illiteracy, and a weak middle class, which were derived from Iraq’s poor economy.
Ultimately, as Lipset put it, I will underscore the premise that there is a close
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relationship between economic factors and democratic development, which can help
understand why Iraq had not become a democratic state until Saddam’s fall in 2003. 908
Iraq’s economy was called ‘Arab Socialism,’ which can be depicted as “a
middle way between the Capitalist West and the Communist East, and as a modern
expression of traditional values.”909

Iraq’s economy has been based primarily on oil

– e.g. crude oil accounted for around 98 percent of Iraqi total exports in 1975 (Stork,
1981, 15).

Now that Iraq has had the world’s second largest oil reserve and it was

the fourth largest oil producer in the Arab/Persian Gulf, once Iraq’s economy seemed
to become thriving and enviable (Galvani, 1972:10).

As a matter of fact, just before

Iraq launched the war against Iran, Iraq’s economy looked promising.

At least, Iraq

was not poor at all, before it waged wars: the eight-year war with Iran (1980-1988)
and war with the US-led coalition forces (1991).

Indeed, even on July 16, 1979

when Saddam became president, Iraq did not have any serious economic problem
along with no long-term foreign debt, and Iraq had cash reserves of $36 billion
(Alexander and Rowat, 2003:33).

Importantly, this indicates that Iraq had some

possibility to become a democratic state, in particular when considering economic
prosperity as a significant element for democratic success, and when considering the
growth of the Iraqi middle class and the increase of the Iraqi literacy rate/education Iraqi educational standard had been ahead when compared with those of its
neighboring states in the Middle East - as vital conditions for democratic development,
which were derived from economic growth based on oil.

However, such hope was

completely ruined, as Iraq became engaged in a series of wars – e.g. 1980 and 1991.
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The Iraq-Iran war had a destabilizing and deteriorating effect on Iraq’s
national economy.

In other words, Iraq’s economic meltdown began with the onset

of its war with Iran in September 1980 (Foote, Block, Crane and Gray, 2004:49).
Within days of the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, both countries put each other’s oilexporting capabilities out of operation, including loading facilities, pumping states,
refineries, terminals and pipelines (Alnasrawi, 1986:873).

As a result, Iraqi oil

output declined, for instance, from 3.4 million barrels per day in August 1980 to
140,000 in October 1980 and to 0.9 MBD in 1981, which ultimately meant the
collapse of Iraq’s oil revenue from $ 26 billion in 1980 to $10 billion in 1981
(Alnasrawi, 1986:873, 2001:206).

And, between 1981 and 1985, oil revenues were a

mere $48.3 billion, but military expenditures were two and half times higher at $120
billion (Alexander and Rowat, 2003:33).

Indeed, military expenditure per capita

doubled from 30% of GDP in the period 1975-79 to 60% of GDP in the period 198086 (Alnasrawi, 1992:344).

And, as a result of the war, Iraq’s $35 billion of foreign

exchange reserves on the eve of the Iraq-Iran war were, by the first quarter of 1987,
transformed into accumulated debts of between $50 and $ 80 billion (Mofid,
1990:54).910 Eventually, as the Iran-Iraq war continued, the Iraqi economy could no
longer be shielded from the erosive effects of inflation nor could it shake off the
effects of the rise in import prices or the withdrawal of foreign labor from major
industrial sites (Alnasrawi, 1986:875).
Though there were some attempts to reverse the Iraqi deteriorating economic
trend, like ‘economic liberalization/privatization’ and ‘increase of oil price,’ the Iraqi
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Even now (July 2008), a new Iraq still has debt of $ 60 billion, although a new Iraq asks for a debt
relief since the debt belongs to Saddam’s regime.
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bad economy could not be recovered.911

Furthermore, after its failure to reverse the

economic deterioration: privatization/liberalization and high oil prices, 912 Iraq
suffered severely from its dire and exacerbated economic crisis, such as its
widespread unemployment and it reportedly reached 50 percent inflation (Lalor,
1991:11).

As a matter of fact, by 1990 the Iraqi economy reached a dead end from

which there was no prospect for recovery (Alnasrawi, 1992:344).

Iraq did not have

many options; it had almost no option, except for its invasion of Kuwait as a panacea
to its economic problem, or at least as a short-cut solution to its economic crisis and
the regime’s failure to improve living standards (Alnasrawi, 2001:208).

For

certainty, Iraq’s economic recovery and even its economic growth could have been
achieved if Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait was successful (Alnasrawi,
1992:344).
However, such expectation turned out to be simply an illusion.

By contrast,

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait plunged Iraq into deeper economic turmoil – i.e. the
Security Council’s series of tight sanctions and total destruction by the US-led
coalition forces (Alnasrawi, 1992:344).

For instance, the impacts of sanctions can

be summarized with the following:
the loss of more than two-thirds of the country’s GDP, the
persistence of exorbitant prices, collapse of private incomes,
soaring unemployment, large-scale depletion of personal
assets, massive school drop-out rates as children were
forced to beg or work to add to family income, and the
phenomenal rise in the number of skilled workers and
professionals leaving the country as economic refugees in
search of better economic condition (Alnasrawi, 2001:214).
911
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High oil price could not be materialized, since some oil producing countries like Kuwait did not
want to reduce their oil production in order to raise the price of oil.
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Also, the US–led coalition forces’ military attacks in January 1991 brought a complete
halt to Iraqi oil output as the tip of the iceberg (Foote, Block, Crane and Gray,
2004:49).

This seemed severe enough to Iraq when considering that the Iraqi

economy heavily depended on its oil sales.

And, the coalition forces bombed and

destroyed Iraq’s various assets, such as military bases, civilian infrastructure and
industrial structure, including power stations, transport, telecommunications networks,
fertilizer plants, oil facilities, iron and steel plants, factories, bridges, schools,
hospitals, storage facilities, industrial plants and civilian buildings, let alone between
50,000 and 120,000 Iraqi soldier deaths and between 5000-15,000 Iraqi civilian
deaths (Alnasrawi, 1992:345, 2001:209).

This vast scale of destruction relegated a

highly urbanized and mechanized Iraqi society to a pre-industrial age or 19th century
status (Alnasrawi, 2001:209).

As for Iraq, therefore, the Gulf War of 1991 was far

worse than the eight-year war with Iran. As a matter of fact, Iraq’s living standard
had descended to Sub-Saharan level (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:93).
situation, Iraq’s democracy could not be expected.

Under this

For instance, the middle class

itself in Iraq was ultimately wiped out by its devastating economy after sanctions and
a series of wars (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004:99).

And, Iraq’s literacy rate had

radically decreased due to economic hardship which stemmed from sanctions and
wars.

Indeed, due to Iraq’s dreadful economy, Iraqi children no longer had even

basic education.

Instead of education, many children had to become breadwinners

and even some children were forced into street crime, let alone child begging
(Halliday, 1999:32).

All of these made it difficult for Iraq to become democracy.

However, though sanctions and wars (Iraq-Iran war and Gulf War in 1991)
initially seemed to work, their impacts on Saddam’s regime itself had been gradually
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doubted. In other words, Saddam’s regime itself had been intact until the US and
UK invasion of Iraq in 2003, since the Iraqi regime managed to generate income
outside UN control in the form of hard currency or barter goods, and these illicit funds
were used for building new palaces, purchasing luxury goods, maintaining armed
forces, developing military equipment and so on. 913 Indeed, though the original
intention of the economic sanctions was to influence the leadership of Iraq, the result
was the dire situation from which the Iraqi civilians alone severely suffered – e.g. 1.5
million people died (Halliday, 1999:30).

This indicated that the regime change via

the use of force should be adopted as a right and necessary option.

In other words,

we have to consider the resort to force as a last resort and a suitable method to satisfy
the just cause, when economic sanctions did not serve the just cause and simply
proves disproportionately expensive (Bellamy, 2004:136).

And so, the use of force

to topple Saddam’s regime in 2003 was a necessary and right decision.
Since June 2003 when Saddam’s regime was overturned by the US-led
coalition forces, a new Iraq has attempted to rebuild its economic structure based on
strict free market principles (Medani, 2004:28-29).

But, under the US auspices,

Iraq’s current government does not appear to repeat its past failed economic
liberalization reforms which Saddam Hussein implemented in the late 1980s (Medani,
2004:33).914 Instead, Iraq’s transformation into an open capitalist market economy is
not only expected to bring about Iraq’s prosperity, but also to facilitate its
transformation into a liberal democratic beacon to steer the Arab world away from
913

See “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of The British Government.”
Available at the website:
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Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and authoritarianism (Medani, 2004:29).
Obviously, Iraq has become one of the leading candidates among the Arab countries
to develop its vibrant economy, which can accelerate Iraq’s democratizing process,
especially when considering that today, Iraq has a more and more skilled labor force,
talented technocrats and scientists as well as important manufacturing and agricultural
bases, not to mention vast oil wealth and gradually increased oil revenue – e.g. the
world’s second largest oil reserve and Iraq’s oil-fueled surplus for 2008 between $38
and $50 billion (Medani, 2004:30-31).915
5.

Iraq’s military power and its path toward democracy
The Iraqi army, which was originally created by Great Britain even before the

establishment of the Iraqi state, was not strong, since it was created to maintain
Britain’s rule within Iraq rather than to defend Iraq from external invasion (Chalabi,
1991:22-23). Indeed, the Iraqi army was too poor to even manage internal security
campaigns against recalcitrant Kurdish tribesmen in the north (Hashim, 2003:35).
This brought about Iraqi military officers’ disdain for the monarchy’s subordination to
the British, along with their contempt of the existence of political corruption and
cronyism (Hashim, 2003:33).
monarchy.

This in large part came to lead to the overthrow of the

Also, due to the same reason, when he came to power, Saddam sought

Iraq’s military transformation from an instrument of internal security into a modern
and well-armed force, which was critical to Saddam’s vision of a powerful Iraq
(Hashim, 2003:35).

Iraq had the aim of achieving, at least military parity with Israel

and strategic superiority over Iran, as a minimum so as to preclude any aggression
915

In fact, since 2003, Iraqi economy has been getting better and better. For example, Iraq's surplus for
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from any regional power (Chaudhry, 1991:18).

Therefore, Iraq started putting

massive resources into its military expenditures, and a major portion of Iraq’s income
was increasingly absorbed by military expenditure.

Iraqi military expenditures had

continuously increased without any interruption; for instance, from $800 million in
1972 to over $5 billion in 1979 and to around $12.5 billion in 1983 (Alnasrawi,
1986:882).

As a result, the size of Iraq’s armed forces grew considerably during the

eight-year war with Iran, from 242,000 in 1980 to around one million in 1988
(Hippler, 1991:28).

And so, Iraq came to have the fourth largest army in the world.

All in all, we can say that Iraq came to have the largest and the most experienced
army in the Middle East, and it even learned to use its chemical weapons during the
Iraq-Iran war (Mylroie, 1989:89).

Besides a conventional military force, Saddam’s

Iraq had continuously produced chemical and biological weapons, and it had
endlessly developed a nuclear program for a military purpose, nuclear bombs, not to
mention its pursuit of ballistic missiles, since Saddam believed that Iraq’s political
weight in the Middle East would fade away, if Iraq’s military strength rested only on
its conventional military forces.916 Thus, when considering all of these, in terms of
military strength, Iraq appeared to be a potential regional hegemonic power.
Iraq’s military strength had been getting strong enough to become a potential
regional hegemonic power in the Middle East. However, unfortunately, it alerted
many world leaders to the threat to peace and security in the region and whole
international society.

Nevertheless, there might have been no problem with Iraqi

possession of strong military strength or even WMDs, if Iraq was a decent democratic

916

See “Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the British Government.” Available
at the website:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/02/uk_dossier_on_iraq/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf pp.18.
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state as a full member of international society. 917 But, the problem with Iraq was that
it was domestically and internationally a very aggressive and despotic outlaw state –
e.g. its invasions of Iran and Kuwait and its severe violation of human rights such as
its use of chemical weapons against Kurds as well as Iranians, let alone deportation,
torture, execution and rape.

This regime could not be accepted or included in

international society, and needed to be changed even by the use of force by Great
Powers as necessary, which can be seen in a liberal anti-pluralist international society.
All in all, Saddam’s Iraq had to be disarmed and its character had to be altered from a
repressive and aggressive outlaw state to a decent and democratic state as a full
member of international society.

Due to this, Iraq had faced around sixteen UN

sanctions and two Gulf Wars (1991 and 2003).
The 1991 Gulf war could be recognized as a turning point for the Iraqi military
strength because in a broad sense, Iraq’s military strength had been steadily declining
since the beginning of the fighting in the Gulf War in 1991, in particular when
considering that its strength had been abated by military defeat, by the impact of UN
inspections, by underfunding and by a decade in the absence of important arms
imports (Cordesman, 2001:2).

However, it was not enough.

Despite the 1991 Gulf

war and sanctions that led to massive destruction – e.g. loss of 60% of Iraqi major
combat equipment via the war (Cordesman 2001:3) and more than one and a half
million casualties via sanctions - Saddam’s regime was still intact, which brought
about some criticism against George H. W. Bush’s policy to reject any occupation of
Iraq for regime change.

More accurately, until March 2003 when the US-led

917

We know that North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons reveals a fundamentally different
milieu from Canada’s or Japan’s possession of nuclear weapons. One is a despotic and repressive
outlaw state. The other is a decent democratic full member of international society.
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coalition forces invaded Iraq to eventually topple Saddam’s regime, Iraq still had the
most powerful conventional forces in the Gulf region, along with Iraq’s strong elite
Republican Guard and its possession of some unconventional weapons (Cordesman,
2001:2).

Thus, Iraq’s military strength was still pretty lethal, when considering that

even after the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq had the largest military power in the Gulf in terms
of sheer numbers, and when considering that Iran had only around half the size of
Iraq’s major equipment strength, the Saudi army and air force capabilities had
declined since 1995 due to mismanagement and underfunding, and Kuwait had a
limited military strength of about 15,000 men (Cordesman, 2001:5).

All in all, this

indicates that without the US and Britain, Iraq could still militarily dominate the Gulf,
let alone its posing a great threat to the regional security (Cordesman, 2001:5).
All in all, when considering the above circumstances, we can reach one option,
which is the necessity of the use of force so as to stop Saddam’s regime’s pursuit of
WMDs and a missile program, and in the end, so as to change the regime from an
aggressive outlaw state to a decent democratic state as a full member of international
society.

As former US President George W Bush put it, we can say that the decision

of the 2003 Gulf War to change Saddam’s regime was a right and necessary thing to
do, since Saddam’s Iraq could not be changed without it.

Indeed, it was almost

impossible to expect Saddam’s Iraq to voluntarily adopt democracy without the USled coalition forces’ invasion of Saddam’s Iraq.

In 2003, a new Iraq was eventually

put on a path toward a prosperous and stable democratic country by the US-led
coalition forces.

Now, its democratic future seems pretty rosy.

Nonetheless, I have

to admit that Iraq still has some problems concerning security, especially when
considering that Iraqi people are often killed by car bombs.

More outstandingly, as

one slice of a whole democratic picture, new Iraqi security forces have a new identity
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and character to serve and secure Iraqi citizens rather than to repress them as a simple
tool for cruel dictatorship, and they are no longer engaged in politics, which can be
normally seen in decent and prosperous democratic states.
sign for Iraq’s democracy.

This is clearly a positive

In fact, we can say that Iraq is on the right track toward a

prosperous and stable democracy. 918
6. Iraq’s foreign policy and its path toward democracy
Iraq shares frontiers with six countries, making for thousands of miles of land
borders, while being bounded by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria
and the Persian Gulf. 919

Iraq had competed with its rivals like Iran for a hegemonic

position in the region.

As a matter of fact, on and off, Iraq appeared to take

leadership in the Arab world, claiming pan-Arabism as well as anti-imperialism.
Nevertheless, amid Iraqi pursuit of hegemonic power in the region, Iraq often seemed

918

During Saddam’s rule, Iraqi army was used as a simple tool for Saddam’s brutal dictatorship. Due
to this, it was disbanded and dissolved in May 2003. Nonetheless, some people argued that
disbanding the former army was a controversial and ill-advised Coalition Provisional Authority’s(CPA)
decision – e.g. disbanding military might lead to increasing unemployment, growing insurgency,
nationalism, humiliated pride, nostalgia and attack on Iraqi identity, and later, some veterans of Saddam
Hussein’s military are put into a new Iraqi army. For instance, in August, 2008, about 80 percent of
the Iraqi army’s officers and 50 percent of its rank and file are veterans of Saddam Hussein’s military.
But more important, a new Iraqi army was created with its different identity and character from its past
ones. Unlike its past identity as a tool of oppression and aggression, the new Iraqi army is primarily
to serve Iraqi civilians via securing them from internal and external threat. Also, we can think of Iraqi
new Defense Ministry which advocates the change in identity and character. A new Defense Ministry
is civilian controlled, transparent, professional, merit-based, and broadly representative of the Iraqi
people. Moreover, there is a balanced ethnic, religious, and regional makeup in Iraqi army rather than
greatly favored Arab Sunni’s dominance: for example, 60 percent were Shi’ites, 25 percent Sunnis, 10
percent Kurds, and 5 percent from other minority groups. Also, according to polling conducted by the
U.S.-led coalition, the percentage of Iraqis who did not believe that the Iraqi army was sectarian has
gradually increased, for example, from 30 percent in June 2007 to 54 percent in June 2008. Now, Iraqi
security forces have some 566,000 personnel (May 2008), and they are expected to be strong enough
soon to defend Iraq from internal and external threat, which was confirmed by their successful military
operations in Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Sadr City, Amarah and so on (2008). See “US to end Iraq
combat next year” Aljazeera, July 10, 2008. Also, see Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O’Hanlon, and
Kenneth M. Pollack (2008). Moreover, see Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R.
Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell (2008:138-142).
919

See Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker, Keith Crane, Richard R. Brennan, Jr., Heather S. Gregg, Thomas
Sullivan, and Andrew Rathmell (2008: 135).
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to put the region into conflict rather than to keep away from aggression, like Iraq’s
invasion of Iran (1980) and of Kuwait (1990). This proclivity had not changed until
2003 when Saddam’s regime was overthrown by the US-led coalition forces, and we
can verify it in Iraq’s past foreign policy.

In the past, Iraq’s foreign policy was

embedded in anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and a quest for hegemony, which were
closely related to a repressive, aggressive, despotic outlaw state, but which were far
away from human rights and democracy.
Let us start examining Iraq’s anti-imperialism as one of the primary aspects for
Iraq’s foreign policy.

As mentioned earlier, Iraq experienced several foreign

occupations as well as foreign interventions, let alone foreign influence.

This led to

Iraq’s anti-imperialism, not to mention dislike and suspicion of foreign interference
and so Iraq became hostile to the West, in particular Britain and the US (Mylroie,
1989:89).920 For instance, Qasim withdrew Iraq from the pro-Western Baghdad Pact,
while abolishing Iraq’s various treaties with Britain, and also he withdrew Iraq from
an agreement with the US, regarding military hardware (Abdi, 2008:12).

Also,

Qasim signed economic and military aid agreements with the Soviet Union as a
counter force against the Western influence (Galvani, 1972:8).

Moreover, thanks to

the Baath’s anti-imperialist posture, Iraq supported the People’s Democratic Republic
of Yemen (socialist country) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (a
Marxist and Arab nationalist revolutionary organization) and the Arab Gulf PFLAG as
anti-imperialist forces (Galvani, 1972:19).

However, as Iraq’s foreign policy based

on anti-imperialism, its proclivity toward Marxist and socialist countries against the
West did not help facilitate Iraq’s democratic development.
920

Also, today, Iraq’s anti-

As a matter of fact, I have to mention that once the relationship between Iraq and West was briefly
good, in particular during the Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988).
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imperialism can be interpreted as xenophobia.

Such xenophobia is expected to be

rectified, as a new Iraq gradually becomes a stable, mature, prosperous democratic
state in the long run.
Second, as Iraq’s distinguishing aspect of foreign policy, pan-Arabism is worth
examining.

Pan-Arabism can be depicted as Arab cultural unity and political

solidarity, while positing the existence of one Arab nation and calling for the unity of
all Arabs. 921 However, due to this feature, the voices of dissent from minorities
became silent, which reveals an anti-democratic trend (Abdi, 2008:6).

Indeed,

within Iraq, pan-Arabism indicated a conflicting division rather than a harmonious
unity, in particular when considering that Iraq itself has been recognized as a multiethnic nation, and that most of Shias and Kurds have been averse to pan-Arabism. 922
Also, in Iraq, pan-Arabism had been used to justify Iraqi Sunni’s dominance, though it
has alienated Shias and Kurds, as Sunnis searched to transcend their minority
situation in Iraq by relying on the rest of the Arab world, which happened to be
mostly Sunnis (Abdi, 2008:10, Luizard and Stork, 1995:19).
that pan-Arabism was a barrier to Iraq’s democratization.

This clearly indicates
Also, pan-Arabism can

facilitate unlimited aggression, when considering that Israel’s total destruction has
been a key goal of pan-Arabism. 923 Indeed, Iraq’s amicable and hostile relations with
other states, including wars with non-Arab states such as Iran and Israel, were often
attributed to pan-Arabism.

Saddam adopted pan-Arabism for the Iran-Iraq war.

Saddam Hussein aggravated pan-Arab nationalism, with portraying the Iraq-Iran war

921

See “Pan-Arabism – Bibliography.” Available at the website:
http://science,jrank.org/pages/7944/Pan-Arabism.html
922

See, for more information, Amir Taheri (2003).

923

See, for more information, Charles Paul Freund (2003) and Amir Taheri (2003).
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as a sacred Arab cause, ‘Saddam’s Qadissiyat,’ referring to the 7 th century Arab
victory over the Persian Sassanian empire (Parasiliti, 2003:158).

Also, pan-Arabism

empowered Saddam’s megalomaniacal orientation, in particular when considering
that pan-Arabism itself tended to legitimize the notion of a single great Arab leader,
speaking for and acting on behalf of all Arabs. 924 In short, as Nasser’s pan-Arabism in
Egypt demonstrated, pan-Arabism ultimately facilitated Saddam’s unrestrained
ambition and aggression, let alone tyranny. 925 All in all, the fall of Saddam and his
Baath regime in 2003 means not only the end of a grim era (the Republic of Fear) but
also liberalism’s gradual arriving which can assist Iraq’s democracy (Abdi, 2008:4). 926
In other words, the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime is not only a strategic defeat
for pan-Arabism, but also a starting point of Iraq’s young democracy. 927
Third, Iraq’s quest for hegemony could be seen as a primary aspect of Iraq’s
foreign policy, which was very conspicuous, in particular during Saddam’s regime.
As a matter of fact, Iraq’s quest for hegemony reflected Saddam’s character and
ambition, along with his unconstrained aggression, in particular when considering
Iraq’s totalitarian system in which the leader (Saddam) himself became the
embodiment of the party, the ideology and the country (Abdi, 2008:22-23).928 The
prime objective of Saddam’s Iraq was to get rid of major rivals in the Middle East,
bringing all Arab states into its stance.

924

Therefore, Saddam’s Iraq tried to grasp its

See Charles Paul Freund (2003).

925

Ibid. Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir (Nasser) of Egypt not only led Egypt to catastrophe in his delusional
1967 war against Israel, but took the whole Arab world with him.
926

Also see Charles Paul Freund (2003).

927

See Amir Taheri (2003).

928

For example, in Iraq, Saddam’s image adorned every house, office, shop, street, and square.
school textbooks, bank notes, stamps, and T-shirts carried Saddam’s image.
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Also

hegemony by bringing the states of the Middle East under its sphere of influence or its
umbrella (Mylroie, 1989:89).

Nonetheless, Iraq’s quest for hegemony under

Saddam’s rule was more likely to bring about tensions and even wars than stability
and peace in the Middle East.
Let us examine the mutual positive relationship between Saddam’s character,
ambition and unconstrained aggression, and Iraq’s pursuit of hegemony.

Looking

into Iraq’s pursuit of a hegemonic power in the region (and possibly international
society), we can easily find that such Iraq’s policy was deeply embedded in Saddam’s
strong paranoid orientation, his blind ambition, and his unconstrained aggression.
For instance, Iraq’s hostility against Iran, Israel and the US could be seen as coming
from Saddam’s belief in a conspiracy of Iran, Israel and the US to eliminate him
(Ghadban, 1992:784).

Without any specific reason, Saddam often felt that he was

surrounded by his enemies, and so he was always ready for retaliation, adopting
unlimited aggression (Post, 1991:285).

When considering Saddam’s paranoid

orientation, we cannot say that it had nothing to do with Iraq’s invasion of Iran.
Also, Saddam’s blind ambition was closely related with Iraq’s pursuit of
regional hegemonic power (maybe further a hegemonic power in international society
as a whole), along with his willingness to use whatever weapons were necessary and
available, including weapons of mass destruction.

For example, Saddam Hussein’s

decision to invade Iran, in the consensus view, was the outcome of his ambition to
play a preeminent role in Gulf security by taking out the revolutionary government in
Iran, in the process securing and legitimizing his own rule in Iraq (Parasiliti,
2003:152).

Indeed, as for Saddam, the Iraq-Iran war could be used to solidify his

base and enhance his legitimacy, and it was also regarded as the ladder to raise him to
leadership in the Arab world (Farouk-Sluglett, Sluglett and Stork: 1984:30).
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In

addition, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait can explain the close relationship between
Saddam’s blind ambition and Iraq’s pursuit of regional hegemony.

Kuwait appeared

to be a forward step in Saddam’s ambitions for Iraq’s regional hegemony (Parasiliti,
2003:152).

More precisely, Iraq’s possession of tiny Kuwait could have healed

Saddam’s declining Iraq and served Saddam’s ambition for Iraq’s greater role in the
Gulf and Arab political affairs with Kuwait’s money and oil (Parasiliti, 2003: 160).
Furthermore, because of Saddam Hussein’s blind desire for Iraq’s regional hegemonic
power, if Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait had not been challenged, Saddam would not
only have controlled the huge oil reserves of Iraq and Kuwait, but also he would have
used military force again to invade Iraq’s neighboring chief rival, Saudi Arabia that
has the large oil reserves. 929
Saddam’s strong paranoid orientation and endless blind ambition along with
his unlimited aggression were dangers to Iraq’s civilians, to the region and to
international society as a whole.

In fact, this proved how threatening Saddam’s Iraq

would have been to the region and further international society as a whole, in
particular if Saddam possessed nuclear weapons.

Moreover, this ultimately

demonstrated why Iraq’s regime change in 2003 was the most appropriate option to
avoid the repetition of ‘the destruction of civilization’ which Nazi Germany
committed more than a half century ago.

Saddam’s Iraq as ‘rogue state,’ ‘state of

concern’ (Madeleine Albright), ‘axis of evil’ (George W. Bush), or ‘an outlaw state’
could not be changed, unless Saddam would step down forsaking the succession of
power to his sons.

Nevertheless, more terrible, barring the regime change by the

external forces, there was almost no possibility for the Iraqi oppositions to overthrow
929

See “Using Our Power to Secure the Peace.” Available at the website:
http://cdd.stanford.edu/docs/2003/btp2003-nic1.pdf
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Saddam via their revolt, or via massive civil protests for democracy like those seen in
South Korea in 1987.

All in all, the US and UK’s invasion of Saddam’s Iraq and

their imposition of democracy in Iraq were necessary and right things to do for longterm peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East.
To sum up, in the past, Iraq’s foreign policy had been deeply embedded in
anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and regional hegemony.

However, those facades in

foreign policy had hardly been helpful in Iraq’s democratic promotion, in particular
when considering that they simply reflected xenophobic, anti-liberal, anti-democratic,
and unconstrained aggressive trends.

In Iraq, those could not be expected to be

altered, at least unless Iraq’s regime had been radically changed toward democracy.
Therefore, along with the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, Iraq has been given a new
identity and a new character which necessitate new facades of foreign policy.

As

Iraq becomes a stable, prosperous and democratic state, the new character of foreign
policy is most likely not only to comply with human rights and democracy as
universal norms of international society, but also to even promote those norms in the
Middle East in the long run.

This is flatly expected to bring about peace and

prosperity in the Middle East, rather than to pose great threat to the region.
Conclusion
Like external variables, internal variables – history, culture, politics, economy,
military and foreign policy - cannot be disregarded in the promotion and consolidation
of democracy.

We should recognize that along with external variables, internal

variables can influence paths toward democracy.

In this appendix, I attempted to

demonstrate how internal variables can have an impact on paths toward democracy.
I tried to show that each country’s internal variables, along with external variables,
can lead to relatively different paths toward democracy.
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Three cases, China, South

Korea and Iraq can help us understand that relatively different internal variables bring
about relatively different paths toward democracy – i.e. China (interest-oriented
socialization), South Korea (legitimacy) and Iraq (external force).

In China’s history,

China’s humiliating experiences and its brief period of democratic experience can
influence China’s path toward democracy.

For instance, nationalism derived from its

past humiliating experience can lead China toward democracy, as Chinese
increasingly believe that democracy can make China a strong nation and a Great
Power, though as for Chinese, democracy is an instrumental tool in order to elevate
China into the category of Great Powers (He 2000: 92 and Zhao 2000:46-47).

In

terms of Chinese culture, we can see the compatibility between Confucianism and
democracy, in particular when considering that some aspects of Confucianism are
democratic norms and values, such as pluralistic life, moral equality and human
dignity.

With regard to Chinese politics, we can find the fact that China’s eight

democratic political parties and its intra-party democracy have contributed to China’s
democratization, even indirectly preventing the CCP’s dictatorship in the policymaking process.

However, we can see that China’s democratization has to be slowly

evolutionary rather than radically revolutionary.

Regarding China’s economy, we

can find that China’s economic growth based on its embracing the market economy
can extend its political freedom, because democratic political institutions alone can
ultimately satisfy the condition of economic growth on account of capitalist market
economy.

In the military arena, China’s military power is strong enough to evade

any Great Power’s military attempt to change China toward democracy, although it
cannot pose any threat against entire international society and it cannot even directly
confront a Great Power, the U.S.

This ascertains that China’s democratization can be

materialized by interests on account of rational calculation and interest-oriented
610

socialization rather than the use of force.

In terms of China’s foreign policy, I

emphasized the fact that China’s foreign policy has been gradually pragmatic rather
than ideological.

Due to this, China is highly likely to adjust itself to norms of

international society.
With respect to South Korea’s history, I showed that South Korea’s traditional
strategic location in Northeast Asia, habitual influences of big powers, and saddae
chuii (reliance on a big power) could ultimately put South Korea on a road toward
democracy.

In South Korea’s culture, I made it clear that Christianity has greatly

contributed to South Korea’s promotion and consolidation of democracy.

Also, I

tried to make it known that the fusion among different religions, Christianity,
Buddhism, Shamanism and Confucianism have been more likely to lead South Korea
toward democracy, and that under diverse religions, South Korea’s mature democracy
demonstrates that cultural factors are not the fundamental barriers to the promotion
and consolidation of democracy, even though each culture might have a relatively
different impact on South Korea’s path toward democracy.

As to South Korea’s

politics, I underscored the fact that South Korean civilians have been deeply
embedded in common values, human rights and democracy, and their democratic
movement led to the surrender of authoritarian regimes in South Korea in the end.
In regard to South Korea’s economy, I exposed a close co-relationship between
economic and democratic development, emphasizing that strong middle class and
high education as well as high living standard, which was derived from economic
development, had directly or indirectly goaded South Korea toward a mature
democracy.

Also, I showed that since 1998, South Korea’s economic reforms have

brought about economic democracy, which has underpinned South Korea’s
consolidation of democracy.

In terms of South Korea’s military power, I accentuated
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the idea that order and security are the necessary elements for democratic
development, since justice cannot be obtained unless order and security are
guaranteed.

In other words, South Korea’s military superiority over North Korea’s

military strength has guaranteed positive surroundings for South Korea’s democratic
development.

Regarding South Korea’s foreign policy, I attempted to put emphasis

on the fact that in the late Cold War era and post-Cold War era, South Korea’s foreign
policy has reduced anti-communist sentiments among its citizens through various
procedures such as Roh Tae Woo’s ‘Northern’ policy, Kim Dae Jung’s ‘Sunshine’
policy, and Roh Moo Hyun’s ‘Peace and Prosperity’ policy, which could, in due
course, bring about a more open and more democratic environment in South Korea.
Also, in the post-Cold War era, human rights and democracy themselves have become
the goals of South Korea’s foreign policy, and South Korea become an ardent
supporter of spreading human rights and democracy in international society.
As to Iraq’s history, I attempted to reveal Iraq’s cycle of dictatorship, ill-liberal
foreign occupation and rebellion/coups as a barrier to Iraq’s democratic development,
which can help justify the use of force by the US-led coalition forces in 2003 so as to
initiate a new cycle of cooperation, democracy, peace and prosperity in Iraq.

With

respect to Iraq’s culture, I demonstrated that Islamic culture can be compatible with
democracy, which rejects the wrong assumption that Iraq cannot be democratic due to
its Islamic culture.

Regarding Iraq’s politics, I argued that Sunni’s dominance,

Saddam’s dictatorship, Baath Party’s role and close relationship between military and
politics were obstacles to Iraq’s democratic development, and that those factors can
help to justify the US-led coalition forces’ invasion of Iraq in 2003 as a necessary and
right decision, which led to a radical change in Iraqi political system.

In terms of

Iraq’s economy, I revealed that Iraq’s economic failure via sanctions and wars brought
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about anti-democratic environment, such as poor education, high illiteracy rate and
the absence of middle class.

With regard to Iraq’s military, I emphasized the fact

that Saddam’s strong military power could not help Iraq’s democratic development as
long as Saddam’s Iraq was an outlaw state which posed an existential threat to its
region and international society.

In Iraq’s foreign policy, I demonstrated that Iraq’s

foreign policy based on anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism and regional hegemony was
not compatible with Iraq’s democratic development.

To sum up, due to each

country’s relatively different internal variables, each country has a relatively different
path toward democracy – e.g. China (interest), South Korea (legitimacy), and Iraq
(force).
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